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FOREWORD
Benchmarking of key infrastructure industries such as telecommunications
services, where government has played an important role, provides essential
information by which to judge whether services central to the well-being of
Australians are being supplied at internationally competitive prices.
This benchmarking study is part of a continuing program of research into the
performance of economic infrastructure industries, which was commenced by
the Bureau of Industry Economics. It is the third Telecommunications Services
report in the cycle.
The study builds on the two previous studies, by benchmarking residential as
well as business telecommunications prices and expanding on the number of
services considered. To do this, the Commission further developed the price
comparison methodology. Regulatory arrangements were also examined for the
first time, to help in the interpretation of price differences between Australia and
other countries.
The study was undertaken within the Economic Infrastructure Branch of the
Commission. An officer of the Communications Research Unit (formerly part of
the Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics) was seconded to
assist with the price comparisons.
The study could not have been completed without the active co-operation of
many participants in the sector, who either assisted the Commission directly or
provided information to its consultant, Eurodata. We are grateful to all those
who took part.
The Commission welcomes further feedback on this report, consistent with its
objective to improve the information base on key issues affecting Australia’s
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GLOSSARY
Access line Connection from the customer to the local telephone
exchange for access to the telephone network. Also
the connection between the serving toll center and
the serving office of the inter-exchange carrier used




A technology for supporting high bandwidth
(6 Mbps) over conventional telephone lines allowing
subscribers to access multimedia-based applications
such as video on demand.
Advanced Mobile
Phone System
The analogue cellular mobile phone system in
Australia and more than 35 other countries. AMPS
cellular systems operate in the 800 to 900  MHz
band, compared to 1.8 to 1.9  GHz for the digital
GMS systems.
Analogue A signal for which the amplitude (strength) and




A network has this feature when subscribers to one
network are able to call and receive calls from
subscribers to an alternative network.
Asynchronous
Transfer Mode
An international packet switching standard using a
cell based approach, in which each packet of
information features a uniform size of 53 bytes.
Backbone A central network that connects several other,
usually lower bandwidth networks. The backbone
network is usually composed of a high capacity
communications medium, such as fibre optic or
coaxial cable.
Bandwidth The range of frequencies, expressed in Hertz (Hz),
that can pass over a given transmission channel. The
bandwidth determines the rate at which information
can be transmitted through a circuit. The greater the
bandwidth, the more information that can be sentINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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through the circuit in a given amount of time.
Basic  services Services that provide the minimum carriage
switching and routing functions necessary to




An emerging telecommunications technology that
will provide integrated voice, data, and video
services at speeds of 155 Mbps and above.
Bits  per  second Basic unit of measurement for serial data
transmission capacity.




The access network connecting customers to the
local switch. In Australia, the CAN essentially
comprises a fixed network of copper wire pairs.
Carriage service
provider
A business that uses network facilities to provide
basic or value-added communication services.




A digital cellular phone technology that operates in
the 1.9 GHz (digital GSM) and 800 MHz (analogue
AMPS) bands. CDMA uses a spread spectrum
technique that codes each digital packet and allows
multiple calls to be placed on one channel, boosting
caller capacity 20 to 35 times that of the analogue
network. CDMA phones are noted for their call
quality and long battery life.
Cellular A communication service in which voice or data is
transmitted by radio frequencies. The service area is
divided into cells each served by a transmitter. The
cells are connected to a mobile switching exchange
which is connected to the worldwide telephone
network.
Centrex  services PBX services provided by a switched service
provider. Switching is done in the local exchange.
Some services switch at the customer’s site, others
control it in the local exchange.  GLOSSARY
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Channel In data communications, a path along which signals
can be sent between two or more points.
Committed
Information Rate
The amount of bandwidth that a user can expect
from a frame relay carrier on a particular virtual
circuit.
Circuit  switching Temporary direct connection of two or more
channels between two or more points in order to
provide the user with exclusive use of an open
channel with which to exchange information. A
discrete circuit path is set up between the incoming
and outgoing lines, in contrast to message switching




Terminal equipment on the customers premises




Charge to retail customers for access to the PSTN.
DATEL Analogue data transmission services offered over the
PSTN.
Digital Data Service A digital transmission service supporting speeds up
to 56 Kbps.
Digital Communications procedures, techniques and
equipment that encode information as either binary
‘1’ or ‘0’; the representation of information in




The asynchronous exchange from computer to
computer of inter-company business documents
(such as purchase orders, bills of lading, and
invoices) and information. EDI can be accomplished
through OSI standards or through proprietary
products.
Enterprise  network A network that connects every computer in every
location of a company and runs the company's
mission critical applications.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Frame  relay A high-speed (up to 45 Mbps) packet switching
protocol used in wide area data networks.
Frequency An expression of how frequently a periodic
(repetitious) wave form or signal regenerates itself at
a given amplitude.
Gateway A device or program that connects two networks that
use different protocols and translates between these
protocols, allowing devices on the two networks to
communicate with each other.
Global Information
Infrastructure
A term used to describe a vision of individual
national information infrastructures joined together
to form an international network.
Group Speciale
Mobile
A digital cellular phone technology based on TDMA
that operate in the 1.8 to 1.9 GHz band, compared to
800 to 900 MHz for the analogue AMPS systems.
International Direct
Dialling
Cooperative service enabling subscribers to place
international calls without operator assistance.
Intelsat International Telecommunications Satellite
Consortium, formed in 1964 for the purpose of
creating a worldwide communications satellite
system.
Interconnection The inter-working of two separate networks.
Interconnection is used in reference to both the
technical interface and to the commercial
arrangements between the two network operators
providing service.
Internet Physically, a collection of packet switching networks
interconnected by routers along with protocols that




A communication standard enabling a variety of
mixed digital transmission services to interconnect.
ISDN is part of the physical layer of the OSI
reference model. A 144 Kbps basic rate is defined in
ITU-T 1.430, and a primary rate (1.544 Mbps)





Telecommunications agency of the United Nations,
established to provide standardised communications
procedures and practices including frequency
allocation and radio regulations on a worldwide
basis. Parent of the ITU-T (telecommunications),
ITU-R (radio), and ITU-D (developing nations)
committees.
Local  Area  Network A system for linking terminals, programs, storage
and graphic devices at multiple workstations over
relatively small geographic areas.
Leased line A communication channel contracted for exclusive




Interconnection is provided for downstream of the
tandem switch or local exchange.
Local switch Switching center in which subscribers’ lines
terminate.
Multiplexing The process of interleaving or simultaneously
transmitting two or more messages on a single channel
using a device called a multiplexor or MUX.
Non-switched  line In data communication, a permanent connection
between computers or devices that does not have to
be established by dialling. Contrast with switched
line.
Overlay  network A high performance digital network which
interconnects with the main public network but




Private automatic telephone exchange that provides
for the transmission of calls internally, and to and
from the public telephone network.
Packet switched
network
A network consisting of a series of interconnected
switches that route individual packets of data over
one of several redundant routes. Most commonly,
packet switched networks refer to X25.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Packet  switching A method of transmitting messages through a
communication network, in which long messages are
subdivided into short packets. Each packet contains
the data and a destination address and is passed from
source to destination through intermediate nodes. At
each node, the packet is received, stored briefly, and
then passed on to the next node. The packets are then





Refers to a variety of personal wireless




A defined path that provides essentially a dedicated
private line between users in a packet switching
network.
Private network A network based on leased lines or other facilities
which are used to provide telecommunications
services, within an organisation or within a closed




The PSTN provides the basic infrastructure for
telecommunications services (including telephones,
switches, local and trunk lines, and exchanges).
PSTN network
hierarchy
The network hierarchy describes the linkages
between switches in the PSTN that determine the
strategy for routing individual calls.
Resale service
provider
A business that redistributes the services of a
common carrier and retails the services to the public.
Reseller A business that purchases carriage services from
another operator and sells them to retail customers.
Synchronous Digital
Hierarchy
An ITU-T standard for digital broadband
communications.
Smart card An insertable credit card sized device with imbedded
processors that can be programmed to decrypt
messages, verify messages and digital signatures and
create digital signatures for outgoing messages.  GLOSSARY
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Switched  line A temporary connection between computers or
devices.
Switching The process of interconnecting circuits.
Telephony Generic term describing voice telecommunications.
Traffic Messages sent and received over a communications
channel. Also, a quantitative measurement of the
total messages and their length, expressed in
hundred call seconds or other units.
Transmission Sending information in the form of electrical signals
over electric wires, waveguides, or radio.
Value-Added
Services
Services provided over a public or private network
which, in some way, add value to the basic carriage
services, usually through the applications of
computerised intelligence. This includes services
which provide enhanced network features such as
store and forward message switching, terminal
interfacing and host interfacing.
Virtual Private
Network
A software defined network offered by telephone
carriers for voice and data communications among
multiple sites. The network provides the appearance
of a private network, except that it makes use of the
public switched network rather than physically
dedicated leased lines.
Wide Area Network A group of computer networks connected over long
distances, often by telephone lines and satellite
transmission.
X25 An ITU-T standard that defines the interface
between equipment operating in the packet mode on
public data networks. It defines the interface for the
packet mode.
X75 The ITU-T gateway standard which defines the
interconnection of two or more X25 packet switched
data networks.xxiii
OVERVIEW
This study compares the performance of the Australian telecommunications
services industry with those in other countries. It is the latest in a series of
international benchmarking studies conducted by the Commission. As with
previous studies, it contains a variety of findings about Australia’s relative
performance (see Box 1), but has no policy recommendations.
Box 1 Key messages
·  Australia’s residential and business telecommunications prices rank about average
among the countries benchmarked.
·  However, prices in the best performing countries are 20 to 40  per  cent below
Australian prices on a purchasing power parity basis in most major market
segments.
·  The results are not sensitive to changes in assumptions about usage.
·  Further, the price performance gap is too great to be explained by factors outside
the control of industry participants, such as technological change, input prices,
taxes and geography.
·  An overall assessment of the evidence points to government involvement and
intervention having a major influence on prices across the countries benchmarked.
·  There are few quality of service indicators to make international comparisons.
·  There is some evidence of scope for further productivity improvement and
consequential lower prices in Australia.
·  The potential benefits to consumers of even modest price reductions would be
large.
  Approach
·  Australia is benchmarked against Canada, Finland, France, Japan, New
Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States
- these countries have a reputation for best practice in the industry and
have economic environments broadly comparable to Australia
- ownership in these countries varies from fully public to private
- and they cover a wide range of regulatory and institutional environments.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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·  For the first time, an extensive range of voice and data communications
services sold by the major incumbent carrier(s) in each country were
examined over a wide range of products and business sizes
- including PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network) customer access
and telephone calls, fax and calls to mobile phones and Internet Service
Providers
- as well as ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network), leased lines,
frame relay and ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode) services
- however, the provision of customer premises equipment (telephones,
computer hardware and software) was not benchmarked.
·  Industry performance was measured in terms of outcomes for consumers of
telecommunications services
- in particular the price and quality of services.
·  The Commission did not benchmark charges for service provider access to
essential infrastructure services because of the focus on the final consumer
- however, consideration was given to their impact on consumer prices.
·  The productivity of the industry within each country was not investigated in
depth
- because of the difficulty in making comparisons among a small number
of multi-product, vertically-integrated businesses with a degree of market
power
- in any case, prices are most relevant to consumers, and they can reflect
both productivity and the effectiveness of government regulation, as well
as other factors.
·  The reasons for international differences in prices have been considered
- with the objective of assessing the impact of exogenous cost differences,
internal factors and the institutional and regulatory environment on
prices, as well as measurement error.
·  The Eurodata Foundation was engaged to collect and analyse information on
telecommunications prices
- Eurodata has worked with the OECD to develop standard ‘baskets’ of
residential and small business services to weight telecommunications
prices into a single index.OVERVIEW
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·  A workshop was held in December 1998 to provide a range of interested
groups and individuals with the opportunity to comment on the preliminary
benchmarking results and their interpretation.
·  Telstra and Telecom Corporation of New Zealand accepted a general
invitation issued at the workshop to make submissions and to examine the
pricing model developed by Eurodata on behalf of the Commission
- these submissions are posted on the Commission’s Internet site
- and the matters arising out of the model review are discussed in
Chapter 5.
·  Telstra furnished details of Australian demand patterns, so that the
sensitivity of benchmarked prices to demand assumptions could be assessed
by replacing the neutral ‘standard’ basket used to compare prices for the
study with one that represented Australian consumption.
  Telecommunications in Australia
·  Telecommunications services, currently valued at about $20 billion are
playing an increasingly important role in product and service industries for
accessing, processing and disseminating information
- about 70 per cent of the Australian communication industry’s output, of
which telecommunications services is a large part, was used as an
intermediate input in 1993–94 (the latest year for which data are
available)
- the majority of this input to other industries (59 per cent) was consumed
by the services sector, which is currently the fastest growing sector in the
economy (see Figure 1).
·  Overall, communications services accounted for about 3.5 per cent of total
intermediate expenditure by Australian industry, and 5.3  per cent of
expenditure by the services sector (see Figure 2).
·  Telecommunications services also make a growing and significant
contribution to economic activity in their own right
- between 1994 and 1996, global telecommunications services revenue
expanded from $374 billion to more than $489 billion
- and is estimated to have reached $1105 billion by 1998.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Communications services used in the production
of other goods and services by Australian firms
(68.2%)
Communications services output
used for final consumption
(31.8%)
Note: Communications services includes ANZSIC classification 711 Postal and Courier Services, and
ANZSIC 712 Telecommunications Services.
1993–94 is latest available data.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on ABS (1997a).
 
Figure 2 Communications services expenditure as a proportion of




















































































Intermediate consumption Final consumption All ab c
Note: Communications services includes ANZSIC classification 711 Postal and Courier Services, and
ANZSIC 712 Telecommunications Services.
a Communications services expenditure as a proportion of total expenditure on goods and services
used in the production of final goods and services produced by Australian firms.
b Communications services expenditure as a proportion of total final goods and services
expenditure.
c Total communications services expenditure as a proportion of total intermediate and final goods
and services expenditure.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on ABS (1997a).OVERVIEW
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·  Telecommunications is a dynamic service industry with many new products
being developed, particularly for data transfer
- Box 2 gives details of value added services and the main data products
available in the Australian market.
·  In this environment, competition is important for stimulating innovation and
productive investment, the keys to maintaining efficiency over time.
·  Telstra still dominates the Australian market
- in 1998, it accounted for nearly 75 per cent of overall market revenue.
·  Local calls remain the most significant traffic in volume
- but are on a par with long-distance calls in revenue terms.
  Social and price regulation
·  Government intervention in telecommunications markets has significant
implications for benchmarking comparisons
- retail prices are often regulated as well as being affected indirectly by
regulations that are intended to promote competition
- consequently, some understanding of regulatory and institutional
arrangements is important to interpreting observed price differences.
·  Six of the countries studied, including Australia, retained some form of
Universal Service Obligation (USO) following the introduction of
competition
- the USO usually involves the provision of basic services in rural areas at
prices comparable to those in urban areas (see Table 3.1 of the report).
·  There is no direct funding of the USO in any of the benchmarked countries
(including Australia)
- instead all costs are borne by the telecommunications industry and,
ultimately, (some) consumers.
·  The cost of USOs in the United States had been estimated at less than 1 per
cent of the industry’s total revenue (Lewin and Kee, 1997).
·  The overall cost of the Australian USO recognised under carrier cost-sharing
arrangements, was equivalent to about 1.3 per cent of total industry revenue
in 1996–97INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Box 2 Details of Australian value added services and data
products, 1998
In 1998, value added services (VAS) revenue amounted to $5.1 billion, about a quarter
of total telecommunications services revenue. Between 1992 and 1997, average annual
growth in VAS revenue was 15.6 per cent, more than double the growth in basic services
revenue over the same period.
Data network services accounted for about $2.5 billion in 1997, or about one half of all
value added services revenue in that year. Between 1991 and 1997, revenue expanded
about 10 per cent per year on average, with the rate increasing after 1994. The most
important of these services are:
 Leased  lines
·  Leased line services (Datel, DDS (64Kbps) and 2Mbps services) account for more
than half ($930 million) of data network services revenue in 1997.
 ISDN
·  Between 1991 and 1997, revenue from ISDN services expanded by an average of
nearly 40 per cent a year and accounted for $450 million of total data network
services revenue in 1997. There were around 50 000 customers in 1997 (including
37 000 basic access rate and 8500 primary rate users).
  Packet switching and international data network services
·  In 1997, revenue from domestic packet switched data network services was
$115 million.
·  Packet switching is the dominant technology for international data
communications which accounted for $220 million in 1997 and continues to
expand at an increasing rate due, in part, to the globalisation of business.
ATM
·  ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode) broadband data services have been launched
by both Optus and Telstra as wide-area network solutions, mainly in the 2Mbps
market.
 Frame  relay
·  Revenue from frame relay network services in 1997 was around $45 million.
·  Telstra introduced its service (Fastpac) in 1996.  By 1997 there were 14 service
providers offering frame relay services in Australia.OVERVIEW
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- though this ignores the costs to Telstra of other elements of its service
obligations, such as the provision of payphones, or of related price
regulation, such as untimed local calls.
·  Telstra has claimed that the annual USO cost in Australia is in the order of
$1.8 billion, or about 9 per cent of the industry’s annual revenue
- however, this estimate is significantly higher than those prepared for the
Government’s review of USO costs, which is still to be finalised.
·  The Commission is not in a position to assess this estimate
- although consideration is given to how it might affect price relativities.
  Price regulation
·  Governments regulate telecommunications prices with the aim of protecting
consumers and achieving social objectives
- customer access charges and local call prices are frequently regulated to
ensure affordability and to promote universal access
- in some countries, notably the United States, price regulation has also
been introduced to prevent predatory pricing.
·  In Australia and many other countries, price capping is the preferred
regulatory approach for protecting consumers
- rather than the alternative of rate-of-return regulation.
·  Differences in the stringency of price caps directly affect price relativities.
  Competition policy
·  In most of the countries benchmarked, the incumbent telecommunications
provider has been left with ownership of the established network.
·  The incumbents generally have residual market power because they control
access to the network and the price of that access
- and are advantaged by economies of scope in marketing and billing
services.
·  Generally, governments have not vertically separated the monopoly
segments of the industry, such as customer access network services, from
those that are more competitive.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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·  Instead, most governments regulate the industry by establishing rights of
interconnection and access to certain network services for the incumbent’s
competitors
- to promote competition and efficient outcomes and mitigate the market
power that control of the network gives the incumbent.
·  As such, the regulatory environment in each country is dynamic
- changing as regulators respond to market conditions.
·  In most of the selected countries, decisions about how far the network should
be unbundled were pre-determined at the outset of market liberalisation by
the regulator.
·  Australia is unique among these countries in that it has a formal regulatory
process (based on Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act 1974) through which
industry participants can have network services ‘declared’ open to access
- this approach was adopted primarily because the Government believed
the industry was best-placed to determine where regulation of access is
required.
·  The advantages of allowing industry participants to identify access
requirements over time must be weighed against the potential cost of
delaying competition and investment
- in situations where ‘first-mover’ advantage can provide incumbents with
time to cement and maintain a competitive advantage.
·  In effect, the Australian approach involves a tradeoff between potential costs
of delay, and possibly additional transactions costs for industry participants,
against the benefits of ultimately getting better competitive outcomes.
  Price comparisons
·  Price comparisons for voice and data services were undertaken for both
residential and business users, with an index based on annual expenditure on
fixed baskets of telecommunications services.
·  The Commission, in conjunction with Eurodata, developed a new price
comparison methodology for residential and business users (see Box 3 for
details)
- utilising generally available discounted actual prices rather than
scheduled pricesOVERVIEW
xxxi
- involving a more extensive range of services to small, medium and large
businesses than in previous studies, and
- covering a wider range of services.
Box 3 Price comparison methodology
Price information for many individual services was aggregated into ‘indices’ to provide a
practical means of comparing price performance. Each price index was based on the
expenditure over one year on a defined ‘basket’ of telecommunications services
purchased by a representative user, at February 1998 prices.
OECD demand assumptions were used as a starting point for the baskets. However, they
were developed further following consultations with Telstra and Eurodata.
The key elements of this approach are described below.
Demand assumptions
·  Each basket or sub-basket specifies a distribution of calls made at different times
of the day or week and over different distances.
·  Although generally representative of usage patterns, they do not reflect actual
usage in any particular country to ensure that comparisons are as neutral as
possible.
Discounting plans
·  Prices used in the comparisons are intended to reflect the actual cost to the user.
The specified baskets of services are priced in each country using the lowest-
priced discount plan that is widely available in the relevant market and
consistently offered by the incumbent(s) in that country.
·  Plans involving limited destinations, periods or targeting narrowly defined groups
were not used, because there is no information on their market shares or the extent
of their usage.
Taxes
·  Indirect taxes imposed by governments differ among countries and so influence
the relative prices of services in those countries.  The indirect taxes associated
with the production of telecommunications services, such as value added taxes,
have been included because the aim is to compare the telecommunication cost for
the consumer.
 Currency  conversion
·  OECD measures of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates current at
February 1998 were used for the conversion of prices to reflect the cost of
telecommunications relative to the general cost of goods and services in each
country.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Note: The data underlying the above charts expresses the service price for each country as an index relative
to the least expensive country. The price in the least expensive country corresponds to an index of
100. The bars represent the range of prices among all the selected countries for the particular service
and is the same for each country as depicted. For each country, each dot indicates how much more
expensive the price of the service is compared with the lowest-priced country. For example,
Australia’s PSTN price falls approximately in the middle of the range of prices represented by the
bar. Where necessary, price differences have been averaged to provide a basis for aggregate
comparisons.
na Data not available for this service
Source: Productivity Commission estimates.OVERVIEW
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·  The results of the price comparisons are summarised in Figure 3
- and Australia’s relative performance is presented in Table 1.
·  A broad indication of relative prices can be obtained from the results over all
markets
- price relativities in some individual markets are less reliable.























PSTN Finland 6 of 9 23 23
ISDN Sweden 6 of 7 41 24
Mobile Finland 5 of 8 44 44
Small and medium business services
PSTN for small business Finland 7 of 9 40 40
PSTN for medium business Finland 6 of 9 39 39
ISDN for small business Sweden 6 of 7 43 32
ISDN for medium business Sweden 4 of 7 46 35
Mobile for small business Finland 3 of 8 14 14
Mobile for medium business Finland 3 of 8 5 5
Data services for business
Leased lines Sweden 6 of 9 63 63
X25 (packet-switched) New Zealand 6 of 8 52 48
Frame relay Sweden 6 of 7 46 22
Large business services Sweden 4 of 6 47 43
a Finland is used as the benchmark because its prices, overall, are the lowest.
Note: A ranking of 6 of 9 for Australia’s price performance for residential PSTN services (for example)
means Australia has the sixth lowest prices out of 9 countries included in the particular comparison
(given all the specified assumptions).
The business comparisons above are simple averages of relative prices obtained from the various
business baskets.
Source:  Productivity Commission estimates.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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·  It is also important to avoid ascribing unwarranted precision to performance
rankings
- adjustment for differences in external factors, such as economies of scale,
could alter the ranking among countries with similar prices.
  Residential prices
·  Price comparisons for residential customers were undertaken using separate
baskets of PSTN, ISDN and mobile services
- within the PSTN ‘total service’ baskets, there are sub-baskets for
particular types of calls, such as domestic voice, Internet, and
international.
There is a wide dispersion in the price performance of the countries studied (see
Figure 3).
·  Australian PSTN prices for the total service were nearly 30 per cent above
the lowest prices (Finland) and about 30 per cent below the highest (Japan)
- Australian residential mobile prices were over 70  per cent above the
lowest prices (Finland again) and around 35 per cent below the highest
(New Zealand).
·  The ranking and dispersion of price indices were not greatly affected by
changes in assumptions about the number and duration of calls (see
Chapter 5).
·  Utilising the Australian residential demand patterns provided by Telstra for
all the countries benchmarked improved Australia’s price relativity against
most other countries
- using an Australian demand pattern naturally favours Australia because
services with lower prices have higher demand relative to other countries
and receive a greater weighting
- for this reason, the OECD uses a neutral basket to weight prices.
·  The Commission’s results are consistent with previous studies undertaken by
the OECD and others
- with Australia in the middle rank of those advanced countries with low
telecommunications prices.
·  Periodic comparisons of standard prices by the OECD and Eurodata do not
indicate a significant trend in Australia’s relative price performance for
residential PSTN services over recent years.OVERVIEW
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  Business prices
·  International price comparisons were undertaken for small, medium and
large business users and for services using PSTN, ISDN, mobile, leased line,
X25, frame relay and ATM technology
- price comparisons were made for different volumes and patterns of
demand for communications services and combinations of the
technologies available for supplying the services.
·  There is a reasonable degree of consistency in the price comparisons for
different business customer groups and product groups
- Finland and Sweden generally have the lowest prices
- Australia generally ranks in the middle of the countries benchmarked for
most services and is one of the best performers for mobile services.
  Price structures
·  There are some important differences in the price structures of the various
countries.
·  Using the OECD price basket assumptions of an average day-time call
duration of about 3 minutes for local voice calls and 20 to 30 minutes for
Internet calls, Australia has relatively high prices for local voice calls and
relatively low prices for Internet calls in the residential market.
·  Using an average day-time call duration of 5 minutes, which may be more
typical of the current situation, Australia’s relative local voice call price
performance would be improved
- but the price of the total PSTN service for residential customers would
still be 20 to 30  per cent more than those of the best performing
countries.
·  The current level of Australian residential fixed charges, and the ratio of
fixed to usage charges, are relatively low compared with most of the
countries benchmarked.
  Quality of service
·  Both prices and service levels should be benchmarked to make a judgment
about overall performance
- quality of service (QoS) is linked with price outcomes for consumers
because of tradeoffs between the standard of services and their cost.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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·  The main service aspects of concern to consumers are their ‘administrative’
dealings with carriers and the availability of services in geographically-
remote areas
- complaint records indicate that, for most consumers, the quality of the
signal is not a major concern.
·  There are few objective and consistent QoS indicators with which to make
reliable international comparisons
- and those available are clouded by definitional and methodological
differences.
·  More could be done to address the dearth of information to measure service
quality in Australia
- this would involve ensuring that performance indicators are relevant,
consistent with measures used internationally, and published regularly
without breaks due to changes in definition and collection methodology.
·  With these qualifications in mind, the available comparable indicators of
QoS show mixed results for Australia (see Table 2)
- on some indicators, such as call failure rates and the penetration of card
operated payphones, Australia performs quite well, though below the best
of the countries for which data are available
- on others, such as fault restoration, Australia performs relatively poorly.
Table 2 Australia’s ranking compared with other OECD countries
supplying data on QoS indicators, 1992 to 1996
 Indicator  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
  Fault clearance   na   7 of 19   11 of 14   21 of 22   na


















  Answer seizure ratio for international
calls
a
  15 of 27   16 of 27   17 of 27   19 of 27   na
  Payphones per 1000 inhabitants
b   18 of 27   16 of 26   17 of 26   9 of 26   8 of 25
  Payphones in working order   na   3 of 9   3 of 11   5 of 13   na
  Payphones that are card phones   na   na   na   3 of 20   na
a Measure of the proportion of international calls that successfully ‘seize’ an international circuit and are
answered in the terminating country
b Australian data prior to 1995 excluded non-public payphones.




·  The size of the average variation in prices among countries is such that
Australia’s relative position cannot be simply explained by measurement
error or differences in external factors outside the control of the industry
- in fact, Australia has a significant indirect taxation advantage relative to
the countries with the lowest prices
·  If the effects of factors outside the control of the industry are small, it
follows that differences in government involvement and intervention are
likely to be the major influence
- the nature and degree of government intervention in telecommunication
markets varies considerably among the benchmarked countries.
·  Differences in business internal factors, such as governance structures,
corporate culture and managerial performance, are another possible source of
variation
- however, the extent of this variation in practice can be expected to be
influenced by the effectiveness of government supervision in preventing
any abuse of market power.
  Role of price controls
·  In some countries, including Australia, price capping is claimed to be
distorting efficient price structures
- resulting in a so-called ‘access service deficit’ where customer access
charges do not reflect costs.
·  Differences in the stringency of price caps and the USO cost affect relative
prices
- particularly local service prices.
·  Caps on local services that prevent a normal rate-of-return from this segment
of the market can be expected to affect prices in the long-distance market
also
- because of the nature of the industry, the need to maintain prices at a
level that provides for an adequate overall rate of return means that the
incumbent’s ability to compete in the long-distance market is
constrained.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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·  With this in mind, it is interesting to note that the countries with the lowest
relative prices have pursued a policy of ‘rebalancing’ incumbent prices so
that they reflect costs across all market segments
- and have few controls on local services to ensure that normal rates of
return are achievable in all market segments.
·  The cost of the USO in Australia is suggested as one reason for the access
service deficit and relatively high prices.
·  However, no more than a third of the difference between Australian prices
and those in the best performing countries can be explained even if the
highest current USO cost estimate (9 per cent of revenues) were used
- and the unfunded costs in other countries are taken into account.
  Role of competition policy
·  Overall, the countries that have the best price performance moved earliest to
facilitate competition
- from a previous emphasis on retail price supervision.
·  The regulatory regimes in these countries generally provide for
interconnection at any technically feasible point in the incumbent’s network
at cost-based prices
- with competitors given maximum flexibility to decide how much of the
incumbent’s network they need to access
- and cost-based pricing ensuring that incumbents are constrained in
monopoly pricing access to facilities that entrants find inefficient to
duplicate.
  Benefits of improving Australia’s performance
·  Residential and business prices in the best performing countries are 20 to 40
per cent below Australian prices on a purchasing power parity basis.
·  Furthermore, indirect taxes do not affect Australian telecommunications
prices as much as European prices (which include 18 to 25 per cent value
added tax)
- which makes the performance of countries such as Finland and Sweden
all the more impressive.OVERVIEW
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Improvement seems possible
·  There is also some evidence that across the countries benchmarked higher
prices may also have been associated with higher profitability
- with financial performance positively correlated to prices.
·  A rudimentary indicative assessment of relative productivity shows that there
could be a significant performance gap between Telstra and the incumbents
in countries with the lowest prices
- there may accordingly be further scope to reduce prices through
productivity improvement.
Savings to consumers could be significant
·  The lower prices and profitability in the best performing countries provides
evidence that the benefits of productivity improvement are usually passed on
to consumers
- through competition or effective regulatory supervision.
·  Significant savings could flow to Australian consumers if prices were
reduced
- given that industry revenue for fixed and mobile telecommunications
services, including data network services, equals some $20 billion
- and telecommunications is an essential input to other industries in
Australia.1
1 INTRODUCTION
This study is part of a series of international benchmarking studies conducted by
the Productivity Commission. The chief aim of this study is to compare the
price and quality-of-service of the Australian telecommunications industry with
those in other countries. Comparisons of the regulatory arrangements in
Australia and overseas have also been undertaken to assist with the
interpretation of these measures.
The industry was last benchmarked by the Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE),
using mainly 1994 data. Since then, the industry, both in Australia and overseas
has undergone significant change. The timing of this study was opportune
because the benchmarking results provide a baseline for future measurement of
the success of the Australian regulatory regime introduced in July 1997.
1.1 Rationale for benchmarking telecommunications services
A telecommunications industry that performs well against other countries is
vital to Australia because of its economic significance.
Telecommunications makes a notable direct and indirect contribution to the
economy. End users consume about $20 billion of telecommunications services
annually, with about two-thirds of these services being used in the production of
other goods and services and the remaining one third being final consumption.
For the most part, telecommunications services comprise a small but
nevertheless vital component of production. In the service industries, for
example, telecommunications constitutes 5.3 per cent of costs. Apart from the
telecommunications sector itself, the most significant service industry users are
property and business services (where telecommunications services represent
6.5 per cent  of  costs),  retail  (6.7 per cent),  and  personal  and  other  services
(7 per cent).
In manufacturing, mining, and agriculture, forestry and fishing, the industry’s
role as an intermediate input is less significant. In these industries
telecommunications constitutes between 1 and 2 per cent of costs.
The industry’s importance is increasing. From 1992 to 1998, output of
telecommunications services increased by between 9 and 13 per cent per year.1
                                             
1  Estimate based on ABS Consumer Price Index data, Table 2.1.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Growth has been fastest in the mobile services sector where numbers of
subscribers have increased a thousand-fold since 1986 and in data services
where revenues have increased by 70 per cent between 1992 and 1998.
1.2 Approach
For this study, the aim was to benchmark how well the Australian
telecommunications industry compared in relation to its counterparts in other
countries (benchmarking is described in Box 1.1).
Box 1.1 Benchmarking
The chief purpose of benchmarking is to identify performance gaps and areas of
potential improvement. This may be done by measuring the performance achieved by a
better performing business engaged in the same or similar activity, or by a business
regarded as being ‘best practice’. Alternatively, the current performance can be measured
against past performance to gauge whether improvement is occurring over time.
The term ‘benchmarking’ is also used to encompass the identification of ‘best practice’
processes, that is, finding ways of doing better. This involves assessing a business’s
practice against those of other high performing businesses engaged in the same activity
(‘in-industry’ benchmarking) or against businesses in other industries engaged in similar
activities (‘out-of-industry’ benchmarking). It is also possible to determine which
practices make a significant contribution to performance.
Industry performance is measured in terms of outcomes for the consumers of
telecommunications services, in particular the price and quality of the services.
The reasons for differences in performance among countries are also considered,
focussing in particular on the impact that different regulatory approaches have
on prices.
The Commission was unable to collect the comparative data necessary to
construct direct measures of total factor productivity. These measures require
estimates of the quantities of inputs used and outputs produced by
telecommunications carriers. The inputs include fixed capital, various types of
labour, and material inputs purchased by the carriers.
More often, partial productivity measures are used in international comparisons.
However, these measures are defective because they ignore differences in the
proportions of factor inputs used by carriers in different countries. For example,
data on lines per employee are readily available for many countries and
therefore reported as indicators of labour productivity and sometimes interpreted1   INTRODUCTION
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as measures of relative efficiency. Such an interpretation overlooks the fact that
some carriers employ their own staff to provide services which other carriers
purchase from subcontractors.
Price comparisons
This benchmarking study follows, for the most part, the methodology initially
developed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) — also used by the BIE for their telecommunications services price
comparisons.
The main indicator used is prices of telecommunications services purchased by
residential and business customers measured by their annual expenditure on
fixed baskets of services valued at February 1998 prices.
Previous studies by the OECD and BIE based their comparisons on prices
obtained from incumbent operator’s standard plans. However, this approach has
been compromised by the emergence of discount plans which provide savings
on  standard  plans  (for  example,  up  to  25  per cent  for  residential  PSTN
customers).
To ensure that comparisons would continue to reflect the actual cost to the
telecommunication user, a refinement introduced in this study is to compare
prices on the basis of the lowest-priced discount plans. That is, the prices used
in this study are those taken from the lowest-priced discount plan that is widely
available in the relevant market and consistently offered by the incumbent
operator(s).
To facilitate cross-country comparisons, the cost, in local currency, of each
basket was converted into $US using OECD purchasing power parities (PPPs).
PPPs reflect the real purchasing power of a national currency — that is, the
ability of currency in a particular country to purchase a representative basket of
consumer goods and services. Consequently, prices of telecommunications
services are compared in relation to the general level of prices in each country.
The Commission attempted to benchmark quality of service. However, there are
few comparable indicators in the public domain. They are usually constructed to
satisfy disparate regulatory requirements in each country. As such, they were
not sufficiently consistent for robust comparison.
That said, the benchmarks of quality of service provide some useful insights into
Australia’s relative performance and the change over time.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Comparison of regulatory approaches
Government involvement in the telecommunications industry has significant
implications for benchmarking comparisons. Differences in price controls will
result in price variations. Furthermore, the regulatory arrangements affect the
degree of competition and incentives for efficient outcomes.
In this study, Australia’s regulatory arrangements are compared with the
approaches used in the benchmarked countries. These arrangements include
universal service obligations, retail price controls, interconnection or access
arrangements to the existing network, number portability and carrier pre-
selection and accounting separation.
The comparisons highlight key differences in the regulatory approach. The
comparisons are also examined to determine if these are possible factors
influencing differences in relative price performance.
Limitations of benchmarking
There are a range of factors which affect the usefulness of benchmarking. These
include:
·  the accuracy and integrity of the assumptions and data used in the analysis;
·  difficulties ensuring that comparisons are being made in like-with-like
circumstances; and
·  problems with interpreting benchmarking results, in particular, identifying
the cause of performance differences.
The impact of any deficiencies in the accuracy and integrity of the assumptions
has been tested through sensitivity analysis.
The benchmarking approach has been designed to mitigate, but not eliminate,
the impact of external factors that are beyond the control of the industry and
regulatory authorities. It was beyond the scope of the study to ‘standardise’
price and quality of service comparisons by adjusting for these factors.
Instead, information is provided to qualify the results and give the reader
insights into their interpretation by providing possible explanations for
differences in prices.
1.3 Study scope
The Australian telecommunications industry is benchmarked against those in
Canada, Finland, France, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom and
the United States. These countries were chosen from among the members of the1   INTRODUCTION
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OECD which have been used in previous benchmarking studies (including those
conducted by the BIE and the OECD Secretariat).
The number of countries studied was dictated by project resource
considerations. They were selected to represent a range of regulatory or
institutional environments and include countries regarded to be at ‘best
practice’.
Just the incumbent carriers — in most cases the original monopoly supplier —
were benchmarked because they provide similar ranges of products. Although it
is acknowledged competitors often have lower prices, they were assumed to be
offering a similar price-quality of service mix to the incumbent (which usually
still dominates the telecommunications market).
The services considered were chosen from among the extensive range of voice
and data communications services on the market. The provision of customer
premises equipment (telephones, computer hardware and software) were not
included. Telecommunications equipment, systems and services were the
subject of a recent Industry Commission inquiry (IC  1998). Broadcasting
services also do not fall within the scope of the study, which is concerned with
inter-active point-to-point communications services.
1.4 Data Collection
The Eurodata Foundation was engaged by the Productivity Commission to
collect information and develop spreadsheets for the purpose of international
comparisons of telecommunications prices.
Eurodata has worked with the OECD to develop the ‘baskets’ of services
reflecting the telephone access and call patterns of residential and small-
business customers on which both Eurodata and the OECD base their current
price comparisons. These baskets were costed at standard or ‘list’ prices charged
in each OECD country.
The Commission asked Eurodata to obtain information on the published
discounts available from the major telecommunications carriers in the selected
countries. This approach was adopted to use the best price generally available
and overcome differences in the margins between discounted and standard ‘list’
charges.
Eurodata was required to collect and analyse prices relevant to a wide range of
medium and large businesses in addition to small businesses. The product range
includes PSTN, ISDN, mobile services, leased lines, X25, frame relay and
(where possible) ATM services.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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1.5 Consultation
The Commission consulted widely with Government, industry, consultants and
others during development of the study approach. Advice was obtained on
methodology, specification of customer groups and products, and regulatory
issues.
Throughout the study, comment on the accuracy of the description and
interpretation of regulatory arrangements was obtained from the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission, the Department of Communications,
Information Technology and the Arts, Ovum, Telstra and overseas regulatory
authorities. Feedback was also obtained on the accuracy and interpretation of
other data used.
A list of the organisations and individuals contacted by the Commission, in the
course of the study is provided in Appendix A.
Interested parties were also provided with opportunities to examine the price
comparison models used and their input data. This process of rigorous scrutiny
served to refine the price benchmarks and increase confidence in the results.
A workshop was held on 17 December 1998 — to provide a forum for
discussion of the study methodology, the presentation of results and their
interpretation. A list of organisations and academics who were invited to attend
the workshop is provided in Appendix A.
Following the workshop, Telstra commissioned consultants, NECG Ltd, to
prepare papers on a number of topics related to the study. The topics included
the USO, the impact of geography on costs, rebalancing, performance
measurement and the Finnish and Swedish telecommunications markets.
Telecom New Zealand also provided several papers on the price comparisons.
The NECG and TCNZ papers are available on the Productivity Commission
web site.
1.6 Refereeing
Drafts of the report chapters were refereed by Professor Peter Forsyth, Monash
University. A draft of Appendix B was refereed by Dr John Small, Director of
the Centre for Research in Network Economics and Communications,
University of Auckland.1   INTRODUCTION
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1.7 Structure of the report
Major technological issues, the recent emergence of new telecommunications
products and demand trends being experienced by the industry are outlined in
Chapter 2. There is also a brief discussion of the industry’s place within the
general economy. This chapter is intended to provide the context in which the
regulatory arrangements and industry performance are assessed.
The current regulatory arrangements in Australia and the other countries
selected for this study are described in Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 3, the
arrangements for the provision of universal service obligations and retail price
controls are compared. Arrangements governing competition policy — covering
interconnection and access arrangements; number portability and carrier pre-
selection; accounting separation; and the regulation of anti-competitive conduct
— are reviewed in Chapter 4.
Price comparisons for residential and various types of business customers are
reported in Chapters 5 and 6. The ‘baskets’ of services typically purchased by
the customer groups are specified, and the price structures employed by the
carriers described. The impact of tax structures and exchange rates on the price
comparisons is considered. Having outlined the approach and assumptions, the
price comparisons for the customer groups and types of services are presented.
Quality of service measures are reported in Chapter 7. Also included is a
discussion of measurement issues, and approaches to monitoring quality in
Australia and overseas.
The factors affecting the level of Australia’s telecommunications prices relative
to those in other countries are discussed in Chapter 8, with particular attention
paid to the impact of regulatory arrangements on prices. The total impact on
consumers of improvements in telecommunications prices is also raised.9
2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES IN
AUSTRALIA
Communications in Australia, along with many other developed and developing
countries, is undergoing a fundamental transformation with the approach of the
new millennium — the so-called ‘post-industrial information age’.
Central to this transformation has been an increasing globalisation of markets
and organisations, and a relative decline in importance of the traditional
agricultural and manufacturing sectors. Trade in the global economy has an
increasing dependence on the use, transfer, and management of information. As
a result, access to information and communications services are increasingly
important in determining competitiveness and living standards.
Information is provided in this chapter about the economic significance of the
telecommunications industry in Australia, trends in technology and demand for
services, and the structure of the Australian industry in terms of the roles of the
main carriers and service providers. This serves as background to the
subsequent discussions of regulatory arrangements and presentation of material
on performance benchmarking.
The new regulatory arrangements are opening the telecommunications market to
new carriers and service providers which are competing with incumbent
carriers. Despite this diversification, the incumbent carriers — Telstra in
Australia — still dominate the overall market and are the focus of the price
comparisons.
2.1 The significance of telecommunications services to
economic activity
The telecommunications services industry has a major influence on the
competitiveness of other industries and makes an important contribution to
economic activity in its own right. The overall contribution of
telecommunications services to economic activity can be examined from the
proportion of total telecommunications services consumed by other industries
and by the economy as a whole. The importance of telecommunications services
relative to other inputs can be determined by examining the expenditure of each
sector on telecommunications services relative to the sector’s total expenditure.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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ABS data for 1993–94 show that about 68 per cent (or $12  billion) of
communications industry output — of which telecommunications services is a
large part — was used as an intermediate input by other industries.1 The
majority of this output (59 per cent) was consumed by the services sector which
is currently the fastest growing sector in the economy (see Figure 2.1).















Communications services used in the production 
of other goods and services by Australian firms 
(68.2%)
Communications services output
used for final consumption
(31.8%)
Note: Communications services includes ANZSIC classification 711 Postal and Courier Services, and
ANZSIC 712 Telecommunications Services.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on ABS (1997a).
Overall, communications services accounted for about 3.5 per cent of total
intermediate expenditure by Australian industry and 5.3 per cent in the service
sector (see Figure 2.2).
Growth in telecommunications services
Telecommunications services have also made a significant and growing
contribution to economic activity in their own right. For example, between 1994
and 1996, global telecommunications services revenue expanded from
$374 billion to more than $489 billion (ITU 1995, 1998a), and was estimated to
have reached $1105 billion by 1998 (Budde 1999g).2
                                             
1 Communications services includes ANZSIC classification 711 Postal and Courier
Services, and ANZSIC 712 Telecommunications Services. 1993–94 was the latest
available data from the ABS at time of publication.
2 Throughout this chapter, currency conversions to Australian dollars are based on RBA
published exchange rates for 30 June for the relevant year.2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES IN AUSTRALIA
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Figure 2.2 Communications services expenditure as a proportion




















































































Intermediate consumption Final consumption All ab c
Note: Communications services includes ANZSIC classification 711 Postal and Courier Services, and
ANZSIC 712 Telecommunications Services.
a Communications services expenditure as a proportion of total expenditure on goods and services
used in the production of final goods and services produced by Australian firms.
b Communications services expenditure as a proportion of total final goods and services
expenditure.
c Total communications services expenditure as a proportion of total intermediate and final goods
and services expenditure.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on ABS (1997a).
Over the same period, telecommunications services revenue in Australia grew
from $14.1 billion to $22.0 billion and is expected to approach $24.7 billion by
1999 (see Table 2.1; Budde 1999b, pp. 1-2). This represents an average annual
growth rate of about 11  per  cent, with the greatest growth being in mobile
communications. Despite rapid demand expansion there was a slowdown in
revenue growth in 1997. This is likely to reflect the impact of increasing
competition on prices. For example, fixed voice, mobile, and data services usage
was estimated to have expanded at 10 to 20 per cent, 30 to 40 per cent and 40 to
Table 2.1 Australian telecommunications services revenue,
1992 to 1998
Type 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
($b) ($b) ($b) ($b) ($b) ($b) ($b)
Fixed services 10.4 10.1 10.2 11.0 11.7 11.8 13.3
Mobile services 0.6 1.0 1.3 2.3 3.0 3.2 3.7
Value-added services 1.8 2.2 2.6 2.8 3.3 4.0 5.1
Total revenue 12.8 13.2 14.1 16.1 17.9 19.0 22.0
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Budde (1998f, 1998g, 1998l, 1999b, 1999d, 1999f).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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100 per cent respectively during 1997 (see Section 2.3).
Telecommunications services revenue is also a significant and growing share of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), accounting for about 2.1 per cent of world
GDP in 1996 (ITU 1998a). The Australian share has grown rapidly compared
with the OECD (see Figure 2.3(a)), and was nearly 4 per cent in 1996 (see
Figure 2.3(b)).
Figure 2.3 Telecommunications revenue relative to GDP









































































































(17) (na) (14) (13)
(9) (8)
(3) (2)
Legend AUS: Australia, CAN:  Canada,  FIN: Finland,  FR: France,  GDP: Gross  Domestic  Product,
JAP: Japan, NZ: New Zealand, SWD: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom and US: United States.
a The chart presents data for the OECD countries selected as the benchmark group (see Chapter 1).
Bracketed figures denote ranking out of the 27 OECD countries for which data were available.
Source: ITU (1998a); OECD (1997c).
Growth in investment
Between 1981 and 1996, telecommunications investment in the OECD
expanded at an average of 2.3 per cent a year, with total growth over the period
approaching 42 per cent. Over the same period, telecommunications investment
in Australia grew at an average of 6.8 per cent a year and more than 150 per
cent over the entire period (OECD 1997c; ITU 1998a).
Although Australian telecommunications investment as a proportion of Gross
Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) fluctuated significantly between 1981 and
1996, it generally followed the OECD average (see Figure 2.4(a)). In 1996,
Australian telecommunications investment as a proportion of GFCF was in the
top quartile of OECD countries (see Figure 2.4(b)).2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES IN AUSTRALIA
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Figure 2.4 Telecommunications investment relative to Gross Fixed
Capital Formation (GFCF)













































































































Note: Bracketed figures denote ranking out of the 27 OECD countries for which data were available.
Legend AUS: Australia,  CAN: Canada,  FIN: Finland,  FR: France,  JAP: Japan,  NZ: New  Zealand,
SWD: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom and US: United States.
Source: ITU (1998a); OECD (1997c).
Figure 2.5 Telecommunications investment relative to revenue





































































































Note: Bracketed figures denote ranking out of the 27 OECD countries for which data were available.
Legend AUS: Australia,  CAN: Canada,  FIN: Finland,  FR: France,  JAP: Japan,  NZ: New  Zealand,
SWD: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom and US: United States.
Source: ITU (1998a); OECD (1997c).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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In contrast, telecommunications investment relative to revenue in Australia has
fallen steadily since the early 1980s and is now close to the OECD average (see
Figure 2.5).
2.2 Network structure and technological trends
The principal building block of telecommunications infrastructure is the public
switched telephone network (PSTN). Originally designed for the carriage of
analogue voice traffic, the PSTN can be divided into a number of sub-networks:
· Customer access network (CAN): The local loop (the twisted pair copper
wires in the street) that connects homes and offices to the local switch;
· Transit networks: Short distance carriage and basic switching; and
· Long-distance networks: Country  trunks,  interstate  fibre  cables  and
microwave bearers, international submarine cables and satellites.
Gateway switches allow interconnection between fixed, wireless voice and data
networks, and between the domestic and international networks.
Global trends in communications technology
The traditional public telecommunications networks have evolved to become the
fundamental element of the ‘global information infrastructure’ (GII). This is
leading to changing philosophies behind network expansion and technological
development, with the focus shifting to the services and applications running
over the network rather than the network itself.
The likely direction for future development in telecommunications networks has
been generally assessed as:
· The network will be digital: In a digital network, information should be
able to flow from any source to any destination.
· Capacity will be abundant: Data  compression  technologies,  the
development of broadband fibre-based networks, and the use of digital
transmission are expanding existing capacity.
· Services will be personal: The basic user will be the individual rather than
the residential or work location (ITU 1995, pp. 17-20). This trend is
already being realised in the growth of the ‘wireless’ or mobile
communications market.
The key technological developments that are influencing the ability to deliver
these services in a high quality and cost effective format include:2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES IN AUSTRALIA
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· Computer power and accessibility: Increasing processing power, at lower
unit cost, is a key factor influencing the current development of the PSTN.
Greater processing power will allow more efficient use of existing and
future network capacity and the ability to deliver network-based services
through ‘intelligent network’.
· Digital processing techniques: Advances in data compression techniques
and switching technology are increasing the quality and speed of
transmission and making it possible to make more efficient use of existing
network infrastructure and bandwidth.
· Photonic technologies: Developments in photonic technology promise to
substantially reduce bandwidth constraints. Optical fibre networks transmit
messages by means of light pulses (generated by light emitting diodes),
rather than electricity. With new wavelength multiplexing techniques,
bandwidths of up to 75THz can be achieved, compared with about 1MHz
on twisted copper pair and up to 750MHz on coaxial cable (see Table 2.2).
Photonic switches are forecast to enter commercial usage around the turn
of the century and will increase current network capacity by around
200 000 times (Lido 1998a).
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Digitalisation of the PSTN is one of the most important stages in modernising
the existing infrastructure. Digital transmission is cheaper, faster and of higher
quality than traditional analogue transmission and is an essential precursor to
further technological development.
Australia had one of the lowest penetration rates of digital telephone exchanges
within the OECD countries (see Figure 2.6(b)) in 1996 with 74 per cent of main
lines digitised, compared with 83.3  per cent for the OECD on average (see
Figure 2.6(a)).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Among OECD countries, the Netherlands was the first to reach full
digitalisation followed closely by Finland, Luxembourg and Iceland. New
Zealand, Japan and Sweden had all achieved greater than 95 per cent
digitalisation by 1996 (see Figure 2.6(b)).
Telstra’s $3.3 billion modernisation program — Future Mode of Operation
(FMO) — is expected to deliver full digitalisation by 1999 (Telstra 1997). By
June 1998, 95 per cent of all metropolitan and 94 per cent of country PSTN
services were digital (Telstra 1998a, p. 11).
Figure 2.6 Progress in network digitisation
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Note: Bracketed figures denote ranking out of the 27 OECD countries for which data were available.
Legend AUS: Australia,  CAN: Canada,  FIN: Finland,  FR: France,  JAP: Japan,  NZ: New  Zealand,
SWD: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom and US: United States.
Source: ITU (1998a); OECD (1997c).
2.3 Telecommunications services demand
Telecommunications services demand can be examined from either the
perspective of subscriber access or service characteristics.
Subscriber access
Subscriber access characteristics include: 
· Transmission media:  Principally the traditional fixed telephone services
and emerging ‘wireless’ or mobile networks.2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES IN AUSTRALIA
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· Sectoral segments: Private residences and businesses; and
· Geographical segments: Metropolitan and regional areas.
Between 1986 and 1998, the fixed network expanded at around 3 per cent a
year, reaching about 9.6 million access lines by June 1998 and is expected to
exceed 10.5 million by the end of the century (see Table 2.3).
Table 2.3 Fixed and mobile penetration in Australia, 1986–87 to 2000









(million) (No.) (’000) (No.)
1986-87  6.8 41.9  4 0.0
1987-88  7.1 42.9  32 0.2
1988-89  7.4 44.1  95 0.6
1989-90  7.8 45.6  185 1.1
1990-91  8.1 46.6  292 1.7
1991-92  8.3 47.2  497 2.8
1992-93  8.5 48.3  690 3.9
1993-94  8.9 49.6 1 220 6.8
1994-95  8.9 49.3 2 305 12.8
1995-96  9.2 50.1 3 815 20.8
1996-97  9.4 50.4 4 893 26.4
1997-98  9.6 51.0 5 382 28.6
2000 (estimate)
a 10.5 55.7 7 500 39.5
a ITU estimates based on average growth rates over the last four years of data.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Telstra (1998a); ITU (1998a); ABS (1997b).
The expansion of the mobile network over the same period has been far greater
(averaging 32 per cent a year between 1994 and 1998 but slowing after 1997).
As a result, the share of total connections accounted for by the fixed network
has fallen from close to 100 per cent in 1985–86 to around 64 per cent in
1997–98. If current trends continue, it is expected to fall below 60 per cent by
the end of the century (see Table 2.3).
Payphone penetration in Australia is slightly less than the OECD average. In
1997, there were less than 82 000 payphones, or about one payphone for every
220 persons in Australia (see Table 2.4). The decline in the number and
penetration of payphones in recent years is partly explained by the increasing
penetration of other telecommunications technologies (mobile communications
in particular), and the consequent cutbacks to Telstra’s payphone services.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Payphones nonetheless represent a significant source of revenue (Telstra
$225 million, others $130 million (Budde 1998g).
Future developments for payphone services in Australia are likely to be
focussed on ‘smart technology’ and enhanced service rather than penetration.
For example, Telstra initiated a major program in May 1997 to upgrade its
payphones to ‘smart card technology’ and expected to have had 30 000 of the
new phones installed by mid-1998. Telstra also intends to have 5000
‘multimedia payphones’ installed by the year 2000.
Table 2.4 Payphones services in Australia, 1995 to 1998
1995 1996 1997 1998
Payphones in Australia
Public payphones operated by Telstra np 30 740 30 170 36 892
Non-public payphones operated by Telstra np 6 309 7 192 np
Non-public payphones operated by other parties np 45 153 44 335 43 278
Total 84 000 82 202 81 697 80 170
Payphone per 1000 inhabitants
Australia 4.65 4.49 4.41 np
OECD 4.66 4.53 np np
np not published.
Source: Budde (1998g), ITU (1995, 1997, 1998a), Telstra (1998); Productivity Commission estimates.
Population and economic activity in Australia are concentrated in metropolitan
regions. In 1997–98, more than 64 per cent of the estimated 9.6 million fixed
telephone connections were in metropolitan areas (Budde 1998g). Residential
subscribers are the most numerous in both metropolitan and regional areas
accounting for 72  per cent of connections overall (see Table 2.5). However,
while households spend around $800 per annum on telecommunications
services, business users average around $10 000 per annum and account for
about 72 per cent of total revenue (Budde 1998g).
Service characteristics
Services characteristics include:
· Basic services: Traditional traffic over the PSTN, including voice, data,
image (fax) and video transmission;2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES IN AUSTRALIA
19
· Value-added services: Services provided over public or private networks
which, in some way, add value to the basic carriage, usually through the
application of computerised intelligence.














All Business 2.7 28.2
All Australia 9.6 100.0
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Budde (1998g); Telstra (1998).
Basic services
Basic services include local, long-distance and international calls. In 1998,
Telstra processed 10.8 billion local calls, accounting for about 84 per cent of all
fixed network calls. In comparison, long-distance calls accounted for around
15 per cent and international calls for just 1 per cent (see Table 2.6).
Call durations vary according to the type of call and the subscriber. Voice calls
in Australia average between 3.5 to 4 minutes in duration compared with
20 minutes for data or Internet calls (Budde 1998g).
Value-added services
In 1998, value-added services (VAS) revenue accounted for about 23 per cent
($5.1 billion) of total telecommunications services revenue. Between 1994 and
1998, average annual growth in VAS revenue was 18.5 per cent — more than
double the growth in basic services revenue over the same period (see
Table 2.1).
VAS are foreshadowed by most commentators as the area that offers the greatest
growth potential. For example, Budde suggested that:
Developments in information services, multimedia, pay TV and broadband
networks all indicate the importance of value-added telecommunicationsINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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services. It will be this segment of the market that will add real value to the
infrastructure provided by the carriers (Budde 1998k, p.1).
Table 2.6 Telephone call patterns, 1993 to 1998
Fixed network calls Mobile Total
Local calls STD calls IDD calls Total calls calls
(billion) (million) (million) (billion) (billion) (billion)
1993 9.7 2 000 124 11.8 0.8 12.6
1994 10.0 2130 144 12.3 1.1 13.4
1995 10.3 2270 167 12.7 1.2 13.9
1996 10.5 2400 194 13.1 1.5 14.6
1997 10.8 2550 233 13.6 1.9 15.5
1998 11.1 2700 275 14.1 2.1 16.2
Source: Budde (1999c, p.1).
Although the VAS industry is highly dynamic, three main segments are widely
recognised:
· Voice-based VAS: Principally delivered over the PSTN, voice-based VASs
include premium rate services, enhanced call services, interactive voice
response services, call centres and computer integrated telephony;
· Video-based VAS: Dominated at present by video conferencing, but also
includes video entertainment services such as video-on-demand; and
· Data-based VAS: Data  network  services  are  the  most  significant  data-
based VAS. Other data-based VAS include data transaction services
(EFT/EFTPOS), electronic data interchange (EDI), enhanced facsimile
services, on-line information services, Internet access provision, electronic
messaging, facilities management and outsourcing (telemetry and alarm)
and electronic bureau services.
Data network services — which are a major focus of the performance
comparisons presented in this report — are discussed in detail in the following
section. The remainder of the VAS industry is discussed in more detail in
Appendix B.
Data network services
Data network services accounted for about $2.5 billion, or about half of all
value-added services revenue in 1998. Between 1992 and 1998, revenue
expanded at an average of around 10 per cent a year, with the rate increasing
since 1994 (see Table 2.7).2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES IN AUSTRALIA
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Table 2.7 Data network services revenue, 1992 to 1997
Data network services 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
($m) ($m) ($m) ($m) ($m) ($m) ($m)
Leased line services
Analogue Datel 84 74 59 47 37 30 25
64 Kbps Digital Data Service (DDS) 567 629 635 650 660 680 700
2Mbits services 145 157 170 183 198 220 240
Total leased line service 796 860 864 880 895 930 965
Other data network services
ISDN 81 107 150 210 320 450 800
International data services 100 110 126 150 180 220 280
Packet switching (X25) 88 95 100 105 110 115 125
A T M n a1234 56
Frame Relay na na na 10 25 100 200
Others 54 56 58 60 65 75 90
Total other data network services 323 369 436 538 704 965 1501
Total revenue 1 119 1 229 1 300 1 418 1 599 1 895 2 466
Source: Budde (1999e, p.1).
While there are a number of service providers active in data network services,
they generally use Telstra’s infrastructure. In 1998, Telstra’s data services
revenue was estimated to be in excess of $2.2 billion (Budde 1999e, p.1).
Budde estimated that data traffic volumes accounted for 58 per cent of total
communications traffic in 1997 (Budde 1998j, p.2). If current trends continue,
data traffic is expected to account for around 80 per cent of traffic by the year
2000 (Lido 1998b, p. DCB-2). Corporate demand for Local Area Network
(LAN) and Wide Area Network (WAN) traffic on enterprise networks, coupled
with current Internet developments and falling prices (which are expected to
increase residential uptake), are increasing the overall demand for data network
services. On average, data network services revenue expanded by 14 per cent a
year between 1993 and 1998 (some newer services are expanding much faster).
Leased line services (Datel, DDS (64Kbps) and 2Mbits services) account for
about 39 per cent ($965 million) of data network services revenue in 1998. The
Datel analogue network is declining as users switch over to the 64Kbps (DDS)
and 2Mbits digital services (see Table 2.7). Corporate customers with
fluctuating needs generally opt for more cost effective services such as frame
relay.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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ISDN services were introduced by Telstra as a separate network in 1989.
Although Australia became one of the first countries with a nationwide ISDN
service, links to this proprietary system have been expensive by world standards
(Budde 1998j). Telstra’s On-Ramp ISDN service (based on the ETSI Euro-
ISDN standard) was launched in two stages (the Basic Access service in March
1997 and the Primary Rate Access service six months later). The proprietary
services will be phased out after 2000.
Between 1993 and 1998 revenue from ISDN services expanded by an average
of about 47 per cent a year and accounted for $800 million of total data network
services revenue in 1998 (see Table 2.7). However, revenue growth understates
the growth in usage of the service. ISDN faces competition from other
technologies such as frame relay and cable modems which provide data and
voice services at less cost. As a result, ISDN tariffs were reduced by 13 to
17 per cent in July 1996 and by a further 30 per cent in early 1997. There were
around 88 000 customers in 1997 (including 74 000 basic access and 14 000
primary rate access users). This is expected to grow to 180  000 by 2000
(Budde 1999e, p.3).
Packet Switching and international data network services generated
$405  million in 1998 (see Table 2.7). Revenue growth in domestic packet
switching network services was principally based on growth in EFTPOS, but
has slowed due to saturation in the EFTPOS retail market and because the
Internet offers cheaper alternatives (Budde 1998j).
Packet switching is still the dominant technology for international data
communications which accounted for $280 million of data network services
revenue in 1998 and continues to expand at an increasing rate due, in part, to
globalisation (see Table 2.7).
ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode) broadband data services have been
launched by both Optus and Telstra as WAN solutions, mainly in the 2Mbps
market. Although growth in revenue has been significant since 1993 (see
Table 2.7), this is from a low base and ATM is not expected to have a major
impact before the end of the decade (Budde 1998j).
Frame relay services generated revenue of around $200 million in 1998, a
100 per cent growth over the previous year (see Table 2.7). One reason for the
rapid growth in frame relay is that it offers operational cost savings of up to
20 to 30 per cent over ISDN (Budde 1998j). Another is the ability of service
providers to increase the effective capacity of traditional leased lines by using
frame relay. Several Internet service providers have adopted frame relay as their
backbone network to allow more efficient use of traditional leased lines
(Budde 1998j).2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES IN AUSTRALIA
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Telstra introduced its frame relay service (Fastpac) in 1996. By 1998, there were
15 main service providers offering frame relay services in Australia (see
Box 2.1).
Box 2.1 Frame relay service providers in Australia, 1998
AAPT Equant Saturn Global Network
AT&T Global One Telecom NZ
BT Australasia Interlink Telstra
CITEC MUAnet TMI
Eclipse Optus TPG
Source: Budde (1999e, p.4).
2.4 Telecommunications carriers and service providers
The  Telecommunications Act 1997 (TA 1997) liberalised entry into the
telecommunications services industry in Australia. Specifically, it removed the
distinction between mobile and general carriers and allowed for an unlimited
number of carrier licenses. The Act made a distinction between carriers and
service providers. Carriers are organisations that own or have control of network
infrastructure (fixed network over 500 meters, satellite, mobile and so on). A
carrier must be licensed and has defined obligations and rights. The Act
distinguishes between two types of service provider:
· Carriage service providers: Organisations that supply carriage services to
the public; and
· Content service providers: Organisations that supply content services to
the public.
Service providers do not require a special licence.
The benchmarking study focuses on the incumbent — Telstra — which is
dominant in the Australian telecommunications market (see Table 2.8). Telstra
is a very important provider in all the main telecommunications markets, and
has about 75 per cent of overall market revenue.
There are, however, a range of other carriers and service providers now existing
in Australia. The role of these players will become increasingly important for
the performance of the industry.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Table 2.8 Share of the Australian telecommunications market, Telstra
and others, 1997 and 1998
Telstra Others
(%) (%)
Mobile, 1998 (subscribers) 57 43
Payphones, 1997 (number of payphones) 46 54
Local calls, 1997 (number of calls) 91 9
Long-distance and international, 1998 (call minutes) 55 45
Business voice, 1997 (sole provider)
a 54 46
Business data, 1997 (sole provider)
a 86 14






a Responses to Amos Aked Swift Telecommunications Business Users Survey. Based on the proportion
of respondents that used Telstra as their sole service provider for each specified service.
Source: Productivity estimates based on Amos Aked Swift www.aas.com.au (accessed October 1998); Budde
(1999b, 1999c, 1999d).
Major facilities-based carriers
At February 1998, there were 14 licensed carriers (see Table 2.9). Telstra, Optus
Communications and Vodafone are the major facilities-based carriers in the
Australian market.3 AAPT is Australia’s third largest long-distance service
provider.
Telstra
Telstra is Australia’s largest telecommunications carrier and accounted for more
than 2.4 per cent of GDP in 1996 (Budde 1998m). The Australian and Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation Ltd (AOTC) was formed by the merger of
Overseas Telecommunications Commission Limited (OTC) and the Australian
Telecommunications Commission (trading as Telecom Australia) in 1992. In
April 1993, Telstra Corporation Ltd became the legal corporate name of the
AOTC, trading as a fully Government-owned enterprise until the one third
public float in November 1997. The public ownership of Telstra is split between
                                             
3 Facilities-based carriers provide voice or data communications services over
telecommunications infrastructure which it owns or has control of. The infrastructure of a
telecommunications network includes lines, towers, masts and switches necessary to
complete a communications circuit and to interconnect with another telecommunications
network.2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES IN AUSTRALIA
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small investors (40.7  per cent), Australian institutions (21 per  cent), foreign
institutions (19  per cent),  stockbrokers  and  financial  planners’  clients
(15 per cent) and staff (4 per cent) (Budde 1998m).
Table 2.9 List of licensed carriers, January 1999
Carrier licence granted to: Date licence granted
Telstra Corporation Ltd 1 July 1997
Optus Networks Pty Ltd 1 July 1997
Optus Mobile Pty Ltd 1 July 1997
Vodafone Pty Ltd 1 July 1997
AAP Telecommunications Pty Ltd 1 July 1997
Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd 1 July 1997
Optus Vision Pty Ltd 1 July 1997
Telstra Multimedia 1 July 1997
Horizon Telecommunications Pty Ltd 25 July 1997
OMNIconnect Pty Ltd 19 August 1997
United Energy Telecommunications Pty Ltd 27 August 1997
Windytide Pty Ltd 4 September 1997
Northgate Communications Australia — Ballarat Pty Ltd 3 December 1997
Macrocom Pty Ltd 18 December 1997
Oz Telecom Pty Ltd 2 March 1998
WorldCom Australia Pty Ltd 24 March 1998
Iridium South Pacific Pty Ltd 2 April 1998
PanAmSat Asia Carrier Services Inc 1 May 1998
Spectrum Network Systems Ltd 6 May 1998
Agile Pty Ltd 15 May 1998
Xinhua News Telecommunications Pty Ltd c/- Hunt & Hunt Lawyers 1 June 1998
Amcom Pty Ltd Unit 28 July 1998
Davnet Pty Ltd 1 September 1998
SCCL Australia Ltd 22 September 1998
Hutchison Telecommunications (Australia) Ltd 30 September 1998
Source: www.aca.gov.au, accessed January 1999.
As at June 1998, Telstra had 57 234 full-time employees, generated $17 billion
in revenue in 1997–98 and reported an operating profit before income tax of
$4.5 billion (Telstra 1998a).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Telstra provides local call services and basic access to virtually all homes and
most businesses in Australia. It is also the major provider of international and
national long-distance services.
Fixed local and national long-distance telecommunications (including basic
access) accounted for 40 per cent of Telstra’s revenue in 1997–98. International
telephone services revenue contributed a further 8 per cent (see Table 2.10).
Telstra’s network is large and diverse (see Box 2.2). Virtually every residence in
Australia is connected to the PSTN via Telstra’s local loop. It operates fixed and
mobile networks for voice telephony, and a number of switched and dedicated
digital networks. Broadband services via fibre optic and hybrid fibre coaxial
(HFC) cable are also provided.
Telstra currently operates both analogue and digital mobile networks.4 The
analogue (AMPS) network is among the world’s largest, consisting of about
41 switching centres and 1361 base stations and providing coverage of more
than 346 000 sq km (about 4.5 per cent of the continent) to 91 per cent of the
population. Telstra’s digital mobile (GSM) network was launched in 1993. By
June 1997, Telstra had invested more than $1 billion in expanding the network
to provide coverage for 90 per cent of the population. At June 1997, its digital
mobile network consisted of 11 mobile switching centres, 8 home location
registers and 1763 base stations.
Until recently, Telstra provided ISDN services via an overlay network
(consisting of 28 nodes situated in capital cities and provincial cities) which was
integrated with the PSTN. Under its FMO capital program, ISDN is now
available on nearly all local exchanges. Using these delivery options,
93.4 per cent of Telstra customers could gain access to ISDN services (within
90 days where the deployment of a modular unit is required). Telstra’s plan is
for ISDN access to Australian customers to grow from 30  000 in 1997 to
1.1 million by 2000 (Budde 1998n, p.3).
Telstra began a $400 million upgrade to ISDN services in 1996 and launched a
new suite of ISDN services under the tradename On-Ramp. This upgrade should
be finalised by the end of 1998. On-Ramp is based on the Euro-ISDN (ETSI)
standard which provides increased performance and a greater range of features.
                                             
4  The analogue network is scheduled to be closed down in metropolitan areas on 1 January
2000. The Government is considering extending operation of the AMPS network in some
regional areas to ensure residents in these areas continue to ‘enjoy reasonably equivalent
coverage’ by mobile networks post 1 January 2000.2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES IN AUSTRALIA
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Table 2.10 Telstra revenue by major product and service category for
years ended 30 June, 1996 to 1998
1995–96 1996–97 1997–98
Revenue category ($m) (%) ($m) (%) ($m) (%)
Sales revenue
Basic access
a 1 727 11 1 740 11 1 770 10
Local calls
b 2 669 18 2 664 17 2 664 15
National long-distance calls
c 2 505 16 2 455 15 2 594 15
International telephone services
d 1 338 9 1 342 8 1 380 8
Mobile telecommunications services
e 1 705 11 1 981 12 2 154 12
Data and text services
f 1 574 10 1 883 12 2 097 12
Directory services
g 709 5 723 5 1 013 6
Customer premises equipment
h 611 4 576 4 538 3
Intercarrier services
i 485 3 558 3 582 3
Public payphones
j 259 2 248 2 225 1
Other sales and services
k 1 134 8 1 266 8 1 803 10
Total sales revenue 14 716 97 15 436 97 16 819 97
Other revenue
l 523 3 547 3 483 3
Operating revenue $15 239 100 $15 983 100 17 302 100
a Revenue from installation and connection charges and monthly rental fees associated with providing
basic connection between customer premises and Telstra’s PSTN.
b Revenue associated with local calling and certain billable value-added services.
c Revenue from fixed-to-fixed national long-distance calls, including calls made from independently
operated payphones to Australian fixed and mobile telephones and calls from Telstra’s non-PSTN
network to Australian mobile telephones. Excludes calls from non-PSTN networks, such as ISDN,
VPNs and FaxStream® services.
d Revenue from international outgoing calls, fees charged by Telstra to overseas telecommunications
carriers for carriage and termination services, operator assisted international calls and the transit of
international traffic.
e Revenue from initial connection charges, monthly access fees and usage charges, sales of mobile
handsets and charges for a number of value-added and paging services. Excludes provision of analogue
services to Optus.
f Principally revenue from data transmission services, dedicated leased lines, ISDN access and call
revenue, and facsimile products such as FaxStream® services.
g Revenue from advertising fees for special listings, value-added directory products and services such as
electronic and online services.
h Revenue from the rental of customer premises equipment including the sale of small business systems,
maintenance of PBX systems, rental and sale of telephones and telecommunications equipment.
i Revenue from the provision of services to other carriers and service providers.
j Revenue from coin-paid calls from public payphones and pre-paid phone cards .
k Revenue from other sales and services including intelligent network products and services, various
controlled entities, Internet access and intranet products and services, domestic operator-assisted calls,
Pay-TV connections, ship-to-shore services, recorded message and other enhanced call products.
l Includes interest received/receivable, proceeds from sale of assets/investments, dividends
received/receivable and miscellaneous revenue.
Source: Telstra (1997; 1998).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Box 2.2 Major features of the Telstra network, June 1997
Fixed network:
·  local access network to 9.4 million lines;
·  5000 local exchanges of which 84 per cent were digital;
·  200 digital switches;
·  2700 digital radio systems;
·  over 2.4 million kilometres of fibre optic trunk network;
·  5000km of SDH (synchronous digital hierarchy) lines running from Perth to
Brisbane;
·  digital undersea cable to Tasmania;
·  broadband cable network passed 2.1 million homes;
·  international Internet bandwidth 32Mbps, national 64Mbps;
·  international gateways;
·  partner in several fibre optic submarine cable networks;
·  sixth largest investor in IntelSat;
·  fibre optic loops in major business centres; and
·  a wide variety of data connection networks.
  Mobile network:
·  analogue AMPS: 41 switches and 1361 base stations; and
·  digital GSM: 11 switches and 1763 base stations.
Source: Budde (1998n).
Following trials in the early 1990s, Telstra developed a five-year plan to roll-out
synchronous digital hierarchy (SDH) links between major capital cities, and
fibre optic loops within capital cities, that would provide a ‘future proof’ fibre
optic network for businesses. Roll-out began in 1994 and is expected to cost
more than $500 million over the life of the plan. Telstra’s SDH network has the
capacity to carry 30 000 simultaneous long-distance calls, 64 broadcast quality
TV channels, 240 Pay TV channels or 250 000 data channels (Budde 1998n,
p.5). At Port Headland the network is linked to the international submarine
cable JASURAUS, connecting Australia with Indonesia and other Asian
countries.
Cable & Wireless Optus Limited (C&W Optus)
C&W Optus (then Optus Communications) was awarded its licence to become
Australia’s second facilities-based carrier in November 1991.2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES IN AUSTRALIA
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Initially owned by a private consortium, C&W Optus listed on the Australian
Stock Exchange in November 1998. As at February 1999, the UK-based Cable
& Wireless held 52.8 per cent of the shares. The remainder is owned by major
Australian and international institutional investors as well as a large number of
private investors.
As at June 30 1998, C&W Optus employed 5745 full-time and full-time
equivalent employees and generated $2.9 billion in revenue (Optus 1998a, pp.
6 and 60).
C&W Optus is the second largest provider of telecommunications services in
Australia and provides a broad range of telecommunications services
including: Mobile Communications Services; National and International Long
Distance; Local Telephony Services; Business Network Services (BNS);
Internet Services and Premium TV. In 1997–98 C&W Optus’s largest business
line, Mobile Services and Equipment, accounted for 46 per cent of operating
revenue. Long Distance services and Business Network Services accounted for
36 per cent and 13 per cent of operating revenue respectively (Optus 1998a,
p. 38).
C&W Optus launched its AMPS analogue mobile telephone service in June
1992 (leasing capacity on Telstra’s network) followed by its GSM digital
mobile telephone service (using its own network) in May 1993. As at June
1998, Optus had 1.62 million mobile subscribers (with 74 per cent of those
customers connected to the digital network), representing about 30 per cent of
the mobile market (24 and 33 per cent of the analogue and digital mobile
markets, respectively) (Optus 1998a, pp. 38–9).
C&W Optus launched its national and international long-distance call service in
November 1992. By December 1996, C&W Optus was offering this service to
more than 99 per cent of the Australian population. As at June 1998,
C&W Optus had obtained a 17 per cent share of long-distance traffic (in market
minutes) (Optus 1998a, p. 40).
C&W Optus launched its BNS in December 1992 and initial services included
Interlink™, Datalink™ and BusinessNet Premier™. BNS services have
subsequently been augmented and currently generate more than $375 million a
year in revenue (Optus 1998a, p. 70).
Optus operates four principle networks. The fixed long-distance and mobile
networks were rolled out by Optus itself, the satellite network acquired with
Aussat in 1991 and since expanded, and the broadband local network acquired
through the acquisition of Optus Vision.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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The Optus fixed network comprises more than 8500 kilometres of fibre optic
cable linking Brisbane to Perth via Sydney, Canberra, Melbourne and Adelaide.
Switching centres for national long-distance traffic are located in six Australian
cities, with international switches located in Sydney and Melbourne. Optus’s
network is one of the first in the world to be built around the SDH standard and
is complemented by ATM technology to enhance the provision of high speed
communications services.
Fibre optic loops in the CBDs of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth, Adelaide
and Canberra provide business and government customers with direct access to
C&W Optus’s fixed backbone network.
The wireless component of the C&W Optus’s network is largely comprised of a
digital mobile phone network based on the international GSM standard. It
consists of over 1150 base stations connected to mobile switching centres by
microwave, fibre optic cable or leased lines from Telstra. Mobile switching
centres are connected to C&W Optus’s fixed backbone network. This network
currently provides coverage to 92 per cent of the Australian population.
C&W Optus also has a satellite mobile phone service called MobileSat, which
provides coverage to 100 per cent of the continent and up to 200 kilometres out
to sea. MobileSat uses C&W Optus’s own communications satellites.
Optus gained three satellites when it acquired Aussat in 1991 and two more
have been launched since (C&W Optus currently has 4 satellites in operation).
C&W Optus also has a number of international satellite earth stations which
provide up and down links to INTELSAT satellites for the transmission of
international traffic.
At present, most television broadcasts in Australia pass through an Optus
satellite at least once. These satellites also provide a backup to C&W Optus’s
terrestrial network.
In February 1996, Optus launched Project Aurora, a plan to migrate the current
13 analogue satellite transponders to 5 digital ones which will free up capacity
for a large number of new services including data broadcasting, video-
conferencing and high-speed Internet services.
The broadband local network acquired through Optus Vision has passed
2 million homes in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane. The network is a hybrid
fibre coaxial network with an initial capacity of 750Mhz to the customer and
42 Mhz from the customer which is sufficient to carry pay TV, telephony, full2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES IN AUSTRALIA
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two-way high-speed access to data transmission and other digital and interactive
services.5
Vodafone
Vodafone became Australia’s third mobile carrier in December 1992. Vodafone
Australia is owned jointly by Vodafone UK (90.5 per cent), AAP (5 per cent)
and Philip Cornish (4.5 per cent).6 However, Vodafone has foreshadowed a
public float around the year 2000.
As at November 1997, Vodafone controlled 6.7 per cent of the total mobile
market and 20 to 25 per cent of the GSM market. Vodafone’s revenue has
increased from $135 million in 1995–96 to about $500 million in 1997. Over
the same period, the number of subscribers has grown from 200 000 to about
450  000 and is expected to increase to 1.5  million by the year 2000
(Budde 1998o).
Vodafone is operating as a wholesaler, relying on 15 service providers with
650 outlets for the delivery of services to the end customer.
Vodafone commenced operation of Australia’s first fully digital network on
1  October 1993 for Sydney, Melbourne and Canberra — with coverage
extended to all capital cities in March 1994. Vodafone estimated that, as at
February 1998, it had coverage of 92 per cent of the Australian population
(hand-held and car-kit) (www.vodafone.com.au, April 1998).7
Through a number of international alliances and partnerships, the Vodafone
network also allows ‘automatic’ and ‘plastic’ global roaming in 78 countries.8
The terrestrial network will also be supplemented by interconnection with the
Globalstar satellite consortium in late 1998 (see Box 2.3).
                                             
5  Internet access via cable modem is expected to be available in the near future.  It is
anticipated that this technology will deliver speeds up to 100 times faster than standard
dial up modem products.
6  Vodafone UK controls more than 50 per cent of the mobile phone market in the UK and
operates networks and services in ten other countries. Globally, Vodafone UK services
more than 4 million subscribers.
7 Mobile phones mounted in car-kits generally have greater range.
8  With ‘automatic’ global roaming, subscribers use their own handset and Vodafone mobile
phone number while travelling in countries which have the GSM system and with whom
Vodafone Australia has a roaming agreement. Alternatively, subscribers can obtain access
to ‘plastic’ global roaming by using a different SmartCard (and therefore a different phone
number), while travelling in countries which have a roaming agreement with Vodafone
UK (www.vodafone.com.au, June 1998).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Box 2.3 Globalstar
There are several global satellite systems in the advanced stages of planning and
implementation. One such system is Globalstar, which is currently being developed by
Vodafone and a number of other multinational companies. Globalstar is a network of 48
low-earth orbiting satellites (LEOs) scheduled to be launched in January 1999.
Globalstar will enable customers with dual-mode handsets to use their mobile phones
almost anywhere in the world. It is estimated that by 2002 Globalstar will be providing
service to 2.7 million customers, and to 16 million by 2012.
Globalstar will cover 100 per cent of Australia and its coastal waters. Consequently it
will provide coverage to the 10 to 15 per cent of the population living in rural and
remote areas that will not be serviced by the terrestrial networks. Vodafone has
developed a site at Dubbo (NSW) to be used for the new satellite service. A second
gateway will be built in Darwin.
Source: www.vodafone.com.au, April 1998.
AAP Telecommunications (AAPT)
Established in 1991, AAP Telecommunications (AAPT) operated under a
Service Provider’s Class Licence to compete with Telstra in the switched long-
distance and international telecommunications markets. In July 1997, AAPT
was granted a carrier licence, becoming the largest of several organisations to
migrate from service provider to carrier under the new liberalised arrangements.
AAPT listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in November 1997 (the
first Australian carrier to do so), placing about 16 per cent of ownership in
public hands. The balance of ownership is distributed between AAP Information
Services Pty Ltd (AAPIS) (Australia), Todd Communications (Australia) Ltd
and Singapore Telecom International (Australia) PTE Ltd which hold about 40,
21 and 21 per cent of all shares respectively (Budde 1998a, p.1).
AAPT is the third largest long-distance telecommunications service provider in
Australia. In 1997, it provided voice, data, frame relay, Internet, mobile and
facsimile services to 300  000 (100  000 residential and 200  000 business)
customers and is estimated to have generated $392 million in revenue. AAPT’s
major revenue source is the rebilling of other carriers’ services (including
mobile services), which accounted for 46 per cent ($87 million) of revenue for
the six months to June 1997. For the same period, data services accounted for
7  per cent ($13 million), international services accounted for 18  per cent
($34  million), and long-distance services accounted for 29 per cent
($54 million) of revenue, respectively (Budde 1998a, p.1).2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES IN AUSTRALIA
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AAPT delivers telecommunications services via its virtual private network
(VPN) which consists of:
· AAPT’s fully-owned Vantage network — an intelligent network that
includes major switching exchanges in all capitals (except Darwin and
Hobart), and 13 smaller exchanges or intelligent nodes in regional
locations;
· High-capacity trunk links leased from Telstra and Optus;
· Dedicated access lines from customer premises; and
· Interconnection with a number of submarine cables.
AAPT has invested more than $90 million in its own fully-digital network and
expects to continue investing $20 million a year. At present about 80 per cent of
AAPT’s services are carried on its own network (Budde 1998a, p.4).
The terrestrial network is backed up by Sat-Tel, AAPT's fully-owned satellite
network, with additional satellite-based services provided through PanAmSat.
Mobile services are provided through Cellular One (Vodafone’s largest
independent network reseller), in which AAPT has had a 40 per cent interest
since 1996.
Service providers
Service providers are a significant and innovative segment of the
telecommunications services industry. There is also evidence that a strong
service provider segment can promote greater growth and innovation than
markets where carriers predominate (or have a monopoly). However, one
prerequisite for this is a regulatory environment that encourages competition via
open and reasonably priced interconnection.
In an attempt to improve the image of the service provider market, a number of
service providers negotiated voluntary membership of the Telecommunications
Industry Ombudsman (TIO) scheme in 1995–96. Under the TA  1997, all
carriage service providers have to belong to the scheme from July 1998, which
also includes some 500 Internet service providers.
Service providers can be segmented into four categories:
· Switched service providers;
· Switchless service providers;
· Mobile service providers (which are also switchless); and
· International service providers (which can be either switched or
switchless).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Switched service providers: Businesses that combine their own switching and
network facilities with those of facilities-based carriers. Switched service
providers have high entry costs but can retain between 35 per cent to 40 per cent
of their resale revenue. This is higher than the 10 per cent to 20 per cent retained
by switchless carriage service providers because of lower interconnect costs
(Budde 1999a, p.2). The principle difference between switched service
providers and facility-based carriers is their scale of operation and regulatory
requirements.
Switchless service providers:  These service providers do not own their own
infrastructure and typically onsell basic carriage services, generating profit from
the margin between the retail price to their customers and the volume discounts
they can negotiate with the facilities-based carriers. Switchless service provider
categories include aggregators, rebillers and dealer networks:
·  Aggregators: Customers receive a share of the volume discount, although
billing is still managed by the carrier. The value-added by the service
provider is low and profits rely on discount margins. This form of resale is
declining under new tariff arrangements by the carriers.
·  Rebillers: Rebillers process raw data from the carrier with ‘smart’
software. This allows for a greater range of management services
including bill analysis (with an estimated error detection rate of
10 per cent (Budde 1998b, p.3)), and represents a value-added component
by the service provider that is much higher than under simple aggregation.
This is currently one of the stronger markets for switchless service
providers.
·  Dealer networks: Approved dealers are able to resell to residential and
small business markets at discounts of approximately 15, 12 and 3 per cent
for long-distance, international and local calls respectively. Although
dealers do not ‘own’ their customer lists, they benefit from Telstra’s large
dealership development budget. One example of a dealer network is
Telstra’s ‘Solution Plus Dealership’ plan.
Overall, switchless resale is the largest (in numbers) service provider segment
and is expected to account for more than 10 per cent of long-distance revenue
by the year 2000 (Budde 1999a, p.3).
Mobile services providers: Mainly engaged in resale, mobile service providers
are one of the strongest growth areas of the service provider segment. Each of
the top three carriers has developed networks of (non-exclusive) service
providers to resell their mobile services:
· Telstra MobileNet:  CXA Communications, Corptel, Axicorp, United
Telecommunications;2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES IN AUSTRALIA
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· Optus Communications:  First Direct, Link Communications, Hutchison,
One.Tel, First Netcom; and
· Vodafone: AAPT, Advanced Communications, Cellular One
Communications, Digicall-Vodata, GSM Renta Fone, Martin Dawes
Communications Pty Ltd, MobileCom, Mobile Innovations, Myline,
Nomad Telecommunications, Talkland, Total Tel, Vodac, Votel,
Winterton Communications.
There are also numerous mobile phone retailers who sell handsets and act as
agents for the carriers. However, billing and customer support is supplied by the
carrier.
International service providers:  More commonly referred to as callback
operators, they derive profits from the differences in international tariffs that
exist between countries. In the past, these differences have allowed callback
operators to offer customers discounts of between 25 and 30 per cent. However,
falling outbound international tariffs and the emergence of new
telecommunications alliances that offer globally managed services foreshadow
limited growth in this segment. In Australia, the callback market is estimated to
account for less than $8 million of the $1.5 billion international call market.
Although there are several operators active in the callback market, Telegroup
Australia with 15 000 customers claims to control 95 per cent of the market
(Budde 1998b, pp. 6-8).
2.5 In summary
The services provided by the telecommunications services industry are a major
input to many industries, particularly those in the service sector (currently the
fastest growing sector in the Australian economy). The industry itself also
makes a significant and growing contribution to economic activity.
Growth prospects and the level of competition vary among market segments.
Those experiencing the greatest growth relative to the traditional voice services
are mobile, data and value-added services. These are also areas where entry and,
potentially, competition have been the greatest.
Technological developments and convergence have significant implications for
the network infrastructure and the cost, quality and range of telecommunications
services that carriers deliver. These developments centre on digitalisation that
allows for a range of services (voice, data, video) to be transmitted across
common infrastructure. Data and multimedia communications are the areas
likely to have the greatest benefit from these developments.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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That said, new technologies are not expected to significantly affect comparisons
in the price of traditional voice services in the benchmarked countries,
particularly as all have access to the latest technology. However, the changing
usage patterns necessitate some consideration of broadband data services such
as ATM, frame relay and ISDN in price comparisons.
Another practical consideration of technological development is that price
comparisons must be based on carriers providing a comprehensive range of
services. For Australia, the incumbent, Telstra, dominates all segments of the
market (see Table 2.10).
The telecommunications industry has become increasingly important to the
competitiveness of other industries and, therefore, it is crucial that it is efficient.
The rapidly changing nature of the industry highlights the importance of
innovation and investment (dynamic efficiency). An efficient industry that
exploits new technology and is responsive to changing demands benefits
business and private consumers.37
3 SOCIAL POLICY AND RETAIL PRICE
REGULATION
Government involvement in the telecommunications industry has significant
implications for benchmarking comparisons. An understanding of regulatory
and institutional arrangements is important because they affect performance
measures, including prices.
Social policies (including the Universal Service Obligation (USO) and retail
price regulation) form one part of the regulatory arrangements surrounding the
Australian telecommunications industry. Another significant part is competition
policy which is discussed in Chapter 4.
In Australia, there is currently a range of social obligations placed on
telecommunications providers:
·  the USO;
·  emergency call services;
·  operator services and directory assistance;
·  a customer service guarantee; and
·  itemised billing of timed calls, with the option of itemised billing of
untimed local calls.
  There are also a range of retail price controls in place, including price caps and a
requirement for untimed local calls.
  The most significant of the social policy obligations are the USO, retail price
regulation and the regulation of service quality. The aim of this Chapter is to
describe the arrangements for the provision of the USO (Section 3.1) and retail
price regulations (Section 3.2) in Australia. The arrangements in other countries
are also discussed briefly and important differences identified.
  Arrangements regulating quality of service are outlined in Chapter 7.
  The arrangements described in this Chapter were those in place as at February
1998 when the price comparisons presented in Chapters  5 and 6 were
conducted. Unless otherwise indicated, documentation published by the
regulatory authorities and relevant Ministries in each country was used.
  The application of USOs and other controls affect prices. An understanding of
these effects is required to interpret differences in the prices reported for each
country in Chapters 5 and 6.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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3.1 The Universal Service Obligation
  In Australia and in other countries covered by this study, the USO was
traditionally a condition for the incumbent’s retention of its monopoly. The
costs of providing the USO were borne by the incumbent.
  All of the countries studied, including Australia, retained some form of USO
requirement following the introduction of competition (see Table  3.1).
However, not all provide a mechanism for funding this obligation.
Purpose of the USO
  The purpose of the current Australian USO is:
  ... to safeguard access to a minimum standard of essential communications
services for all persons in Australia. This recognises the fundamental importance
of telecommunications in supporting effective participation in Australian society
(Explanatory Memorandum to the TA 1997, vol. 1).
  The role of the USO in achieving access to basic voice telephony services in
Australia is difficult to assess. The high percentage of households with a
telephone in Australia and the other countries covered by the study may not be
solely attributable to the USO (see Table 3.2). All these countries have well-
developed systems of telecommunications and high per capita incomes.
  Defining the USO — Australia
  Telstra remains the nominated universal service provider. Although the
legislation allowed for the possibility that the USO (or sections of it) could be
fulfilled by other carriers, this provision has not been invoked.3 SOCIAL POLICY AND RETAIL PRICE REGULATION
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Table 3.1 USO requirements in the selected countries, 1996
 
   USO  requirements
 
  Australia   Requires that standard telephone services, including services for the disabled, public
payphones and prescribed carriage services are reasonably accessible to all people in
Australia on an equitable basis, wherever they reside or carry on business.
 
  Canada   Requires that telephone services be provided to all who can pay for it, but customer access
and usage charges are not required to be maintained at a uniform level across the country.
 
  Finland   Dominant operators must serve all customers in their territory.
 
  France   Obligation to provide a quality telephone service at an affordable price
 
  Japan   The USO requires uniform and regulated charges for local calls and customer access. In
high-cost areas these charges are cross-subsidised by customer access charges in more
populated and therefore less costly areas, and by long-distance charges.
 
  NZ   The Kiwi Share Obligation on TCNZ:
·  mandates maintenance of the option of free local calls for residential customers, but
tariff packages incorporating charges for local calls may be offered as an optional
alternative;
·  prohibits real increases in residential customer access charges, subject to no
‘unreasonable impairment’ of the overall profitability of the TCNZ’s subsidiary
regional operating companies;
·  requires the ordinary residential telephone service to be made as widely available as it
was at 11 September 1990; and
·  obliges TCNZ to maintain rural customer access charges at rates no higher than the
standard residential rental.
  The Obligation does not extend to public payphones.
 
  Sweden   Telia is obliged to provide telephony services between fixed points to all regardless of
where they live at an affordable price.
 
 UK ·  a connection to the fixed network able to support voice telephony and low speed
data and fax transmission;
·  the option of a more restricted service package at low cost; and
·  reasonable geographic access to public call boxes across the UK at affordable
prices.
  US   Local Exchange Carriers (LECs) must average call prices for a given distance across their
entire service areas, regardless of differences in costs. They must give customers in remote
areas access to telecommunications services that are ‘reasonably’ comparable to services
provided in urban areas at charges which are ‘reasonably’ comparable.
  Services must be provided at concessional rates to libraries, educational and health
facilities and low-income customers.
  There is no legal requirement for LECs to install and maintain public payphones.  
Source: EC (1997); Harris and Kraft (1997, p. 109); MoC (1997); TA 1997; Appendix E.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Table 3.2 Household penetration rates in Australia and the selected
countries, 1996
 
    Households with a telephone   Residential main lines per 100 household  
   (per  cent)  (number)
 Australia  96.4  96.4
 Canada  98.7  >100
 Finland  95.0  88.3
 France  97.0  >100
 Japan  not  reported  96.2
 New  Zealand  96.0  >100
 Sweden  not  reported  >100
 UK  91.1  96.1
 US  93.9  >100  
Note: Since households may have more than one residential main line or, alternatively, may share a main
line with other households, column 2 is not necessarily identical to column 3.
Source: ITU (1998a, p. A23).
  In Australia, the USO is defined in the Telecommunications Act 1997 (TA
1997) as the obligation to ensure that:
·  standard telephone services, including services for the disabled;
·  public payphones; and
·  prescribed carriage services
  are reasonably accessible to all people in Australia on an equitable basis,
wherever they reside or carry on business.
  Carriers are required to offer the option of untimed local calls. However, this
obligation is not part of the USO requirement. Rather, the provision of untimed
local calls forms part of retail price regulation (see Section 3.2).
  This is commensurate with the main feature of the Australian USO, which
requires the provision of a standardised service to all areas at ‘equitable’ prices.
The Explanatory Memorandum to the TA 1997 makes it clear that the USO
does not encompass affordability. Rather, affordability is a matter which should
be dealt with through such mechanisms as price controls:
  In relation to the concepts of ‘reasonable access’ and ‘equitable basis’, it should
be noted that these concepts are intended to relate principally to access in
geographical terms and equity in terms of equality of opportunity, rather than
concept of affordability. While affordability is clearly important to access in
general terms, it is a matter which the Government considers should not be
embedded in the USO itself, but should be tackled through other (transparent)
mechanisms such as competition, price control and targeted assistance
(Explanatory Memorandum to the TA 1997, vol. 1).3 SOCIAL POLICY AND RETAIL PRICE REGULATION
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  The standard telephone service is voice telephony. The standard telephone
service and prescribed carriage services must be supplied on request. According
to the Explanatory Memorandum to the TA 1997, the intention is:
  ... that people will always have reasonable access to a minimum service that is of
general appeal and that can change over time, while providing a mechanism to
ensure that more advanced services, which may not be of general appeal, can be
required to be made accessible under the USO, without affecting overall access
to the basic service (Explanatory Memorandum, TA 1997, vol. 1).
  The USO provider must also supply a service of equivalent functionality to the
standard telephone to those whose disability prevents the use of the equipment
normally supplied to customers.
  All reasonable requests for the provision of a payphone must be met by the
provider. The Minister may also determine that a payphone should be provided
at a particular location. Customer equipment must be supplied under the USO.
At a minimum, this is a telephone which allows calls to be made and received,
but does not necessarily have other functionality.
  In addition, there are a number of statutory obligations for consumer protection
which are not included in the legislation. For example, all carriage service
providers supplying the standard telephone service must offer access to
emergency and directory services, operator assistance, untimed local calls and
itemised billing for calls priced on a timed basis. A number of these
requirements apply in most other countries covered by this study, and are
sometimes, but not always, included in legislation.
  The TA 1997 provides two means of adjusting and upgrading the services
covered by the USO over time. Changes can be effected by prescribing
additional purposes or performance characteristics for the standard telephone
service or by expanding the definition of the USO to include new carriage
services.
  Prescribing additional purposes or performance characteristics for the standard
telephone service requires the USO provider to deliver the upgraded service
universally. Expanding the definition of the USO requires that the upgraded
service be delivered only to those who request the new carriage service.
  Costing and funding USOs
  The TA 1997 specifies three permissible alternatives for estimating the ‘total’
costs of the USO in Australia:
·  the ‘avoidable cost less revenue foregone’ method;
·  the amount established in any tendering or other selection process; orINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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·  the amount agreed between the carriers.1
  Under the ‘avoidable cost less revenue foregone’ method, the provider may
claim costs for ‘net cost areas’ only. ‘Net cost areas’ are areas in which the
provider is likely to make a ‘substantial loss’ in the course of delivering the
USO. They are declared by the Australian Communications Authority (ACA)
after making suitable inquiries. The ACA must be satisfied that the loss is
beyond the provider’s power to avoid or mitigate.
  The cost of the Australian USO was originally estimated by the Bureau of
Transport and Communications Economics (BTCE) in 1989. Using an
avoidable cost-based model, the BTCE estimated the net USO cost at around
$250 million (see Box 3.1). This estimate subsequently became the basis for the
USO costing under the cost sharing arrangements established by the
Telecommunications Act 1991.
  However, the model prescribed in the legislation proved ‘essentially very
difficult and … unworkable’ (Lomdahl 1997 quoted in Langtry 1998, p. 30).
Consequently, in 1993–94, Telstra, Vodafone and Optus commercially agreed to
a USO cost of $230 million, indexed at CPI in subsequent years.
  Recently, the ACA engaged Bellcore to assess the original model and develop a
more accurate costing of the USO. Using the Bellcore model, Telstra
subsequently claimed that the net cost of the USO is $1.8 million. As part of the
assessment of this claim a further study was commissioned by the ACA which
implies a much lower than $1.8 million net cost (Gibson Quai and Associates
and Ovum (1998)).
  A policy principle of the TA 1997 is that the USO should be fulfilled as
efficiently and economically as practicable. This is not to be at the expense of
achieving the USO, but is directed at ensuring that the provider delivers it cost-
effectively (Explanatory Memorandum of the TA 1997, vol. 1). The legislation
provides that the Minister may reduce the net cost claimed by Telstra.
  USO providers are required to submit plans outlining how they intend to meet
their USO for Ministerial approval. Prior to obtaining Ministerial approval, a
preliminary draft must be made available for public comment. The plans must
include the performance standards to which the provider will be subject under
the Consumer Service Guarantee. For example, Telstra’s Universal Service Plan
includes an undertaking to reduce connection times to the basic phone service in
very remote areas lacking existing infrastructure (Australian Financial Review
19 May 1998).
                                             
1 The Minister may also make a determination specifying a method of determining the cost.
However, its adoption requires the written consent of the USO provider.3 SOCIAL POLICY AND RETAIL PRICE REGULATION
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Box 3.1 The current agreed cost of the Australian USO, 1998
  In 1989, the Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics (BTCE) estimated the
cost of the USO to Telecom using the ‘avoidable cost (net of revenue foregone)’ method
(now incorporated in the legislation) as approximately A$250 million. This approach
estimated the cost of the USO by summing only those costs that could have been avoided
if the USO had not been provided. Revenue foregone includes the sum of incoming and
outgoing call revenue.
  This was in contrast to the ‘distributed cost’ method then advocated by Telecom, which
resulted in an estimation of A$800 million. Under this method, all costs are allocated to
the USO and non-USO services regardless of whether they would have been incurred if
the USO had not been provided. The rationale was that the system would have had a
different configuration if it had not been for the USO. Revenue included outgoing call
revenue only.
  Maddock (1996) identifies the difference between the distributed cost and avoidable
costs methodologies as the treatment of joint costs incurred in providing both the USO
and non-USO services. He also nominates a third method — the ‘stand-alone cost’
approach — as the method that a new entrant would use to price the activity concerned.
If there are economies of scale and scope, the stand-alone cost will be higher than
avoidable cost. The use of the stand-alone cost method involves leaving all the benefits
of such economies with the owner of the enterprise. The use of the avoidable cost
methodology gives the benefits of economies to the USO recipients — leaving the fixed
costs to be recovered from other customers.
a The stand-alone cost approach involves estimating the costs that would have been incurred if the
USO alone was delivered.
 
  The TA 1997 also requires that the costs of the USO be shared among carriers
so that no one carrier is disadvantaged (see Table 3.3). To this end, the costs of
the USO must be shared in proportion to carriers’ shares of ‘eligible revenue’
(as defined in regulations). After obtaining the consent of participating carriers,
the Minister may specify another cost-sharing mechanism.
  Loading all the costs onto a single carrier would be incompatible with
competition policy:
  It is generally recognised that a universal service provider that must subsidise
USO losses by itself in a competitive regime is at a disadvantage (Explanatory
Memorandum to the TA 1997, vol. 1).
  Moreover, distributing the burden is intended to ensure the sustainability of the
USO.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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  However, USO arrangements must not under- or over- compensate the provider
for the cost of the USO.2 Under- or over-compensation may impede the
establishment of a fully competitive market, impairing the long-term interests of
end-users.
  In the United Kingdom, the Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL) argued
that funding through the Government budget is the ‘fairest and least distorting’
mechanism of funding a USO (OFTEL 1995, p. 62). Moreover, since it avoids
cross-subsidisation, it is potentially the most transparent mechanism, provided
all social obligations are costed and included in the estimates. Few, if any, of the
selected countries practice direct funding of the USO.
  In the United Kingdom, OFTEL estimated the annual cost of the USO as being
between £50 million ($131 million)3 and £100 million ($262 million)
(OFTEL 1997d, p. 17).
  In the United States, Inter-Exchange Carriers (IXCs) and all other suppliers of
interstate services are now required to contribute to a universal service fund for
high-cost areas served by incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (LECs), in
proportion to their revenues from interstate services. In effect, this involves a
continuation of partial subsidisation through the pricing structure.4
  Lewin and Kee (1997) estimates the cost of the USO in the United States as
$US1.65 billion in mid 1997, of which $US1.5 billion is attributable to the high
cost area subsidy.
  USOs in the United States were previously financed through averaging across
geographic areas and a surcharge on charges for access to the services of LECs
paid for by the IXCs. Concern about the efficiency of such arrangements led to
new approaches.5
                                             
2 Violations of competitive neutrality are likely to deter efficient entry, investment and
innovation.
3 Using a conversion rate of £1 to $2.7.
4 Consideration is also being given to competitive tendering for supply of the basic
telephone service in small rural areas of the US (Ovum 1997).
5 These inefficiencies were mainly as a result of immunity from competition for LECs by
new entrants in subsidised areas and inefficient entry in areas providing the subsidy. The
contributions through access charges led to inefficient by-pass (Vogelsang and Mitchell
1997). Inefficient by-pass is duplication of the network which is not cost effective.3 SOCIAL POLICY AND RETAIL PRICE REGULATION
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Table 3.3 Funding USOs, January 1998
 
   Funding  mechanism
 
  Australia   The costs of the USO must be shared among carriers so that no one carrier is
disadvantaged. To this end, the costs of the USO are shared in proportion to
carriers’ shares of ‘eligible revenue’. After obtaining the consent of participating
carriers, the Minister may specify another cost-sharing mechanism.
  Canada   Carriers are required to contribute to the USO requirement through a Portable
Contribution Subsidy. The Subsidy is an explicit toll levied on all long-distance
traffic carried on the local telephone network. The funds are distributed to all
local carriers based on subsidy requirements per residential Network Access
Services or equivalent by rate band.
  Finland   There is no specific universal scheme and as such universal service costs are not
borne by other market participants. Incumbent must meet all universal service
costs.
  France   A national universal service fund was established in 1997. Net costs of overall
geographic supply will be compensated by interconnection surcharges until
31 December 2000 at the latest.
  Japan   Designated carriers must bare the cost of the USO’s provision. Funding of the
USO is to be reviewed in 2000.
  New Zealand   Kiwi Share Obligation is met by TCNZ through surcharges on its interconnection
rates.
  Sweden   There is no specific universal scheme and as such universal service costs are not
borne by other market players. Incumbent must meet all universal service costs.
 United
Kingdom
  BT is responsible for the provision of the universal service obligation but the cost
of the obligation is not re-imbursed.
  United States   Each telecommunications carrier that provides interstate or intrastate
telecommunications services must contribute, on an equitable and non-




  The European Commission permits, but does not require, the establishment of
cost-sharing arrangements to finance USOs. It reports that nine member States
(from a total of 15) have decided either that the costs of the USO do not
constitute an unfair burden on the provider or that the costs of establishing a
fund are not justified.6
                                             
6 The rebalancing taking place in Europe, to the extent that it has reduced constraints on cost
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  In Canada, carriers are required to contribute to the USO requirement through a
Portable Contribution Subsidy. The Subsidy is an explicit toll levied on all long-
distance traffic carried on the local telephone network.
  Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT), the Japanese provider of
domestic services, has traditionally been regarded as having funded the USO
through a cross-subsidy from its long-distance charges (Lewin and Kee 1997).
Competition has reduced these charges. Although the regulator has permitted
NTT limited tariff rebalancing — that is, increases in prices and charges for its
local services — the poor financial performance of NTT indicates that it is
unlikely that the current price structure can be sustained. The regulator, the
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, has indicated that it will review the
current arrangements.
3.2 Retail price regulation
 Governments regulate telecommunications prices and charges to protect
consumers from monopolistic pricing or from sudden increases in prices. Price
regulation in telecommunications is often justified on the grounds that the
market is not fully competitive. It is argued that dominance confers market
power on incumbents. As a result, their prices are higher and their output lower
than if the market were more competitive (see Appendix B for a discussion of
market power in the industry).
  In some countries (notably the United States) price regulation has also been
prompted by the possibility that incumbents might engage in predatory pricing
to the detriment of emerging competition in the more contestable segments of
the market (Braeutigam and Panzar 1993, p. 374).7 In Australia, predatory
pricing is addressed under s.46 or Part XIB of the Trade Practices Act 1974.8
  Price regulation also has political and social objectives. Customer access
charges and local call prices are frequently regulated to ensure affordability and
promote universal access.
                                             
7 It is argued that the incumbent could price below short-run incremental cost in the more
contestable sectors of the market (such as the long-distance market), thus deterring entry.
Price regulation may prevent this — for example, by placing constraints on price increases
in the less competitive areas of the market (such as the local call market).
8 Einhorn (1991, p. 218) considers that price regulation is an inappropriate means of
preventing predatory pricing, which is best dealt with under competition law.3 SOCIAL POLICY AND RETAIL PRICE REGULATION
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  Differences in price controls across countries will impact on customer price
outcomes. Price controls ultimately impact on the extent of competition in each
of the market sectors and, hence, on price performance.
  Instruments
 Retail  price regulation is designed to ensure that prices and charges to end-
users of telecommunications are appropriate. Price regulation may take the form
of direct price controls on charges for individual services or products. For
example, regulation requires that the price of locals calls in Australia not exceed
25 cents from residential phones or 40 cents from a public payphone.
  Another form of retail price regulation is rate of return regulation. Rate of
return regulation involves the imposition of a maximum target rate on the
capital invested by a telecommunications company.9 Provided this is not
exceeded, the company is free to make any changes to prices it sees fit.
  Retail price regulation may also include price caps. Price caps typically cover a
number of services and are set for a pre-determined period of time. Prices can be
adjusted within the cap during that period, subject to any additional constraints
which may be imposed, such as caps on individual services (sub-caps) within
the overall basket.
  Under price caps, the amount that price can be adjusted over time is frequently
set by reference to the rate of inflation (CPI) less an amount X. X is usually
determined by reference to expected productivity growth over the price cap
period.10 The value of X should be equal to the difference between the
productivity growth of the incumbent carrier and the economy as a whole.
  The result of a positive X is a reduction in the real price of the services covered
over the period of the price cap. Expected productivity growth may arise from
technical progress, but might also come from eliminating inefficiencies.
However, allowance may be made for factors which increase costs but are
outside the control of the enterprise.
  The usual arrangement is to set the price cap for a basket of services and
products, with the weighting system of the basket based on each service’s
contribution to revenue. At the end of the period, both X and the composition of
the basket are reviewed and adjusted and a new period specified.
                                             
9 A minimum, or target, rate of return may also be set for publicly owned enterprises to
ensure that they at least achieve the required return on their capital.
10 Consistency with the achievement of a minimum rate of return may also be a factor in the
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  Within the overall basket, there are often sub-caps on individual services.
Individual services may also be subject to direct price controls. Sub-caps and
individual controls can ensure that particular classes of customer, such as
residential customers, share in the benefits of price control.11
  A common practice, when the basket is reviewed, is to exclude services
considered to be supplied competitively. If the omitted services are those whose
prices are expected to fall relatively rapidly (for example, long-distance
services), the X applied to the more narrowly defined basket may be smaller
than before. Furthermore, the decrease may be less than the expected rate of
productivity increase for the enterprise as a whole.
  Price caps and rate-of-return regulation allow flexibility to adjust the ‘relative’
prices of goods and services. This permits prices to reflect costs and to achieve
an efficient price structure. Where there are price distortions, it allows for
rebalancing to a more efficient structure (see Box 3.2).
  Australian arrangements
  Retail prices in telecommunications in Australia are controlled in a variety of
ways. All suppliers of local calls are obliged to offer untimed local calls on
fixed telephones and public payphones. Telstra’s untimed local call charges are
subject to direct price control. In addition, Telstra’s retail prices and charges are
subject to an overall price cap, applied to a weighted average or ‘basket’ of
services, with sub-caps applying to some individual services within the basket.
  The TA 1997 gives the Minister power to establish price control arrangements
for the standard telephone service and for services supplied under the USO.
Should a carrier other than Telstra assume the USO within a particular service
area, it could become subject to a Ministerial determination for the prices of
USO-related services, but within the specified service area only. As of January
1999, no determinations had been made.
  Price caps
  Under the Notification and Disallowance provisions of the Telstra Corporation
Act 1991, Telstra is required to notify the Minister of any proposed changes in
charges for particular services. The Minister can disallow changes. These
provisions currently only apply to charges for directory assistance services.
                                             
11 OFTEL (1996) pointed out that in six years of price control covering the whole of the
market, BT’s low to medium spending residential customers on average received real price
reductions of 2.7 per cent a year, compared to average real reductions of around 9.3 per
cent per year for business customers.3 SOCIAL POLICY AND RETAIL PRICE REGULATION
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Box 3.2 Rebalancing
  What is rebalancing?
  Rebalancing in telecommunications services means adjusting the structure of prices —
between different services, classes of customer or between customer access charges and
usage charges — to achieve a more efficient structure. See IC 1997b for a discussion of
rebalancing access and usage charges.
  There are two reasons for advocating rebalancing. One is the argument that rebalancing
is necessary to achieve economic efficiency. The other is the argument that rebalancing is
needed to facilitate effective competition.
  Political and social objectives also frequently impose constraints on the extent to which
price adjustments are possible.
 Pricing  efficiency
  The case for rebalancing is mainly argued on the grounds that there is cross-subsidisation
in the existing price structure and that this is inefficient and inequitable. For example, it
has been frequently argued that long-distance call prices should be reduced, and that
customer access charges should be increased. It has also been argued that the relative
charges faced by businesses and householders should be adjusted.
  There are various methods of adjusting prices towards a more economically efficient
structure to recover financial costs fully (see IC 1997b, pp. 43-47 for a discussion).
However, the general aim is to minimise reductions in the levels of demand selectively
from those which would apply when prices are set at marginal costs.
 Competition
  It is sometimes asserted that rebalancing is required for the introduction of competition,
which in turn produces a more efficient telecommunications industry.
  Generally across countries, the inherited price structure (existing before rebalancing) has
tended to yield higher returns for the incumbent from long-distance calls than from
customer access and possibly also from local calls. The market for long-distance calls is
expected to be more attractive to new entrants than the market for customer access and
local calls.
  Under open competition at existing prices, the incumbent could lose revenue to new
entrants in the long-distance market without compensating revenue improvements in the
local markets. Therefore rebalancing may be required to allow the incumbent to compete
in the long-distance markets while earning a reasonable return in the local markets.
 
  The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is responsible
for the administration of price regulation. The prior consent of the ACCC isINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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required if Telstra proposes to increase a charge that is subject to the price
control arrangements by more than the change in the CPI during a year. Under
Part XIB of the Trade Practices Act 1974, the ACCC is also responsible for
monitoring and reporting to the Government annually on the prices of specified
goods or services.
  Price caps were chosen, in preference to rate-of-return regulation, as the means
of price regulation because of concern that imposing a maximum rate-of-return,
while avoiding excessive profits, would not create any incentive to improve
efficiency.
  It was argued that price capping would encourage efficiency improvements by
allowing Telstra to increase its profits to the extent that it could achieve annual
increases in productivity in excess of X per cent over the specified period of the
cap (Brunker and Shaw 1989).
  Price caps were first applied to Telstra (then Telecom) in 1989 (see Table 3.4).
This regime was part of a change in the Government’s policy towards
telecommunications which left Telecom’s monopoly powers almost intact,
while giving it a degree of independence through corporatisation.12 Prior to that
Telecom and OTC prices for basic or standard services were subject to
Ministerial approval following consideration by the Prices Surveillance
Authority.
  Between 1989 and 1992, Telstra operated under a price cap (CPI-4 per cent)
applied to a revenue-weighted basket of line rentals, local calls, STD and IDD
calls. Subcaps (CPI) were also applied to local calls and residential rentals.
Increases in connection fees, payphone calls, calls to directory assistance were
notifiable and disallowable. Leased line charges, 008 services and mobile
services were added to the list of notifiable services in 1991.
  In 1992, the price cap on the revenue-weighted basket of services was changed
to CPI-5.5 per cent and the basket extended to include connections, domestic
leased lines, international leased lines and mobile services. Subcaps applied to
certain services, including connections, rentals and local calls (CPI-2 per cent)
and STD and IDD calls (CPI-5.5 per cent). In addition, prices for connections,
rentals, local calls and STD calls could not increase by more than CPI each year.
Increases in payphone calls, calls to directory assistance and connections for
resellers were notifiable and disallowable.
  The current Australian arrangements impacting on the price comparisons in
Chapters 5 and 6 came into effect on 1 January 1996 and were originally to
                                             
12 Competition was confined to value-added services and customer equipment at this time.3 SOCIAL POLICY AND RETAIL PRICE REGULATION
51
apply until 30 December 1998. The Minister has extended the application of the
price caps until June 1999:
·  The price cap on the overall basket of Telstra’s main services tightened to
CPI-7.5 per cent for each calendar year.
·  Within this basket are individual price caps of CPI-1 per cent for each year
applying to residential connections, line rentals, long-distance and
international calls.
·  Before increasing any charge subject to these price control arrangements
by more than the CPI during a calendar year, Telstra is required to obtain
the prior consent of the ACCC.
·  There is a direct price control of 25 cents on local calls from fixed phones
and 40 cents on local calls from payphones.
·  Telstra’s charges for directory assistance are subject to notification and
disallowance. The Minister may, after receiving a report from the ACCC,
disallow a charge on public interest grounds.
  The intention of retail price regulation in Australia is to protect end-users from
the effects of Telstra’s market power and satisfy social objectives. The sub-caps
and the controls on individual services, such as the cap on line rentals and direct
price control on untimed local calls, are consistent with this motivation.
However, there may be a tension between price regulation and competition
policy.
  Both in Australia and many countries overseas, price caps have been chosen as
an alternative to rate-of-return regulation. Price caps may be important for
protecting and benefiting consumers, at the same time permitting the incumbent
to earn a normal rate of return and encouraging productive efficiency. However,
price cap settings, together with other forms of price regulation, such as direct
price controls on individual services, must be established within a holistic
framework.
  Price regulation involves making a trade-off between social objectives and the
desirability or otherwise of encouraging entry into particular markets. For
example, if price regulation leads to the incumbent’s charges for local services
being below levels at which a new entrant can attain ‘full cost recovery’, entry
into that market will be deterred, with possible adverse consequences for
efficiency.
  The current price controls are being reviewed by the Government, with a view
to determining appropriate arrangements to apply until the end of the year 2000
(DoCA 1998). This review includes assessments of constraints on the prices of
particular telephony services and the price cap on a broader basket of services.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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The principles or criteria for making the assessments include effects on
incentives to improve efficiency and the protection of particular groups of
consumers.
  There are likely to be tensions among these criteria. The rebalancing of prices
towards a structure which is more efficient and more conducive to a competitive
environment may impinge on other social and economic objectives (see
Appendix B). For example, there is some concern that increasing customer
access charges may deter customers from connecting to the network, reducing
the value of the network as a whole.
  Untimed local calls
  All carriage service providers must give the option of untimed local calls — for
voice, facsimile, data transmission and the Internet — to all residential and
charitable customers who had access to untimed local calls before 20 September
1996.13 Although business customers have a statutory right to untimed voice
calls only, service providers voluntarily offer an untimed local call option for
facsimile, data transmission and the Internet to their business customers.
  The right to untimed local calls applies in local call zones, but not to mobile or
satellite-delivered services. The geographically isolated, outside local call zones,
do not have access to untimed local calls, but pay a special ‘pastoral rate’ of 25
cents for each 4.5 minutes. Commencing on 1 January 1998, those in remote
areas receive an annual rebate of $160 per year against their pastoral call
spending. This is the amount Telstra estimates as the benefit to the average
consumer in country towns of being able to make untimed local calls rather than
‘pastoral rate’ calls (Alston 1998).
                                             
13 In some of the countries included in the study — New Zealand and some parts of the US
— there is a requirement that local calls be free.3 SOCIAL POLICY AND RETAIL PRICE REGULATION
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Table 3.4 Retail price regulation in selected countries
 
   Start
date
 Price  control  Services  covered
 
  Australia   1989  CPI-4%   Line rentals, local calls, STD and IDD calls.
     Sub  caps
CPI
  Local calls and residential rentals.
     Notifiable  and
disallowable
  Connection fees, payphone calls, calls to directory
assistance.
   1991  Notifiable  and
disallowable
  008 services, leased line charges, mobile services.
    1992   CPI-5.5%   Connections, line rentals, locals calls, STD calls, IDD calls,
domestic leased lines, international leased lines, mobile
services.
      Subcap CPI-2%   Connections, rentals and local calls.
     Sub  caps
CPI-5.5%
  STD calls; IDD calls.
      Capped at CPI   Increases in prices for connections, rentals, local calls and
STD calls
     Notifiable  and
disallowable
  Payphone calls, calls to directory assistance, connections for
resellers.
   1996  to
1998
  CPI-7.5%   Connections; line rentals; local, long-distance and
international calls; leased lines; mobile telephone services.
     Sub  caps
CPI-1%
  Residential connections, line rentals, long-distance calls and
international calls.
        Before increasing any charge subject to these price control
arrangements by more than the CPI during a calendar year,
Telstra is required to obtain the prior consent of the ACCC.
        There is a direct price control of 25 cents on local calls from
fixed phones and 40 cents on local calls from payphones.
     Notifiable  and
disallowable
 Directory  assistance.
 Canada  1994  Direct  price
control
  Three regulated increases proposed for 1996, 1997 and 1998
to bring residential services rates in line with costs.
    1995   Rate of return   Utility segment (the non-competitive part of the industry).
   1998  to
2002
 CPI-4.5%  Utility  segment.
      CPI   Basket of basic local residential services.
No individual local residential or business charge will
increase by more than 10 per cent any year.
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Table 3.4 Retail price regulation in selected countries (cont.)
 
   Start
date
 Price  control  Services  covered
 
  Finland       No retail price controls.
 France  1995  CPI-4.5%  Basic  voice  telephony  services.
   1996  CPI-5.5%  Basic  voice  telephony  services.
   1997  CPI-6%  Basic  voice  telephony  services.
   1998  CPI-9%  Basic  voice  telephony  services.
  Japan       Rate of return price regulation.
 New
Zealand
  1989   CPI   Line rentals; customer access charges for residential customers
in rural areas not to be higher than in the cities.
     Direct  price
control
  Local free calling to remain a tariff option available to all
residential customers.
  Sweden   1993   CPI-1%   Basket of telephony services supplied to households and
smaller companies.
     Light  user
scheme
  Users with low consumption offered reduced subscription
fees.
   1997  CPI  Customer  access  charges.
  UK   1984   CPI-3%   Line rentals; local and long-distance calls.
     Indiv.  cap
CPI+2%
  Line rentals. This sub-cap remained with the same X until
1997.
    1989   CPI-4.5%   Line rentals, local and long-distance calls.
    1991   CPI-6.25%   Basket extended to include international calls.
    1992   CPI-7.5%   Line rentals; local and long-distance calls; international calls.
In addition to the cap on this basket, some individual price
caps were place on certain services.
   1997  to
2001
  CPI-4.5%   Line rentals; local, long-distance and international calls for
small to medium usage households (light user scheme).
      CPI   Line rentals; local, long-distance and international calls for
small business.
 USA      Price caps in some States. Price cap on AT&T’s interstate
charges for a period after 1989.
  Allowed rate of return for LECs interstate connection.
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  A Ministerial Determination under the Telstra Corporation Act 1991 came into
effect on 31 December 1997. Under the determination, the weighted average
untimed local call price for residential and charity customers in rural Australia
in 1998 is not to exceed the weighted average local call price for residential and
charity customers in metropolitan Australia in 1997. A similar rule applies to
untimed local call prices for business customers.
  The Minister has also indicated that he will prevent any attempt by Telstra to
impose timed charges on Internet Service Providers for calls made to them by
their customers. This is intended to promote use of the Internet (DoCA 1998b).
  Overseas arrangements
  A similar array of instruments are apparent in overseas price regulation (see
Table 3.4).
  United Kingdom
  Price caps were introduced following the privatisation of British Telecom (BT)
in 1984. It was deemed superior to ‘rate-of-return’ regulation then being applied
in the US (Scott 1996). Reviews were to take place every 4 years. Scott (1996)
comments that it was intended to be ‘light-handed’ in both procedural and
substantive terms. Changes could occur only in conjunction with alterations to
BT’s licence conditions, a procedure requiring the agreement of BT.
  Between 1984 and 1988, BT kept its prices below the levels allowed under the
regime (Einhorn 1991). Despite this, its profitability increased. ‘X’ was
increased in 1989, in 1991 and again in 1992, when individual price caps were
placed on certain services. According to Spiller and Vogelsang (1993, p. 25),
BT agreed to the 1992 increase in X under threat of a reference to the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, with the possibility of eventual
restructuring.
  These adjustments to X were required by OFTEL because of the slowness with
which effective competition — which might have been expected to lead to price
reductions — had developed.
  Although price caps had originally been adopted in the UK as an alternative to
rate-of-return price regulation, OFTEL used BT’s rate-of-return both in the
process of determining the value for ‘X’ and as an indicator of the effectiveness
of price capping. BT’s rate-of-return was unexpectedly high, despite increases
in ‘X’. Calculating the rate-of-return required detailed investigations of BT’s
financial structure and costs (Scott 1996) and therefore imposed similar
transactions costs to rate-of-return regulation. Liston (1993) concluded that aINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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well-functioning price cap regime requires as much knowledge about costs as
rate-of-return regulation.
  In 1997, OFTEL replaced an emphasis on price control with more general
powers to regulate anti-competitive conduct based on the European Commission
model. The scope of the price cap in terms of revenue covered was reduced.
Price capping now applies to services for residential and small business
customers only. OFTEL intends to abolish price controls completely at the end
of 2001.
  United States
  Rate-of-return regulation was the traditional method of regulating the prices of
utilities in the US. However, many States introduced ‘incentive regulation’ or
price caps as an alternative to rate-of-return regulation.
  The motive was the level of administrative effort and regulatory transactions
costs in annual rate of return hearings, and the time and costs associated with
ratepayer refunds if the operator exceeded the authorised ceiling rate-of-return.
Incentive regulation was intended to operate for more than one year, and to
establish bands for efficiency improvement which might be shared between the
ratepayers and the operator’s shareholders.
  Price caps first replaced rate-of-return regulation in Michigan in 1980 (Einhorn
1991), resulting in considerable savings in administrative costs (estimated at
$US 40 million in 1982) for the company concerned.
  A number of State public service commissions have imposed price caps on
Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs), but many persist with rate-of-
return regulation.14 Price caps are frequently combined with some form of rate-
of-return regulation (Brauetigam and Panzar 1993). When earnings exceed a
certain level, prices may be reduced (Majumdar 1997).15 Many States exempt
competitive services from price caps.
  A comparison of the pricing behaviour of RBOCs regulated by rate-of-return
regulation and incentive regulation in 1991 indicates that, by itself, price-
                                             
14 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) currently prescribes rates of return on
interstate connections for local exchange carriers. The FCC announced in October that it
intends to represcribe the rate of return in 1999 – carriers have been invited to comment on
appropriate methodologies by February 1999.
15 Majumdar found that these ‘revenue sharing’ arrangements were less conducive to
efficiency improvements than ‘pure’ price capping. In particular, the incentive to reduce
‘X-inefficiency’ and invest in cost-saving technology was lower.3 SOCIAL POLICY AND RETAIL PRICE REGULATION
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capping may have no significant effect on long-distance prices, and may even
increase them (Blank, Kasserman and Mayo 1998).
  At the Federal level, American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) was
subjected to de facto rate-of-return regulation from the 1930’s. Price capping
AT&T’s interstate charges commenced in 1989. As services became
competitive, they were removed from the basket, and eventually, price
regulation of AT&T ceased.
  Canada
  All federally-regulated carriers were placed under the jurisdiction of the
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC),
which approved carriers’ tariffs and their rate-of-return, in 1993. In 1994,
companies were required to separate their accounts for the ‘utility’ parts of their
businesses (those not considered to be supplied competitively) and ‘competitive’
parts. Rate of return regulation applied to the utility segment only.
  Between 1995 and 1 January 1998, telephone companies were required to
rebalance by increasing local residential line rentals, offset by reductions in call
prices.
  Price caps replaced rate-of-return regulation in 1998. The current regime will be
effective for 4 years from 1 January 1998 and applies to regional incumbents.16
The price caps are only applied to services which are not supplied competitively,
mainly local residential services.
  New Zealand
  The Kiwi Share Obligation places certain pricing obligations on Telecom New
Zealand (TCNZ):
·  to provide the option of free local calls to residential customers;
·  to restrict the rate of price increases for residential access rentals to the
annual rate of inflation, subject to no ‘unreasonable impairment’ of
TCNZ’s profits at the regional subsidiary level; and
·  to maintain rural residential customer access charges at rates no higher
than standard urban residential customer access charges.
  This pricing regime does not require scrutiny of TCNZ’s costs. However,
TCNZ’s rival, Clear Communications, has claimed that TCNZ bundles
competitive services (long-distance) with monopoly services (for example,
                                             
16  The companies affected are BC Tel, Bell Canada, Island Tel, MT&T, MTS, NBTel,
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customer access charges) to the detriment of competition (Lewin and Kee
1997). Lewin and Kee (1997) considers that long-distance rates are
comparatively high, allowing scope for considerable rebalancing.
  France
 Basic voice telephony services provided by France Telecom are subject to price
capping arrangements. From 1 January 1998, joint control was to be exercised
by the Ministry of the Economy and the industry’s regulator, Autorite de
regulation des telecommunications (ART).
  Japan
  Prior to opening the market to competition, the Diet was responsible for price
regulation. Any telecommunications company wishing to alter prices must now
apply to the regulator, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT),
which uses rate-of-return as a guide to appropriate prices. However, to reduce
delay in the introduction of a new or changed service, a system of notification is
to be introduced. After introduction, the charges can be disallowed by MPT if
found to disadvantage end-users (MPT 1998).
  MPT currently uses price regulation to regulate competition. For example, the
incumbent, NTT, may be refused permission to lower prices if this appears
likely to harm new entrants (Vogel 1996, p. 163).
  Consideration is currently being given to introducing price capping for
telecommunications services (MPT 1998).
  MPT has permitted some rebalancing — increases to local call prices and
customer access charges and reductions to long-distance call rates. According to
Lewin and Kee (1997), the ratio between charges for long-distance and local
calls services now reflects the ratio of the underlying costs of provision.
  Sweden
  Until 1997, the incumbent, Telia, was subject to price caps on baskets of calls.
According to Lewin and Kee (1997), the National Posts and
Telecommunications Authority, the regulator for telecommunication, removed
the price capping because:
·  rebalancing was considered to have been completed; and
·  competition was considered to be emerging and to be reducing the need for
price controls.3 SOCIAL POLICY AND RETAIL PRICE REGULATION
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  Finland
  Competition in network services has been extended to local services through the
Telecommunications Market Act which came into effect in July 1997. There are
no price caps in Finland, and operators can set prices without prior government
approval.
  Commentary
  The arrangements chosen for price regulation may affect the incumbent’s
incentives to invest efficiently, to adopt an efficient price structure and to pursue
cost savings and efficient production techniques. Consequently, differences in
price control arrangements across countries can result in price differences that
affect comparisons and interpretation of overall price performance. In particular,
differences in the composition of price cap baskets, the value of X, the timing of
reviews and the application of sub-caps can make interpretation of price
differences difficult.
  Price regulation can impact upon the degree of competition in a market. Price
regulations can interfere with competitive processes by reducing the competitive
returns available in a market and thus making entry unattractive.
  Pricing efficiency
  In Australia, there is no mandatory requirement for rebalancing.17 Indeed, there
are separate controls on ‘big ticket items’ within the basket — that is, individual
services making major contributions to revenue — such as line rentals and local
calls.
  There is evidence that the price caps on line rentals have inhibited Telstra from
removing the ‘access service deficit’ by adjusting the balance between
customers so that prices reflect costs (see Box 3.3) (IC 1997b; NECG 1999a). It
has been required to maintain its residential line rental in real terms each year
since 1989–90. This has left little scope to rebalance, especially after having
regard for the administrative costs and loss of goodwill of making frequent price
adjustments.
                                             
17  The European Union and the Canadian regulatory authorities require incumbents to
rebalance. However, because rebalancing may require increases in customer access
charges, there is a contradiction between this and ‘affordability’. For this reason, the
European Union permits member countries to proceed with rebalancing at a pace
consistent with the maintenance of affordability in the local call market.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Box 3.3 The access service deficit
  The access service deficit is the alleged difference between non-call related costs and
non-call related revenues. Non-call related costs are incurred independently of the use of
the network and comprise such things as capital, installation and maintenance costs of
the links between the network and the customer’s premises. Non-call related revenues
are customer access charges such as line rentals and connection charges.
  A customer-by-customer access service deficit is created when the cost of providing and
maintaining a connection to the network for a particular customer exceeds connection
and annual customer access  charges. For example, if the annualised cost of maintaining
a connection to a customer is $300 but the annual customer access  charge is $140, then
the access deficit for the customer is $160.
  A geographic access service deficit is created when the costs of maintaining a connection
to the network for customers in one particular area exceed the revenues raised through
line rentals from that area. For example, if the average cost of connecting customers in
an area is $400 and the average customer access  is $140, then the access deficit is $260.
  An average access service deficit can also be calculated across all customers on the
network.
  If an access service deficit exists, then the network operator must recover the shortfall
from other charges, such as call charges.
Source: ACCC (1998a, p. 5).
 
  Telstra (1998, per. comm) has also identified political considerations as another
factor possibly discouraging increases in customer access charges, pointing out
that there is a high level of political interest, and willingness to intervene in
Telstra’s pricing. It regards a number of recent decisions as evidence of this,
namely the:
·  requirement for average pricing of local calls in metropolitan and non-
metropolitan areas;
·  requirement that directory assistance be ‘free’ to the inquirer; and
·  prohibition on B-party charging of Internet service providers for long held
data calls.
The extent to which prices can be rebalanced toward a more efficient pricing
structure can affect the level of competition. Hence countries that have
rebalanced and increased competition should display better overall price
performance than those where progress has been slow.3 SOCIAL POLICY AND RETAIL PRICE REGULATION
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Sidak (1998,  p.  14) has drawn attention to the interaction of price caps and
changes to the duration of calls in Australia. The duration of local calls has been
rising in recent years largely as a result of increasing Internet usage. Given that
local call prices are capped at an untimed 25 cents, this has resulted in the
implicit price per minute of a local call falling:
Because a carrier incurs incremental costs on a per minute basis to provide a
local call, and because the price of a local call must contribute also to the
recovery of the carrier’s non-incremental costs, Telstra’s falling implicit price per
minute for local calling discourages entry and investment by competitors in the
local call market (Sidak 1998, p. 14).
One possible implication of a falling implicit price in the local call market is
that the incumbent may not be able to fully rebalance prices between the local
call and long-distance markets. Hence, the cap on local call prices could
potentially detract from Australia’s performance in international comparisons of
long-distance prices (see Chapters 5 and 6).
Timing of reviews
Changes in X have occurred at roughly three year intervals in Australia. The
review currently under way will establish price controls to apply only in
calendar years 1999 and 2000, with a further review during the year 2000 to
establish the need for controls beyond that date.
The timetable, principles and expected outcomes associated with the current
review have been sufficiently well articulated to remove the possibility of
unanticipated changes in X such as those experienced in the United Kingdom in
1989, 1991 and 1992. However, the setting of the new price regulation regime
involves a number of difficult trade-offs. The most significant of these is the
trade-off between social objectives and the benefits attainable through efficient
competition.
The level of X
X has been increased with each review of the price capping arrangements in
Australia. With the exception of the most recent reviews, this has also occurred
in the United Kingdom.
Price cap basket
The current Australian and French baskets are the most comprehensive of those
covered by Table 3.4, and include, for example, long-distance calls, regarded as
being supplied more competitively than local services in most countries.
However the terms of reference for the review of price capping arrangements
currently under-way in Australia includes the following statement:INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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A reduction in, or removal of, price caps for specific product areas, or generally,
would normally be expected where there is effective competition in the relevant
market.
In the United Kingdom and Canada, services considered to be supplied
competitively have been removed from the basket of services, with a view to the
eventual abolition of price capping. Since there would be less scope for price
reductions for the remaining services in the basket, a lower value of X would
generally be expected for a less comprehensive basket.18
3.3 In summary
All of the countries studied, including Australia, have retained some form of
USO requirement. However, three countries — Sweden, Finland and the United
Kingdom — do not have a mechanism for funding this obligation.
Recasting the USO to fit a more competitive environment has proved difficult.
However, few, if any, of the countries studied directly fund the USO. Rather the
costs are borne by the industry and ultimately some consumers.
Until recently, the estimated cost of the USO in Australia was small by
comparison with total revenue. However Telstra has recently claimed that the
net cost of the USO in Australia was $1.8 billion. However, Gibson Quai &
Associates and Ovum (1999) who were engaged by the ACA to look into the
matter have estimated a range of possible costs that are much lower.
Studies conducted in the United States and United Kingdom estimate their
respective USO costs at $US1.65 billion and between £50 million and £100
million.
It was beyond the scope of this study for the Commission to estimate the cost of
the USO. However, if recent cost estimates conducted are accurate, then the
requirement on Telstra to provide a universal service could be a factor in
explaining price differences between Australia and the overseas countries
included in this study.
The effect of retail price regulations may prove more significant in the pricing
comparisons. Telstra is currently subject to a range of retail price controls which
limit the annual price increases of various telecommunications services to
residential and business customers. Principal among these are the price cap
applying to line rentals and the direct price control on local call charges plus the
requirement to offer untimed local calls.
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It is suggested that both of these price controls greatly restrict Telstra’s ability to
rebalance prices so that they more accurately reflect costs (NECG 1999a). Price
caps on line rentals have prevented Telstra from rebalancing its charging
structure from usage to customer access, creating an access service deficit.
The price control upon local calls may also restrict Telstra’s ability to rebalance
prices between local and long-distance, possibly causing long-distance prices to
be above costs. It may also discourage entry into the local call market. This
situation may be aggravated by increased usage of the local network as Internet
usage grows.
While Telstra has been unable to rebalance its prices, incumbents in most of the
benchmarked countries have faced a similar situation. Like Telstra, at the time
of the pricing comparisons in Chapters 5 and 6, these incumbents have also been
subjected to retail price regulation.
Only Finland and Sweden are considered to have fully rebalanced their retail
prices. Full rebalancing may mean that these countries have relatively low USO
costs and thus relatively lower retail prices.65
4 REGULATION OF COMPETITION
The institutional and regulatory arrangements in a country affect the
performance of the telecommunications industry, including the prices of
services. By influencing the extent of competition and degree of concentration
in the market they also affect efficiency incentives for operators.
Governments in all the countries studied have sought to introduce competition
into their telecommunications industries. Previously, these industries were
characterised by a publicly-owned and regulated monopoly.
In doing so, governments have established regulatory regimes to maximise the
extent of competition in an industry where incumbents retain significant market
power and have a presence in all of the telecommunications markets. Primarily,
the regimes provide for access to network facilities and services at reasonable
prices and also provide for supervision of market conduct and sanctions against
anti-competitive behaviour.
Regulatory intervention was considered necessary because of perceived barriers
to entry, particularly where the incumbent remains vertically integrated. An
incumbent with market power has little incentive to open any segment of the
market to competition and is often in a position to reduce its effectiveness:
... a firm can leverage its monopoly power in one market into other markets
where it faces competition. That can happen through price squeezes, vertical
restrictions and attempts at foreclosure by which the monopoly firm can prevent
entry or induce exit in those markets. Thus monopoly leveraging can lead to
reductions in the amount of effective competition and to distortions in the
monopolist’s behaviour (Vogelsang and Mitchell 1997, p. 57).
The purpose of the analysis contained in this Chapter is to compare the
Australian arrangements — the processes and instruments — against those in
place in the selected countries. Regulatory design affects price and quality
performance and hence is important in the interpretation of results in later
chapters. The justification for the regulatory intervention is not examined, nor
its effectiveness. The possible impact of the regulatory arrangements on
performance is discussed in Chapter 8.
The regulatory arrangements dealt with in this Chapter concentrate on those
necessary for competition. In Section 4.1, a brief history of the evolution of
competition policy in the selected countries is provided. This is followed in
Section 4.2 with a discussion of the arrangements in place which allow
competitors to access the network. The availability of number portability andINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
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carrier pre-selection is highlighted in Section 4.3, while, in Section 4.4, the
arrangements for access pricing are discussed. In Section 4.5, an outline of the
industry-specific anti-competitive conduct provisions in place is provided.
The comparison of the regulatory frameworks relate to those existing at
February 1998 and relies on documentation published by the regulatory
authorities and relevant Ministries in each country. This date was chosen to
coincide with the price comparisons in Chapters 5 and 6.
4.1 Evolution of regulatory arrangements
Prior to deregulation, telecommunications services in most countries were
provided by a telecommunications carrier that was government-owned and
protected from competition by legislation. The main exceptions to this were
Finland, Canada and the United States where there were privately-owned
telecommunications carriers.
Over the last two decades, governments in each of the selected countries have
sought to introduce competition into the industry. Market liberalisation has
occurred at different speeds and times and in different ways (see Table 4.1) but
is similar in that it has sought to remove legislated barriers to entry and establish
arrangements to facilitate access to existing network services.
In Australia, the regulatory arrangements introduced in 1991 established a
general carrier duopoly and a three mobile carrier market. The legislation was
intended to nurture facilities-based competition so that the post-1997 regime
could be light handed. Entry into the industry was restricted to allow Optus to
undertake the large capital investments involved in establishing its own
network. The arrangements set in place in 1997 removed all legislative barriers
to entry and established an industry specific access regime and anti-competitive
conduct framework.
All statutory barriers to entry into the New Zealand telecommunications market
were removed in 1989. However, unlike the other countries studied, New
Zealand has not attempted any direct regulation of the industry.1 Rather, it has
placed sole reliance on general competition policy.
The Japanese telecommunications market was opened to competition in 1985.
Japan originally followed a framework similar to New Zealand’s in that direct
regulation of the industry was minimised. However, a report by Japan’s
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Telecommunications Council found that competition was not effective because
of the difficulty confronting new carriers in negotiating access to the
incumbent’s facilities. Consequently, new regulatory arrangements were
introduced in 1998 to strengthen interconnection rights for new carriers.
In the United States, competition originally developed in the long-distance
market after the finalisation of the Modified Final Judgement (MFJ). The MFJ
restructured the telecommunications industry into its competitive and non-
competitive elements. It required American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T)
to divest itself of its local exchange carriers.
The local exchange carriers remained protected by a legislated monopoly until
the enactment of the Telecommunications Act 1996. This Act sought to
introduce competition into local exchange services by imposing an obligation to
interconnect on the local exchanges and requiring them to resell retail services
at wholesale prices.
In Canada, where the market structure resembles that of the United States,
competition in the long-distance market began in the early 1990s. In 1997, the
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) set
out the terms and conditions of local competition in the territories of certain of
the local exchange companies. The new regime obligated incumbent operators
to interconnect and foreshadowed the regulation of interconnection charges.
In Finland and Sweden, all sectors of the telecommunications industry were
opened to competition in the early 1990s. Originally, there was little direct
regulation of the industry. However, in 1997, both countries introduced changes
which aimed to stimulate competition in the local call market and bring
regulations in line with the directives of the European Union.
France did not begin deregulating its telecommunications industry until required
by the European Union Directives. The Telecommunications Act 1996 set out
the principles for the liberalisation of the telecommunications market on
1 January 1998.
The United Kingdom began liberalising its telecommunications industry in
1984 when British Telecom (BT) was privatised and a general carrier duopoly
was established. Two mobile network operators (Cellnet and Vodafone) were
also licensed. In 1991, all legislative barriers to entering the industry, either as a
fixed or mobile carrier, were removed. In 1997, a third wave of deregulation
removed regulatory controls from what the Office of Telecommunications
(OFTEL) considered were competitively provided services. Despite this, certain
network charges remained under direct regulation.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
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Table 4.1 Major regulatory reform initiatives in Australia and the
selected countries
Date Major reform initiatives
Australia 1989 Telecommunications Act 1989 begins liberalising the industry. Competition
restricted to the provision of value-added services, private networks, customer
equipment and cable installation. AUSTEL created and charged with the
economic and technical regulation of the industry and the introduction of a new
system of price regulation based on a CPI–X price cap.
1991 Telecommunications Act 1991 establishes a general, fixed network carrier
duopoly and a three mobile carrier market. AUSTEL given the power to behave
as an arbitrator in access disputes.
1997 Telecommunications Act 1997 introduces open competition and revises the
definition of universal service obligations and the mechanism for funding it.
The Trade Practices Amendment (Telecommunications) Act 1997 establishes
an industry-specific access regime and anti-competitive conduct framework.
Canada 1979-
1981
CNCP permitted to compete in the provision of certain interconnected private
line voice services and interconnected data services in Bell Canada's territory.
Decision extended to allow CNCP to operate in B.C. Tel's territory.
1982 CRTC sets out the terms and conditions governing the attachment of
subscriber-provided terminal equipment to the networks of all federally
regulated telecommunications carriers.
1984 CRTC sets out terms and conditions for interconnection by cellular mobile
radio systems with federally regulated telephone companies following a
decision by the Department of Communications to establish two cellular radio
systems in each of the major markets in Canada.
1986 CRTC allows Telesat Canada to offer interconnected private line services like
those permitted in 1979.
1987 Resale and sharing of the private line services of the federally regulated
companies permitted.
1992 CRTC sets out the terms and conditions for competition in the provision of
public long-distance voice services.
1994 CRTC establishes a new regulatory framework for the federally regulated
Stentor-member companies. New framework establishes a transitional period
for a move toward the implementation of price cap regulation for these
companies’ utility segments.4   REGULATION OF COMPETITION
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Table 4.1 Major regulatory reform initiatives in Australia and the
selected countries (cont.)
Date Major reform initiatives
Canada
(cont.)
1997 CRTC sets out the terms and conditions of local competition in the territories
of certain of the Stentor-member companies as well as establishing the
parameters of the price cap regime. The new regime obligated incumbent
operators to interconnect. Other key features required incumbent telephone
companies to:
· unbundle ‘essential facilities’ and allow for co-location on the same terms
as are used by the incumbents themselves;
· provide access to their local networks at prices consistent with established
access pricing rules; and
· provide for the resale of local residential services (at retail rates).
Finland 1987 Telecommunications Act 1987 introduces first steps towards liberalisation by
defining the responsibilities and duties of telecommunications operators and
the rights of users of the telecommunications services.
1988 Competition in corporate networks and data transmission partially liberalised.
1990 Free competition in data networks and GSM networks.
1991 Corporate networks become subject to free competition.
1994 Local, long-distance and international telecommunications markets become
subject to free competition
1996 Amendments to the Telecommunications Act 1987 made:
· Telecommunications operators obliged to lease telecommunications
connections to each other.
· Whole field of telecommunications no longer subject to licences granted
on the basis of discretion.
· Customer fees become free of regulation.
1997 Telecommunications Market Act 1997 aims at further stimulating competition,
particularly in the local call market. Fixed network operators are obliged to
interconnect. Those with significant market power must accept all reasonable
requests for interconnection. Charges must be non-discriminatory and
reasonable. Those with significant market power must publish standard
reference offers and separate their accounts.
France 1996 Telecommunications Act 1996 set out principles for the liberalisation of the
telecommunications market in 1 January 1998.
1998 Telecommunications industry liberalised. Fixed network operators are obliged
to interconnect. Those with significant market power must accept all
reasonable request for interconnection. Charges must be non-discriminatory
and reasonable. Those with significant market power must publish standard
reference offers and separate their accounts.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
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Table 4.1 Major regulatory reform initiatives in Australia and the
selected countries (cont.)
Date Major reform initiatives
Japan 1985 New entrants permitted to operate in the national or international markets but
the incumbents in each of these markets (NTT and KDD) are not permitted to
compete with each other. Interconnection terms and conditions are negotiated
between parties and agreements must be authorised by the MPT.
1998 Proposed restructure of NTT into a long-distance supplier and two local call
suppliers. The two regional companies not permitted to compete in long-distance
market.
New interconnection requirements introduced:
· Type I network operators obliged to interconnect. Access must be provided
at wholesale rates and authorised interconnect agreement must be made
public.
· Designated carriers (NTT) required to provide interconnect at any
technically feasible point. Tariffs must be cost-based and annually
submitted to Minister for approval. Essential facilities must be provided to
other carriers on conditions equal to those the designated carrier provides
itself.
Designated carriers become subject to accounting separation requirements.
NZ 1987 Telecommunications Act 1987 removes competitive restrictions on the supply of
customer premises equipment.
1988 Telecommunications Amendment Act 1988 removes restrictions on the supply of
telecommunications services of all kinds.
1989 Radiocommunications Act 1989 reforms the management of the radio spectrum
to facilitate competitive entry into the industry.
1990 Telecommunications Amendment Act 1990 establishes information disclosure
requirements on TCNZ. TCNZ required to publish prices, terms and conditions
for the supply of certain prescribed telecommunications goods and services.
Sweden 1992 Telia negotiates Sweden’s first interconnect agreement with Tele2.
1993 Telecommunications Act 1993 establishes an independent regulator (PTS) and
opens the industry to competition.
1997 Amendments made to the Telecommunications Act 1993 leading to the
attainment of the Government’s objectives through legislation rather than
through State ownership of Telia and the imposition of special obligations
regarding interconnection on operators with significant market power (such as
Telia).4   REGULATION OF COMPETITION
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Table 4.1 Major regulatory reform initiatives in Australia and the
selected countries (cont.)
Date Major reform initiatives
UK 1984 BT privatised and a duopoly policy initiated, regulated by the newly-formed
OFTEL, which limited entry into the sector until 1991. BT’s retail prices
controlled by a price cap covering quarterly rentals and connection charges and
national and local call charges. BT required to interconnect with Mercury.
Two mobile network operators (Cellnet and Vodafone) licensed. Network
operators not permitted to sell directly to customers. Mobile services must be
marketed through service providers.
1991 Entry into the telecommunications market liberalised. BT’s prices remain under
price caps except that the controls extended to international calls. Accounting
separation requirements imposed upon BT.
The mobile duopoly ended and two further operators licensed.
1997 Third wave of deregulation removes regulatory controls from what OFTEL
considers to be competitively provided services. Certain network charges also
become subject to a price cap regime and a Fair Trading Condition inserted into
carrier licences.
USA 1982 Modified Final Judgement results in AT&T divesting its local exchange carriers
and all areas of the industry opened to competition with the exception of
intraLATA services.
1996 Telecommunications Act 1996 introduces competition into intraLATA services.
Obligation to interconnect placed on LECs. Unbundling of local loop and local
call resale at wholesale prices required.
4.2 Approaches to regulating access
Regulatory design has a bearing upon the way in which competition develops.
Who gains access, to what types of services access is mandated and at what
price, can determine the form that competition takes and the effectiveness of
that competition.
The most crucial issues are regulations relating to interconnection (including
unbundling of the local loop2) and access to the incumbent’s carriage services.
For example, allowing carriers to interconnect and gain access to each other’s
carriage services at wholesale prices, but not extending this right to resellers,
creates an incentive for new competitors to enter the industry as carriers rather
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than resellers. Ensuring carriers and resellers have equal rights in
interconnecting and obtaining access to carriage services neutralises the impact
that regulations have on entry decisions. Similarly, how the local loop is
unbundled affects the configuration of the network and the types of investments
undertaken by competitors.
Australian approach to interconnection, reselling and unbundling
The new regulatory regime introduced with the enactment of the
Telecommunications Act 1997 (TA 1997) and the Trade Practices Amendment
Act 1997 takes a neutral approach to the development of competition. The
regime removed legislative barriers to entering the industry and aimed to
provide equal rights of access to all types of operators. It does this by making
commercial negotiation the primary means of determining access rights and,
thus an operator’s right of access depends on what is negotiated with existing
operators.
However, underpinning commercial negotiation is a regulatory regime that
provides mechanisms for mandating access rights. The Commonwealth
Government intended that industry self-regulation be the primary means of
mandating access rights (Second Reading Speech, Trade Practices Amendment
(Telecommunications) Bill, 5 December 1996). To this end, an industry forum
— the Telecommunications Access Forum (TAF) — was formed and charged
with, among other things, developing a list of carriage services that carriers
should make available to all competitors.
Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA) allows the ACCC to approve
TAF recommendations on declaring a carriage service, provided the ACCC is
satisfied that the TAF has given interested parties adequate opportunity to
comment on the proposed declaration (s.152AL). Access rights established
through this process apply equally to all types of operators.
Alternatively, access rights may be determined by the ACCC following a public
inquiry (see Box 4.1 or, for more detail, Appendix D of the report).3 Declaration
of a carriage service involves neutral treatment because it grants equal rights of
access to that service to carriers, carriage service providers and resellers. The
provider of that carriage service is obliged to provide the declared service on
reasonable terms and conditions.
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Box 4.1 Declaration under Part XIC
Under Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act 1974, the ACCC may declare a service where
such a declaration would promote the long-term interests of end-users. The ACCC is
required to engage in a public inquiry process prior to making its decision.
In determining whether a declaration will promote the long-term interests of end-users,
the ACCC must have regard to the extent to which declaration would achieve the
following objectives:
·  promoting competition in markets for listed services;
·  achieving any-to-any connectivity in relation to carriage services that involve
communication between end-users; and
·  encouraging the economically efficient use of, and economic efficient investment
in, the infrastructure.
Upon declaration, all carriers and carriage service providers supplying the declared
service become subject to standard access obligations (exemptions are available). These
obligations require the access provider to supply a declared service to whoever requests
it. They also require the access provider to ensure that the technical and operational
quality and the level and quality of fault detection, handling and rectification are
equivalent to those which the access provider provides to itself.
Source: Trade Practices Act 1974.
Declaration, either through TAF recommendation or ACCC determination, does
not fundamentally change the rights of access already in existence under
Section 46 of Part IV of the TPA. Under this provision, a supplier of carriage
services cannot refuse to deal with a competitor. Refusals to deal could also
breach the competition rules contained in Part XIB of the TPA.
Declaration shifts the resolution of access pricing disputes from the Courts to
the ACCC, although it does not preclude parties from seeking redress under
general competition legislation. In particular, it has implications for pricing of
carriage services subject to a declaration because, in the event of a pricing
dispute, the ACCC may be called to arbitrate.
Declaration can also have the effect of determining the degree to which carriage
services are unbundled. In this way, it can set minimum interconnection
requirements.
When the regulatory regime changed on 1 July 1997 certain carriage services
were immediately declared. These were:
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·  domestic GSM originating and terminating access;
·  domestic AMPS originating and terminating access;
·  transmission;
·  digital data access service;
·  conditional local loop service;
·  AMPS to GSM diversion service; and
·  broadcasting access service.
Since that time, the following services have also been declared by the ACCC:
·  ISDN origination and termination services (draft decision);
·  inter-city high bandwidth transmission capacity; and
·  local loop unbundling and local call resale (draft decision).
As of January 1999, the ACCC was conducting inquiries into the possible
declaration of fixed-to-mobile services.
Declaration does not mean that carriers must offer these services at a particular
price. Rather, the price of access must be negotiated between the carrier and
access seeker. Alternatively, the price as specified in an approved undertaking
may be used (see Section 4.5).
Overseas approaches
Internationally, a variety of approaches to regulating access have been used (see
Table 4.2).  The  countries  selected  for  coverage  are  those  included  in  the
benchmarking comparisons made in Chapter 5, 6 and 7. The level of detail
varies across countries due to difficulties in obtaining information in some
instances. However, the information included here has been corrected by the
relevant regulatory authority in each country.
Interconnection
Many of the countries examined for this study have a legislative requirement on
carriers to allow competitors to interconnect with their network.
This requirement is implemented across most countries, although generally it
only applies to fixed-wire services as the mobile phone sectors in these
countries are considered sufficiently competitive. Different countries also apply
different demands upon carriers with significant market power or those
considered dominant (usually the incumbent).4   REGULATION OF COMPETITION
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Table 4.2 Access arrangements, February 1998
Access arrangements
Australia Access or interconnection must be negotiated with existing operators. Provision for
mandatory access requirements through declaration following self-regulatory processes
or an ACCC inquiry.
A declaration may apply to any market sector (ie fixed or mobile) and applies to all
carriers and carriage service providers.
Certain services were declared under transitional arrangements on 1 July 1997.
Resale of retail services at wholesale rates requires negotiation with existing operators
although declaration may force cost-based pricing.
Canada All local exchange carriers in a local call area must be interconnected. Each carrier is
required to designate a point of interconnect as a gateway for the interchange of traffic.
Only those local loops considered ‘essential’ by the regulator must be unbundled. Other
local loops must also be unbundled, with prices based on the rating principles for
essential facilities, for a period of five years from 1 January 1998.
Resale of retail services only permitted at retail rates.
Finland Requirements apply to fixed network services only as there is no operator with
significant market power in the mobile sector.
All operators must provide for interconnection. Operators with significant market power
must accept all reasonable interconnection requests. This may require the network
operator to lease connections even where it does not normally provide them, including
the unbundling of the local loop.
There is no requirement for the resale of retail services at wholesale rates.
France Requirements apply to fixed network services only as there is no operator with
significant market power in the mobile sector.
All operators must provide for interconnection. Operators with significant market power
must accept all reasonable interconnection requests.
There is no requirement for the resale of retail services at wholesale rates.
Japan Requirements apply to fixed network services.
All carriers are required to interconnect. Designated carriers (own >50 per cent of
subscriber lines in a market) are obliged to provide a minimum number of
interconnection points. There are seven minimum points of interconnection
 and, subject
to technical feasibility, designated carriers are required to unbundle other facilities on
request.
Resale of retail services required at wholesale rates (based on cost).
NZ No formal access arrangements. To interconnect with the networks of existing carriers
or gain access to retail services, competitors must negotiate with the carrier and take
recourse for unfair dealings through general competition legislation.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
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Table 4.2 Access arrangements, February 1998 (cont.)
Access arrangements
Sweden Requirements apply to fixed network services only as there is no operator with significant
market power in the mobile sector.
All operators must comply with requests for interconnection. Those with significant
market power must comply with special interconnection requirements. In particular, this
requires that the incumbent comply with all reasonable interconnection requests. There is
a legislated requirement for the incumbent to unbundle its local loop, however it is
unclear whether this has in fact occurred.
There is no requirement for the resale of retail services at wholesale rates.
UK Requirements apply to fixed network services only. Mobile market is considered
competitive.
Carriers with significant market power are required to connect their networks with other
network operators. Regulations do not extend interconnection rights to unbundling of the
local loop.
There is no requirement for the resale of retail services at wholesale rates.
USA Requirements apply to fixed network services where incumbents have significant market
power.
All operators have a right to interconnect. Incumbent local exchange carriers required to
provide interconnection at any technically feasible point. The regulator prescribes seven
minimum points of interconnect, including unbundling of the local loop.
Resale of retail services required at wholesale rates (based on avoided cost).
Source: Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 (Part XIC); Brock and Katz (1997); CRTC (1997a); Finish
Telecommunications Market Act 1997; MPT (1997); MPTS (1997); MTCS (1997); Keewin and
Lee (1997).
In line with European Commission Directives, the United Kingdom, France,
Sweden and Finland require carriers with significant market power (that is, the
incumbent) to allow competitors to interconnect with their networks. The
United Kingdom, which has tended to favour facilities-based competition,
allows BT to determine the point of that interconnection. In France, Sweden and
Finland, the incumbent must accept all ‘reasonable requests’ for interconnection
(MPTS 1997; MTCS 1997; Finish Telecommunications Market Act 1997).
Disputes over what is reasonable are resolved by the regulator.4
Regulations in the United States and Japan also require the incumbent to
provide for interconnection (Brock and Katz 1997; MPT 1997). In both cases,
the regulators defined a list of minimum interconnection points that the
incumbent must make available to competitors.
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The only country studied that does not mandate interconnection is New
Zealand. New Zealand has any telecommunications specific regulations.5 There
is no mandated requirement for the incumbent to interconnect its network with
the networks of its competitors nor is there any regulation mandating the resale
of retail services. To interconnect with the incumbent’s network or gain access
to its retail services, competitors must negotiate with the incumbent and take
recourse for unfair dealings through general competition legislation.
Unbundling the local loop
There are disparate policies on whether interconnection rights should extend to
unbundling the local loop. Some countries provide for unbundling, others do
not.
Unbundling requirements are most extensive in the United States and Canada
where incumbent local exchange carriers are required to unbundle their local
loops (CRTC 1997b). In Finland, interconnection rules require the network
operator to allow connection even where it has not provided them before,
including at the local loop (MTCFb 1997).
In the United Kingdom, BT provides for interconnection at its tandem switches
and on the network side of its local switches (Ovum 1997). OFTEL specifically
excluded unbundling of the local loop from interconnection requirements. It
believed that unbundling would be counter to its policy of facilities-based
competition by dissuading competitors from investing in their own networks
(OFTEL 1997c).
Reselling
There are also differing approaches to reselling. Regulations in the United
Kingdom, Canada, France, Sweden and Finland do not provide for the resale of
retail services at wholesale rates. In some of these countries (notably Canada),
resellers may purchase the retail services of the incumbent but may only do so at
retail rates.
In the United States and Japan, network operators are required to sell retail
services at wholesale rates (Brock and Katz 1997; MPT 1997). In the United
States, wholesale rates are based on avoided cost (Brock and Katz 1997) while,
in Japan, wholesale rates are based on long-run incremental cost.
                                             
5  Except in terms of TCNZ’s Kiwi Share Obligation and information disclosure
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Commentary
Differences in the approach to access arrangements will affect the extent of
effective competition. This is likely to lead to differences in the incentives to
improve performance and ultimately the prices paid by consumers of
telecommunications services.
The most significant difference between Australia’s approach and those in the
selected countries is that Australia has a formal co-regulatory process by which
industry participants can initiate declarations.
The intention of the legislation was to have services declared primarily through
industry self-regulatory processes as embodied in the TAF:
It is a clear policy intention that, as much as possible, both the determination of
access rights and terms and conditions of access be the result of commercial
processes and industry self-regulation (Trade Practices (Telecommunications)
Amendment Bill, Second Reading Speech, 5 December 1996).
The ‘self-regulatory’ element of the framework allows the industry, which is
closest to the issues, to drive declaration decisions. It also reduces some of the
costs on government as they are borne by the industry itself. While the burden is
shared, there is only a saving to the government or its regulator if industry
participants reach substantive agreement.
Ovum has argued that:
Many observers believe that commercial conflict between the TAF members is
unlikely to lead to the addition of many new services through [the TAF process]
(Ovum 1997).
Transaction costs, which must ultimately be borne by the community and
consumers, may be higher overall under a co-regulatory approach if all
declaration decisions end up with the ACCC.6 Industry participants must also
invest resources in being a member of the TAF rather than responding to
arguments put forward by the regulator.
Allowing the industry to progressively identify areas where declaration is
needed has the benefit of avoiding unnecessary declarations. Where participants
                                             
6  The cost associated with regulating an industry can be significant. There are the direct
costs of running the regulatory agency, the cost of input to policy formulation and
compliance by the parties and the waste of resources when firms engage in lobbying
activities to try to influence regulators.
There may also be an efficiency cost associated with delays to the regulator making a
decision. This cost is dependent on the complexity of the issue and the capabilities of the
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are prepared to duplicate facilities as a viable commercial proposition there is no
need for declaration.
However, there may be a cost in terms of the lost opportunities for competition
and there are the transactions costs associated with dealing with the TAF and
ACCC. In addition, the possibility of having additional services declared has the
potential to encourage regulatory ‘gaming’. The incumbent could use the
declaration process to delay competition and competitors could use it as a means
of cheap and easy entry.
The effectiveness of the declaration regime in promoting efficient competition
will be crucial to how well Australia performs in any price and quality of service
comparison (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7). If the process of obtaining a declaration
obstructs competitive entry to telephony markets, then Australia may not
perform well in price and service quality comparisons.
Of course, the limited period of time over which the declaration regime had
been in operation at February 1998 (when the price and service quality
comparisons are made) needs to be taken into account when examining the
likely impact of the Australian access regime upon price performance.
The service-by-service approach to access that results from using a declaration
process has been criticised. King and Gans have argued that:
If you are planning to invest in infrastructure in the future, do not expect to have
full control of your investment. ... access regulation in [the telecommunications]
industry is likely to have the perverse effect of reducing future investment and
innovation (King and Gans, AFR, January 1998).
Similarly, KPMG stated that:
... investment can be discouraged if there is uncertainty as to whether the ACCC
may declare a facility service under the access provisions. A decision to declare
could affect future net returns for the access provider (KPMG 1998, p. 8).
Declaration may also have the effect of shifting future investment between
services:
It is possible that declaration may have the potential to diminish investment
incentives in relation to networks used to supply the eligible service, while
encouraging investment in infrastructure used to supply other services (ACCC
1998a, p. 27).
The service-by-service approach to access employed under declaration may
introduce uncertainty into investment decisions. New and existing carriers
cannot be certain that current investments will not become subject to future
declarations, resulting in the investor carrying the full risk of the investment but
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The ACCC has undertaken to reduce this uncertainty to some extent by
introducing certainty of process. It has published a series of guidelines, such as
Declaration of Telecommunications Services, which outline the approach the
ACCC will take in declaration proceedings.
The ACCC also takes the opportunity provided in each declaration hearing to
indicate how similar matters will be approached in the future. This provides for
a more detailed and certain policy framework than is actually provided for under
the legislation.
The legislation outlining the processes that the ACCC must take in its
declaration proceeding provides for a high degree of transparency. Under the
TPA and TA 1997, the ACCC is required to hold public hearings into proposed
declarations, inform the public of the existence of that inquiry, provide
reasonable opportunity for the public to make written submissions and prepare a
report setting out its findings. Recently, the ACCC has taken this further and has
released draft declarations and provided scope for public comment on those
drafts prior to making a final determination.
However, certainty in process does not necessarily mean that there will be
commensurate certainty in the outcomes of that process. The interpretation of
access issues and the resolution of those issues may change over time.
4.3 Number portability and carrier pre-selection
Number portability and carrier pre-selection promote competition by
facilitating consumer choice and reducing transaction costs for subscribers.
With number portability and pre-selection, subscribers can change carriers
without having to change telephone numbers or dialling extra digits each time
they make a call.
Most of the countries studied have or are in the process of introducing number
portability and carrier pre-selection (see Table 4.3). The two exceptions are New
Zealand and the United Kingdom.7 New Zealand does not have a legislated
requirement to provide number portability or pre-selection. Instead, it requires
operators to negotiate this amongst themselves should it be desired. The United
Kingdom does not require carrier pre-selection because OFTEL believes this
would detract from its policy of encouraging network competition.
                                             
7  At January 1999, OFTEL was in the process of introducing number portability, in line with
European Union Directives.4   REGULATION OF COMPETITION
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Table 4.3 Requirement for number portability and carrier pre-
selection, February 1998
Country Number portability Carrier pre-selection
Aust. Number portability required for fixed
services. Moving to extend to 1800, 13,
1300 and mobile services.
A basket of national long-distance,
international direct dial, operator
assistance, and international ringback
calls.
Canada Yes Information unavailable.
Finland Yes Moving to carrier pre-selection by
30 September 1998.
France Number portability due by 1 Jan. 2001. Moving to carrier pre-selection
Japan Moving towards its introduction. Introducing carrier pre-selection.
NZ Number portability based on call
forwarding has been introduced. Cellular
number portability is under negotiation.
No. Currently only indirect access.
Sweden Regulator desires the deployment of
number portability by 1 Jan. 1999.
However, regulator has also allowed 1
January 2003 in the event of technical or
costing difficulties.
Introducing carrier pre-selection by
September 1999.
UK Number portability being introduced into
fixed and mobile services
No. Currently only indirect access is
available. Users directly connected to a
particular carrier have no right of access
to other operators’ long-distance services.
USA Deployment of number portability due by




Australia is well placed in terms of the availability of number portability and
carrier pre-selection in comparison with the other countries examined. Under
Australia’s Numbering Plan, all carriers and carriage service providers, unless
exempted, must provide full number portability (including local calls) by 1
January 2000. The terms and conditions for providing number portability must
be negotiated, although the ACCC may arbitrate in a dispute.
In line with its power under Part 17 of the TA 1997, the Australian
Communications Authority (ACA) mandated that pre-selection be available forINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
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a basket of national long-distance, international direct dial, operator assistance,
and international ringback calls.
Number portability and carrier pre-selection reduce transaction costs for
consumers but they can also impose a cost upon providers. For example, there is
the cost of establishing the technology required to provide these services. These
costs must be weighed up against the gains from competition and direct
consumer gains from greater choice.
4.4 Access terms and conditions
Once access rights are in place, the terms and conditions must be determined.
Terms and conditions relate to the price and other non-price aspects (such as
quality) of providing a carriage service.
The price of access is critical to the achievement of efficient outcomes. Where
charges are too high, efficient operators may be dissuaded from entering the
market or inefficient bypass of network services may occur. Conversely, if
charges are too low, the access provider may not be able to recover the full cost
of supplying the network and curtail efficient investment. In addition, inefficient
operators may be encouraged to enter the market or new entrants may be
discouraged from establishing their own infrastructure.
The price of access will also have flow on effects to the final price of
telecommunications services and will thus affect the price comparisons made in
Chapter 5 and 6. The significance of the price of access is illustrated in Optus’s
claim that access charges are at least 30–50 per cent of input costs for new
entrants (Optus Communications 1998b).
The non-price aspects of a carriage service also influences an access seeker’s
ability to compete in downstream markets. For example, if a lower level of
quality is provided to those seeking access, they will be unable to compete
effectively with the provider.
Australian approach
In Australia, access conditions are determined through commercial negotiation.
In the case of declared services, failure of negotiations may trigger either the
application of terms and conditions specified in an undertaking or ACCC
arbitration.4   REGULATION OF COMPETITION
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Voluntary undertakings specify a set of standard terms and conditions that apply
to the provision of particular declared carriage services. These undertakings
must be approved by the ACCC following a period of public review.8
Arbitration occurs when either negotiating party requests it of the ACCC. There
is no guidance under Part XIC as to what is a reasonable timeframe for
negotiations to occur before the parties resort to arbitration. This allows
discretion, both on the part of the negotiators and the regulator, over when to
intercede.
Where a carriage service meets certain criteria,9 the ACCC has foreshadowed
the use of forward-looking total service long-run incremental cost (TSLRIC)10
when arbitrating or assessing the appropriateness of the terms specified in an
undertaking (see Appendix B for definition). However, application of TSLRIC
is not mandatory and the ACCC reserves the right to consider a range of criteria
before doing so.
Part XIC of the TPA also requires that carriers and carriage service providers
supplying a declared carriage service to take all reasonable steps to ensure that:
·  the technical and operational quality of the declared service being supplied
is equivalent to what the access provider provides itself; and
·  the access seeker receives a level of fault detection, handling and
rectification that the access provider provides to itself.
Where access terms and conditions are negotiated without recourse to an
undertaking or arbitration, there is no legal requirement on the parties to publish
the access agreement.11 Division 9 of Part XIC provides for parties to have their
agreements registered with the ACCC, however, this is at the discretion of the
parties involved.
                                             
8  The ACCC must approve an undertaking that adopts the set of model terms and conditions
contained in an approved access code.
9 Where the ACCC considers a particular declared service is necessary for competition in
dependent markets, where the forces of competition, or the threat of competition, work
poorly to constrain the price of access to efficient levels and the service is well developed
in the market (ACCC 1997a).
10 The forward-looking nature of these costs refers to those that apply to the best in-use
technology. Where a carrier’s technology has been superseded, it is costed as though it is
the latest (usually lower cost) technology.
11 There is a possibility that carriers or carriage service providers may be required under
Divisions 4 & 5 of Part XIB to forward access agreements to the ACCC (Department of
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Overseas approaches
Commercial negotiation is a common approach to determining access terms and
conditions in the other countries studied (see Table 4.4).
In some countries, Japan, France, Sweden and Finland, the regulator is
empowered to require certain carriers (those with significant market power) to
develop and publish standard reference offers. Typically, standard reference
offers specify the technical conditions and tariffs applicable for interconnection.
In most cases, the technical and financial terms specified must be the same as
what the access provider provides to itself. Standard reference offers are
generally negotiable, although in Japan they are binding and any variation away
from terms specified in a standard reference offer must be approved by the
regulator.
Standard reference offers generally specify all the terms and conditions relevant
for interconnection. For example, the MPTS in France decreed that:
The services listed in the standard interconnection offer ... shall contain the
various conditions to meet, on the one hand, the interconnection requirements of
public network operators and, on the other hand, the network access
requirements of public telephone service providers ... These conditions shall be
broken down to a sufficient level of detail so that the various individual
components required by applicants may be identified. The information necessary
to the establishment of interconnection shall be provided to other operators under
the same conditions and to the same degree of quality as that furnished by these
operators to their own departments and their subsidiaries and partners (MPTS
1997).
Other countries (the United Kingdom, United States and Canada) have seen the
need for continued direct regulation of some network prices. The United
Kingdom applies price caps to certain of BT’s network services considered non-
competitive and, like the United States and Canada, requires reciprocity of call
termination charges.4   REGULATION OF COMPETITION
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Table 4.4 Determination of terms and conditions, February 1998
Method of determining access terms and conditions
Aust. Negotiation with provision for the application of approved undertakings and ACCC
arbitration. Arbitration decisions may be appealed in the Australian Competition
Tribunal and, ultimately, in the Federal Court.
Canada Negotiation, although call termination charges must be based on the principle of
reciprocity or mutual compensation. CRTC may act as an arbitrator in disputes. It is
unclear whether arbitration decisions may be appealed.
Finland Operators with significant market power must publish standard interconnection offers
specifying the technical conditions and tariffs applicable for interconnection. Offers
must be approved by the regulator against cost-based pricing principles. The technical
and financial terms offered to other operators must be the same as what the operator
provides itself. Operators must not refuse to negotiate where certain interconnection
conditions are not provided for in the standard offer. Standard offers do not preclude
negotiated agreement between interconnecting parties so long as they are objectively
justified and transparent.
The Ministry may arbitrate in a dispute. It is unclear whether arbitration decisions are
binding.
France Access terms and conditions determined as per Finland.
Regulator may arbitrate in a dispute. It is unclear whether arbitration decisions are
binding.
Japan Negotiation with non-designated carriers is required.
Ministry regulates the tariffs set by designated carriers. Designated carriers must submit
tariffs and any proposed changes to the Ministry for authorisation. Tariffs must be at
least equal to those for comparable services provided to itself. Tariffs set by designated
carriers are reviewed annually by the regulator on the basis of interconnect accounting
data. Designated carriers may only provide interconnection by individual agreement after
obtaining Ministerial authorisation.
The Ministry may arbitrate in a dispute. It is unclear whether arbitration decisions are
binding.
NZ Negotiation. Private arbitration available with ultimate resort to the Courts.
Sweden Access terms and conditions determined as per Finland.
At the request of either party to a negotiation, the regulator may set a time limit for
negotiations and the regulator may mediate if the time limit is not met. The regulator
may arbitrate in the event of a dispute. Its decisions may be appealed in a general
administrative court.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
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Table 4.4 Determination of terms and conditions, February 1998
(cont.)
Method of determining access terms and conditions
UK Negotiation with BT subject to price caps on certain of its network services. BT is
required to give notice of changes to a charge covered by the price caps. Call termination
charges must be based on the principle of reciprocity.
OFTEL may act as an arbitrator in disputes and its decisions are binding.
USA Preference for incumbent local exchange carriers and new entrants to come to privately
negotiated interconnection agreements. However, call termination and transport charges
must be based on the principle of reciprocity. RBOCs may (but are not required to) file
general offers of interconnect services and prices with the relevant State Commission.
Commercially negotiated agreements must also be approved by the relevant State
Commission.
State Commissions may act as a mediator or as an arbitrator where negotiations fail.
Mediation is not binding while arbitration is.
Source: Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 (Part XIC); Brock and Katz (1997); MPT (1997); MPTS
(1997); MTCF (1997); MTCS (1997); OFTEL (1997b).
Disclosure of final interconnection agreements is common in the selected
countries (see Table 4.5). Disclosure has the advantage of ensuring certainty for
entrants and neutrality of treatment. It is also possible that disclosure may
produce outcomes similar to mandated standard reference offers.
Commentary
Disclosure of agreed access prices may play a role in discouraging anti-
competitive pricing arrangements. In particular, it may allow others in the
industry to view final interconnection agreements and bring the regulator’s
attention to possible undesirable pricing practices.
KPMG has argued that a higher degree of transparency would remove the need
for the ACCC to apply its access pricing principles:
... it would seem desirable for the ACCC to try to deal with the monopoly
problem more by promoting market transparency, monitoring prices and
removing artificial barriers to entry than by attempting to regulate prices directly.
The difficulties associated with direct price regulation are well known and will
no doubt be again manifested if the ACCC attempts to pursue the total service
long-run incremental cost approach (KPMG 1998, p. 13).
Disclosure may also have the added benefit of increasing the level of
information available to potential entrants. Having access to access prices prior4   REGULATION OF COMPETITION
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to entry allows entrants to more adequately assess the true cost of entering the
industry.
Table 4.5 Disclosure requirements, February 1998
Disclosure requirements
Aust. Approved undertakings are publicly available. Negotiated access agreements need not
be published.
Canada It is unclear what form of disclosure, if any, is required.
Finland Approved set of standard terms and conditions must be publicly available.
Interconnection contracts must be submitted to the Ministry where they shall be made
available to the public with the exception of sections handling the business strategy of
the parties.
France Those with significant market power must publish standard interconnection offers
incorporating services and components specified in regulations. Standard offers must
be approved by the regulator.
Interconnection agreements must be forwarded to the regulator. The regulator may
make agreements available to interested parties without prejudice to information
covered by commercial confidentiality.
Japan Authorised interconnection agreements entered into by non-designated carriers must be
made available for public perusal.
Designated carriers must publish their set of interconnection tariffs approved by the
Ministry. Tariffs set by designated carriers are reviewed annually by the Ministry on
the basis of interconnect accounting data.
NZ TCNZ is obliged to disclose all interconnection agreements with other parties,
including its own subsidiaries. It is understood that publication may be delayed six
months so that publication does not deprive the competitor of the commercial benefit
of its agreement.
Sweden Those with significant market power must publish their set of approved standard
interconnection charges.
UK Operators with significant market power must publish a standard contract and a list of
standard services with standard charges. Additionally, all interconnect agreements with
the incumbent must be published.
USA The set of approved standard terms and conditions for interconnection are publicly
available. Privately negotiated agreements must be approved by the relevant State
Commission against specified pricing requirements. Incumbent local exchange carriers
are required to offer the terms specified in an existing agreement to any party who
requests it.
Source: Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 (Part XIC); Harris and Kraft (1997, p. 104); MPT (1997);
MPTS (1997); MTCS (1997); MTCF (1997); New Zealand Telecommunications (Disclosure)
Regulations 1990 (as amended in 1993); OFTEL (1997b).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
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However, against this must be weighed the disadvantages of disclosure.
Disclosure may militate against welfare-enhancing price discrimination where
there are common costs to be recovered and final demands are different.
Disclosure is likely to result in prices set closer to incremental average costs
because arbitrage is made possible.
Disclosure may also be disadvantageous to some access seekers who do not
wish competitors to know the price they negotiated. Access seekers do not want
competitors to know critical cost input data.
However, non-disclosure creates a substantial information asymmetry in favour
of the incumbent. Undertakings may not completely correct this because not all
the material terms and conditions are required to be disclosed under legislation.
4.5 Accounting separation
AUSTEL introduced accounting separation requirements in the early 1990s and
specified how carriers were to meet these requirements in its Chart of Accounts
and Cost Allocation Manual. These requirements applied to Telstra, Optus and
Vodafone and aimed to assist AUSTEL in arbitrating over disputes involving
interconnection. There is no requirement on these carriers to make these
statements publicly available.
Accounting separation is a common practice internationally and, in most cases,
there are no requirements on operators to publish these accounts (see Table 4.6).
Most countries require that the operator publish a statement of compliance
accompanied by an independent auditor’s statement.
Publication of accounts can go some way to reducing the information
asymmetry present in the negotiation of access prices. Without cost information,
access seekers cannot be sure that the price offered by the access provider is a
true reflection of cost and thus reasonable.
However, disclosure of accounting costs may be detrimental to efficient
outcomes. First, it requires the access provider to divulge commercially
sensitive information and thus weaken its competitive position against access
seekers (ie its competitors). Second, disclosing information of this nature may
provide a basis for collusive behaviour.4   REGULATION OF COMPETITION
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Table 4.6 Accounting separation requirements, February 1998
Accounting separation requirements
Aust. Certain carriers required to meet accounting separation requirements specified by AUSTEL in
its Chart of Accounts and Cost Allocation Manual. The Manual specifies 26 broad product
categories for monitoring within each carrier’s business. Publication is not required.
The ACCC has the authority under Part XIB to issue other account keeping rules which specify
the manner and form in which records must be kept.
Can. No longer required as of January 1998.
Fin. Operators with significant market power are required to separate out their accounts for
interconnection. Interconnection accounts must show the main categories into which costs are
divided (ie direct costs and common costs) as well as the rules used for the allocation. Cost
accounting descriptions must be forwarded to the Ministry. The accounting method must be
approved by the Ministry.
Fr. Operators with significant market power must keep a separate accounting system for their
interconnection activities, the specifications of which are set out under a decree of the Ministry.
In particular, the system must allow for the identification of the following costs: general network
costs; costs specific to interconnection services; costs specific to the operator’s services other
than interconnection; and common costs. The cost accounting systems are independently
audited. Publication is not required although the operator is required to publish a statement of
compliance.
Jap. Designated carriers’ accounting reports must be separated between the management and
operation of essential facilities and the provision of services to users utilising essential services.
A report on their interconnection accounting must be forwarded each year to the Ministry and
published. A certification of the results authorised by a certified public accountant must be
attached. Accounting standards are defined by the government.
NZ TCNZ required to publish separate financial statements for its principal operating subsidiary,
Telecom New Zealand.
Swe. Operators with significant market power are obliged to keep the accounting of revenue and
expenses for interconnection separate from other accounts.
Further details of the accounting separation system are unavailable.
UK BT is required to separate its accounts for its retail services, core network services and access
network services.
BT is also required to publish statements of incremental costs for the network business. These
will show the attribution of costs to each network component and part and provide incremental
cost floors and stand-alone cost ceiling for all services. There is also a requirement for BT to
publish its current cost accounting statements annually.
All accounts are independently audited to tight audit standards and reconciled to statutory
annual accounts.
USA The regional Bell operating companies must provide long-distance services through a separate
affiliate for a period of three years. The affiliate is required to publish its own set of accounts.
Source: AUSTEL (1993); Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 (Part XIB); New Zealand
Telecommunications (Disclosure) Regulations 1990; CRTC (1997b); MPT (1997); MPTS (1997)
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4.6 Regulating anti-competitive conduct
Part XIB complements Part XIC of the TPA in that it provides for the ACCC to
act upon evidence of anti-competitive conduct in those telecommunications
carriage services not under a Part XIC declaration. This does not preclude the
ACCC from using Part XIB to take action against a carrier attempting to behave
anti-competitively in relation to a declared service.
Part XIB complements rather than replaces the anti-competitive conduct
provisions contained in Part IV of the TPA.
It was felt by the government that total reliance on Part IV may be ineffective to
constrain anti-competitive conduct in the telecommunications industry, given the
still developing state of competition (ACCC 1997b, p. 7).
Part XIB was intended to allow:
... the ACCC to respond swiftly where anti-competitive conduct is evident
(Second Reading Speech, Trade Practices (Amendment) Bill, 5 December 1996).
Some form of anti-competitive conduct regulation applies to the
telecommunications industries in each of the benchmarked countries. However,
as far as the Commission is aware, the United Kingdom is the only other
country studied that uses special anti-competitive conduct provisions for the
telecommunications industry. OFTEL has introduced a Fair Trading Condition
into the licences of all operators which prohibits a licensee from engaging,
whether by act or omission, in certain anti-competitive practices (OFTEL
1997a).
4.7 In summary
In all the countries benchmarked, whilst competition has been introduced into
the market, the incumbent has been left vertically-integrated with ownership of
the established network.12 Some possible reasons for this are:
·  separating the monopoly segments of the industry from those that are
competitive and ensuring that they remain independent would result in
customers having to deal with two entities;
                                             
12 Vertically-integrated here means that the incumbent operates in both the wholesale and
retail sectors. Hence, the local exchange carriers in the United States are considered
vertically-integrated because they own the local exchange network and provide retail
services to final consumers.4   REGULATION OF COMPETITION
91
·  there are potential dynamic efficiency advantages where facilities service
providers having a presence in retail markets that make them more
responsive to demand; and
·  there are significant economies of scope in marketing and billing services.
Governments recognise that some form of regulatory oversight of
telecommunications, at least in regard to fixed networks, is required to ensure
competition and efficient outcomes. They have regulated to mitigate the market
power that control of the network gives the incumbent.
The regulations establish rights of interconnection and access to certain network
services for the incumbent’s competitors. How these regulations are designed
can have a significant impact upon the way in which competition develops.
A variety of approaches to regulating access have been tried. These are
summarised in Table 4.7. However, with the possible exception of New
Zealand, all of the overseas countries studied are similar in that the critical
decision over how far the incumbent is required to unbundle its network was
pre-determined by the regulator. In each country, the regulator was given wide
scope to determine what demands would be placed on the incumbent in regard
to interconnection and access to network services prior to deregulation.
In Australia, Part XIC of the TPA established a formal process for industry
participants to have additional network services declared.
There are costs in empowering a regulator to pre-determine access rights. These
include the potential for political interference and the possibility of information
deficiencies leading the regulator to establish inappropriate access requirements.
However, there are costs in delaying fully effective competition because
competitors do not have access to the necessary network services. There are also
transactions costs involved in dealing with both the TAF and ACCC. Australia’s
service-by-service approach to access may also cause investment uncertainty
and create a potential for regulatory ‘gaming’ — the incumbent could use the
declaration process to delay competition and competitors could use it as a means
of cheap and easy entry.
These costs need to be weighed against the perceived benefits of taking an
industry-based approach. Establishing mechanisms that allow industry
participants to initiate declaration proceedings means that the need for
declaration in a particular case would emanate from competition. In other
words, service-by-service declaration is economically-sound, resulting in
sustainable long-term investment decisions.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
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Table 4.7 Overarching characteristics of competition policy in
selected countries, February 1998
Access rights Scope of access rights Standard
offers
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a Defacto when terms and conditions are filed.
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Disclosure of agreed access prices may play a role in discouraging anti-
competitive pricing arrangements. Disclosure may also have the added benefit
of increasing the level of information available to potential entrants. Having
knowledge of access prices prior to entry allows entrants to more adequately
assess the true cost of entering the industry.
However, against this must be weighed the disadvantages of disclosure.
Disclosure may militate against welfare-enhancing price discrimination and may
be disadvantageous to some access seekers who do not wish competitors to
know the price they negotiated.
Overall, Australia’s regulatory framework is flexible enough for regulators to
arrive at an effective regime that suits local market circumstances. However,
arriving at this regime is likely to take some time.
In effect, the Australian approach involves a tradeoff, the costs of delay against
the benefits of ultimately making a better decision. It may also delay
competition in new services as incumbents have time to cement and maintain a
competitive advantage.
The regulatory environment has implications for the assessment of the outcomes
or benchmarks of performance discussed in Chapter 5, 6 and 7. The possible
impact of regulatory arrangements on price comparisons are discussed in
Chapter 8.95
5 RESIDENTIAL PRICE COMPARISONS
Australian prices of residential telecommunications services are compared with
the prices in eight other OECD countries in this Chapter. The services examined
include the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), the digital mobile
network and the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) network. These
comparisons are an extension of previous OECD studies, which did not include
ISDN comparisons. Also, calls from fixed lines to mobile phones, calls to
Internet Service Providers and normal voice calls within the networks are
included in the comparisons.
The telecommunications industry is diverse and changing rapidly. As discussed
in Chapter 2, new technologies and services are emerging and competing with
established services. There are different regulatory frameworks applying across
countries as increasing competition occurs (Chapters 3 and 4). Also the process
of regulatory change in telecommunications markets is encouraging new pricing
strategies involving innovative discount plans.
At best, a broad picture of relative prices in different countries is presented in
this study. The comparisons are based on many assumptions related to the
specifications and pricing of the services provided to customers. The effect on
the price comparisons of changing the most important assumptions is
investigated in order to test the robustness of the approach.
The countries selected for analysis are generally among the better performing
countries with relatively low prices according to previous OECD comparisons.
Therefore, Australia’s relative position among all OECD countries (and possibly
among a list of other non-OECD countries) can be expected to be better than
among the countries studied.
The Commission appointed the Eurodata Foundation to assemble the price
indexes utilised in this study. Eurodata maintains and updates the OECD
telecommunications database. Eurodata, in conjunction with the Commission,
further developed the methodology currently utilised by the OECD.
Telstra and Telecom New Zealand examined the model and consulted on some
of the price and demand assumptions.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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5.1 Methodology
Price information for many individual services is aggregated into ‘indices’ to
provide a practical means of comparing overall prices. Each index is based on
the expenditure over one year on a defined ‘basket’ of services purchased by a
typical residential user, at prices as at February 1998. For example, price
comparisons for the total service provided by the PSTN are based on an index
which includes the price of access to a line and the prices for a representative
basket of domestic and international calls.
Inter-country comparisons are obtained by pricing the same basket of services in
each of the countries selected for this study (see Chapter 1).
Telecommunications carriers
The prices used for the international comparisons were normally obtained by the
consultant from the incumbent carriers in each country. In four of the countries,
a single dominant carrier was used (see Table 5.1 and Table F.1 in Appendix F).
In other countries it was necessary to combine an incumbent local service
provider with the major long-distance or international carrier. Prices for both the
competing Finnish incumbent carriers were included in the analysis.
Table 5.1 Carriers used for the price comparisons
Country Carrier
Australia Telstra
Canada BC Tel, Stentor
Finland Telecom Finland (now Sonera), Finnet
France France Telecom
Japan NTT, KDD
New Zealand TCNZ (Telecom Corporation of New Zealand)
Sweden Telia, Tele2
United Kingdom British Telecom
United States AT&T, Nynex, PacBell
Residential price baskets
Separate baskets are used for PSTN, ISDN and mobile services supplied to
residential customers. Furthermore, within the PSTN ‘total service’ basket there5 RESIDENTIAL PRICE COMPARISONS
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are sub-baskets for particular types of calls, such as domestic voice, Internet or
international calls.
Each basket or sub-basket of national (domestic) calls specifies the distribution
of calls made at six different times of the day or week and over 14 different
distances. This is necessary because prices vary with distance and time-of-day
and day-of-week. The usage weights are based on those developed by the
OECD, which are widely considered to be industry standards for
telecommunications price comparisons.1 The price of international calls from
each country is the weighted average of the prices of calls to the various
destinations, the weights being the relative call volumes to the destinations.
The demand assumptions for this study were developed further in consultation
with Eurodata and Telstra. In doing so, the aim was to ensure that there was a
reasonable representation of usage patterns which were, as far as possible,
neutral in their impact on the measurement of prices.
The actual distributions in any particular country depend on the structure of
prices in the country, as well as geographic factors such as population
distribution. The impact of changes in the assumptions on the price comparisons
was assessed.
Discounting plans
Comparisons such as those published by the OECD were normally based on the
standard prices. The accuracy of these comparisons has been affected by the
widespread emergence of discount plans. Price savings resulting from these
discount schemes can represent up to one quarter of the ‘standard’, or ‘list’,
price structure.
Discount plans generally take the following forms:
·  proportionally lower usage charges, once customer expenditures have
achieved a specified level;
·  higher customer access charges and lower usage charges, which are
attractive to very high volume users; or
                                             
1 Sets of assumptions for both residential and small business customers were originally
developed in the late 1980s by the OECD Secretariat and a working group consisting of
representatives from a number of OECD member countries.
The OECD recognised that a basket that reflected the demand patterns of any one country
would tend to influence the price comparisons in favour of that country. The OECD
therefore agreed to attempt to develop assumptions which were broadly representative of
member countries.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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·  lower usage charges to a limited number of specified destinations (such as
family and friends packages) or for a limited period.
For this study, the prices used in the comparisons are intended to reflect the
actual cost to the user. The specified baskets of services are priced in each
country using the lowest-priced discount plan that is widely available in the
relevant market and consistently offered by the incumbent operator(s) in that
country.
Plans involving limited destinations or periods (the last of the above three
categories) were not used because there is no information on their market shares
or the extent of their usage. Also there are plans which target narrowly defined
groups of customers (for example, students) which are excluded for the same
reasons. New Zealand has many such plans.
Regional price variations
In countries such as Finland and the US, there are significant regional variations
in prices within the country. Variation occurs within the operational area of the
same incumbent (for example, rural and urban areas), and between incumbent
carriers operating in different parts of the country.
In Finland, the Finnet group is a federation of many companies providing local
services in different regions and other companies providing mobile, long-
distance or international services. In the context of historically separate local
service companies, prices were not required to be uniform across the country.
Although some averaging of different regional prices has been undertaken, it
has not been possible to take into account all the complexities of the regional
pricing structures in these countries. The Commission is unaware of any studies
that have fully addressed this issue.
Taxes
Indirect taxes imposed by governments differ between countries and so
influence the relative prices of services in those countries. The indirect taxes
associated with the production of telecommunications services, including value
added taxes, have been included in the price comparisons because the aim is to
compare the cost to the consumer.5 RESIDENTIAL PRICE COMPARISONS
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Currency conversion
Purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates were used for the conversion of
prices into a common currency (US dollars).2 The particular rates used for this
study are given in Table 5.2 and are the same as those used by the OECD for
residential telecommunications price comparisons. They were constructed by
the OECD using a broad basket of goods and services weighted to be
representative of the average expenditure patterns of households throughout
OECD member countries.
Table 5.2 Purchasing power parity exchange rates used for the price
comparisons, 1998
Country Unit of local currency US dollar equivalent of one unit of
local currency
Australia Australian dollar 0.7463
Canada Canadian dollar 0.8264
Finland Markka 0.1698
France French franc 0.1541
Japan Yen 0.0059
New Zealand New Zealand dollar 0.6667
Sweden Swedish krona 0.1017
UK Pound (sterling) 1.4771
USA US dollar 1.0000
PPPs are designed to reflect the real purchasing power of a national currency.
Through the use of PPP exchange rates, the prices of telecommunications
services are compared in relation to the general level of prices in each country
(see Box 5.1).
                                             
2  The choice of exchange rate used reflects the objective of the study. PPP exchange rates
have been used in this study because the focus is on determining the extent to which
Australian telecommunications services prices are higher or lower, relative to the general
consumer price level, when compared with other countries.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Box 5.1 Purchasing power parity
Purchasing power parities (PPPs) are rates of conversion that are designed to equalise the
internal purchasing power of different currencies by eliminating differences in general
price levels between countries. A given sum of money, converted into other currencies at
PPP rates, should buy the same broad and representative basket of final goods and
services in each country.
This would not necessarily be the case if market exchange rates were used. Market
exchange rates are determined by trade in a smaller (traded) basket of goods, by capital
inflows and outflows, by government policies on quotas, tariffs and taxes, and by
expectations. Consequently, comparisons based on market exchange rates are often
volatile, particularly when capital flows are volatile. The rates may shift abruptly with
changed expectations, government trade and tax policies, trade patterns and monetary
conditions — thus they can quickly become dated.
The PPP adjusted prices are aimed at providing information on the price of
telecommunications services relative to the general price level facing residential
consumers in each of the countries studied.
For business comparisons, PPPs constructed to compare general business input price
levels may be preferable. However, this type of index is not available and constructing
such an index would, in itself, be a major undertaking.
The adequacy of the available PPP rates as a proxy for an ideal ‘business’ index depends
on the magnitude of variation in the general level of prices faced by businesses, relative
to the general level of prices for final goods and services, across the countries compared.
The countries compared are all mature, developed economies. Hence this variation is
likely to be significantly smaller than it would have been if underdeveloped countries
had also been included.
As an alternative to the PPP rates, market exchange rates were also considered for
business price comparisons. They might be useful for comparisons in situations where
businesses can easily switch their demand for telecommunications between countries.
However, most businesses are unable to do so without also relocating to the other
country. Telecommunications services typically comprise only a small component of
most businesses’ overall costs. Consequently, in most industries, they generally have
little bearing on location decisions.
5.2 Public Switched Telephone Network
The residential PSTN customer access service supplied to an average household
consists of a single connection to the fixed telephone network. The annual5 RESIDENTIAL PRICE COMPARISONS
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expenditure by the household covers customer charges for access to this
network and usage charges for the calls made over the year.
Customer access charges include line rental and installation and registration
charges associated with setting up a telecommunications service amortised over
five years. They are independent of the amount of usage by the customer.
Usage charges accrue on a per call or per call minute basis. Call charges include
charges for national (local and long-distance) voice calls, international voice
calls, calls to mobile telephones and calls to Internet Service Providers (ISPs),
but exclude fees charged by the ISPs.
Assumptions for the benchmarks
The assumptions about the numbers and average duration of calls for the single
line residential PSTN user are summarised in Table 5.3. More details are given
in Appendix F.
Table 5.3 Key assumptions of the residential PSTN basket
Call durations





c 970 2.5 to 3.5 3.5 to 6.0
Long-distance calls 158 3.5 to 6.0 6.0 to 7.0
Calls to mobiles 60 3.0 3.0
Fax calls 0 na na
Calls to ISPs 150 20.0 30.0
International calls 12 3.0 5.0
a The peak period includes calls in the basket made at 11:00am and 3:00pm on weekdays in all countries.
b The off-peak period includes calls made at 8:00pm and 3:00am on weekdays, and 11:00am and 3:00pm
on weekends.
c Local calls are those made to destinations up to and including 27 kilometres distance from the caller.
na Not applicable.
Source: OECD, Eurodata; Productivity Commission.
Internet service providers were assumed to be located within the local call area
as defined in each country. This is a reasonable assumption for Australia which
has relatively large local call areas. However, for countries with small local callINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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areas, a reasonable proportion of calls to ISPs may in fact be charged as long-
distance calls.
Sensitivity tests show that the comparisons were quite robust. Large changes in
weighting assumptions have a relatively small impact on Australia’s
comparative prices for the total residential PSTN service.
Residential price comparisons
The price indices for the nine selected countries are presented below.
Comparisons for the total residential service are considered first, followed by
discussion of the major components of the total service.
Total service
For the residential PSTN basket of services, Australia was ranked sixth out of
the nine countries included in the analysis (see Figure 5.1, chart (a)). That is, the
price of these services in Australia was the sixth lowest among the nine selected
countries.
Each price index in Figure 5.1 is the expenditure in each country (in US dollars
using PPP exchange rates) on the defined service or fixed basket of services, at
February 1998 prices. For example, a residential customer in Australia would
pay $US502 for the total basket of services defined in Table 5.3, including
$US160 on access rental, $US241 on domestic (local and long-distance) voice
calls, and so on. However, price relativities are of more relevance than the actual
numbers.
Customer access and usage charges
Comparisons of customer access charges and various components of usage (call)
charges are given in Figure 5.1, charts (b) to (f).
Customer access charges in Japan, Australia and the United States were a
relatively  small  component  of  total  PSTN  charges  (see  Figure 5.2(b)).  New
Zealand and Canada had relatively high access charges, but zero prices for short
distance calls.
The structure of customer access and usage charges has pricing efficiency
implications (see Chapter 3). In some countries, including Australia, discount
plans reducing usage charges result in customer access charges contributing
proportionally more to the overall cost of PSTN services to residential
consumers.5 RESIDENTIAL PRICE COMPARISONS
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Note: The price index is the expenditure in each country (in $US using PPP exchange rates) on a
fixed basket of Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) services. The expenditures are
valued at February 1998 prices, based on the widely available discounting plan that minimises
cost to the customer.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
104
Figure 5.2 Customer access and usage shares of total PSTN
prices, February 1998
(a) Standard prices























Access charges Usage charges
Note: Customer access charges are shown as the lighter portion of the bar, usage charges by the dark
portion.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.
Domestic voice calls on the PSTN
Australia’s relative prices for domestic voice calls are indicated in Figure 5.1(c).
Each country has a different definition of local calls. In particular, local call
areas differ in size, so that, for example, a 10 kilometre call is normally a long-
distance  call  in  Canada  but  a  25 kilometre  call  is  normally  a  local  call  in
Australia.
A common definition of local calls has been established in order to generate
separate international price comparisons for local and long-distance calls (see
Figure  5.3). According to this definition, which is related to the estimated
maximum distance of Australian local calls, calls up to and including 27
kilometres in distance are regarded as local calls. Under this assumption for
instance, annual expenditure on local calls in Canada is $US62 — despite a zero
price for calls defined in Canada as local. This expenditure of $US62 includes
an amount for some calls which are priced in Canada as long-distance calls but
are within the definition used here for local calls.
Australia’s local call prices were relatively high. However, a more favourable
result for Australia would be obtained by increasing the assumed call duration
(see Table 5.3). Local calls of longer duration might be expected in Australia,
where the price remains constant as the duration increases, than in countries
where the price increases with the duration of the call.5 RESIDENTIAL PRICE COMPARISONS
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Figure 5.3 Relative domestic local and long-distance PSTN voice
service prices, February 1998












































Note: The price index is the expenditure in each country (in $US using PPP exchange rates) on a
fixed basket of Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) services. The expenditures are
valued at February 1998 prices, based on the widely available discounting plan that minimises
cost to the customer.
a Calls to destinations up to and including 27 kilometres distance from the caller.
b Domestic (national) calls to destinations 40 kilometres or greater form the caller.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.
Local call price comparisons are particularly sensitive to the call duration
assumptions. For example, with an average day-time duration of 3 minutes, the
local call price in the United Kingdom is 32 per cent below the Australian price.
With an average duration of 5 minutes, the United Kingdom local call price is 7
per cent above the Australian price.
International voice calls
Australia, United States, Japan and New Zealand had higher prices for
international calls than the European countries and Canada (see Figure 5.1(d)).
However, removing international calls from the basket did not change the
country rankings (see Figure 5.4).
The contribution of international calls to the overall cost of the basket was about
8 per cent for Australia and 5 per cent for all other countries. International calls
from Australia are likely to be more expensive because:
·  Call destinations are generally further away than for the other countries
studied; and
·  Traffic volumes are smaller compared with European and North American
countries. Smaller traffic volumes are an impediment to negotiating
favourable agreements under the international accounting rate system.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Technological development has resulted in reductions in the cost of providing
international telecommunications. However, the international system for
determining the prices paid by consumers has resulted in premiums above the
underlying costs of calls (IC 1997a). On the other hand, competition is
progressively eroding these premiums (Sidak 1998).
Calls to mobile phones
The proportion of expenditure on calls to mobile phones (see Figure 5.1(e)) was
greater than would be expected given the relatively small number of such calls
made. For the basket of services used in the comparisons, only 5 per cent of all
national voice calls from fixed phones were to mobiles, but these latter calls
account for about over 20 per cent of expenditure on all national voice calls.
Calls to mobiles were generally expensive relative to other voice calls.
Calls to Internet service providers
Australia had relatively low prices for calls to Internet Service Providers (see
Figure  5.1(f)). These calls were assumed to be local calls with an average
duration of nearly half an hour. Removing Internet calls from the PSTN basket
would only marginally change total service ranking for residential prices (see
Figure 5.4).
Australia’s untimed local calls resulted in relatively cheap Internet calls, with
Internet calls contributing 4 per cent of the residential PSTN total service cost,
below the average of 11 per cent for all other countries. In countries with timed
local calls, the cost of Internet calls can be substantial compared to voice calls,
which are assumed to be only a few minutes long. In the United Kingdom, for
example, Internet calls represented about half of the cost of all domestic voice
calls. However, in Canada, where unlimited local calls are included in the
customer access fee, calls to Internet service providers are free.3
These results are dependent on an assumption that calls to Internet service
providers are made within a local call zone. This is a realistic assumption for
Australia because of its large local call areas. However, for countries like
Canada with relatively small local call areas, the price of calls to Internet
Service Providers may be understated.
                                             
3 Free local calls are also available in New Zealand but only to households.5 RESIDENTIAL PRICE COMPARISONS
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Figure 5.4 Impact of exclusion of Internet and international calls on























































































Note: The price index is the expenditure in each country (in $US using PPP exchange rates) on a
fixed basket of Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) services. The expenditures are
valued at February 1998 prices, based on the widely available discounting plan that minimises
cost to the customer.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.
Impact of call and price assumptions
Some of the assumptions behind the residential PSTN basket were varied to test
the robustness of the price comparisons for the total residential PSTN service.
Comparisons can be regarded as being robust where variations in the usage
assumptions do not lead to significant changes in the countries’ relative price
performance.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Figure 5.5 Impact of different usage assumptions on the total PSTN


























































































Note: The price index is the expenditure in each country (in $US using PPP exchange rates) on a
fixed basket of Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) services. The expenditures are
valued at February 1998 prices, based on the widely available discounting plan that minimises
cost to the customer.
a 50 per cent more voice calls, that is from 1200 to 1800 calls per annum.
b Double the proportion of long-distance calls, from 14 per cent to 28 per cent of domestic voice
calls.
c Duration of day-time local calls increased from about 3 minutes to 5 minutes.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.
Impact of changes to call patterns
Three different sensitivity tests were performed to assess the impact of different
call patterns (see Figure 5.5).
More calls: When the total number of voice calls made by a household was
increased by 50 per cent from 1200 calls to 1800 calls per annum, Australia’s
rank among the countries benchmarked did not change, despite differences in
the fixed and variable cost shares (see Figure 5.5(b)).5 RESIDENTIAL PRICE COMPARISONS
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More long-distance calls, fewer local calls: The proportion of long-distance
calls (call distance 40 kilometres and greater) was doubled and the number of
local calls reduced to keep the total number of domestic voice calls constant.
Increasing the proportion of long-distance calls in this way did not change
Australia’s price ranking (see Figure 5.5(c)).
Longer local calls: When the assumed average duration of day-time local calls
was increased from about 3 minutes to 5 minutes, Australia’s overall total
service performance improved slightly (see Figure 5.5(d)). As discussed earlier,
such a change would have a larger impact on Australia’s relative price
performance for local calls than for the total service.
Sensitivity tests show that the comparisons are quite robust. Changing
weighting assumptions for call patterns by as much as 50 per cent had a small
impact on Australia’s relative price for the total residential PSTN service.
Impact of discount plans
Plans tailored for residential consumers can generate significant savings over
standard  packages  (see  Figure 5.6(a)  and  5.6(b)).  For  example,  France
Telecom’s discounts reduced the total cost of the basket by over 25 per cent.
The effect of this level of discounting was to improve France’s ranking from
seventh to fourth position, above Australia. Telstra’s discounts represented
savings of 6 per cent.
The decisions about which plans to utilise in the study involved an element of
judgement by the consultant using the criteria of the lowest-priced plan which
was widely available to customers with the assumed usage call patterns.
Impact of exchange rate assumptions
The effect of using market exchange rates instead of PPPs was to improve
Australia’s ranking because of the relatively low value of the Australian dollar
in February 1998 (see Figure 5.6(c)). As discussed previously, use of market
exchange rates for currency conversion would render the price comparisons
subject to factors external to the telecommunications industry.
The PPP exchange rate used for Australia was 74.6 US cents. The market rate
for the Australian dollar declined from about 73 US cents in September 1997 to
67 US cents in February 1998 because of the impact of the Asian crisis and
falling commodity prices. This reduced by nearly 9 per cent Australian
telecommunications prices measured in terms of US dollars using market
exchange rates.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Figure 5.6 Impact of discounting, exchange rate assumptions, and
recent Australian price adjustments on total PSTN













































(c) Discounted prices and market











































Note: The price index is the expenditure in each country on a fixed basket of Public Switched
Telephone Network (PSTN) services. Expenditures are expressed in $US purchasing power
parity (PPP) terms, except in chart (c) where average market exchange rates in February 1998
are used.
All other assumptions are as summarised in Table 5.1 for the total PSTN service.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.
Impact of Telstra’s May 1998 price adjustment
Telstra changed its price structure in May 1998. However, there was very little
impact on the overall expenditure on the residential basket (see Figure 5.6(b)
and (d)).
Treatment of discounts on long-distance calls
Australia and New Zealand have adopted, as a pricing strategy, a cap on long-
distance calls in off-peak periods. Once the price of such calls reaches the cap5 RESIDENTIAL PRICE COMPARISONS
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($3 in Australia), it does not increase as the call duration increases further. The
price comparisons model does not include the effective discounts on these calls.
The $3 cap in Australia starts to bring benefits to customers when long-distance
evening calls last longer than about 15 minutes. The assumed average duration
of long-distance off-peak calls was 7 minutes — based on OECD assumptions
— which suggests that a relatively small proportion of calls would have
durations longer than 15 minutes and receive the benefits. However, some
customers would tend to increase the duration of their calls when the $3 cap
applies.
Impact of Australian call patterns
Telstra furnished commercial-in-confidence information, on the numbers,
distributions and durations of domestic calls for a typical Australian residential
customer. Internet calls were not separately identified from voice calls. The data
was provided in an aggregated form which satisfied the input requirements of
the Eurodata model. The Commission did not have access to raw data.
Price comparisons using the Australian call pattern were then contrasted with
the comparisons based on the basket developed by the Commission as described
earlier (see Figure 5.7). This latter basket was more broadly representative of
OECD call patterns.
The ‘Australian’ basket had a much smaller proportion of very short-distance
calls (less than 3 kilometres) and a correspondingly larger proportion of
medium-distance calls (7 to 40 kilometres). This may reflect the relatively lower
population densities of Australian urban regions.
The price structure in Australia can be expected to have an impact on calling
patterns. Those services with relatively low prices in Australia compared with
other countries can be expected to be relatively more in demand in Australia.
Costing a basket in which these services are given a greater weight would
generally be expected to lead to a lower relative price for the total service.
The effect of using the Australian basket for all countries benchmarked was to
improve Australia’s relative prices from sixth lowest to the third lowest for
residential domestic service. Canadian, French and US prices became higher
than Australia’s. In the case of Canada, the Australian distribution adversely
affected the overall price because 3 kilometres calls are free and middle-distance
calls relatively expensive in Canada.
However, Finnish and Swedish prices remain substantially below Australia’s
prices, using the Australian basket.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Figure 5.7 Australian and OECD basket price comparisons for total











































Note: The price index is the expenditure in each country (in $US using PPP exchange rates) on a
fixed basket of Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) services. Expenditures are valued
at February 1998 prices, based on the widely available discounting plan that minimises cost to
the customer.
International calls were excluded from both comparisons.
The $3 charge cap for off-peak calls in Australia leads to some very long-duration calls which
are not properly accounted for in the price comparisons model. Telstra has provided
information which suggests that the estimated price index for Australia using the Australian
basket is over-estimated by between 4 and 5 per cent. Any other countries with discounts on
long-duration calls could be similarly over-estimated.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.
New Zealand prices
As stated previously, the Commission’s methodology was based on a common
neutral basket of calls which is priced in each country. TCNZ’s Friends and
Family Home pricing plan was used to calculate New Zealand’s price index.
This plan is widely available to customers and embodies a substantial discount
from basic rates. As with other countries, price plans with more limited
applicability were not used.
In a submission, TCNZ provided a price measure for New Zealand based on
revenue per call minute (yield) for national and international calls. This measure
embodied all of the discount plans offered by TCNZ including the NZ$5 cap in
off-peak periods (similar in concept to Telstra’s $3 cap). Also, the overall yield
measure reflected the numbers and durations of calls made in different time
periods and over different distances by New Zealanders.5 RESIDENTIAL PRICE COMPARISONS
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The price measure provided by TCNZ was 16 per cent lower than that recorded
in Figure 5.1(a). However, a measure for one particular country based on yield,
and hence on the call pattern in that country, would be expected to produce a
more favourable result for that country.4
Comparison with other price benchmarking
In its most recently published price comparisons, the OECD reported that, based
on 1996 tariffs, Australia’s standard residential prices for customer access and
local and long-distance national voice calls (excluding calls to mobiles) were
slightly higher than the average of 23 OECD countries (OECD 1997b).
However, in the OECD’s comparison, Australia was ranked last (having the
highest prices) among the nine benchmarked countries considered in the
Commission’s  study  (see  Table 5.4).  Eurodata  updated  the  comparisons  in
February and May 1998, using the OECD methodology.
Table 5.4 Results of cross-country comparisons of residential prices






c January 1996 Nine Standard prices; national voice calls
Eurodata
d February 1998 Seven Standard prices; national voice calls
Productivity
Commission
e February 1998 Six Discount prices; calls to mobiles and
ISPs as well as national voice calls
Eurodata
d May 1998 Eight Standard prices; national voice calls
a Australia’s price ranking relative to the nine benchmark countries. For example, a rank of seven means
seventh lowest price out of the nine countries.
b All studies use PPPs for currency conversions and include indirect taxes.
c The most recent published OECD comparisons.
d These comparisons are part of a regular service offered to Eurodata customers based on
OECD/Eurodata methodology.
e The current study based on Productivity Commission/Eurodata methodology
Source: OECD, Eurodata and Productivity Commission.
                                             
4  It was not possible to obtain a yield measure for the other benchmarked countries.
Furthermore, use of the yield approach across all countries can produce confounding
results (see Quiggin 1997). For example, it is possible for a country to have higher prices
than another country, for each service, yet still have a lower overall yield due to a higher
proportion of sales in the lower yield parts of the market.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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The Communications Research Unit (CRU) has recently undertaken
international comparisons of standard prices in 6 of the 9 countries considered
by the Commission (Finland, Japan and the US being excluded) (ACCC
1998b).5 The CRU did not use price baskets but examined the individual
charges for connection, rent and calls. Australia was found to rank in the middle
of the sample of countries for most basic telephone services.
Telstra has also recently undertaken international comparisons of local service
telecommunications prices, employing Analysys Limited as consultants (Telstra
1998b). This study examined charges for customer access, local voice and
internet calls and call waiting and forwarding. The comparisons were based on
an average call duration of 6 minutes and a call distribution pattern typical for
Australia. Under these favourable assumptions, the study concluded that
Australia had the lowest local service prices among the incumbent operators of
8 of the 9 countries included in the Commission’s study (Finland was not
included).
5.3 Integrated Services Digital Network
The ISDN basic service for residential households is delivered over a single
twisted copper pair connection but can provide more capacity and a higher
quality of service (see Box 5.2). The annual expenditure on the service by a
household covers customer access charges for installation and access to the
ISDN network and usage charges for national and international voice calls, calls
to mobile phones and calls to Internet Service Providers.
The ISDN basket for the residential user had the same assumptions for call
numbers, distributions over time and distance and durations as the residential
PSTN basket (see Table 5.3).
Penetration of ISDN
The ISDN service is a potential alternative to the PSTN service for households.
From a network perspective, ISDN is available to well over 90 per cent of the
Australian population (see Chapter  2). However, the marketing of ISDN to
residential customers in Australia is in its early stages and, as yet, only a very
small number of residential customers have acquired the service. The promotion
of ISDN to residential customers has been more vigorous in Europe.
                                             
5 The Communications Research Unit was commissioned to carry out the international price
comparisons for the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.5 RESIDENTIAL PRICE COMPARISONS
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Box 5.2 ISDN services
Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) is a technology which is bringing both voice
and data digital communications into the home and office. It can increase the capacity of
the copper pair by providing for simultaneous operation of a telephone and a 64 kilobit
per second Internet service.
ISDN is beginning to challenge the PSTN in Europe, although less so in North America.
The Scandinavian countries have the lowest ISDN call prices.
ISDN has had very little impact yet on the residential market in Australia, but is used
quite extensively by business both as a dial-up service (incurring both rental and usage
charges) and in the form of a semi-permanent circuit (incurring a rental charge). Telstra
currently has a monopoly on ISDN local services. The Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission has issued a declaration aimed at assisting access by service
providers to ISDN terminating and originating services so that they can compete in long-
distance markets.
ISDN may itself be challenged in the future by the implementation of Asynchronous
Digital Subscriber Line technology which could support much higher bandwidth over
conventional subscriber lines.
A basic ISDN service provides more capacity than a single PSTN service but
has much higher customer access costs (including installation and rental). The
call volumes and Internet usage of most households are currently insufficient for
ISDN to be more cost-effective than the PSTN.
ISDN discounting plans
In most countries, discounting plans for ISDN are similar to those available for
PSTN services. Discounts generally apply to variable (call) charges. Since ISDN
fixed charges are relatively large, the savings generated by discount plans are
relatively small (especially for low volume users). For example, applying
Telstra’s Residential Smart Saver discount plan to OnRamp ISDN yields a 3 per
cent saving to the residential customer’s total ISDN costs. In France, discount
packages yield a saving of 5 per cent for residential ISDN customers.
International price comparisons
ISDN price comparisons are presented for seven of the benchmarked countries.
Price information was not available for Canada and the United States — ISDN
services are offered only in pockets of the North American continent.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Australian ISDN prices were relatively high (see Figure 5.8). Although usage
charges for ISDN services were similar to PSTN services, access charges to
residential customers were significantly higher for ISDN which was not subject
to a price cap.
For the group of countries benchmarked, customer access charges averaged
60 per cent of the total ISDN price, compared with an average of 40 per cent for
PSTN. For Australia, the customer access charge represents 60 per cent of the
total service price for ISDN and 32 per cent for PSTN.





















































Note: The price index is the expenditure in each country (in $US using PPP exchange rates) on a
fixed basket of Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) services. The expenditures are
valued at February 1998 prices, based on the widely available discounting plan that minimises
cost to the customer.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.5 RESIDENTIAL PRICE COMPARISONS
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5.4 Mobile
The residential mobile basket includes access to a single digital mobile service,
and 366 annual local and long-distance calls from the mobile phone to fixed
phones and to other mobile phones. International, fax and Internet calls from
mobile phones are excluded.
Annual fixed expenditure includes rental and amortised connection charges and
annual usage expenditure includes the charges for the 366 calls with
destinations and durations indicated in Table 5.5.
Canada was excluded from the comparisons because tariff packages comparable
to those in other countries could not be located.
Table 5.5 Key assumptions of the residential mobile basket
Call durations





c 285 2.5 to 3.5 3.5 to 6.0
Long-distance calls 44 3.5 6.0 to 7.0
Calls to mobiles 37 2.5 3.5
a Peak calls are priced at 11.00am and 3.00pm on weekdays.
b Off-peak calls are priced at 8.00pm and 3.00am on weekdays, and 11.00am and 3.00pm on weekends.
c Local calls are made to destinations up to and including 27 kilometre distance from the caller.
Source: OECD, Eurodata; Productivity Commission.
 
Overall, Australia’s prices were in the middle of the eight countries included in
the comparisons (see Figure  5.9). Australia’s customer access charges were
close to the average of all the countries, while its usage charges were relatively
low.
There was a much greater variation in the customer access charge than in the
usage charges among the countries. The countries with the lowest customer
access charges were also the countries with the lowest prices overall.
For residential mobile users in New Zealand and Japan, about 60 per cent of the
expenditure on the total mobile service related to customer access charges,
about 35 per cent to local and long-distance calls to fixed lines and about 5 per
cent to calls to other mobiles. This contrasts with the United Kingdom, Sweden
and  the  United  States  where  about  35 per  cent  of  total  mobile  expenditureINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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related to customer access charges, about 60 per cent to local and long-distance
calls and about 5 per cent to calls to other mobiles.
For Finnish residential mobile users only 13 per cent of total mobile charges are
fixed. Australian residential mobile expenditures were more evenly distributed
between customer access and usage charges.



























































Note: The price index is the expenditure in each country (in $US using PPP exchange rates) on a
fixed basket of cellular mobile services. The expenditures are valued at February 1998 prices,
based on the widely available discounting plan that minimises cost to the customer.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.
5.5 In summary
International price comparisons of the kind reported in this Chapter are
inevitably based on many assumptions. Although these introduce an element of
statistical variability into the price comparisons, there is nevertheless a
reasonable probability that the following broad conclusions hold:5 RESIDENTIAL PRICE COMPARISONS
119
·  PSTN: Scandinavian countries had the lowest prices, Japan has the highest
prices, with Australia in a group of countries in the middle;
·  ISDN: The United Kingdom and Scandinavia had the lowest prices, New
Zealand the highest prices, with Australian prices also relatively high;
·  Mobile services: Finland had the lowest prices, New Zealand the highest
prices, with Australia in the middle group of countries studied.
There was a wide dispersion in the relative prices of the countries studied. In the
case of the PSTN, based on the assumptions adopted by the study, Australian
prices for the total annual service were above the Finnish prices by nearly 30 per
cent and below Japanese prices by about 30 per cent. In the case of mobiles,
Australian prices were above Finnish prices by over 70 per cent and below New
Zealand prices by around 35 per cent.
These conclusions are not greatly affected by changes in assumptions about the
number and duration of calls, at least for the PSTN for which a considerable
amount of sensitivity testing has been done. The PSTN results were slightly
more favourable to Australia than indicated by the comparisons based on the
OECD methodology, primarily because of the inclusion of untimed calls to the
Internet.
When the price comparisons were based on Australian call patterns, Australia’s
prices improved relative to some of the other countries studied, although
Finnish and Swedish prices remained substantially lower than Australia’s. If the
call pattern of another country were to be used for the comparisons, the measure
of Australia’s prices in relation to the prices of that country might be expected
to be higher.
It is not possible to report on how Australia’s relative price performance has
changed over time. This is because there is no information on discounted prices
from previous periods. However, the OECD’s comparisons of standard prices do
not indicate a pronounced direction or trend in Australia’s relative price for
residential PSTN service over recent years.
The significance of Australia’s overall relative price for ISDN services (sixth
out of seven countries) would have been affected by Telstra’s recent major
upgrade of the ISDN service to international standards (see Chapter 2) and the,
as yet, very limited penetration of ISDN in the residential market in Australia.
Comparisons of the cost of ISDN services to businesses is more meaningful
because of the greater penetration of ISDN in business markets in Australia.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Price structures
There are some important differences in the price structures of the various
countries. Australia has relatively low prices for calls to Internet Service
Providers and relatively high prices for local voice PSTN calls. This is a
consequence of untimed local call prices in Australia and the assumptions of
call durations of about 3 to 6 minutes for local voice calls and 20 to 30 minutes
for Internet calls.
Comparisons of local call prices are sensitive to call duration assumptions.
There would be an improvement in Australia’s ranking for local call prices if
the assumption about the duration for local voice calls was increased. However,
relative prices for the total service would not be affected greatly by the local call
duration assumption because local voice calls represent only around 20 per cent
of the residential customers total bill (on average).
The incumbent operators in most of the countries studied have progressively
rebalanced their price structures by maintaining or increasing customer access
charges and reducing usage charges so that prices more closely reflect costs (see
Chapter 3). Some of this rebalancing in residential prices has occurred because
of competitive pressures and the widespread implementation of discount plans.
For Australian residential markets, the level of customer access charges and the
ratio of customer access charges to usage charges were found to be lower than
for most of the other countries benchmarked. An in-depth assessment of the
price structures of the various countries would require extensive analysis of cost
structures and demand characteristics.121
6 BUSINESS PRICE COMPARISONS
The telecommunications needs of a business vary with its size, the geographical
scope of its operations and the industry in which it operates. The
telecommunications prices of the services available to business also vary with
the combination of services chosen, traffic volumes and patterns and types of
calls. For example, small businesses face relatively large fixed costs in gaining
access to telecommunications services, whereas large corporations can reduce
their telecommunications costs by negotiating discounts.
Past price studies of the Australian telecommunications industry have focussed
on small businesses, and have not included services such as Integrated Services
Digital Network (ISDN) and frame relay. This was the case for the 1995
telecommunications benchmarking study by the Bureau of Industry Economics
(BIE) as well as OECD studies.  Also, previous studies mostly used standard
rather than discount prices for the price comparisons.
For this study, the telecommunications prices for ten different types and sizes of
business were examined. Price discounts have been taken into account. The
service needs of the various businesses were defined to reflect the diversity of
requirements for telecommunications services. The effect on the price
comparisons of the differences in the telecommunications demands of these
businesses provides an indication of the robustness of the comparisons.
The Commission appointed Eurodata to collect the data and work with it in the
development of the methodology.
6.1 Methodology
As for the residential price comparisons reported in Chapter 5, the price index
for each of the business comparisons was the annual expenditure in each
country on a specified basket of services.
Business price baskets
Separate price comparisons were developed for each of ten representative
businesses and for the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), ISDN,
mobile services, leased lines and various other data products. Appropriate
baskets of services were defined for each business.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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The businesses were primarily defined in terms of the numbers of users of fixed
voice telephony, the traffic distribution by distance (local, long-distance and
international)  and  numbers  of  company  sites  (see  Table 6.1).  For  many
businesses, the number of telephone users is less than the total number of
employees. Also, the number of external PSTN lines from the business to the
local exchange is usually less than the number of users for medium and large
businesses.
Table 6.1 Representative businesses included in the study
Class Code Description
Small business S1 One user, mainly local traffic
S2 Three users, mainly local traffic
Medium business M1 30 users and one site, mainly local traffic
M2 100 users and one site, mainly local traffic
M3 30 users and one site, mainly long-distance traffic
M4 100 users and one site, mainly long-distance traffic
Large business L1 National financial company, 300 users and 30 sites
L2 National manufacturing company, 300 users and 5 sites
L3 International manufacturing company, 600 users and 10 domestic sites
in home country
L4 Multinational company, 1000 users and 5 sites in home country
Source: Eurodata (1998).
The small and medium-sized businesses were assumed to use the PSTN or ISDN
for fixed network voice communications, as well as fax and access to Internet
Service Providers (except for S1). Six representative businesses were defined.
Each of the six was compared for both PSTN and ISDN prices, giving 12
different inter-country price comparisons.
Two baskets of mobile voice communications services were priced for business.
They relate to usage patterns for small businesses and medium to large
businesses.
Separate price comparisons are presented for leased lines, X25, frame relay and
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM). Brief descriptions of these services are
given in the glossary and Chapter 2 has some additional information about them.
Two baskets for each of these services were specified for medium-sized
businesses. These data services are not commonly used by small businesses.6   BUSINESS PRICE COMPARISONS
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For large business, aggregate price comparisons over selected voice and data
services were made. Four different comparisons are presented for the four types
of large business.
The assumptions underlying the price comparisons for each of the various types
of businesses and services are summarised later in the chapter. More details of
the assumptions are given in Appendix F.
Prices
As with the residential comparisons, the business price comparisons were based
on prices as at February 1998. The price (discount plan) for a service was the
one that minimises the cost to the customer of the specified service in February
1998.
Discounts are often much more significant for business customers than for
residential because the volumes of voice traffic are larger. The discounts tend to
increase with the volume of traffic.
Generally, the prices included in this study were limited to published discount
plans. Information on negotiated rates and individual contracts available to large
businesses could not be obtained because they are normally confidential.
Taxes
As for the residential price comparisons, indirect taxes associated with the
production of telecommunications services were included in the business price
comparisons. In a number of overseas countries, value-added taxes are paid by
businesses when they purchase telecommunications services. Australian
providers pay various indirect taxes (for example, payroll taxes) which are
imbedded in the prices for telecommunications services paid by businesses.
Including all indirect taxes therefore provided a reasonably fair method of
comparing the relative prices of telecommunications services of different
countries.
The BIE (1995) excluded these taxes from their international price comparisons.
It was argued that business users in overseas countries may reclaim value-added
taxes included in the prices they pay for telecommunications services. However,
taxes on the value added by all businesses are ultimately included in final
consumer prices of goods and services (although not export prices).
Currency conversion
As for the residential price comparisons, purchasing power parities (PPPs) were
used to compare business telecommunications prices in a common currency.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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This has the benefit that the international comparisons focus on the relationship
of telecommunications prices to the general price level in each country.
The BIE used market exchange rates in its 1995 study and argued that large
business customers of telecommunications services tend to make business
decisions on the basis of comparing costs using market exchange rates, rather
than on considerations of consumer purchasing power.
This argument is most valid for those businesses producing tradeable goods or
services and for which telecommunications represents a significant input cost.
For many other businesses it may be argued that PPP rates are more appropriate.
In particular, PPP rates may be more appropriate where differences in
telecommunications services prices could be expected to have little influence
over a business’ decision to relocate (see Box 5.1).
6.2 Small businesses
Relative prices are estimated for the two representative businesses, S1 and S2,
indicated in Table 6.1.
The annual expenditure used as the price index included the fixed charges for
access to the services and usage charges for the calls made. The fixed charges
were those associated with the installation, amortised over five years, and rental
of each telecommunications service.
In consultation with the industry and the Commission’s consultant (Eurodata),
the assumptions originally developed by the OECD for its business price
comparisons were modified for this study.
Business S1 has only one telephone user who makes 3260 voice calls a year and
S2 was assumed to have three users, each of whom is assumed to make 4000
voice calls per year, 80 per cent of which are made in the peak-period (that is,
during the day on week-days). Assumptions for the number of each type of call
and average call duration are summarised in Table 6.2.
The majority of calls were local area calls. International calls and calls to mobile
phones are included in the baskets for both types of business. Fax calls and calls
to Internet Service Providers were included only in the S2 basket.
Voice calls and calls to Internet Service Providers can be made using either
PSTN or ISDN services offered by carriers. The price comparisons for each of
these services were based on the same assumptions about the numbers of users
and calls. However, the PSTN and ISDN are different technologies and
represent different price–quality combinations.6   BUSINESS PRICE COMPARISONS
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Table 6.2 Specifications of small business PSTN and ISDN services
Annual calls per user
a
Type of call S1 S2 Call durations
(No.) (No.) (Minutes)
Local
b 2 335 2 801 2.5 to 3.5
Long-distance 565 679 3.5 to 4.5
International 35 120 5.0
To mobiles 325 400 30.0
To Internet Service Providers na 230 40.0 or 60.0
Fax na 575 3.0
a The S1 basket includes one user, the S2 basket, three users.
b Local calls are made to destinations up to and including a 27 kilometre radius from the caller.
na Not applicable.
Source: Eurodata (1998).
Public switched telephone network
The PSTN customer access service for representative small business S1 was
specified as having a single telephone line, and S2 having three telephone lines
(one for each user), a fax line and a modem line.
Discount plans for PSTN services are available in most sample countries. In
Australia, for example, two plans offered to business are Telstra’s Business
Saver Plus and Long Distance Saver 4 plans. Both plans provide proportional
discounts on the cost of long-distance and international calls, depending on the
amount of expenditure by customers. Business Saver Plus is the discount
package that yielded the largest savings for Telstra’s small-business customers.
Generally, Australia’s PSTN prices for small businesses were higher than those
of European and North American countries and below those of New Zealand
and Japan. Australia’s relative prices were slightly better for the S2 basket than
for S1 (see Figure 6.1). This difference arose partly because calls to Internet
Service Providers were excluded from the S1 basket and included in the S2
basket. Internet calls are relatively cheap in Australia. Unlike a number of other
countries, Australia has untimed charges for Internet calls, which are assumed to
be local calls of long duration.
Price comparisons for each component of PSTN traffic for S1 and S2 customers
are shown in Table 6.3. The contrast in Australia’s relative prices for calls toINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Internet Service Providers and voice calls is clearly evident, with Internet call
prices ranking second lowest.





Australian rank compared to
other countries
Australian rank compared to
other countries
Customer access 5 of 9 5 of 9
Voice calls 7 of 9 7 of 9
Fax calls na 6 of 9
International calls 6 of 9 6 of 9
Internet calls na 2 of 9
Calls to mobiles 5 of 9 5 of 9
Overall 7 of 9 6 of 9
Note: Australia’s price ranking is out of nine countries, based on annual expenditures in each country on a
fixed basket of Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) services. For example, a rank 5 of 9
means fifth lowest price out of the nine countries.
a S1: A small business with one user; S2: A small business with three users.
na Not applicable.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.
Australia’s relative prices for PSTN services supplied to small businesses as
measured in the BIE (1995) and  OECD (1997b) studies and the 1998 Eurodata
comparisons using the OECD methodology is presented in Table 6.4 along with
the results of this study. These results indicate a degree of consistency across all
studies with regard to Australia’s price performance.
Telecom New Zealand claimed that the Commission over-estimated new
Zealand’s prices used in the comparisons of telecommunications prices for
business customers. The issues were similar to those raised for the residential
price comparisons which are discussed in Chapter 5. Utilising TCNZ’s proposed
methodology did not greatly change New Zealand’s relative position for small
businesses.6   BUSINESS PRICE COMPARISONS
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Table 6.4 Results of cross-country price comparisons for PSTN
services to small business





BIE 1994 seven Single line; value-added taxes
excluded; market exchange rates
OECD
c January 1996 nine Single line; value-added taxes
excluded; PPPs
Eurodata














d May 1998 eight Single line; indirect taxes included;
PPPs
a Australia’s price ranking relative to the nine benchmark countries. For example, a rank of seven means
seventh lowest price out of the nine countries.
b Only the Productivity Commission/Eurodata comparisons use discount prices.
c The most recent published OECD comparisons.
d Based on OECD/Eurodata methodology.
e The current study based on Productivity Commission/Eurodata methodology.
f Unlike the other comparisons, this includes fax calls and calls to mobiles and ISPs.
Source: OECD, Eurodata and Productivity Commission
Integrated services digital network
ISDN services are increasing in importance for small businesses. A basic ISDN
service over one twisted copper pair can achieve the functionality of at least two
PSTN lines.
The ISDN services for small business are specified as follows:
S1 Basic access connection, which is equivalent to two 64 kbps (kilobits per
second) channels available for use for voice calls; and
S2 Three basic access connections, equivalent to at least six 64 kbps channels,
of which one is used for fax, another for an Internet connection and the
other four are available for voice calls.
The relative prices for ISDN services for small business for the seven countries
studied are presented in Figure 6.1.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
128


















































































Note: The price index is the expenditure in each country (in $US using PPP exchange rates) by S1
and S2 customers on a fixed basket of Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) or
Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) services. The expenditures are valued at February
1998 prices, based on the widely available discounting plan that minimises cost to the
customer.
a S1: A small business with one user.
b S2: A small business with three users, and one fax line and one modem line.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.
Australia has a low penetration of ISDN services among small business users.
Fixed costs are relatively high in Australia, which discourages low-volume
users. Australia’s ISDN fixed charges (that is, access charges) were found to be
relatively high compared with its PSTN fixed charges, as indicated by a
comparison of Tables 6.3 and 6.5.6   BUSINESS PRICE COMPARISONS
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For the small business baskets defined above, ISDN was more expensive than
PSTN for five of the seven countries for which both PSTN and ISDN prices are
available. Only in Japan and Sweden was ISDN cheaper.
In Australia, ISDN prices were about 10 per cent higher than PSTN prices for
both of the small businesses. In other countries, ISDN prices were about 13 per
cent higher. It should be noted, however, that there is more capacity and
functionality available from the specified ISDN services than the specified
PSTN services.






Customer access 6 of 7 6 of 7
Voice calls 5 of 7 5 of 7
Fax calls na 4 of 7
International calls 5 of 7 5 of 7
Internet calls na 3 of 7
Calls to mobiles 3 of 7 3 of 7
Overall 6 of 7 5 of 7
Note: Australia’s price ranking is out of seven countries, based on expenditures on a fixed basket of
Integrated Service Digital Network (ISDN) services. For example, 3 of 7 means third lowest price out
of the seven countries.
a S1: A small business with one user; S2: A small business with three users.
na Not applicable.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.
Mobile
Small business users were assumed to make 920 calls per year (four per working
day), 86 per cent of these being made in the peak period (that is, during the day
on weekdays). International calls were excluded. The numbers of different types
of calls and average call durations assumed are summarised in Table 6.6.
The range of tariff plans available for mobile services is very large. Plans with
pre-paid tariffs and subsidised handsets were excluded from the basket in order
to simplify the comparisons.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Table 6.6 Specification of mobile service use by small businesses




Long-distance 110 3.5 to 4.5
To mobiles 165 3.5
a Local calls are made to a destination within a 40 kilometre radius of the caller.
Source: Eurodata (1998).
Australian mobile prices (when compared to prices in other countries) were
significantly better for small business than for residential users, as can be seen
by comparing Figures 5.8 and 6.2. Furthermore, Australia’s mobile prices were
lower, relative to mobile prices in other countries, than its PSTN and ISDN
prices for small business customers.




















Note: The price index is the expenditure in each country (in $US using PPP exchange rates) on a
fixed basket of cellular mobile services. The expenditures are valued at February 1998 prices,
based on the widely available discounting plan that minimises cost to the customer.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.
6.3 Medium-sized businesses — dial-up services
The prices of dial-up PSTN and ISDN services were estimated for four medium-
sized businesses (M1 to M4). Their assumed telecommunications needs are
defined in Table 6.1.
As with small business, the price comparisons were made by calculating the6   BUSINESS PRICE COMPARISONS
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expenditure on annual fixed and usage charges in each country for the basket of
services defined for each of the four business types and each of the
telecommunications services they were assumed to use.
The four medium-sized businesses differed in the volume of calls and in the
proportions of local and long-distance calls. In each business, the average user
was assumed to make 4000 voice calls, 230 Internet calls and 460 fax calls per
year, using either the PSTN or ISDN. The distribution of these calls by time of
day and the call duration assumptions were the same as for the small business
baskets.
For M1 and M2, 80 per cent of the national voice calls were assumed to be less
than 40 kilometres. For M3 and M4, 33 per cent of calls were assumed to be less
than 40 kilometres.  The proportion of international voice calls increased from
M1 to M4. For all the medium-sized businesses, 42 per cent of fax calls were
assumed to be less than 40 kilometres and all Internet calls 3 kilometres or less.
Public switched telephone network
The number of PSTN lines assumed to be required to carry voice calls, fax and
Internet services, and the numbers of users of these services, are given in
Table  6.7 for each of the four types of medium businesses. Users share the
available telephone lines connecting the company site to the public network.
Table 6.7 Specification of PSTN services for medium-sized
businesses
Medium-sized business baskets
M1 M2 M3 M4
National calling profile Local Local Long-distance Long-distance
International calling profile None Minimal Moderate Heavy
Users (No.) 30 100 30 100
Voice lines (No.) 10 30 10 30
Fax lines (No.) 2 4 2 4
Internet lines (No.) 3 9 3 9
Source: Eurodata (1998).
For the PSTN services specified for the four medium-sized businesses,
Australian prices are around the middle of the prices in the nine countries
studied (see Figure 6.3). The Scandinavian countries consistently had the lowest
prices and Japan and New Zealand the highest.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Note: The price index is the expenditure in each country (in $US’000 using PPP exchange rates) on a
fixed basket of Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) services.  The expenditures are
valued at February 1998 prices, based on the discounting plan that minimises cost to the
customer.
a M1: Business with 30 users and mainly local traffic.
b M2: Business with 100 users and mainly local traffic.
c M3: Business with 30 users and national traffic.
d M4: Business with 100 users and national traffic.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.
Australia’s relative price ranking for each of the various elements of PSTN
traffic, for each type of business, is presented in Table 6.8. Australia’s relative
performance was best for Internet calls and worst for voice calls.
Australian fixed charges were in the middle of the group of nine countries.
However, the fixed charges were much less important for medium-sized
businesses, representing between 3 and 7 per cent of total service price
compared with 15 per cent for small business S1 and 34 per cent for residential
customers.6   BUSINESS PRICE COMPARISONS
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Table 6.8 Australia’s relative price ranking for PSTN services to
medium-sized businesses, February 1998
Medium-sized business basket
a
Service M1 M2 M3 M4
(Rank) (Rank) (Rank) (Rank)
Customer access 5 of 9 5 of 9 5 of 9 5 of 9
Voice calls 7 of 9 7 of 9 6 of 9 6 of 9
Fax calls 5 of 9 5 of 9 6 of 9 6 of 9
International calls na 6 of 9 6 of 9 6 of 9
Internet calls 2 of 9 2 of 9 2 of 9 2 of 9
Calls to mobiles 5 of 9 5 of 9 5 of 9 5 of 9
Overall 5 of 9 6 of 9 6 of 9 6 of 9
Note: Australia’s price ranking is out of nine sample countries, based on expenditures on a fixed basket of
Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) services. For example 2 of 9 means second lowest price
out of nine countries.
a M1: Business with 30 users and mainly local traffic; M2: Business with 100 users and mainly local
traffic; M3: Business with 30 users and national traffic; M4: Business with 100 users and national
traffic.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.
The high proportion of local calls assumed for representative businesses M1 and
M2 adversely affected Australia’s relative price. Australia’s untimed local voice
calls ranked poorly compared with its performance for long-distance voice calls
(see Chapter 5).
Australian relative fax call prices for M1 and M2 were lower than voice call
prices. This was because fax calls were assumed to be evenly distributed across
call distances, rather than concentrated in local calls as in the case of voice calls
for M1 and M2.
Australia’s prices for international calls were higher than the four European
countries and Canada. However, Australia’s relative performance may have
been better than its ranking implies. The majority of international calls from
European countries are to other European countries and the majority of
international calls from Canada are to its neighbour, the US. The short distances
of these markets and, more significantly, the high traffic volumes are likely to
reduce unit costs. Most international calls from Australia are not to nearby
countries and not on routes that are heavily trafficked. Therefore unit costs are
higher than those for European and Canadian international calls.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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The absence of international calls helped Australia’s overall price performance
for business M1. If international calls were omitted from M2, Australia’s price
would become lower than the UK’s.
Australia has relatively low prices for calls to Internet Service Providers. To
some extent, this is attributable to untimed local call charges and the long
duration of Internet calls. Australia’s fixed-cost local calls bring the cost of an
average Internet call to less than one cent per minute, well below the other
countries studied, except Canada where local calls are free.
The Australian price for calls to mobiles from a PSTN service was the sample
median, fifth out of the nine countries studied. The contribution of these charges
can have a significant effect on overall expenditure on PSTN services by
businesses. Although calls to mobile phones were assumed to represent ten per
cent of traffic generated by medium-sized businesses, they can contribute as
much as all other national voice calls to the total cost of the basket.
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand has concerns about the comparisons in
Figure 6.3 which relate primarily to the omission of commercially negotiated
discounts available to large businesses in New Zealand, in particular M4
business types. Most of these prices are subject to disclosure requirements in
New Zealand.
TCNZ has calculated a much lower price index for New Zealand for the M4
basket. The index is based on revenue per call minute (discussed in Chapter 5)
and takes into account negotiated discounts in New Zealand. However, if it was
possible to adopt the same approach for the other countries’, their prices would
have also improved.
Integrated services digital network
Assumptions about the numbers of ISDN channels required to satisfy the
specified profiles of voice calls, fax and Internet services for the four medium
businesses, and the numbers of users generating the voice traffic, are given in
Table 6.9. It is assumed that each channel carries 64 kbps with channels shared
by users. It was assumed that the businesses use primary rate service and
therefore the number of channels for each type of business is a multiple of 30.
Although the number of users in each type of business was assumed to be the
same as those used in the PSTN comparisons, the capacity provided by the
ISDN service exceeds that of the specified PSTN service (especially for M1 and
M3). Therefore, it may be misleading to make direct comparisons between the
prices of ISDN and PSTN services.6   BUSINESS PRICE COMPARISONS
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Table 6.9 Specification of ISDN services for medium-sized
businesses
Medium-sized business baskets
Service M1 M2 M3 M4
National calling profile Local Local Long-distance Long-distance
International calling profile None Minimal Moderate Heavy
Users (No.) 30 100 30 100
ISDN channels (No.) 26 55 26 55
Fax channels (No.) 2 3 2 3
Internet channels (No.) 2 2 2 2
Source: Eurodata (1998).
Australia’s overall price for ISDN services was better for the medium
businesses with local, rather than national, call profiles (Figure 6.4).
Australia’s relative price ranking for each traffic element of the ISDN service is
summarised in Table 6.10.
Table 6.10 Australia’s relative price ranking for ISDN services to
medium-sized businesses, February 1998
Medium-sized business basket
a
Service M1 M2 M3 M4
(Rank) (Rank) (Rank) (Rank)
Customer access 4 of 7 4 of 7 4 of 7 4 of 7
Voice calls 5 of 7 4 of 7 4 of 7 4 of 7
Fax calls 4 of 7 4 of 7 4 of 7 4 of 7
International calls na 5 of 7 5 of 7 5 of 7
Internet calls 1 of 7 1 of 7 1 of 7 1 of 7
Calls to mobiles 3 of 7 3 of 7 3 of 7 3 of 7
Overall 3 of 7 3 of 7 5 of 7 5 of 7
Note: Australia’s price ranking is out of seven sample countries, based on expenditures on fixed baskets of
Integrated (ISDN) services. For example 3 of 7 means third lowest price out of the seven countries.
a M1: Business with 30 users and mainly local traffic; M2: Business with 100 users and mainly local
traffic; M3: Business with 30 users and national traffic; M4: Business with 100 users and national
traffic.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Note: The price indices are the expenditure in each country (in $US’000 using PPP exchange rates)
on fixed baskets of Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) and Integrated Services
Digital Network (ISDN) services. The expenditures are valued at February 1998 prices, based
on the discounting plan that minimises cost to the customer.
a M1: Business with 30 users and mainly local traffic.
b M2: Business with 100 users and mainly local traffic.
c M3: Business with 30 users and national traffic.
d M4: Business with 100 users and national traffic.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.
For medium businesses with voice call profiles oriented towards local usage
(M1 and M2), Australian ISDN prices, relative to those in the other countries
studied, were lower than Australian PSTN prices. ISDN services are not as
heavily regulated, and carriers need not supply fixed-price local calls. Thus, the
relatively large cost associated with a demand profile of large numbers of short-
duration local calls charged on an untimed basis can be avoided.6   BUSINESS PRICE COMPARISONS
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The price of Internet calls using ISDN were relatively low for Australian
medium-sized businesses. Australian businesses tend to rent ISDN semi-
permanent circuits for purposes of Internet access instead of paying timed local
call rates for dial-up ISDN services. Businesses pay a higher monthly or annual
rent for a channel with continuous Internet access at no extra usage cost. The
option of timed local calls for Internet access using dial-up ISDN would be
much more expensive in Australia given the assumptions about the numbers and
duration of calls.
For international calls, Australia was more expensive than the four European
countries, but less expensive than Japan and New Zealand. As discussed above,
Australia’s international call profile is characterised by greater distances and
smaller traffic volumes than the European carriers, which has an adverse affect
on costs and prices. The impact of this on Australia’s relative price for ISDN
services overall was greatest for M3 and M4 because of their greater demand for
international calls.
Mobile
Only one basket was used to represent the call patterns of mobile users in both
medium-sized and large businesses.
As with the other mobile price comparisons, only the digital service was
considered, and plans with pre-paid tariffs and subsidised hand-sets were
excluded from the basket to simplify the tariff comparison.
As for small businesses, Australia’s relative prices for mobiles used in medium
to large businesses were better than those for most other telecommunications
services because of the low call charges (see Figure 6.5). Of the eight countries
studied, Australia had the lowest usage charges for calls to the PSTN and
second lowest charges for calls to mobile telephones.
6.4 Medium-sized businesses — data services
Price comparisons for data services were undertaken for leased lines and various
switched data services including X25, frame relay, and ATM. Price data were
more readily available for leased lines and X25 than for frame relay and ATM,
the market for the latter being in the early stages of development.
Demand assumptions were specified for various hypothetical businesses, with
characteristics not necessarily the same as those of the businesses described in
the preceding section.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
138




















Note: The price index is the expenditure in each country (in $US using PPP exchange rates) on a
fixed basket of cellular mobile services by a representative medium to large business users.  The
expenditures are valued at February 1998 prices, based on the discounting plan that minimises
cost to the customer.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.
Leased lines
The leased lines included in the price comparisons were assumed to provide
digital data services for businesses. Businesses leasing a dedicated
telecommunications line of defined capacity from a carrier were assumed to
have exclusive use of the line.
Carriers charge installation and rental fees but there is no price for usage. The
fixed charges for a leased line vary with bandwidth (transmission capacity) and
distance. Therefore price indices based on the expenditure (at February 1998)
on specified baskets of lines representative of the requirements of the two
businesses were constructed.
Leased lines for the smaller of the two businesses (LL1) were assumed to have
64 kbps capacity. Larger businesses (LL2) were assumed to have 64 kbps and
2  Mbps circuits for national services, and 64 kbps circuits for international
services (see Table 6.11).
National circuits of 2  kilometres, 50  kilometres and 200  kilometres in length
were included in the baskets. Some of the international circuits were to nearby
countries and some to more distant countries.
Australia’s relative price performance was better for the smaller of the medium-
sized businesses which use lower bandwidth lines (see Figure 6.6).6   BUSINESS PRICE COMPARISONS
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(No. of lines) (No of lines)
64 kbps national lines 10 18
2 Mbps national lines - 6
64 kbps international lines - 6
Source: Eurodata (1998).
The Scandinavian countries once again had the lowest prices, and New Zealand
and Japan the highest prices. Results for the US should be treated with some
caution. The charges for the US vary depending on where in the US the circuits
are located.














































Note: The price indices are the expenditures in each country (in $US’000 using PPP exchange rates)
on fixed baskets of leased line services.  The expenditures are valued at February 1998 prices,
based on the discounting plan that minimises cost to the customer.
a LL1: Business with 10 lines.
b LL2: Business with 30.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Switched data services
Switched data services provided by carriers allow businesses to exchange data
across a range of locations without leasing data lines. Businesses in the financial
services, transport, wholesaling, retailing, government and manufacturing
sectors may find their data communications needs met more cost-effectively
using switched services.
There are various existing and emerging public networks providing data
transmission services using packet-switching techniques, in contrast to the
ISDN networks discussed earlier which provide circuit-switched voice and data
services. Packet switching technology is more suitable for data transmission
than for voice, making more efficient utilisation of network facilities (see the
glossary for brief descriptions of services and technologies).
Packet-switching data networks using the X25 protocol have been in use for
many years. Frame relay services are a more recent development and are likely
to progressively replace X25 services and also the leasing of dedicated data
lines. ATM is a new high-speed service as yet only in limited use.
International price comparisons for switched data services were based on a
number of price baskets developed for X25, frame relay and ATM services.
Separate price baskets were specified for X25, frame relay and ATM because
they offer widely different capabilities based on different generations of
technology, and are available at different prices.
As tariffs were not publicly available for each service in all the countries
studied, there are some gaps in the price comparisons. This implies that prices
for the service in that country was not disclosed by carriers, not that the service
is not offered in that country.
X25
The X25 service usually has fixed charges for installation and rental of the
connection, and usage charges for traffic carried. In most countries usage is paid
per unit volume of traffic measured in data segments or kilobits — sometimes
there is a further charge per minute of access for each call. Customer premises
equipment costs and the costs of leasing a line from the customer premises to
the X25 network are excluded from the analysis.
Prices were compared for the baskets of X25 services for two businesses, PS1
and PS2. Both businesses were assumed to have a national profile but PS2 has a
much larger demand for data transmission than PS1 (see Table 6.12).  It was
assumed that 60 per cent of data calls are long-distance, and 75 per cent of calls6   BUSINESS PRICE COMPARISONS
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are made during the working day. Further, each call has between 5000 and 9000
segments of data.




Calls per year (No.) 1150 4600
Port bandwidth (kbps) 9.6 64
Source: Eurodata (1998).
Business type PS1 was assumed to have access to a 9.6 kbps X25 service and
PS2 access to a 64 kbps service. Only one port (interface) was assumed for each
business.
X25 services were found to be relatively expensive in Australia, as illustrated in
Figure 6.7.










































Note: The price index is the expenditure in each country (in $US’000 using PPP exchange rates) on a
fixed basket of X25 services.  The expenditures are valued at February 1998 prices, based on
the discounting plan that minimises cost to the customer.
a PS1: Business with 1150 data calls per year.
b PS2: Business with 4600 data calls per year.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Frame relay
Currently, frame relay services are normally permanent virtual circuits, and
customers pay installation charges and an annual rental but no usage charges.
There are two rental components — the port rental, which varies with the port
speed or bandwidth (capacity) and a rental for the committed information rate
(CIR), which is a guaranteed bandwidth of the circuit. A CIR of half the port
speed was assumed.
A feature of frame relay is that short unpredictable bursts of traffic at speeds
greater than the CIR can be transmitted. Consequently, a CIR can be specified at
lower bandwidth than that necessary for a leased line to handle occasional bursts
of high volume traffic. Businesses with sharply fluctuating demands for data
transmission should find frame relay more cost-effective than the leasing of
dedicated lines.
The assumed number of ports and bandwidth per port is given in Table 6.13 for
the business types FR1 and FR2. It was assumed that each service is supplied
for use over a distance of 200 kilometres.
Table 6.13 Specification of frame relay services for medium-sized
businesses
Medium-sized business:
frame relay service baskets
FR1 FR2
Frame relay ports (No.) 2 2
Bandwidth per port (kbps) 64 128
Committed Information Rate (CIR) per port (kbps) 32 64
Source: Eurodata (1998).
Frame relay services were assumed to be used only for national traffic, within
the coverage area of the national service. The line connecting the customers
premises to the frame relay network was not included in the baskets.
Frame relay services were priced in seven countries. Tariffs were not disclosed
in France and the US. Sweden’s prices were based on a theoretical service
between Stockholm and Karlskoga (about 200 kilometres).
Australian frame relay prices are relatively high (see Figure 6.8). Relative prices
for Finland and Japan were found to be sensitive to the bandwidth. For example,
Finland’s frame relay service became more competitive at higher usage
volumes, moving up four ranking positions from FR1 to FR2.6   BUSINESS PRICE COMPARISONS
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ATM
ATM is a relatively new service and is currently used only by businesses
transmitting very large amounts of data with high bandwidth requirements.
ATM services are normally provided by permanent virtual circuits. As with
frame relay, customers pay installation charges and an annual rental but no
usage charge. There are two rental components — rental for each port, and
rental for each virtual circuit. The rental charges both vary with bandwidth. The
costs of access circuits between company sites and the ATM network were not
included in the price comparisons.
Price comparisons were made for two businesses, ATM1 and ATM2, both with
relatively large demands for data transmission. Business ATM2, however, was
assumed to have a much greater demand for total bandwidth than ATM1.






































Note: The price index is the expenditure in each country (in $US’000 using PPP exchange rates) on a
fixed basket of frame relay services.  The expenditures are valued at February 1998 prices,
based on the discounting plan that minimises cost to the customer.
a FR1: Business with two ports and 64kbps per port.
b FR2: Business with two ports and 128kbps per port
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.
The businesses were also assumed to differ in the relationships between ports
and virtual circuits. The numbers and bandwidths of ports and virtual circuits
assumed for the two ATM baskets are given in Table 6.14. The virtual circuits
were assumed to be national and vary in length from 2  kilometres to
50  kilometres to 200  kilometres. A Constant Bit Rate (CBR) service was
assumed. The large number of ports for ATM2 implies a number of separateINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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sites linked by virtual circuits (with a port at each end). ATM1 on the other
hand has more circuits than ports indicating data transfer to external locations.
ATM services could only be priced in three countries. Carriers usually
considered ATM prices either to be commercial-in-confidence, or negotiated on
a case-by-case basis.
Of the three priced countries, Australian ATM services were by far the most
expensive — more than five times the cost in the other two countries (see
Figure 6.9).




ATM ports (No.) 2 15
Bandwidth per port (Mbps) 34 34
Virtual circuits (No.) 4 11
Bandwidth per virtual circuit (Mbps) 10 10
Source: Eurodata (1998).





















Note: The price index is the expenditure in each country (in $US’000 using PPP exchange rates) on a
fixed basket of ATM services by a representative customer  The expenditures are valued at
February 1998 prices, based on the discounting plan that minimises cost to the customer.
a ATM1: Business with two ports (34Mbps per port) and 4 virtual circuits (10Mbps per circuit).
b ATM2: Business with 15 ports (34Mbps per port) and 11 virtual circuits (10Mbps per circuit).
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.6   BUSINESS PRICE COMPARISONS
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6.5 Large businesses
Prices of services supplied to large business were estimated for the four
different types of business (L1 to L4) defined in Table 6.1.
Ideally, price comparisons across countries would be on the basis of the
aggregate purchase of telecommunications services by the representative
business. This approach would be consistent with the normal practice of large
businesses of negotiating with the telecommunications provider for the supply
of a total service rather than separate purchases of individual services. However,
quoted prices for individual products were used because negotiated prices for
total service were generally unobtainable.
Patterns of demand were defined for the voice services and data access circuits
of a national finance company, a national manufacturing company, a larger
manufacturing company with subsidiaries in neighbouring countries and a major
multinational company. The types of services and technologies assumed to be
used by the four representative businesses are described in Table 6.15.
Table 6.15 Types of services included in price comparisons for large
business
Large business baskets
L1 L2 L3 L4
ISDN basic rate, voice, fax, Internet á
ISDN primary rate for voice, fax ááá
Mobile áááá
Leased lines for Internet ááá
Leased lines for other data áááá
Frame relay for other data áá
Source: Eurodata (1998).
It was assumed that large companies would use ISDN rather than PSTN
services, with basic rate services used by L1 and primary rate services by L2, L3
and L4. Each of the businesses were assumed to use leased lines for all or some
of their data transmission needs. L2 and L4 were assumed to have made
progress in adopting the new frame relay services for data transmission.
Frame relay can be expected to provide more cost-effective data
communications than leased lines or ISDN, especially for large businesses. It
was not possible to include ATM in any of the these baskets because of lack of
price data for most of the countries.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
146
Unlike the medium-sized businesses in most of the analyses reported above, the
four representative large businesses were assumed to have multiple company
sites (see Table 6.16). They were also assumed to have much larger numbers of
telephone users and call volumes than the medium businesses. It was assumed
that usage patterns for national calls (by time of day, day of week and distance)
for large businesses are similar to those of small and medium-sized businesses.
Half of the users of fixed telephony in each type of large business were assumed
to also use a mobile phone.
Table 6.16 Assumptions for large businesses
Large business baskets
L1 L2 L3 L4
Sites (No.) 30 5 10 5
Fixed telephony users per site (No.) 10 60 60 200
International calls (per cent of total) 2 5 8 15
ISDN channels required per site (No.) 7 25 25 70
Mobile users (No.) 150 150 300 500
Leased lines (No.) 29 25 120 35
Frame relay ports (No.) 0 20 0 20
Bandwidth per port (kbps) na 128 na 256
na Not applicable.
Source: Eurodata (1998).
The price comparisons, based on the annual expenditure on all of the specified
services, are reported in Figure 6.10 for the four representative businesses. In
addition to the total expenditures, the separate expenditures on ISDN, leased
line, frame relay and mobile services are identified.
Overall, Australia’s prices were in the middle of the countries included in these
comparisons, having either third or fourth lowest prices out of the six countries.
The Scandinavian countries had the lowest prices and Japan and New Zealand
the highest prices.
Australia’s relative prices were lowest when ISDN and mobiles predominate,
which is the case for business L1. The performance of Australia, Japan and New
Zealand suffered in comparison with European countries for the largest
businesses which have heavy demands for data communications and
international calls.
Looking at the results for the individual services (see Table 6.17), Australia’s
relative prices were lowest for mobiles and highest for frame relay.6   BUSINESS PRICE COMPARISONS
147

































































ISDN Leased lines Frame relay Mobile
Note: The price index is the expenditure in each country (in $US’000 using PPP exchange rates) on a
fixed basket of services. The expenditures are valued at February 1998 prices, based on the
discounting plan that minimises cost to the customer.
a L1: National financial company with 30 sites, 10 users per site and leased lines used for data.
b L2: National manufacturing company with five sites, 60 users per site and leased lines and
frame relay used for Internet and other data.
c L3: International manufacturing company with ten sites in home country, 60 telephony users
per site and leased lines used for Internet and other data.
d L4: Multinational company with five sites in home country, 200 telephony users per site and
leased lines and frame relay used for data.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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L1 L2 L3 L4
ISDN 3 of 6 4 of 6 4 of 6 4 of 6
Leased lines 4 of 6 4 of 6 4 of 6 5 of 6
Frame relay na 5 of 6 na 5 of 6
Mobile 2 of 6 2 of 6 2 of 6 2 of 6
Overall 3 of 6 4 of 6 4 of 6 4 of 6
Note: Australia’s price rankings are out of the six countries studied, based on annual expenditures. For
example, a rank of 2 of 6 means second lowest price out of the six countries.
a L1: National financial company with 30 sites, 10 users per site and leased lines used for data; L2:
National manufacturing company with five sites, 60 users per site and leased lines and frame relay used
for Internet and other data; L3: International manufacturing company with ten sites in home country,
60 telephony users per site and leased lines used for Internet and other data; L4: Multinational
company with five sites in home country, 200 telephony users per site and leased lines and frame relay
used for data.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.
6.6 In summary
International price comparisons have been undertaken for small, medium and
large business users and for voice and data communications using PSTN, ISDN,
mobile, leased line, X25, frame relay and ATM technology. Different volumes
and patterns of demand for telecommunications services and combinations of
the technologies available for supplying the services were assumed.
The price comparisons presented in this chapter for services supplied to
business, and in Chapter 5 for services to residential customers, are summarised
in Figure 6.11.6   BUSINESS PRICE COMPARISONS
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Note: The data underlying the above charts expresses the service price for each country as an index
relative to the least expensive country. The price in the least expensive country corresponds to
an index of 100. The bars represent the range of prices among all the selected countries for the
particular service and is the same for each country as depicted. For each country, each dot
indicates how much more expensive the price of the service is compared with the lowest-priced
country. For example, Australia’s PSTN price falls approximately in the middle of the range of
prices represented by the bar. Where necessary, price differences have been averaged to provide
a basis for aggregate comparisons.
na Data not available for this service
Source: Productivity Commission estimates.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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The countries are ordered in the table according to a broad and subjective
judgement about overall price performance. The results are conditional on the
many assumptions discussed previously.
There is a reasonable degree of consistency among the price comparisons for
different customer groups and product groups. Finland and Sweden generally
had the lowest prices. New Zealand had relatively high prices. Australia was
more or less in the middle of the group of countries benchmarked for most
services and one of the better performers for mobile services.
It is difficult to distinguish overall price performance within the middle group of
countries (UK, Australia, US, Canada and France). This is because of the
variability in relative prices between the products, and the absence of
information for some North American products.151
7 QUALITY OF SERVICE
Service performance must be judged by both price and quality of service (QoS).
Price in isolation can be a misleading performance indicator. Consumers of
telecommunications services may be willing to accept higher prices in return for
a more reliable, or higher quality, of service. Alternatively, service providers
may deliver lower prices by sacrificing service quality.
QoS refers to the ‘non-price’ attributes that consumers associate with
telecommunications services:
...business customers require continuous and reliable service to help them engage
in their business activities, residential customers need the service to meet
domestic requirements (Bantleon et al 1996, p. 12).
Quality has many dimensions. For example, quality can reasonably be expected
to be related to a range of product characteristics including performance,
features, reliability, conformance, durability, serviceability, aesthetics and
perceived quality (BTCE 1992).
A holistic definition of QoS is the totality of attributes embodied in (or
associated with) a product or service that directly interact with the enjoyment
(or utility) that consumers derive from that good or service.
In practice, data considerations and the perceived importance of selected key
aspects of service quality generally result in QoS being identified with a limited
number of attributes.
Australia’s QoS performance was compared to that of eight other OECD
countries. Where data was available, the same OECD countries used for the
price comparisons in Chapters 5 and 6 were used. In other cases, similarly
developed OECD countries were selected. The indicators examined include
fault clearance, network access, call failure, operator services, payphone
serviceability, mobile congestion and mobile drop-out. Changes in Australian
QoS over time supplement the international comparisons.
7.1 Methodological issues
QoS comparisons between countries are hampered by a dearth of information
and the underlying difficulties of constructing QoS indicators.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Sources of information
Data used in the international and time series comparisons of QoS in this
chapter are drawn from a range of sources. The purpose for which these various
data collections were compiled influences the range of, and methodology
underlying the indicators available and thus has implications for their
comparability. The nature of the various data sources also has implications for
the timeliness of the available data.
The majority of publicly available data is collected under the QoS monitoring
regimes in the relevant jurisdictions. Market liberalisation generally increases
the commercial value of market information (include QoS performance
information) and reduces the amount of publicly available data. Where markets
are dominated by few players, there may be less incentive for industry to
voluntarily provide information:
Clearly, most of the information is in the possession of industry, and industry
understands that it can use what it knows to influence what issues are discussed
and in what detail. Consequently, industry will use information as a way to
bargain with [the regulator]. Should the relationship between the [regulator] and
industry become adversarial, it becomes even more difficult to obtain
information  (Witkind-Davis et al 1996, p. 120).
Consequently, there are few unambiguously consistent comparisons that can be
made between countries and over time within the same country based on
publicly available data. Further, there is often insufficient information available
to determine the extent to which methodology differences in available data
collections influence the reliability of comparisons. This is particularly a
problem with subjective indicators such as customer satisfaction.
Thus, care should be exercised when interpreting international QoS
performance differences:
[T]he available data may cover only a small number of aspects of service quality
in the countries that are being considered. Any comparisons may therefore be
based on a narrow and selective group of indicators which does not accurately
reflect the relative levels of overall service quality (BTCE 1992, p. 99).
The two major sources of consolidated internationally comparable QoS
indicators are the biannual Communications Outlook published by the OECD
and the annual World Development Report published by the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU). Although both of these publications are
supported by electronic databases of indicators, only the ITU database is
updated on an ongoing basis. However, the consolidation process generally
means data from these sources are at least two years out of date. More current
data is available for some countries and carriers from their Internet homepages.7   QUALITY OF SERVICE
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In Australia, QoS data are provided by both the Telecommunications Industry
Ombudsman (TIO) in its Annual Report and the Australian Communications
Authority (ACA) in its quarterly Telecommunications Performance Monitoring
Bulletin (previously the Quality of Service Bulletin).
QoS regulation and indicator specification
Different approaches to QoS regulation and monitoring influence the
comparability of QoS indicators between countries. Publicly available QoS
indicators are typically constructed to meet the objectives of QoS regulation and
monitoring regimes established in the respective country.
Approaches to QoS regulation
QoS regulation and monitoring in telecommunications has been enforced by
many governments. The potential for undesirable consequences of liberalisation
described above, has been the principal reason for some regulatory intervention
(Bantleon et al 1996).
Two approaches to QoS regulation have been considered by regulatory agencies
overseas. The first — applicable under price cap regimes — is to include a
quality parameter in the price cap formula (price reductions are thereby tied to
QoS performance). The second is to set specified enforceable performance
targets or standards. This approach has generally been combined with a
requirement that carriers publish regular QoS indicators. Each approach has
inherent merits and limitations (see Table 7.1).
Indicators specification
QoS can be measured by means of subjective and objective indicators. Although
the relative merits of these two approaches is debated, neither type of indicator
is demonstrably superior in all circumstances (see Table 7.2).
Subjective indicators measure consumers’ perceptions of service quality.
Typical indicators in this class are based on customer satisfaction surveys and
analysis of customer complaints.
Objective indicators measure the quantum of key characteristics considered
relevant to individual aspects of service quality. However, it is important to note
that the choice of characteristic, and the measure chosen for objective
indicators, has an inherently subjective basis. Typical objective indicators of
telecommunications QoS include ‘faults per 100 mainlines per period’ and ‘the
proportion of connections achieved within 24 hours’.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Another important specification issue is to measure the attributes that consumers
consider important. For example, a key area of customer complaints in Australia
has been billing issues. However, since coverage of itemised billing reached 100
per cent in June 1997, no objective indicators of billing performance are now
reported on a regular basis (ACA 1997a).1
Table 7.1 Approaches to regulating QoS
Advantages Disadvantages
Including quality
as a parameter in
the price cap
formula
• A quality index in the price cap
can replicate the efficiencies of
a competitive market.
• The benefits and costs of marginal quality
improvement are not precisely known.
• Large data requirements.
• The subjective nature of quality.
• No scope for compensation of customers
that experience poor service.
Setting quality
targets
• Provide a yardstick against
which to measure QoS.
• It is possible, in theory, to
calculate the efficient level of
the penalty (for failing to meet
targets) that would encourage
the appropriate level of quality.
• The regulator must make a judgement
regarding the appropriate level at which
targets should be set.
• Setting specified targets for QoS may
reduce the incentive to provide quality
improvements over and above the target
(that is regulated minimums become
industry maximums).
• Effort to improve QoS may concentrate
only on those QoS aspects for which
targets are set.
• Difficult to strike the appropriate balance:
- Standards set unrealistically high may
be difficult or impossible to achieve.
- If set too low inadequate QoS could
result.
Source: Adapted from Bantleon et al (1996, pp. 27–28).
                                             
1  In recognition of the importance of billing as a consumer issue, the ACA (then Austel)
developed Technical Standard 029, which sets performance targets for the overall accuracy
of network licensees’ charging and billing systems (Austel 1996a; ACA 1997b).
Compliance levels were first reported in the December 1997 edition of the
Telecommunications Performance Monitoring Bulletin. However, because of
implementation problems associated with test equipment, an assessment of the level of
compliance was inconclusive (ACA 1997b).7   QUALITY OF SERVICE
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Table 7.2 Characteristics of subjective and objective indicators
Objective indicators Subjective indicators
Application Directly measures characteristics relevant
to individual service quality aspects.
Directly measures consumers’ overall
perceptions of service quality.
Advantages • Directly affected by factors such as
changes in consumers’ expectations or
aspirations.
• Can be used to identify quality
problems because they are more easily
disaggregated than subjective
indicators.
• Consistent with views of consumers
sovereignty.
• Sometimes the only means for
measuring some aspects of service
quality (eg staff courtesy).
Disadvantages • They measure service characteristics
rather than consumer satisfaction
levels.
• It is technically difficult to define and
construct objective indicators for some
aspects of service quality. For example,
billing or staff courtesy.
• The choice of objective indicator is
based on subjective factors. For
example, stated or revealed preferences
of consumers.
• Also susceptible to deliberate or
inadvertent data recording errors.
• Susceptible to bias if consumers make
judgements based on imperfect
information, have preconceived
perceptions of the firms performance,
or raise or lower their expectations and
aspirations.
• Susceptible to data collection bias.
Source: Based on BTCE (1992, pp. 29–32).
7.2 QoS regulation and monitoring in Australia
The emphasis on QoS monitoring has arisen from concerns about the transition
to competitive markets, the desire to enhance both price and service competition
following liberalisation and the desire to promote social objectives. In its
inaugural issue of the Quality of Service Bulletin, the ACA (then Austel) cited
the Government’s primary concern with regard to QoS monitoring as:
... to ensure that a high level of service is provided to telecommunications users
and quality of service monitoring and reporting provides an important source of
feedback to the Government on the performance of the carriers in providing that
service (Austel 1994c, p. 1).
In the transition to competitive markets, regulated monopolies have an incentive
to cut costs which could, without adequate safeguards, lead to lower service
quality. For example, there is evidence that price regulation encourages cost
cutting and this may lead to lower QoS:INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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In the United Kingdom, price cap regulation of British Telecom was followed by
a decline in service quality. AT&T’s service quality suffered following the
adoption of price caps by the Federal Communications Commission (Witkind-
Davis et al 1996 pp. 5–6).
Telecommunications retail prices in Australia are regulated in a variety of ways.
These include an obligation on all carriers to provide untimed local calls from
fixed telephones and public payphones, and price cap regulation which has
applied to the majority of Telstra retail prices since 1989 (see Chapter 3).
In liberalised markets there may still be a role for QoS monitoring to promote
market efficiency:
Telecommunications customers often have less information about service quality
than do the producers. Such information asymmetry leads to particular market
inefficiencies or failures (Witkind-Davis et al, 1996 p. 131).
QoS monitoring and reporting can assist consumers of telecommunications
services make informed choices by providing them with information which
would otherwise be costly to collect on an individual basis.
QoS monitoring also supports consumer protection and equity objectives. For
example, the ACA is required to develop performance standards in relation to
the customer service guarantee (Part 9, TA 1997). In addition, the ACA is
required to report on, among other things, the QoS performance of carriers and
carriage service providers (s.105, TA 1997).
The Department of Communications and the Arts (DoCA) argued that QoS
regulation must also consider the commercial impact of regulation:
Quality of service regulation, like any regulation, imposes costs on suppliers.
Because quality of services regulation and any required higher quality of service
levels are likely to involve higher costs (unless it is all achieved through
improved efficiency), there is likely to be a trade-off against the level of prices
and/or returns to shareholders (Correspondence, DoCA 2 September 1998, p. 3).
In Australia, the approach to QoS regulation and monitoring has been to
conduct periodic QoS monitoring and reporting and to establish a range of
minimum QoS standards. There is also provision for incorporating changes in
QoS into the price control arrangements for Telstra (see Box 7.1). However,
these arrangements appear to focus on permanent, case-by-case changes in
product mix rather than an ongoing adjustment of price caps in response to
changes in QoS.
QoS monitoring and reporting in Australia
QoS service monitoring and reporting is conducted by both the TIO and ACA.7   QUALITY OF SERVICE
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The TIO is an independent body, established as an ‘... office of last resort, to
provide free, independent, just, informal and speedy resolution of complaints
and disputes regarding telecommunications services’ (TIO 1995, preamble). The
TIO’s annual reports provide characteristics of cases and key issues of consumer
concern (as revealed by complaints) for each reporting period.
Box 7.1 Incorporation of alterations in the value of service into
price control arrangements for Telstra
The  Telstra Carrier Charges — Price Control Arrangements, Notification and
Disallowance Determination  1997 allows the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (ACCC) to take changes in quality of service into consideration when
assessing price movements of services subject to price caps (s.5, PD 1997). This
requirement is more explicitly stated in the Methodology for the Administration of the
Telstra Carrier Charges Price Control Arrangements:  January – December 1998,
a
which states that:
4.1  Reductions in the Value of a Service
The price charged for a service may be taken by the ACCC to have increased by an amount
calculated by the ACCC if, in the reasonable opinion of the ACCC, the value of the service
decreases due to an alteration made by Telstra to the quality of the service or the provision
of the service, and the ACCC considers that the reduction in the quality of the service is a
circumvention of the operation of the Telstra Act [the Telstra Corporation Act 1991] to
control price increases.
For example, this requirement may apply in cases where the area covered by one or more
charging zones is decreased to produce an effective price increase for customers located in
those charging zones or any adjacent charging zones.
4.2  Increases in the Value of a Service
An increase in the value of a service due to an alteration made by Telstra to the quality of
the service or the provision of the service may be treated as constituting a decrease in the
price of the service. For this to occur:
• Telstra must present the details of the increase in the value of the service and the
associated claimed price reduction to the ACCC in writing; and
• the ACCC must agree with the price reduction claimed by Telstra and notify this to
Telstra in writing.
An example of such a situation where Telstra might claim a price reduction would be in
relation to the provision (without additional charge) of Intelligent Network features with
the basic fixed telephone service, for example Telstra EasyCall features.
a The ACCC established this ‘methodology’ in consultation with Telstra under s.9(3) of PD 1997.
Source: Telstra Carrier Charges — Price Control Arrangements, Notification and Disallowance
Determination 1997;  Methodology for the Administration of the Telstra Carrier Charges Price
Control Arrangements: January – December 1998.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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The Austel commenced QoS monitoring for Telstra (then Telecom) and Optus
in November 1992, with the first published indicators appearing in the March
quarter 1994 edition of its Quality of Service Bulletin.2
Telstra (then Telecom) was identified as the main preferred source of QoS data
for basic Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) services because:
With a small number of exceptions, it is largely Telecom that supplies the
standard telephone service which provides a customer’s connection to the local
exchange and access to local calls (Austel 1994c, p. 1).
Comparable indicators (for GSM mobile services only) were first published for
the March quarter 1996. At the same time, monitoring was also extended to
Vodafone.3
QoS standards in Australia
Under the TA 1997, standards-setting,4 compliance testing, labelling and
licensing fall under the jurisdiction of the ACA which can delegate some of
these responsibilities to industry bodies such as the Australian Communications
Industry Forum (ACIF).5 Although it is legal for industry codes to be drafted
and not registered, registration of codes allows the ACA to direct industry
participants to comply.
Technical codes under Part 21 of the TA 1997 are the responsibility of the
ACA. However the ACIF often drafts them for ratification by the ACA.
Standards are made under Part 6 of the TA 1997 where industry codes do not
exist or they fail to achieve the desired outcomes. The ACA — in accordance
with the Minister’s direction6 — also has responsibility for establishing
minimum service standards under the Customer Service Guarantee (CSG)
scheme (see Box 7.2). In addition, the ACA has responsibility for identifying
exemptions, making the scale of damages and generally filling in the details so
                                             
2  The TA 1997  divides the performance monitoring functions of Austel between the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and the newly formed
Australian Communications Authority (ACA). Responsibility for quality of service
monitoring was retained (and slightly expanded) by the ACA under s.105 of the TA 1997.
3  Australia’s third licensed mobile carrier.
4  Standard-setting includes technical standards, quality of service standards and other
industry standards, each of which are covered as distinct areas in the Act.
5  The ACIF is an industry forum for developing consumer codes and operational codes.
6  Under Part 9 of the TA 1997, the Minister may direct the ACA about the use of its powers
and the services to be covered, the amount of compensation, and to some extent the
performance standard expected.7   QUALITY OF SERVICE
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that the CSG is operational. The ACA can also make a ‘CSG waiver’ that allows
customers to forego their CSG rights in exchange for some other customer
benefit.
7.3 QoS performance indicators
The first two indicators examined are consumer satisfaction levels and customer
complaints. These provide a measure of what consumers perceive as
‘acceptable’ levels of quality and which aspects of quality are important to
them. This provides a context for assessing QoS performance as measured by
the other indicators. These indicators include fault clearance, network access,
call failure, operator services, payphone serviceability and mobile congestion
and drop-out.
As discussed above, the need to rely on data in the public domain has resulted in
comparisons based on data drawn from a wide range of sources. In some cases
the comparability of this data is uncertain due to variations in methodology and
environmental factors. As such, care must be exercised in drawing strong
conclusions based on the available data.
Where possible, international comparisons of QoS have been made between the
eight OECD countries used for the price comparisons in Chapters 5 and 6.
When data for one or more of these countries was unavailable, a similarly
developed OECD country was substituted. For some indicators — such as
consumer satisfaction levels and customer complaints — comparisons were
restricted to Australia because no directly comparable overseas data were
available.
Customer satisfaction
The ACA publishes customer satisfaction levels for Telstra in its regular
performance monitoring bulletins. Customer satisfaction is usually ascertained
by surveying a sample of the carrier’s customers. Such surveys measure:
... the gap between the expectations of customers and their perception of the
carrier’s performance. It is usually calculated as the percentage of users satisfied
with the particular aspect of service under consideration (BTCE 1992, p. 69).
Telstra customer surveys reveal that fault restoration is the aspect of service
where there is least satisfaction (see Table 7.3). However, the accuracy of
customer surveys is influenced by the survey methodology (sample selection,
sample size, questionnaire design) and any psychological bias of theINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Box 7.2 Customer Service Guarantee
Part 9 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 provides the framework for the Customer
Service Guarantee Scheme. Where directed by the Minister, the ACA is responsible for
formalising minimum customer service standards and a scale of punitive damages to be
paid by carriage service providers to customers when the standard is contravened.
a
The  Telecommunications (Customer Service Guarantee) Standard 1997 (CSG) came
into effect from 1 January 1998. The CSG applies to standard local, long-distance and
international voice services and some enhanced features (such as call waiting, call
barring, call forwarding and calling number display) that can be supplied as part of the
standard telephone service.
b  Standards have been specified for service connection, fault
and service difficulties, and the making and keeping of appointments.
Service connection:  Reconnection of in-place services must be within three working
days. Connection times for new services range from one week to 12 months depending
on the availability of cabling and other infrastructure, and the size of population centers.
c
Fault or service difficulty:  Repair times are measured from the first full day after the
fault or difficulty was reported or detected. With the exception of disconnections due to
an administrative error of the carrier (which must be rectified within one working day),
repair times are linked to locality. The maximum repair time is one, two and three
working days, for customers in metropolitan, rural and remote areas, respectively.
Appointments:  Telephone companies must offer customers appointments within set
times of the day (for example, am or pm) and must meet appointments at customer
premises within 15 minutes of the appointment time agreed with the customer unless the
phone company changes an appointment by giving reasonable notice to the customer.
Customers have the option to waive, in whole or in part, their protection under the CSG
or to negotiate higher standards where it is beneficial to the customer. Where carriage
service providers agree to provide better service than the standards, these must be
guaranteed.
Where the carriage service provider fails to meet the specified standard (or agreed
standard) the customer is entitled to punitive damages. The amount is based on the
monthly rental fee for the standard telephone service and is calculated at a rate of one
month’s rental for each day the standard is exceeded (half for enhanced services).
Compensation after the first five working days of delay for connecting or repairing the
service increases to $40 per additional working day (half for enhanced services).
a The dollar amount of punitive damages cannot exceed $25 000 (s.236(3), TA 1997).
b Does not apply to mobile services or to customer equipment and cabling.
c The ACA is required to set connection periods in line with those for the Universal Service
Obligation contained in the Universal Service Regime.
Source: ACA (1998a); Telecommunications Act 1997; Telecommunications (Customer Service
Guarantee) Standard 1997; Telecommunications (Customer Service Guarantee) Scale of
Damages 1997; Telecommunications (Waiver of Customer Service Guarantee) Instrument 1997;
Telecommunications (Customer Service Guarantee) Direction No. 1 of 1997 (Amendment No. 1
of 1998).7   QUALITY OF SERVICE
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interviewees (that is, the interviewee’s image of the carrier as a whole).
Customer satisfaction levels can be influenced by changes in perception or taste,
or by recent experiences. Similarly, gradual changes in quality are not often
revealed in customer satisfaction surveys.
Table 7.3 Telstra’s customer satisfaction levels, March 1998
Customer satisfaction with: March 1998
(%)
Call quality (local, long-distance and international) 95
Operator assisted services 94
Provision of new and in-place service 89
Service restoration 82
Source: ACA (1998b, pp. 5, 9, 15, 17).
Customer complaints
The ACA publishes data on customer complaints for Telstra in its regular
performance monitoring bulletins.  Telstra defines customer complaints as:
Any expression of dissatisfaction with a Telstra service, product or policy, or
with any aspect of an oral or written communication with Telstra, that requires
some action by Telstra beyond the initial contact (Austel 1994d, p. 3).
Customer complaints arise when QoS problems are sufficient to cause
customers to seek corrective action. Complaints have increased steadily between
March 1993 to June 1998 (see Figure  7.1). However, changes in complaint
incidence over time can be influenced by a range of factors including consumer
expectations, awareness of consumer rights, changes in complaint procedures
and changes in operating environment — making the interpretation of such
changes ambiguous.
Billing and service restoration are the most common areas of concern,
accounting for more than 60 per cent of all Telstra complaints (see Table 7.4).
Billing was the aspect of service raised most often in complaints to the TIO (see
Figure 7.2):
It is simply the core issue for the investigations team and has consistently
represented approximately one third of cases for the office (TIO 1995, p. 19).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Figure 7.1 Telstra’s customers complaints per 1000 customer











































































































































































First level customer compliants Second level customer compliants
New series
Note: Telstra revised its complaint procedures from July 1997.
Source: ACA (various); Austel (various), Quality of Services Bulletins; Telecommunications
Performance Monitoring Bulletin.
This may highlight a deficiency in existing QoS indicators in the area of greatest
concern to consumers. Apart from the number of customer complaints, the ACA
do not report more detailed performance indicators for billing. Examples of
billing QoS indicators used overseas include the percentage of bill complaints
that lead to amendments (indicating a billing error).
Table 7.4 Telstra’s complaint categories, March 1998
Complaint category Complaint breakdown
(No.) (%)
Billing 17 736 36.8
Restoration of services 13 690 28.4
Provision of service 7 552 15.7
Product/services 4 635 9.6
Staff 1 971 4.1
Access to Telstra  904 1.9
Policy  904 1.9
Pricing  770 1.6
Total 48 162 100.0
Note: Data for previous periods are not directly comparable.
Source: ACA (1998b, p. 22).7   QUALITY OF SERVICE
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Figure 7.2 Customers complaints issues: TIO members, 1994–95
to 1996–97


















Source: TIO (1995, 1996, 1997).
Billing
Customer complaints regarding billing generally fall into four broad categories
— metering issues, payment issues, billing delays, and party line and
information calls.
Metering complaints about the accuracy of metered calls accounted for about
one fifth of billing complaints processed by the TIO in 1997 (TIO 1997).
In addition to faulty metering equipment, billing errors may be caused by
operational faults (including faulty call disconnection necessitating recalling,
faulty customer premises equipment, crossed lines or transposition of lines).
These problems can often be difficult to isolate. Metering complaints can also
arise when customers misunderstand the nature of a metered call, that is, whereINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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a chargeable call can be made even though a connection is not established.  For
example, a fax call may be connected, but because the fax machines fail to
‘handshake’ the customer perceives that a call has not taken place.7
In its 1995 annual report, the TIO drew attention to the contribution of itemised
billing to reducing the number of customer complaints:
It is significant that the TIO receives fewer calls about itemised long distance
calls than non itemised local calls (TIO 1995, p. 20).
And concluded from its experience that:
... itemisation of bills encourages greater vigilance for both the consumer and the
carrier and has the overall effect of reducing the number of disputes when
applied to services (TIO 1995, p. 20).
Telstra successfully met its general carrier licensing obligations under the
Telecommunications Act 1991 (TA 1991) to provide itemised billing to all
customers for time-charged calls before 30 June 1997 (see Figure 7.3). In 1997,
Telstra also introduced its Total Call Record Charging (TCRC) system which
provides itemised local calls.
Figure 7.3 Telstra’s customers provided with itemised billing,



















































































































Source: ACA (various); Austel (various), Quality of Services Bulletins; Telecommunications
Performance Monitoring Bulletin.
                                             
7  The likelihood of this type of misunderstanding is increasing with the proliferation of
telecommunications technologies and services such as fax machines, modems, PABX call
answering, voice mail and call forwarding.7   QUALITY OF SERVICE
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TCRC is available to customers at an additional charge provided their local
exchange supports this facility, but is free of charge if it involves a billing
dispute (TIO  1997). However, the BTCE cautions against viewing itemised
billing as a panacea for billing inaccuracy:
According to a survey reported in OFTEL (1990), customers who opted for
itemised billing as a solution to their billing problems were no more satisfied that
their bills were accurate than customers who did not receive itemised bills
(BTCE 1992, p. 68).
In September 1996, Austel introduced Technical Standard 29 (TS29), which
was intended to promote the technical aspects of call charging and bill accuracy
QoS. Under the TA 1997, this standard continues to apply until replaced by an
industry code of conduct currently being developed by the ACIF.
Payment related complaints are the second most common area of dissatisfaction
with billing. They generally relate to instances where:
... the carrier has been unnecessarily harsh in not accepting a proposed payment
arrangement or extreme in its decision to disconnect a service (TIO 1997, p. 39).
Although this may represent poor customer relations, carriers ultimately have a
legal right to recover owed monies and determine their own credit control
procedures.
Billing delay complaints are principally of two types — those where the carrier
fails to bring call charges into account during the normal account period (‘back
billing’) and those where the carrier fails to promptly issue an account when a
customer transfers to (or pre-selects) another carrier.
Regardless of whether these delays result from interconnection issues between
carriers or from technical problems within a single carrier, they affect QoS.
However, the incidence of such delays has the potential to increase in a multi-
carrier environment.
Party line and information call complaints are difficult to classify due to the
nature of the calls. ‘Party line calls’ refer mainly to 0011 and 0055 sex line
calls, while information calls relate to a host of 1900 and 0055 enhance voice
services (see Appendix C).8  With party line call complaints, customers typically
deny having made the call even when the call has been substantiated by the
                                             
8  Before cable pairs became plentiful and ‘pair-gain’ systems were common, the expression
‘party line’ applied to a shared telephone service where two handsets were connected in
parallel on the same number and the same connection back to the exchange.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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carrier. Similar complaints sometimes occur with information calls that are
billed by a third party service provider.9
Fault clearance
Fault clearance indicators provide a measure of service responsiveness, that is,
the likely time before a fault in the service is restored. Fault restoration times are
influenced by a range of factors. For example, the overall workload and skill of
the service staff will determine, in part, how quickly a fault can be identified
and repaired.
Environmental factors, such as weather and geographical network density, will
influence the time taken to locate and access the fault before repair can begin.
Similarly, the level of network intelligence and redundancy determines the
ability to restore customer service before physical repairs are effected.
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Note: Bracketed figures denote ranking out of the 22 OECD countries that provided data.
1995 and 1996 data for Australia include non-public payphones.
Legend AUS: Australia, CAN: Canada, FIN: Finland; FR: France, GER: Germany, JAP: Japan, NLD:
Netherlands, NZ: New Zealand, SWD: Switzerland, and UK: United Kingdom.
Source: OECD (1997a, 1997c).
Service restoration performance is typically measured as the proportion of faults
repaired within a given time — 24 and 48 hours in Australia. Australia’s
performance for fault clearance within 24 hours compared poorly relative to
                                             
9  Information calls (to 1900 and 0055 numbers) are billed by the telecommunications carrier
from whose network the service is provided, regardless of which carrier the customer has
pre-selected.7   QUALITY OF SERVICE
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other OECD countries in 1995 (see Figure 7.4).  Australia’s  performance  of
67 per cent of faults repaired within 24 hours ranked 21st out of the 22 OECD
countries that supplied data.
Such international comparisons must be treated with caution because some
countries only report on residential customers and others report fault restoration
over different intervals. For example, data for the UK are for repairs within 5
and 9 working hours (for business and residential customers, respectively).
Also, variations in performance between different customer groups make
international comparisons based on ‘average measures’ difficult (see Table 7.5).
Table 7.5 Restoration of service, March 1996 to March 1998
Mar 96 Sep 96 Mar 97 Sep 97 Mar 98
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Australia (Telstra only)
a
National faults cleared within one working day of
notification 66.0 74.0 69.0 67.0 63.0
Metropolitan business faults cleared within one
working day of notification 79.0 82.0 82.0 83.0 79.0
Metropolitan residential faults cleared within one
working day of notification 51.0 64.0 58.0 54.0 54.0
Country faults cleared within one working day of
notification 67.0 75.0 69.0 68.0 59.0
Canada (BC TEL only)
a
Residential out of service conditions cleared
within 24 hours of customer report na 84.0 77.0 87.0 na
Business out of service conditions cleared within
24 hours of customer report na 84.0 82.0 88.0 na
Urban out of service conditions cleared within 24
hours of customer report na 85.0 79.0 89.0 na
Rural out of service conditions cleared within 24
hours of customer report na 74.0 71.0 74.0 na
New Zealand (Telecom NZ only)
b
Faults cleared within 24 hours 60.0 54.0 60.0 na na
United Kingdom (British Telecom only)
b
Business faults cleared in five working hours or
by successful appointment 87.7 89.8 88.8 88.8 89.2
Residential faults cleared in nine working hours or
by successful appointment 82.7 85.7 79.8 81.9 79.7
a Figures are averages for the quarter preceding the recorded date.
b Figures are averages for the six month period preceding the recorded date.
Source: ACA (1997b, 1998b); Austel (1996b, 1996c, 1997); MoC (1997); www.bt.com. (accessed July
1998).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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For Australia (Telstra only), Canada (BC Tel only) and the United Kingdom
(British Telecom only), business customers receive a consistently higher QoS
than residential customers. The extent to which customers are willing to accept
longer repair times in exchange for lower prices is not clear from the available
data.
Consumer groups in Australia have experienced an absolute decline in fault
clearance QoS since March 1993 (see Figure 7.5). Metropolitan residential
customers experienced the greatest deterioration in service between March 1993
and June 1998 for both faults cleared within one day and faults cleared within
two days.
Declining fault clearance QoS has been explained by the combined effects of
changes in methodology, adverse weather conditions and manpower difficulties
(Austel 1996b).
Figure 7.5 Telstra’s restoration of service, March 1993 to
June 1998









































































































































































Source: ACA (various), Austel (various), Quality of Services Bulletins; Telecommunications
Performance Monitoring Bulletin.
Since March 1993, Telstra has introduced two changes to business systems that
have consequences for the reporting of fault clearance indicators.  The first, in
December 1994, resulted in an increase in the overall number of faults recorded
(Austel 1994a).  The second led to the introduction of a ‘customer participation’7   QUALITY OF SERVICE
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system in June 1996. This enabled customers to exchange faulty customer
equipment at nominated Australia Post and Telstra outlets (Austel 1996b).
Although this system allowed customers a quicker alternative to waiting for a
repair visit, the time taken to clear the fault depended on the customer.
Adverse weather conditions were cited by Telstra as a major contributing factor
to falling fault clearance QoS between March 1993 and June 1998.
The effect of storms restricts the workforce from immediate activity repair until
conditions improve sufficiently to affect the repair. Depending on the location
and severity of the storm this increases the number of faults reported creating
peaks in load during particular periods (Austel 1996c, p. 9).
Increasing demand for new service connections are also cited as a source of
fault clearance QoS decline because of the need to reallocate staff from fault
repair tasks to service connection tasks.
Minimum QoS standards for fault clearance are specified in the CSG scheme
which came into effect from 1 January 1998 (see Box 7.2). From June 1998, the
ACA began reporting Telstra’s fault restoration performance against the CSG
specified minimum service levels (see Table 7.6). Although the data indicates
that performance against the CSG minimums declined over the quarter ending
March 1998, the time series is too short to be conclusive.
Table 7.6 Telstra’s fault restoration performance against the customer





b (within 1 full working day) 72 71
Rural areas
c (within 2 full working day) 84 81
Remote areas
d (within 3 full working day) 70 64
a Retro-fitted data for comparison purposes only.
b Areas in Australia with a population greater than 10 000 people.
c Areas in Australia other than urban areas and remote areas.
d Areas in Australia with a population less than 200 people.
Source: ACA (1998b, pp. 8–9).
Network access
A key attribute of telecommunications services is provision of service or
‘network access’. Indicators of service in this area typically measure delivery
precision and network accessibility or penetration.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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For markets or regions reaching telephone penetration saturation levels, delivery
precision — measured as the ability of the carrier to meet deadlines agreed with
customers — is considered a better measure of provision of service quality than
waiting times.10  Delivery precision indicators for Telstra measure the
proportion of customers connected before the Agreed Commitment Date
(ACD).11  Performance is monitored for new and in-place services,12 and is
Table 7.7 Network access performance, March 1996 to March 1998
Mar 96 Sep 96 Mar 97 Sep 97 Mar 98
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Australia (Telstra only)
a
Customers connected to new services on or
before the customer agreed date 83.0 83.0 82.0 79.0 74.0
Customer connected to in-place services on or
before the customer agreed date 86.0 85.0 88.0 89.0 92.0
Canada (BC TEL only)
a
Residential appointments service connection
met on customer arranged date na 91.4 91.2 90.6 na
Business appointments service connection
met on customer arranged date na 92.3 93.4 93.0 na
New Zealand (Telecom NZ only)
b
Residential connections that meet the
customer’s requested installation time 94.0 93.2 90.8 na na
United Kingdom (British Telecom only)
b
Circuits installed in standard lead time or
‘customer later’ date 98.9 99.4 99.3 99.1 98.5
Orders completed by latest ‘customer required
by’ date 92.6 95.6 96.1 95.6 94.9
a Figures are averages for the quarter preceding the recorded date.
b Figures are averages for the six month period preceding the recorded date.
Source: ACA (1997b, 1998b), Austel (1996b, 1996c, 1997); MoC (1997); www.bt.com (accessed July
1998).
                                             
10  In 1996, 96 per cent of Australian households had a telephone (ITU 1998b).
11  ACD replaced ‘customer required date’ in September 1995. ‘The concept of ACD focuses
on providing customers with firm appointment dates which are acceptable to the customer
and realistic in terms of Telstra’s network workforce resources’ (Austel 1995b, p. 3).
12 A new service is defined as ‘... the initial connection of service to the customer’s premises
involving the provision of a new network access line from the local telephone exchange to
the network boundary’ (Austel 1995c, p. 4). An ‘in-place service’ means the path from the
exchange to the service delivery point still exists (Austel 1995c, p. 14).7   QUALITY OF SERVICE
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reported for national, metropolitan business, metropolitan residential and
country customers. Overseas carriers provide similar data (see Table 7.7).
Delivery precision levels and trends between different customer groups or
carriers or even for the same consumer group or carrier over time not directly
comparable because ACDs time intervals can vary:
The actual time intervals (between the date the request is made and the date
promised to the customer) may vary even between customers of the same carrier.
As a result this indicator may be easily manipulated. For example, if the carrier
convinces the potential customer to put back the agreed date to one that better
suits the carrier, the proportion of requests met on the agreed date will probably
increase. Consequently, this indicator can be improving while quality is actually
falling (BTCE 1992, p. 5).
Australian data for new connections suggests two distinct phases in the trends
for national, metropolitan residential and country customers between March
1993 and June 1998 (see Figure 7.6(a)). Until December 1996, performance
improved steadily, when a decline in service occurred. This decline has been
attributed to:
... the introduction of new systems and by the corresponding organisational
changes needed to provide a more flexible and responsive service ... [which]
resulted in greater operational difficulties than anticipated (ACA 1998b, p. 8).
Figure 7.6 Telstra’s network access and service restoration
performance, March 1993 to June 1998
(a) New services connections on


















































































(b) Connections for in-place




















































































ACD Agreed commitment data.
Source: ACA (various), Austel (various), Quality of Services Bulletins; Telecommunications
Performance Monitoring Bulletin.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
172
Connections for in-place services exhibited a steady increase for national,
metropolitan residential and country customers since March 1995, and for
metropolitan business customers since June 1996 (see Figure 7.6(b)).
Call failure
Call connection failure rates are an indication of the ‘technical’ quality of the
network. A call can fail for a number of reasons including network congestion,
failure of network equipment or customer premises equipment.
Congestion is usually greatest during peak periods and may vary for different
services. Innovative marketing strategies are also having an influence on
network congestion. For example, ‘special’ rates for long-distance or
international destinations can produce unexpected congestion on the network.
In 1995, Australia performed well compared with other OECD countries for
which data are available (see Figure 7.7).
Figure 7.7 Call failure rates for selected OECD countries, 1995


























































































Note: Bracketed figures denote ranking out of the 13 OECD countries that provided data.
Legend: AUS: Australia (Telstra only); CAN: Canada; DEN: Denmark; GRE: Greece; HUN: Hungary;
IRE: Ireland; ITA: Italy; SP: Spain; UK: United Kingdom (BT only) and US: United States.
Source: OECD (1997a, 1997c).
There was a steady improvement in local and long-distance call connections for
Telstra’s fixed network between March 1993 and September 1995 for all users
(see Figure 7.8(a) to (c)).13  Country users and users of night time long-distance
                                             
13 Measurement is based on sampling of live traffic using automatic service assessment
techniques. These measures exclude customer premises equipment (which may or may not
be supplied by the carrier) and are segmented by local, long-distance and international7   QUALITY OF SERVICE
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services experienced the greatest improvement in performance. The
improvements prior to 1996 have been attributed to Telstra’s network
modernisation program which included:
... new switching technologies, increases to the trunk cable network and the
digitalisation of country exchanges have all contributed to the general improved
trend in performance over the past few quarters (Austel 1994b, p. 4).
Since 1995, improvement has slowed and there have been some isolated
instances of regression towards the end of the period (see Figure 7.8(a) and (b)).























































































































































































































































































































































Source: ACA (various), Austel (various), Quality of Services Bulletins; Telecommunications
Performance Monitoring Bulletin.
                                                                                                                                   
calls. Long-distance calls are segmented by day and night calls to isolate peak periods. All
measures are reported for metropolitan, country and total (national) users.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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International call connection performance is somewhat more difficult to
interpret. The two available indicators provide conflicting impressions of
Australia’s performance with regard to international call connections, answer
seizure ratios, and international call connection rates.
Answer seizure ratios (ASR) are published by the OECD. This is a measure of
the proportion of international calls that successfully ‘seize’ an international
circuit and are answered in the terminating country.
Australian carriers’ ASR performance compares poorly relative to other OECD
countries (see Figure 7.9(b)). In 1995, Australia’s ASR was 60 per cent, or put
another way, four out of ten international calls originating in Australia failed to
be connected.
Figure 7.9 Answer seizure ratios for selected OECD countries






















































































(10) (7) (6) (4)
(3) (2) (1)
Note: Bracketed figures denote ranking out of the 27 OECD countries in the sample.
Legend AUS: Australia, CAN: Canada, FIN: Finland, FR: France, JAP: Japan, NZ: New Zealand,
SWD: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom and US: United States.
Source: OECD (1997a, 1997c).
Some improvement was achieved between 1990 and 1995. However,
Australia’s ranking — relative to the 27 other OECD countries that provided
data — slipped from 14th in 1990 to 19th in 1995 (OECD 1997c).
ASR measures can be misleading because failure to connect can be outside the
control of the domestic carrier. International call failures occur for a number of
reasons including line congestion, unanswered calls, incorrect number dialling,
technical failure in either the originating or terminating network, busy lines and
national disasters (OECD 1997c). ASR is influenced by a range of factors such7   QUALITY OF SERVICE
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as the availability and take-up of such equipment as answering and facsimile
machines, and services such as call diversion, call waiting and voice mail.
In 1995, international call connection loss varied between 0.46 and 1.06 per
cent (Austel 1995a and Austel 1995b). International call connection rates are
published by the ACA for Telstra in the periodic Quality of Service Bulletin.
Between March 1993 and June 1998, international call connection improved
slightly for all users. However, the gains were far less pronounced than for local
and long-distance services, and by the end of the period the network was
experiencing significant regression in QoS (see December 1996 and
December 1997 in Figure 7.8(d)). Telstra attributes these occurrences to isolated
instances of network congestion on Christmas day traffic and isolated failures of
international and transit switch centres.
Although ASR and international call connection rates are not directly
comparable, the difference in the two measures of performance suggests that a
considerable proportion of the international call failures recorded in the ASR
measure may be beyond the control of domestic carriers.
Operator services
The need for operator assistance declines with the degree of automation and as
network reliability increases.14  However, in those cases where users access
operator services, the helpfulness of operators and the speed with which calls
are answered, are important aspects of operator assistance QoS.
Australian performance relative to overseas countries for which data are
available is difficult to ascertain because of variation in methodology and
presentation format (see Table 7.8).
In Australia, Telstra provides the majority of operator services which comprise
calls relating to service difficulties, directory assistance and operator assisted
national calls. Telstra’s customer surveys reveal a high degree of satisfaction
with these services (see Table 7.4). However, this reflects an aggregated
response that may conceal dissatisfaction of users who rely heavily on such
services.
Indicators published by the ACA allow for a more consistent comparison of
operator services over time (see Figure 7.10). For each classification there is a
                                             
14 Operator services are likely to be more important to people who have difficulty using the
telephone system unaided.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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measure for the proportion of calls answered within a given time and the
proportion of calls that were not answered.15
Table 7.8 Operator and directory assistance performance, March
1996 to March 1998
Mar 96 Sep 96 Mar 97 Sep 97 Mar 98
Australia (Telstra only)
a
Directory assistance calls answered within
10 seconds (%) 33.0 59.0 54.0 73.0 60.0
Operator assisted national calls answered within
10 seconds (%) 79.0 84.0 82.0 76.0 87.0
Operator assisted international calls answered
within 10 seconds (%) 83.0 90.0 na na na
Canada (BC TEL only)
a
Operator assistance — average time to answer
(seconds) na 4.0 4.2 3.9 na
Directory Assistance — average time to answer
(seconds) na 6.0 5.8 6.1 na
New Zealand (Telecom NZ only)
b
Directory assistance calls — average to answer
(seconds) 10.6 10.5 20.0 na na
United Kingdom (British Telecom only)
b
Directory assistance service calls answered within
15 seconds (%) 92.0 87.8 91.1 91.3 91.4
Operator assistance service calls answered within
15 seconds (%) 91.9 88.0 92.1 85.1 89.9
a Figures are averages for the quarter preceding the recorded date.
b Figures are averages for the six month period preceding the recorded date.
Source: ACA (1997b, 1998b), Austel (1996b, 1996c, 1997); MoC (1997); www.bt.com (accessed July
1998).
Although some improvement has occurred over the sample period for each of
the available indicators, there is no clear trend (see Figure 7.10). The number of
service difficulty calls are claimed to be influenced by the same factors that
were discussed above under fault restoration.
                                             
15 Response benchmarks are 15, 10 and 20 seconds for service difficulty, directory assistance
and operator assisted national calls operator services, respectively.7   QUALITY OF SERVICE
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Figure 7.10 Telstra’s operator assisted services and service difficulty
calls, March 1993 to June 1998
(a) Service difficulty calls














































































































































































































































































































































(e) Operator assisted national calls








































































































































































Source: ACA (various), Austel (various), Quality of Services Bulletins; Telecommunications
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Payphones
Payphones are vital for households in countries and regions without private
telephones. Although, in aggregate, Australian households have nearly
ubiquitous access to the fixed PSTN, individuals in groups and geographic areas
still rely heavily on payphone services.16
Even for subscribers to the fixed PSTN, payphone services can be important
when travelling or in emergencies outside the home (the emergence of ‘personal
communications’ technologies such as mobile telephony offers an alternative to
payphones in some circumstances). The two key aspects of payphone services
are accessibility (or availability) and serviceability.
In 1996, Australia ranked 8th among OECD countries reporting data for
payphone accessibility (measured as payphones per 1000 persons) (see
Figure 7.11(a)).  Although  changes  in  reporting  format  make  it  difficult  to
compare trends in Australia with trends in the OECD, there has been a decline
in payphone accessibility since 1995 (see Figure 7.11(b)). Increasing penetration
of mobile and other communications technology offsets this decline to some
extent. However, the consumers that rely most on public payphones (those with
lower-income located in remote regions) may not have equal access to these
alternative technologies.
One measure of payphone serviceability is the proportion of payphones working
at any given time. The main weakness of payphone serviceability indicators is
that measured performance can be increased by removing the payphones prone
to damage. For example, there may be an incentive:
... to locate more payphones in affluent suburbs and less in poorer suburbs, the
very suburbs where there is the most need. It is likely that vandalism may be
more frequent in certain poorer suburbs and that, by under supplying such
suburbs, carriers could reduce their maintenance cost (BTCE 1992, p. 65).
The universal service obligation (USO) provisions of the TA 1997 require
Telstra to provide all people in Australia with reasonable access to public
payphones. In addition, the Minister has the discretion to determine the location
of payphones (see Chapter 3, Section 3.1).
Compared with other OECD countries, Australia performs relatively well in
terms of percentage of payphones in working order, ranking 5th amongst the 13
countries that provided data for 1995 (see Figure 7.12(a)). Other available data
                                             
16 Such as remote communities, caravan parks or in suburbs or socio-economic groups with
lower phone penetration.7   QUALITY OF SERVICE
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Figure 7.11 Payphones per 1000 inhabitants for selected OECD
countries
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a Australian data from 1995 include non-public payphones.
Note: Bracketed figures denote ranking out of the 25 OECD countries in the sample.
Legend AUS: Australia, CAN: Canada, ESP: Spain, FIN: Finland, FR: France, GER: Germany, JAP:
Japan, UK: United Kingdom and US: United States.
Source: ITU (1998b).
Figure 7.12 Payphone performance for selected OECD countries,
1995
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(6) (5) (4) (3) (1)
Note: Bracketed figures denote ranking out of the 13 OECD countries for Figure (a) and 20 OECD
countries for Figure (b).
Legend: AUS: Australia, CAN: Canada, FR: France, GER: Germany, GRE: Greece; HUN: Hungary;
IRE: Ireland, JAP: Japan, NLD: Netherlands, NZ: New Zealand; PORT: Portugal; SWI:
Switzerland; and UK: United Kingdom.
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suggest that although Australia’s performance compared favourably with
overseas counterparts, there was a decline in the proportion of public payphones
in working order towards the end of 1997 (see Table 7.9).
The decline in payphone serviceability towards the end of 1997 is more obvious
in indicators published by the ACA (see Figures 7.13(a) to 7.13(d)). All
payphone serviceability indicators exhibited steady improvement between
March 1993 and September 1997. However, since September 1997 there has
been a marked decline in all indicators (although the decline in QoS for country
users began as early as September 1996 (see Figure 7.13(c) and 7.13(d)). Telstra
has identified the source of this decline as:
... temporary resourcing difficulties associated with the roll-out of new
payphones, and workforce restructuring including problems with the new work
scheduling system. Increased vandalism of the new payphones and technical
problems with coin jam have exacerbated the problem (ACA 1997b, p. 14).
Table 7.9 Payphones in working order, March 1996 to March 1998
Mar 96 Sep 96 Mar 97 Sep 97 Mar 98
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Australia (Telstra only)
a 96.0 96.0 96.0 97.0 91.0
New Zealand (Telecom NZ only)
b 98.0 97.7 97.9 na na
United Kingdom (British Telecom only)
b 95.1 95.3 94.3 95.8 95.3
a Figures are averages for the quarter preceding the recorded date.
b Figures are averages for the six month period preceding the recorded date.
Source: ACA (1997b, 1998b), Austel (1996b, 1996c, 1997); MoC (1997); www.bt.com (accessed July
1998).
Cellular mobiles
The penetration of cellular mobile telephony has increased significantly over the
past few years. However, there are no international data available for
international QoS comparisons. For Australia, only ‘call congestion’ and ‘call
drop-out’ are measured.
Mobile phone call congestion occurs when calls cannot be established because
all channels serving the area are in use. Call drop-out is defined as the
percentage of calls where there is an unintended disconnection of a call by the
network during conversation. This can happen for a number of reasons
including network congestion, the impact of signal fading or radio interference.7   QUALITY OF SERVICE
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Figure 7.13 Telstra’s public payphones, March 1993 to June 1998
(a) Public payphones operating at

















































































(b) Public payphones — average















































































(c) Public payphone faults



















































































(d) Public payphone faults



















































































Source: ACA (various), Austel (various), Quality of Services Bulletins; Telecommunications
Performance Monitoring Bulletin.
Call drop-out and congestion performance are influenced by variations in
networks and operating environment, making comparisons between countries or
regions and between carriers difficult.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Analogue, digital and hybrid standards have quite different performance
characteristics. The impending closure of the AMPS network makes QoS an
important issue in the short-term.17
Performance is also influenced by variations in city-scape and geographical
characteristics of the service region. Variations in usage patterns will also
influence performance (for example, timing influences congestion, proportion of
calls made from inside buildings may influence drop-out rate due to structural
barriers).
Data published by the ACA shows a steady improvement in call drop-out
performance of the AMPS network since March 1993 (see Figure 7.14(a)).
However, Sydney has had consistently poorer QoS performance than other
major cities. This has been attributed to physical features and the size of the
customer base (Austel 1994a).
Call congestion data for the AMPS network have been published since
September 1996. Although there was no appreciable improvement in call
congestion QoS between September 1996 and June 1998, there has equally been
no appreciable deterioration (see Figure 7.14(b)).
QoS data for GSM services are published on a State-by-State basis for Telstra,
Optus and Vodafone. The best and the worst performing States provide upper
and lower bounds on the level of service, respectively. The difference between
service levels for the best and worst results provide an indication of
performance consistency.
Between September 1996 and June 1998, the maximum GSM call drop-out for
all three carriers improved by 6, 8 and 16 per cent for Optus, Telstra and
Vodafone respectively (see Figure 7.14(c)).18  Over the same period, minimum
call drop-out deteriorated for Telstra and Optus, but improved for Vodafone.
                                             
17 On 9 July 1998 Telstra announced plans to invest more than $400 million in a new digital
mobile network using the 800 MHz spectrum. This network is expected to be based on
CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) technology. CDMA technology offers better
spectrum management (reducing capacity constraints) and significant quality
improvements. Although this network will operate in parallel to the GSM network in both
city and rural areas, it is expected to provide the greatest benefit to rural users who
currently rely on the AMPS system due to be phased out by 1 January 2000. Trials for the
CDMA network are expected to commence in early 1999.
18 Call drop-out indicators for the analogue AMPS network are not directly comparable with
those for the digital GSM network. The AMPS network records some events — such as
flat batteries or customer moving out of coverage area — as call drop-outs, which the
GSM network does not (ACA 1998b, p. 32).7   QUALITY OF SERVICE
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Figure 7.14 Cellular mobile call drop-out and congestion
performance: Australia, March 1993 to June 1998
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a AMPS call drop-out indicators are not directly comparable with those for the digital GSM
network as the AMPS network registers some events as drop-outs (such as customer unit flat
batteries) which the GSM network does not.
b Chart present a range of performance around an a simple average of individual carriers
performance for Optus, Telstra and Vodafone.  National performance for each carrier was
derived as a population weighted average of the carriers performance in each state  Error bars
indicate the maximum positive and negative deviation from this mean performance.
Source: ACA (various), Austel (various), Quality of Services Bulletins; Telecommunications
Performance Monitoring Bulletin.
The performance consistency for all three carriers has improved over the period.
While a decline in the ‘upper bound’ or best call drop-out QoS for Telstra and
Optus has occurred, it has been accompanied by a reduction in the range ofINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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performance between the best and worst results amongst states, or an increase in
reliability.
GSM call congestion QoS also improved between September 1996 and June
1998. Both maximum and minimum call congestion levels fell for all three
carriers representing an improvement over the period (see Figure 7.14(d)).
Furthermore, the range between the maximum and minimum call congestion
levels for each carrier closed by 25, 55 and 93 per cent for Telstra, Optus and
Vodafone respectively.
7.4 In summary
Comparisons of QoS performance complement the price comparisons of
previous chapters. Both are required to arrive at an overall assessment of
customer satisfaction performance.
QoS has many dimensions. If Australia’s performance, relative to other
countries, were better or worse across all these dimensions it would be possible
to draw conclusions about Australia’s relative performance with a degree of
confidence. However, this is not the case. Furthermore, there are few indicators
suitable for international comparisons of quality of telecommunications services
and those available are clouded by definitional and methodological differences.





















Answer seizure ratio 1995 Canada Czech Republic 19 of 27
Payphones per 1000 inhabitants 1996 Switzerland Turkey 8 of 25
Payphones in working order 1995 Portugal Turkey 5 of 13
Payphones that are card phones 1995 Japan/Portugal Iceland 3 of 20
Source: Productivity Commission.
The QoS indicators examined suggest Australia’s performance is mixed (see
Table 7.10). On some indicators, such as call failure rates and the penetration of
card operated payphones, Australia performs quite well, though below the best7   QUALITY OF SERVICE
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of the countries for which data are available. On other indicators, such as fault
restoration, Australia’s performance compares poorly relative to other countries
reporting data.
Comparisons over time suggest that Australia’s performance relative to other
OECD countries for which data are available may have deteriorated on some
indicators (see Table 7.11).
General indicators of satisfaction and records of complaints show that billing
and fault restoration are of particular concern to customers. However, it is not
possible to compare Australia’s billing performance because suitable indicators
are not currently collected.
Future assessment of the relative QoS performance of the Australian
telecommunications industry would be enhanced by collecting QoS data for all
carriers. Wherever possible, the indicators collected should be comparable to
those published in other countries. Such indicators should focus on aspects of
quality that are of most concern to Australian consumers.
Table 7.11 Australia’s ranking compared to other OECD countries that
supplied data on selected QoS indicators, 1992 to 1996
Indicator 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996














Answer seizure ratio 15 of 27 16 of 27 17 of 27 19 of 27 na
Payphones per 1000 inhabitantsa 18 of 27 16 of 26 17 of 26 9 of 26 8 of 25
Payphones in working order na 3 of 9 3 of 11 5 of 13 na
Payphones that are card phones na na na 3 of 20 na
a Australian data prior to 1995 excluded non-public payphones.
Source: Productivity Commission.187
8 INTERPRETATION
The purpose of this chapter is to assist with the comparison of measured prices
by drawing together the information in the previous chapters. The focus is
principally on prices. Quality of service has been excluded from the analysis
because of a lack of reliable indicators.
Telecommunications prices vary significantly among the benchmarked countries
(see  Chapters 5  and  6).  For  example,  the  highest  residential  price  index  is
almost 100   per cent higher than the lowest. Despite this variability, cross-
country price relativities are generally consistent across markets.
The following groups of factors provide possible explanations for some of the
observed differences in prices:
·  Measurement errors;
·  External factors outside the control of industry — technological change,
input prices, taxes, geography and other factors affecting the physical
operating environment and the characteristics of the network; and
·  Government involvement and interventions — including ownership,
structural separation, social policies, retail price controls and competition
policy — that affect the market environment and incentives for efficient
outcomes.
The impacts of these factors on prices are expected to vary among
telecommunications markets.
In addition, there are internal factors — such as governance structures,
corporate culture and managerial performance — that contribute to variation in
productivity, profitability and prices.
In competitive markets, internal factors affect financial performance. However,
market disciplines squeeze out poor performers, thus reducing performance
variation. In markets that are not fully competitive greater performance variation
is possible.
The influence of government involvement and interventions on internal factors
and price outcomes is discussed in this report. Typically, telecommunications
markets are not fully competitive and internal factors can account for greater
variation in performance within a market. One source of this variation, for
example, is differences in the nature of public and private ownership.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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The extent of this variation will depend on the effectiveness of government
supervision in preventing abuse of market power. Although market power often
leads to productive inefficiency and higher prices, these outcomes are not solely
attributable to internal factors such as mismanagement. For example, over-
investment may be a response to deter entry, to conceal profits from a regulator
or to hedge against more stringent supervision in the future.
Most attention is given to the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN)
voice market, which remains the largest sector of the industry and the most
heavily regulated. Only brief mention is made of the mobile and data markets.
However, these markets are generally subject to greater growth and competition
with their attendant performance disciplines.
8.1 Measurement errors
The comparisons of final telecommunications prices are dependent on the
assumptions about call patterns and duration that define the basket of services
costed as a price index for each country. These assumptions are necessary
because the price structures and demand patterns differ across the countries
studied.
Although the baskets were designed to minimise measurement error, it must be
recognised that there is some residual error. Sensitivity testing on basket
assumptions is reported in Chapters 5 and 6.
The demand pattern for services in each country is influenced by geographical
and cultural characteristics as well as price structures and service quality. The
sensitivity of the benchmarking results to these demand factors was tested by
costing a basket reflecting Australian usage patterns in each country and
comparing the price indices with those obtained using the composite basket
developed for this study.
The usage profiles of business customers vary considerably within and between
countries. Consequently, rather than attempting to devise a single basket,
comparisons were conducted for a range of market segments, products and
usage  patterns  (see  Chapter 6).  This  provided  a  direct  indication  of  the
sensitivity of the assumptions.
This sensitivity testing suggested that, overall, the residential and business price
relativities are robust.
Only the prices of the incumbent carriers were included in the comparisons.
However, these carriers dominate the markets in each country. Although recent
entrants usually offer lower prices, they generally do so to compensate for8   INTERPRETATION
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perceived differences in service or the inconvenience to customers of switching
suppliers.
Overlooked or misapplied price discounts are another possible source of error.
Eurodata undertook an extensive investigation to determine the price discounts
offered in the benchmarked countries. Further checking was provided by Telstra
and Telecom Corporation of New Zealand (TCNZ).
That said, any price discounts not included in the analysis are unlikely to have
had widespread application, nor have had a significant effect on price indices
that are an aggregation of a large number of prices. New Zealand is a possible
exception. The use of targeted discounts and business contracts in New Zealand
is more extensive than in other countries.
Telstra and TCNZ claimed that the price comparisons are biased against
countries that have caps on charges for long-distance residential calls in off-
peak periods. They argued that the prices used in the analysis based on a fixed
per minute charge would overstate the amount paid by consumers. This arises
because an average charge per minute declines when call durations exceed the
time that the cap takes affect.
Although this is a short-coming of the methodology used, it is not a significant
factor,  particularly  when  comparing  total  service  charges  (see  Chapter 5).
Moreover, other countries with similar pricing schemes, would be affected also.
8.2 External factors outside the control of industry
Production costs and the prices of telecommunications services in each country
are affected by the technology used and the operating environment. For
example, the prices of inputs required by telecommunications suppliers affects
their costs, as does market size, population density and even weather conditions.
To a large extent, these factors are outside the control of the carriers.
Technology
Telecommunications companies world-wide are investing in new transmission
and switching technology. This investment is greatly expanding the capacity
and capabilities of the communications infrastructure, improving productivity
and reducing costs (see Chapter 2). Examples of developments include digital
exchanges, cellular mobile systems, fibre-optic cable for long-distance
transmission and coaxial cable for the customer access network.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Price relativities between countries may be affected by differing economies of
scope arising from uneven uptake of new technologies. Increasingly, the
telecommunications network is being accessed through computers, for data
transmission, broadcasting and broadband inter-active services. The growth of
these activities can alter industry cost structures where these services share
common facilities and provide economies of scope.
It is assumed that all the countries studied employ recent switching and cable
technology. However, there are likely to be differences in the success with
which new technology has been absorbed into the telecommunications
networks.1 This may have some effect on costs per unit of traffic and hence on
prices.
Input prices
The prices of telecommunications services are influenced by the prices of inputs
(including labour, specialised equipment and other materials and services)
purchased by carriers. In an efficient and competitive industry, there will be a
direct link between input prices and telecommunication service prices.
Differences in input prices among the countries studied were to some extent
taken into account by the use of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in converting
the prices of telecommunications services into a common unit of account
(see Chapter 5). Nevertheless, cross-country price relativities of inputs to the
telecommunications industry may differ from price relativities of inputs to the
economy as a whole.
Most of the countries included in this benchmarking study have sophisticated
and globally competitive manufacturing and software industries supplying these
inputs. However, equipment costs in Australia and New Zealand may be higher
than in European and North American countries and Japan. In the past, local
manufacturing was protected, which may have increased the cost of specialised
inputs in Australia relative to other countries.
All the countries are advanced and mature economies with telecommunications
industry labour costs correlated to the cost of labour inputs in general. Across
countries, these labour costs vary, affecting relative prices.
However, the use of PPP adjusted prices for cross-country comparisons
ameliorates these influences. PPP adjusted prices are likely to be most affected
                                             
1 Innovation and the adoption of new technologies and services involves risks as well as
opportunities for the industry when implementation costs and market demands are difficult
to forecast.8   INTERPRETATION
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by variation in the proportional difference between telecommunications labour
cost and the average of all other industries within each country.
Finally, a concern was raised about the validity of using PPP exchange rates to
adjust prices where telecommunications is used as a business input (NECG
1999b). It was suggested that an exchange rate based on the purchase of
intermediate rather than final goods and services would be more appropriate.
Exchange rates based on intermediate goods and services are not generally
available. However, the use of PPP exchange rates is not expected to introduce
significant error. PPP exchange rates are designed to reflect the real purchasing
power of a national currency and input prices would be related to the relative
cost of final goods in the countries chosen for benchmarking.
Geography and economies of scale
Costs are influenced by geography and differences in point-to-point traffic
volumes. In some parts of a network there may be substantial economies of scale
and scope as well as related economies of density and massed reserves.2 If this
is the case, these economies would have an impact on the overall price
comparisons and the cost of Universal Service Obligations (USOs).
The extent to which economies remain in large networks is disputed (see
Appendix B). However, there is a general consensus that there are economies of
density in the provision of local services in particular.
In its 1995 benchmarking study, the Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE) stated
that it was difficult to substantiate evidence that comparisons were being
significantly influenced by average density differences (BIE 1995).
The Commission invited Telstra to provide disaggregated information on the
distribution of line densities in Australia and the other benchmarked countries
so that the actual impact could be assessed. Telstra commissioned NECG Ltd to
prepare a paper on the issue. Some information was provided on the distribution
of line densities in Australia, along with results from two cost models which
provided a cost–line density relationship (NECG 1999c). However, the lack of
similar information for other countries precluded a comparative assessment.
                                             
2 Economies of density are the savings that accrue when the number of services increases for
a fixed area.
Economies of massed reserves arise when there is uneven or stochastic demand and the
level of ‘idle capacity’ necessary to compensate for a given level of variability in demand
falls (as a proportion of total capacity) as scale of the plant increases — raising overall
asset productivity (Mulligan 1983).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Ovum (1998) examined the impact of geographical and scale factors in
Australia relative to other countries. Ovum concluded that, although these
factors may be influencing the relative prices to some degree, the overall impact
was unlikely to be very large. It was argued that this was the case because
Australia is highly urbanised with densities greater than broad aggregates
(population divided by land mass) indicate. For example, Ovum noted that over
55 per cent of the population lives in the 5 largest cities. This compares with
20 per cent for Sweden and approximately 8 per cent for the USA and UK.
Ergas, Ralph and Sivakumar (1990) also noted that in parts of Australia where
there is at least one inhabitant per 8  sq km, population densities are not
significantly lower than in the inhabited parts of Canada and the USA. Also, the
distribution of subscriber loop lengths in Australia is not very different to that in
the US network.
Any scale disadvantage could impact on the cost of the USO. The USO cost
currently recognised under legislation is $250 million — approximately 1.3 per
cent of industry revenue. Telstra has recently claimed that the net cost of
providing a universal service to rural and remote areas is $1.8 billion. However,
Gibson Quai & Associates and Ovum (1999) who were engaged by the ACA to
look into the matter, have estimated a range of possible costs that are much
lower.
Most of the other countries have decided either that the cost of the USO does
not constitute an unfair burden on the provider, or that the cost of establishing a
fund to reimburse carriers for the USO cost outweighs the competitive neutrality
benefit. In the USA, one of the countries with a USO fund, the net cost is
estimated to be less than 1 per cent of industry revenue.
To the extent that there is disparity between the USO cost in Australia and the
other countries studied, it would affect the interpretation of price relativities. In
particular, the cost differences could partly explain price differences between
Australia and the countries with the lowest prices.
Unit costs for mobiles and data transmission markets are also likely to vary with
the density and distribution of population. However, it could not be ascertained
whether Australia’s geography causes higher costs in these markets.
Indirect taxation
Variations in the levels of indirect taxation on telecommunications may account
for some of the observed PPP adjusted price differences. The price comparisons
reported in Chapter 5 for residential services include value-added and sales tax.
The prices also reflect taxes on inputs.8   INTERPRETATION
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In the case of Australia, the level of indirect taxation is low compared with most
other countries benchmarked. The level of taxation on telecommunications
services  imputed  from  input–output  tables  is  approximately  4 per  cent.
Elsewhere,  the  level  varies  between  25 per  cent  (Sweden)  and  3 per  cent
(Japan).
In particular, all of the countries with lower PPP adjusted prices than Australia
have higher indirect taxes.  The countries with the lowest PSTN prices —
Finland and Sweden — have indirect taxes 18 and 21 percentage points higher.
Again, as mentioned earlier, indirect taxes are most likely to result in
differences in relative prices where there is variation between countries in the
extent to which indirect taxes specific to the telecommunications industry differ
from an all industry average.
In countries like Finland and Sweden which have uniform indirect tax systems
(for example, a Goods and Services Tax or Value Added Tax) there is little, if
any, variation from an all industry average. In Australia, however, the difference
is significant — in 1995–96, the average indirect tax rate for the
telecommunications industry was about 4 per  cent, while the average for all
industries was 12 per cent.3
An adjustment for this indirect tax effect would increase the price gap between
Australia and the lower price countries.
Summing up
The size of the average variation in prices among countries is such that
Australia’s relative position is not easily attributed to differences among the
factors outside the control of the industry and governments. Although, it is
possible that Australia is disadvantaged to some extent by the requirement to
provide a universal service in very remote areas, it has a significant indirect
taxation advantage relative to the countries with the lowest prices.
If on balance the effects of factors outside the control of the industry are small,
other factors must explain the large variations in prices.
The telecommunications industry does not operate in fully competitive markets
and is subject to government regulation in most countries. Differences in the
effectiveness of price supervision and competitive disciplines can affect prices
and are likely to be a major source of this price variation. Factors internal to the
businesses are another possible source.
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8.3 Government involvement and interventions
Care has to be taken when assessing the role of government intervention
because of the complex interactions of policy initiatives and market conditions
at the time of their introduction. Any assessment of the effectiveness of
government intervention would require detailed analysis of the actual extent of
competition, and the link between competition and prices. Critically, it would
depend on recognising that regulatory measures take time to have an effect.
Readers are advised not to infer causation between specific regulatory
measures and prices, because the extent of the analysis undertaken for this
study falls well short of that just described. The discussion is primarily aimed at
cataloguing possible influences of broad differences in regulatory approach on
relative prices.
Government ownership
Governments have a long history of involvement in the industry. Most
incumbent carriers were originally government departments under the direct
responsibility of a minister of State. Some incumbents remain government-
owned corporations, while others have been partially or fully privatised.
Where governments are involved, their objectives and governance potentially
affect incentives and, ultimately, competition and prices. For example, failure to
require tax-equivalent payments and commercial rates-of-return on equity and
government finance provides a price advantage and affects competitive
neutrality. The absence of factor market disciplines may allow inefficient
operations to be maintained, which would adversely affect prices. Prices may
also be set at levels that do not fully reflect the cost of capital.
The countries with the lowest PSTN prices include carriers which are both fully
government-owned — for example Telia of Sweden and Sonera (formerly
Telecom Finland) — and not government-owned — for example, Finnet (of
Finland). However, like-with-like price comparison between private and
publicly-owned incumbents was not possible with the small sample of countries
studied.
Structural intervention
Prior to the 1980s, a single carrier provided all domestic telecommunications
services in most countries. These incumbent carriers had, and still have, market
power in most of the countries benchmarked (see Appendix B for a discussion
of market power in the telecommunications industry).8   INTERPRETATION
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Governments have intervened to change the structure of the industry in order to
limit market power. In the past, some have chosen to establish duopolies
through legislation. In the US, the government vertically and horizontally
separated the dominant carrier.
Sources of market power
The main source of market power is the control that the incumbent has over the
existing network. In particular, the incumbent’s ownership of the network gives
it control of essential, or ‘bottleneck’, facilities. This represents an obstacle to
competition unless the entrant can gain access to these facilities.
Some facilities are essential because they are needed to provide the ‘any-to-any’
subscriber connectivity necessary for the entrant to have an equivalent service.
They cannot be bypassed easily because only one point of connection is usually
required for each subscriber to make many calls — that is, subscriber facilities
and the customer access network (local loop) are indivisible.
Market power is most evident in the local service markets, which encompass the
connection of subscribers to the network and local switching services. However,
some have argued that market power in the local service market can be levered
to the long-distance market because all services are ultimately routed through
the local loop (Vogelsang and Mitchell 1997). For example, any reluctance on
the part of subscribers to engage multiple service providers or to switch service
providers, advantages integrated local service incumbents in the long-distance
market.
Dominant incumbent
In most of the countries studied, including Australia, governments have not
intervened to limit the market power of incumbents by vertical or horizontal
separation. The incumbent carriers have been left vertically-integrated and
continue to offer customers both local and long-distance services.4
Other carriers wishing to compete have limited or no local service facilities with
direct access to customers and are obliged to negotiate PSTN originating and
terminating access agreements with the incumbent. The possible influence of
the terms of these agreements on competition and prices is discussed later.
Duopoly
Most countries initially had one dominant incumbent carrier. Finland is an
exception. It had a large number of operators, which amalgamated in 1995 to
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form two main carriers — the Finnet Group and Telecom Finland. Finnet
provided mainly local services and Telecom Finland mainly long-distance
services.
By 1994, both markets had been fully opened to competition. Finnet and
Telecom Finland began to expand their operations into each other’s markets,
becoming integrated carriers. The Finnish incumbents were able to negotiate
interconnection agreements from a position of strength because each represented
a credible competitive threat to the other.
This situation may have influenced the progress of competition and explain why
Finland is among the countries with the lowest overall prices.
UK and Australian governments both sought to stimulate facilities-based
competition by assisting a single new entrant to compete with the integrated
incumbent when they first liberalised telecommunications. The duopoly was
protected from additional competition. Interconnection between the new entrant
and the incumbent was regulated.
Vertically and horizontally separated carriers
The US Federal Government sought to limit market power by structurally
separating the local service market from the potentially competitive long-
distance market. Monopoly suppliers continued to provide local services and
vertically-separated carriers competed in the long-distance market.
The incumbent local service carriers (the regional Bell operating companies)
have been protected monopolies and have not, until very recently, been
permitted to provide long-distance services. All the long-distance carriers have
negotiated agreements with the local-service carriers without having to compete
with them in long-distance markets.
Competition in the US long-distance markets was facilitated with the divestiture
by AT&T of its local operating companies, which contributed to the growth of
MCI and Sprint. However, the effectiveness of this competition has been
questioned (see Box 8.1).
Recent mergers and merger proposals between local service, long-distance
carriers, cable and mobile operators may indicate that economies of scope may
also have been lost with vertical separation.
Leaving other issues aside, the price comparisons do not provide evidence
favouring any one of these approaches. US PSTN prices are reasonably low, but
so too are prices in countries, such as Sweden, where integrated incumbents
continue to dominate.8   INTERPRETATION
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Box 8.1 The impact of competition in the US long-distance market
MacAvoy (1996) examined the impacts, from 1984 to 1994, of an antitrust judgement
and deregulation of the US long-distance market. He concluded that the changes aimed
at introducing effective competition into the US long-distance market during this period
failed.
From the 1930s to 1982, three factors had provided the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company (AT&T) with a near monopoly in the US long-distance market.
These factors were AT&T’s control of local exchange networks, its refusal to
interconnect with rivals and other regulation restricting entry.
The 1982 settlement of an antitrust suit against AT&T facilitated substantial entry into
the US long-distance services market. The Modified Final Judgement (MFJ) required
AT&T to divest itself of local exchange operations by setting up regional Bell operating
companies (RBOCs). These companies were then required to offer all long-distance
carriers interconnection on equal terms. The RBOCs were also restricted from entering
the long-distance market.
After divestiture, AT&T quickly shared the long-distance market with two other large
nation-wide providers — MCI and Sprint — as well as a large number of resellers and
other smaller, facility-based providers.
In the ten years following divestiture, the price of long-distance services fell, in real
terms by more than 60 per cent. Yet, MacAvoy (1996) found that the fall in prices did
not match the even more dramatic fall in operating costs.
Thus, although there was an increased number of competitors (that is, concentration in
various long-distance markets fell) the relative margins of price above costs rose.
This result is surprising, because a reduction in industry concentration could have been
expected to have resulted in reduced margins. MacAvoy concluded that the increased
margins were evidence that competition had, effectively, been reduced.
Alternatively, dynamic factors may have played a role. Because costs in the industry fell
rapidly, prices may not have fully adjusted during the period examined.
Source: MacAvoy (1996).
Retail price controls
Variations in the stringency of retail price controls are likely to affect relative
prices. Retail price controls are most stringent for the local service PSTN market
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(see Chapter 3). There are limited controls over long-distance PSTN prices in
some countries.
Local services typically include charges for:
·  customer access — connection fees and line rental, which may vary
between business and residential customers and between regions (for
example, urban and rural);
·  call set-up — a fee per call; and
·  call time — a fee per unit of time (varying with the time of day, day of
week) or call distance.
Retail price controls and incumbent pricing strategies have resulted in a variety
of local service price structures. For example, local calls in Canada and New
Zealand are free, though access charges are relatively high. Australia has a fixed
charge per call. Other countries have timed local calls and different sized local
call areas.
The contributions of the call charge and access charge components to the annual
expenditure of the representative customer used in the price comparisons for
residential  local  service  are  shown  in  Figure 8.1.  For  this  comparison,  a
common definition of local calls was used (see Chapter 5).
Figure 8.1 Local service price comparisons for residential
customers, February 1998











Access price Local call price Internet
(a)
a Local calls are free of charge in New Zealand.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates.8   INTERPRETATION
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Most price controls are in effect maximum charges or maximum rates of
increase to charges, referred to as price caps. Their purpose is to encourage
productivity improvements over the period of the price cap. Also, they are to
ensure at least some cost savings are passed on to customers.
The price caps may be applied to baskets of services and allow incumbents
flexibility in their price structure. However, this flexibility can be diminished by
multiple caps, thereby impeding efficient pricing.
It was not appropriate to evaluate the economic efficiency of the current price
structure in the context of this international benchmarking study.5 However, an
analysis of the Australian price structure is contained in a staff paper issued by
Industry Commission entitled Telecommunications Economics and Policy
Issues (March 1997).
The price controls on PSTN services in the countries studied are summarised in
Table 8.1. Their impact on prices depends on the severity of the cap and the
period over which the constraint has been applied.
Finland does not have price controls but nevertheless has relatively low local
PSTN service prices among the countries studied. By implication, price caps
may not be essential to low prices if other disciplines are in place, such as cost-
based service provider access charges, which are stimulating competition. Also,
mobile services have reached a higher level of penetration in Finland than in
other countries, and may be providing effective competition with fixed-line
services.
Australia is the only country among those studied still to have a cap on a basket
of both local and long-distance services, as well as controls on line rental and
local calls. It is also interesting to note that the difference between local service
prices in Australia and countries such as Finland and Sweden is less than that
for total service prices (see Figures 5.1 and 8.1).
Comparisons of capped PSTN local service prices are questionable because of
these differences. It is more meaningful to compare total service prices because
they capture the effects of any interactions of price caps across the PSTN
markets.
In Australia, the UK and France, the regulatory authorities impose price caps on
a basket of telephony services including long-distance calls (see Table 8.1). The
                                             
5 In resolving what is appropriate from an overall economic efficiency perspective, there are
a number of critical sub-ordinate issues that must be addressed. Governments must decide
whether customer access network costs should be recovered solely through customer
access charges and, if not, whether there should be contributions to these costs in access
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UK has the longest history of price capping a basket of services, dating back to
1984. Australia has employed price caps on a broadly-defined basket of services
since 1989.




















Finland - - - - -
Sweden - - CPI - -
Canada 1998 CPI-4.5 10 - -
US - a a a -




Australia 1996 - CPI-1 25c CPI-7.5
France 1997 - - - CPI-9.0
NZ 1989 - CPI b -
Japan (c) - na na na na
na not  available.
- not applicable.
a Local service is regulated principally by State authorities with some Federal involvement. Regimes vary
State by State.
b Telecom New Zealand must provide the option of free local calls for residential customers.
c Japan has direct government regulation of retail prices.
d Applied to residential services.
e Applied to a small- business basket.
Note: Countries are listed in order of increasing PSTN total service price.
Source: Appendix E.
Impact of price controls on competition
Price controls have the potential to impede competition, and hence market
disciplines on prices. If set below the cost of providing the local services, price
controls could inhibit entry in the local service market. Carriers will be
compelled to offset the low returns from local service by charging high prices in
other markets, traditionally the long-distance voice market, if they cannot
readily improve productivity. Under these conditions, entrants in the long-8   INTERPRETATION
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distance market can follow the incumbent’s price and earn a higher rate of
return than would be achievable through vigorous competition.
Recently, governments and incumbent carriers have been pursuing a process of
‘rebalancing’ retail PSTN prices so that they better reflect costs by reducing
long-distance call prices much more rapidly than prices of local services, which
in some cases were increased (see Appendix E).6 For example, the European
Commission requires this of its member countries. The Canadian and French
incumbent carriers are rebalancing their price structures with government
encouragement (see Chapter 3).
Comparison of the ratios of local service (access and call) to long-distance (call)
prices provides some information about the ‘balance’ of prices in each country
and its likely impact on competition and prices. The price ratios can be expected
to be similar in all countries if both the ratio of the costs attributable to the local
and long-distance services are similar across the benchmarked countries and
also the returns in each market are similar.
The large disparities in the ratios of local service to long-distance prices for
residential services suggest that this may not be the case (see Table 8.2). For
example, the ratio of local service to long-distance prices for Sweden is 2.64
times that for Australia. In the case of New Zealand, however, the same ratio is
0.69 of Australia’s, principally because of the requirement to offer free local
calls.
Relative price levels in the benchmarked countries are shown separately for
local and long-distance residential voice traffic in Figure 8.2. The countries are
ordered by prices in the long-distance market. The pattern of relative prices is
markedly different in the two markets.
Lower prices appears to be associated with rebalancing. The countries with the
lowest telecommunications prices — Finland and Sweden — claim to have
rebalanced prices to reflect costs across the major market segments. Generally,
they also have the highest ratio of local service to long-distance prices.
In the US, the ratio of local to long-distance prices appears low. However, the
local service costs are met in part by a component of the ‘gross’ access charge
paid by all the long-distance carriers for access to the local networks of the
regional Bell operating companies.
                                             
6 ‘Rebalancing’ is sometimes seen as increasing the fixed cost element (the customer access
charge) and reducing the variable cost element (usage charges). However, rebalancing local
service prices and long-distance call prices is more important because it has a greater
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Table 8.2 Price ratios for PSTN, 1998
Country Index of the ratio of local service to long-distance










Note: Countries are listed in the order of the ratio of local service (access and call) to long-distance (call)
residential price.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates.
Figure 8.2 Relative local service and long-distance PSTN prices
for residential customers, February 1998






























Note: Figures in brackets “()” represent the ranking of each country relative to the other nine countries
in the sample for each service.
a Local call service include access charges, local call charges and Internet call charges.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Eurodata (consultant) data.8   INTERPRETATION
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The ratio of Australian local to long-distance service prices is in the middle of
the range. However, it is significantly below countries such as Sweden and
Finland.
The concept of rebalancing applies not only to local and long-distance charges,
but also between fixed and variable charges and between urban, rural and
remote areas. For example, there are significant regional variations in Finnish
local service prices, reflecting different costs in urban and rural areas.
The Australian USO may be a barrier to rebalancing if it accounts for a
significant proportion of any gap between local-service costs and revenues. In
New Zealand, the incumbent’s capacity to rebalance is hampered by the
government’s requirement that residential users be offered the option of free
local calls in the presence of constraints on line rental charges.
The ratios of local-service to long-distance prices are higher for residential
customers than for business customers, which generally have higher call
volumes in the long-distance market. Also, there is greater variation in the local
to long-distance price ratio for residential customers among the countries. This
is likely to be a manifestation of the absence of caps on non-residential services
and the greater pricing freedom this provides.
Competition policy
Since the early 1980s, governments have sought to introduce competition into
the industry. They have removed legislative restrictions on entry and established
regulations governing access to essential facilities. However, the approaches
differ across countries (see Table 8.3 and Chapter 4).
The time taken for competition to develop depends on the effectiveness of the
policy design and its implementation. Consequently, it is difficult to assess at
any point of time the outcomes of heterogeneous policies that have been in
effect for varying periods of time.
Competition has been much slower to develop in the local service market than
in the long-distance voice market. Consequently, local service prices are more
likely to reflect government price controls than competitive forces.
The wide dispersion of national long-distance prices among the benchmarked
countries — a five to one ratio of most expensive to cheapest — suggests
differences in the effectiveness of policies that facilitate competition in this
market. This is consistent with a wide variety of approaches to and timing of the
introduction of competition. However, it may also reflect a stronger tradition of
low prices in some countries. For example, Telia, the government-ownedINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Swedish carrier, has long been recognised as having among the lowest prices of
the OECD countries (as indicated, for example, by the OECD comparisons since
1989).
Table 8.3 Major developments in the regulatory environment affecting
competition in PSTN markets




Current regulatory arrangements for interconnection
Sweden 1992
1997
Telia’s first voluntary interconnect agreement with a
competitor
Current regulatory arrangements for interconnection
Canada 1992
1997
Introduction of competition in long-distance market
Regulations to facilitate local competition






Introduction of competition in long-distance market
Legislation to encourage competition in local services






Protected duopoly and regulated interconnection
Open competition
Current regulatory arrangements for interconnection
Access prices subject to price cap
Australia 1991
1997
Protected duopoly and regulated interconnection
Open competition
Current regulatory arrangements for interconnection
France 1998 Open competition







Current regulatory arrangements for interconnection
Restructure of NTT
Note: Countries listed in order of increasing PSTN total service price.
In other markets, such as mobile telephony, competition has been more readily
achieved through liberalisation. Most countries have two or three competing
operators. Finland, with two competitors, has the lowest prices in both
residential and business markets. Australia, with three major competitors, also
has relatively low prices, especially in the business market.8   INTERPRETATION
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Technological innovation and rapid growth in demand in the mobile market are
possibly the main drivers of competition and falling prices. However, regulatory
arrangements for interconnection among the carriers and allocation of
bandwidth to existing and new carriers may also be significant factors.
In the data markets, competition is being influenced by the implementation of
new services such as frame relay and ATM and by the rapid growth in business
demand. However, the terms and conditions of access by other service providers
to the originating and terminating digital data services of incumbents affect the
extent of competition in smaller business markets.
Access to local service facilities
Most countries have put in place legislative provisions to facilitate the access of
new competitors to the incumbent’s ‘bottleneck’ facilities (see Tables 8.4 and
8.5). These regimes include processes for establishing the terms and conditions
on which new entrants obtain access to incumbent services.
The main exceptions are New Zealand and Japan, where liberalisation was
initially confined to the removal of legislative barriers to competition. Others
have put their access regimes in place only recently and their potential impact is
unlikely to have been fully realised by the time that prices were benchmarked
for this study.
Appropriate terms and conditions are required for the entrants to be able to
compete with the incumbent, and with each other, for residential and business
customers. Particularly significant are the location of the point of
interconnection and the agreed price of access.
The ability of new entrants to compete is likely to be greater in countries where
the regulator imposes cost-based interconnection prices on the incumbent. This
may be achieved either by requirements for reference offers or by approval of
negotiated agreements.
Requirements for disclosure of the terms and conditions of agreements may also
be a factor. Disclosure has the advantage of hastening convergence on cost-
based prices.
Access prices
Competition from specialist carriers in the long-distance market critically
depends on access to services for originating and terminating PSTN calls. The
access price affects their ability to compete because it feeds into their service
cost.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Agreements between entrants and incumbents are in place in all the countries
studied. However, the price of access to incumbent services may not have been
based on costs (see Table 8.4).
According to an Ovum study (Lewin D. and Kee R.,1997) British Telecom’s
call termination interconnect price was the lowest. Telstra’s price in its
‘undertaking’ to the ACCC was the highest in a sample of 11 countries, which
includes five of the nine countries benchmarked for this study.7 However,
Telstra’s interconnect price, like those of a number of the US local exchange
carriers, included a component to help meet subscriber access costs at the time
prices were measured.
Table 8.4 Regulation of the terms of interconnection, February 1998












Sweden yes yes no no
b
Finland yes yes yes no
b
UK yes (a) yes nr
US yes yes yes yes
Canada nr nr na na
Australia nr nr
c nr yes
France yes yes yes no
b
New Zealand nr nr yes nr
Japan yes yes yes no
b
a As an interim approach, access prices were assessed against fully distributed costs. Now access prices
are subject to a CPI -X cap.
b Being introduced.
c ‘Yes’ if the agreement is arbitrated.
nr not required.
na Information is not available.
Note: Countries are listed in order of increasing PSTN long-distance service prices.
Source: Appendix E.
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The low interconnect prices in the UK are consistent with low customer prices
in the long-distance market and possibly the degree of competition.
Australia was one of the first countries to require the incumbent to provide
carrier pre-selection, which makes it easier for long-distance customers to use a
service provider other than the incumbent. However, this policy may not be a
major factor in explaining price differences, since Sweden and the UK, which
have low long-distance prices, did not have carrier pre-selection at the time
prices were measured (Table 8.4).
Local loop unbundling
Local loop unbundling is the term used for accessing the local loop upstream of
the local switch. Unbundling increases the contestability of the local service
market because it gives service providers the opportunity to interconnect as
close to the customer as commercially viable.8 That said, there are few examples
of facilities-based competition in local services.
The US, Canada, Sweden, Finland and Japan have recently provided regulatory
encouragement for local loop unbundling (see Table 8.5). Except for Japan, they
are also countries with relatively low local service prices.
Local loop unbundling may also increase the contestability of long-distance
services and, thereby, influence prices through actual or potential competition.
Notionally, the service provider has greater discretion over the technology they
use. Furthermore, a greater portion of the overall service cost is under the
control of the provider requiring access.
  Overall, the countries with the lowest prices in the Commission’s sample are
generally characterised by established access regimes providing for
interconnection at any technically feasible point in the incumbent’s network at
cost-based access prices (see Tables 8.4 and 8.5).
  As noted earlier, the association of a particular regulatory approach with lower
prices does not imply causation, particularly for specific initiatives. The sample
is too small and there has been insufficient analysis to justify such an inference.
  Nevertheless, given that the regulatory environment is likely to be a major
explanator of observed price differences, the benchmarking results lend weight
to exploring an increased emphasis on competition to achieve lower prices.
                                             
8 Even if few businesses exercise their right to connect into the copper wires below the local
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Table 8.5 Regulation affecting competition in the local service market,
February 1998.
Country Unbundling of local loop
required




US 1996 1996 no
a




Finland 1997 nr yes
New Zealand nr nr yes
Australia nr nr yes
France 1998 nr no
a
UK nr nr no
a
Japan 1998 1998 no
a
a Being introduced.
b Provided by Telia voluntarily.
nr not required
Note: Countries listed in order of increasing PSTN local-service prices.
Source: Appendix E.
8.4 Prices, financial performance and productivity
Financial performance and productivity are linked with prices (comparisons of
PSTN prices from Chapters 5 and 6 are summarised in Table 8.6). As noted by
Ergas, Ralph and Sivakumar (1990) comparative rankings of carriers in terms of
prices they charge and the rates of return they earn are broadly indicative of
comparative technical efficiency.
High levels of financial performance require high productivity or high prices in
its absence. In an industry that is not fully competitive, incumbents have some
leeway to be less than fully efficient and set prices to compensate or earn above-
normal profits.
Financial performance and prices
There is a significant positive correlation between financial performance, as
measured by sales margin before interest and tax, and prices overall (see
Table 8.7). The simple correlation between the prices and financial performance8   INTERPRETATION
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is 0.41 (0.84 excluding Japan) with the financial performance tending to be
lower in countries with the lowest prices.
This correlation suggests a link between prices and financial performance.
However, this finding should not be used to infer from the relative prices of an
individual incumbent that their financial performance is inappropriately high.
Care has to be exercised when analysing financial performance. For example,
the range of services provided and level of capital investment taking place at a
particular point in time may differ. Furthermore, differences in the cost of
capital or managerial performance may also affect financial performance.
Table 8.6 Comparisons of PSTN prices, February 1998




(index) (index) (index) (index)
Finland 77 60 61 66
Sweden 80 69 65 71
Canada 91 86 73 83
USA 88 84 94 88
UK 111 96 88 98
Australia 100 100 100 100
France 89 97 114 100
New Zealand 114 134 140 129
Japan 140 121 140 134
a Simple average of the residential, small business and medium sized business prices.
na Not available.
Note: Countries listed in order of increasing PSTN prices.
Source:  Productivity Commission estimates.
That said, the result is consistent with the view that high prices resulting from
the exercise of market power allow businesses to earn above-normal profits.
Furthermore, large variations in financial performance often reflect differences
in the intensity of competition or regulatory supervision.
However, the market power and ineffective regulatory supervision that tolerates
high prices is often associated with poor productivity. This off-setting factor
detracts from financial performance. For example, it may be noted that Japan,
which has the highest prices, also has the second worst financial performance
among the countries studied.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Productivity
Productivity — broadly defined as the quantity of outputs per unit quantity of
inputs — is driven by technological innovation, responsiveness to demand and
efficiency in the use of resources. These factors, although substantially under
the control of industry participants, are affected indirectly by market disciplines
from competition or regulatory incentives aimed at encouraging efficient
production.
Table 8.7 Prices and financial performance, 1997–1998











New Zealand +29 +18
Japan +34 -20
a Financial performance measured by sales revenue divided by expenses, where expenses exclude
interest and company tax.
Note: Countries listed in order of increasing PSTN prices.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates.
As alluded to above, there is a link between prices, financial performance and
productivity. Carriers with a high level of productivity are in a position to
provide services to customers at relatively low prices and earn a satisfactory
financial return. The extent to which consumers and shareholders share in the
benefits of high productivity is affected by the incumbent carrier’s market
power, among other things.
It can be demonstrated that relative differences in productivity between
countries is equal to the relative difference in financial performance divided by
the relative difference in the ratio of output and input prices (see Waters and
Street 1998).
In the absence of appropriate input prices indexes, indicative estimates of
differences in productivity may be obtained by assuming that8   INTERPRETATION
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telecommunications input prices, when converted at PPP rates, are the same
across all the countries studied (see Box 8.2).9
Indicative estimates of differences in productivity, based on this assumption, are
presented in Table 8.8. Although rudimentary, the estimates suggest that there is
a significant variation in relative productivity among the countries studied.
The indicative estimates of relative productivity are consistent with Telstra’s
Chief Executive’s assessment in June 1996 that ‘It [Telstra] was not yet at
world’s best practice in terms of operating expenses per access line. “We make
no secret that we are 35 per cent from where we ought to be” he said’
(Meredith, 1996).
There is also a significant correlation between the indicative estimates of
productivity  and  the  differences  in  prices  shown  in  Table 8.8.  The  simple
correlation between relative prices and the indicative measure of relative
productivity is -0.78 (-0.63 excluding Japan) with the relative productivity
tending to be greater in countries with the lowest prices.
This correlation provides some evidence that the relative price differences for
the countries studied may reflect productivity differences as well as profitability.
This implies that customers of telecommunications services generally benefit
from the higher levels of productivity and regulation aimed at maximising
competition and encouraging efficiency.
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand’s financial performance was better than
those of the other incumbents studied. This suggests that TCNZ’s relative
productivity was better than its relatively high customer prices, by themselves,
indicate.
On the other hand, for Japan’s NTT, the combination of below-average financial
performance and relatively high prices indicates that its productivity may be
lower than that of incumbents in the other countries studied. However,
accounting conventions may be important in explaining some of the difference
in NTT’s financial performance from that of other carriers. Also, labour costs
are believed to be relatively high in Japan and may be part of the explanation of
its high prices.
                                             
9  To the extent that this assumption does not hold exactly, the estimates would be subject to
some error and potential bias. Consequently, some of the differences in estimated TFP may
be attributable to variations in the ratio of telecommunications input prices to the PPP
rates. (The PPP rates being equal to the cost, in local currency, of a standardised general
basket of goods and services.) Bias in the indicative estimates may arise if the variation in
the relative prices of some inputs are correlated with productivity. That is, where
productivity is low, input prices are high, and vice versa.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Box 8.2 Calculation of indicative productivity estimates
Total factor productivity (TFP), for an enterprise may be estimated as the quantity of its
output (Q) per unit of quantity of input (I), with quantities as measured by appropriate
indices.
The quantity index for outputs may be estimated by the revenue (R) earned from the
output divided by a price index for output (PO).
Similarly, the quantity index for input is equal to expenses (E) incurred in producing the
outputs divided by a price index for inputs (PI).
Therefore:
TFP = Q/I = (R/PO)/(E/PI) = (R/E)/(PO/PI).
See Waters II and Street (1998) for a recent discussion of the links between price
indices, financial performance and productivity.
Estimates for revenue (R), expenditure (E) and output prices (PO) are available for each
country. Input prices (PI) may be approximated by assuming that they are proportional to
the PPP exchange rate for that country. With this assumption:
(PIi/PPPi) = k for each country (i)
(POi/PIi) = (POi/PPPi) /(PIi/PPPi) = (POi/PPPi) /k
In per cent difference (%D) form this implies:
%D (Poi /PIi) = %D [(POi/PPPi) /k] = %D (POi/PPPi)
In which case, %D TFP for country (i) (compared with a ‘base’ country) is given by:
%D TFPi @ %D [(R/E)i/(POi/PPPi)]
If PIi is proportional to PPPi for all countries, then the substitution of (POi/PPPi) for
(POi/PIi) does not affect the estimates of %D  TFP. However, exact proportionality is
unlikely to hold. Consequently, the estimates should be treated as indicative only.
Summing up
The above indicative estimates suggest that high prices in the countries studied
tends to be associated with both high financial performance and poor
productivity in relative terms. If measurement error and differences in external
factors are relatively small, the analysis also suggests that weaker competitive
disciplines or less effective regulatory supervision prevail in countries with
higher prices.8   INTERPRETATION
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Table 8.8 Indicative estimates of productivity differences, 1997–1998
Country Financial performance





Finland -14 -34 +31
Sweden -21 -29 +11
Canada -4 -17 +16
USA -14 -12 -3
UK -8 -2 -6
Australia Base Base Base
France -13 0 -13
New Zealand +18 +29 -8
Japan -20 +34 -41
a Financial performance is measured by sales revenue divided by expenses, where expenses exclude
interest and company tax.
Note: These estimates are indicative only because the Commission could not obtain a robust index of input
prices.
Countries listed in order of increasing PSTN prices.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates.
8.5 Benefits of lower Australian prices
With the exception of business mobiles, residential and business prices in the
best performing countries are between 20 to 40 per cent lower than in Australia
(see Table 8.9). This finding is consistent with previous studies.
This provides only an indication of the gap between Australia and the
benchmarked countries with the lowest prices. The actual gap will be different
because it was not possible to compare like-with-like. For example, the price
gap would be less if Telstra and the other Australian carriers were
disadvantaged by factors outside their control to a greater extent than their peers
in the countries with the lowest prices.
Significant savings could flow to Australian consumers if prices were reduced,
given that industry revenue for fixed and mobile telecommunications services
equals some $20  billion and are an essential input to other industries in
Australia.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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PSTN Finland 6 of 9 23 23
ISDN Sweden 6 of 7 41 24
Mobile Finland 5 of 8 44 44
Small and medium business services
PSTN for small business Finland 7 of 9 40 40
PSTN for medium business Finland 6 of 9 39 39
ISDN for small business Sweden 6 of 7 43 32
ISDN for medium business Sweden 4 of 7 46 35
Mobile for small business Finland 3 of 8 14 14
Mobile for medium business Finland 3 of 8 5 5
Data services for business
Leased lines Sweden 6 of 9 63 63
X25 (packet-switched) New Zealand 6 of 8 52 48
Frame relay Sweden 6 of 7 46 22
Large business services Sweden 4 of 6 47 43
a Finland is used as the benchmark because its prices, overall, are the lowest.
Note: A ranking of 6 of 9 for Australia’s prices for residential PSTN services (for example) means Australia
has the sixth lowest prices out of 9 countries included in the particular comparison (given all the
specified assumptions).
The business comparisons above are simple averages of comparisons for businesses of various sizes
with a variety of patterns of demand for telecommunications services.
Source: Productivity  Commission  estimates.215
A PARTICIPANTS
Organisations and individuals contacted by the Commission and its consultant,
Eurodata, in the course of the study are listed below.
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STM Consulting Pty Ltd
Telecommunications, Trans-
European Networks and Services,






A workshop was held on 17 December 1998 to provide a forum for the
discussion of the study methodology, the presentation of results and their
interpretations. Drafts of report chapters were circulated prior to the workshop
on a ‘confidential work in progress’ basis.
The organisations and academics who were invited to attend the workshop are
listed below.1
                                             
1 Representatives from ABN Amro; Australian Communications Industry Forum; Paul
Budde Communications Pty Ltd; and Ovum did not attend the workshop.
AAPT
ABN Amro















Information Technology and the Arts
Department of the Treasury
Forsyth, Prof Peter (Monash
University)




Paul Budde Communications Pty Ltd





New Zealand Telecom requested and were granted an opportunity to comment
on the draft report circulated to workshop participants.217
B TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
For over 100 years, policy makers have attempted to resolve a number of
important issues in the economics of telecommunications. These issues arise out
of the need to address the following:
·  What policy framework best promotes the long-term interests of end-users
in an evolving telecommunications industry?
·  Is there a need for regulation? If there is, which of the regulatory
arrangements available is best?
·  Is there a need for subsidies? If there is, how should they be funded and
targeted? and
·  Given the existing industry arrangements, what is required to facilitate a
transition toward better arrangements?
These issues are discussed in this appendix, drawing on a selective survey of the
economics of telecommunications. The economic topics considered as part of
this survey include:
·  supply and demand in the industry;
·  market power and barriers to entry;
·  the economic need and rationale for regulation;
·  the role for competition; and
·  inter-connection regimes.
Understanding the economics of telecommunications also provides an
appreciation of the many factors affecting price outcomes considered throughout
this report — especially in Chapter 8. An understanding of the drivers of
telecommunication costs and pricing structures is also necessary to appreciate
the importance of the caveats placed on the price comparisons made in
Chapters 5 and 6.
B.1 The complex nature of telecommunications
Telecommunications has been described as radically heterogeneous
(Mueller  1997). The range of products on offer and production technologies
used is immense and growing.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Products offered include voice telephony, video- and tele-conferencing, and
various processing, informational and transaction services.1
Technologies used range from those used for the provision of the basic
infrastructure — for example, microelectronics used in switches, exchanges and
interexchange, cables, optical fibres, microwave relays and satellites — to those
used for value-adding and information services — automatic teller machines,
computers, remote sensing devices and various data storage media.
Further, telecommunications is a network industry. With a range of diverse and
inter-connected products supplied over a network, the economics of the industry
has a higher degree of complexity than most other industries (see Box B.1).
On the demand side, there is a high degree of inter-relation. For example,
different subscriber’s demands are often highly inter-related because many
telecommunication services have value (or their value is enhanced) only when
they are jointly used with others.
As the American Telephone and Telegraph Company 1908 Annual Report
states:
A telephone without a connection at the other end ... [is] one of the most useless
things in the world. Its value depends on the connection with other telephones —
and increases with the number of connections.
On the consumer side, there can also be economies of scope in consumption.
This is because one product often builds on, and has greater value, when used
with another — for example, auxiliary services like message banks, paging and
call waiting.
On the production side, there are significant economies of scale and scope over
some output ranges and product lines — in particular, on high traffic volume
point-to-point carrier services. But in other cases, there may also be significant
diseconomies — for example, historically, for local exchange networks serving
large numbers of customers (Jones and Bigham 1931, Kahn 1971).
The nature of these economies is important because the industry is multi-
layered. The outputs from some layers of the industry provide essential inputs
for other layers of the industry (see Box B.2).
                                             
1  Nevertheless, there is some convergence between data and voice with digitalisation. As a
consequence this multitude of services is increasingly provided by an integrated network.B   TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
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Box B.1 The economics of telecommunications networks
The economics of telecommunications networks differs from the economics of most
goods and services. Most economic analysis begins by treating outputs as identical and
interchangeable — assuming a customer’s demand is independent of others. With many
network products these assumptions break down.
Communication is inherently a two-party or multiparty activity. Therefore, an
individual’s demand for access and use is highly dependent on others. Also, service is
location and consumer specific — neither completely identical nor interchangeable.
Subscribers want wide ranging communication. They have some parties they
communicate with frequently and regularly; a few they communicate with occasionally;
and another group they contact as needed — emergency services and businesses
(Mueller 1997).
These groups of potential subscribers have been referred to as ‘communities of interest’
(Vogelsang and Mitchell 1997). Unless other members of a subscriber’s community of
interest are also connected, the basic telephone service is valueless. In some cases, the
members of a ‘community of interest’ form an exclusive group, separate from the wider
community — for example, the members of a company, or the defence force. In these
cases, there may be no loss in value where their network is disjoint from others. Indeed,
there may be security reasons for separation. In most other cases, communities overlap
hence one large interconnected network yields maximum benefits.
Interdependency means that each subscriber’s access and use produces positive
consumption externalities (unrequited benefits for others). Externalities mean that the
‘penetration’ and coverage of a network is important, providing part of the rationale for
universal service and any-to-any connectivity. Principally, there are network externalities
— people value others being subscribers because there are more people to contact; and
call externalities — people value, but do not pay for, the calls they receive.
Network externalities are likely to be significant when a network has low penetration.
For mature networks, the additional benefit to each existing subscriber, from one more
subscriber, may be small (Taylor 1994). Call externalities may also be small because
parties can always ‘share’ the cost of incoming calls by reciprocating and returning calls.
As discussed in later sections, telecommunications carriage may be a declining cost
industry — as network capacity increases costs of usage may fall. However, one of the
most significant economies in telecommunication arises from having an integrated
network and the any-to-any connectivity this provides. In comparison, a large number of
small, detached networks would be relatively ineffective and duplication can increase
costs. Moreover, most users find a single network is more convenient because it means
they are able to communicate with everyone else through a single access point.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Box B.2 The layers of service provision
Telecommunications has been characterised as having four layers (Vogelsang and
Mitchell 1997). Each providing essential services to the layers above (see Figure B.1).









Provision of information  
Provision of access to 
 information services
Provision of routing  
Provision of transmission 
 capacity and leased lines  
Examples
Cable and TV programs 
Data files 
Information services









Cable TV infrastructure 
Radio and microwave links
The bottom layer provides the network infrastructure owned by the carrier — the
transport facilities (cables, radio, microwave and satellite links) for telephone carriers,
cable television distribution companies and television broadcasters. Parts of this layer are
‘bottleneck’ facilities. They are not easily by-passed by operators in the other layers.
The second layer provides routing services for the messages and signals. It consists of
switches and control facilities, and the basic services provided are voice telephony,
switched and packet data services, and television distribution.
The third layer comprises value-added services — 0055, 1800 and 1900 numbers, credit-
card calling, message banks and email boxes.
The top layer is the information transported over the network — data files, television
programs and the content on 0055, 1800 and 1900 services.
Source: Vogelsang & Mitchell (1997).B   TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
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The layered structure is important when considering issues involving market
power, because companies occupying niches in the higher layers depend on the
services of companies in lower layers. Companies in higher layers risk having
the rewards of their innovation and investment appropriated by carriers who
own the ‘bottleneck’ facilities they rely on.
Finally, telecommunication is one of the most dynamic industries. Moreover,
the rate of change in the industry has accelerated over the last two decades with
the rapid reduction in the costs of microelectronics and the increased variety of
information technology, multi-media content and other uses this has fostered.
B.2 Demand
Over time, the growth of telecommunications demand is becoming increasingly
influenced by new services (for example, cable and the Internet), the availability
of high quality content (voice, music, video or multimedia) for transmission
across the network, and the exponentially decreasing costs of lines and routing
(see Box B.3).
At any point in time, like most other products, the demand for
telecommunication services is also influenced by subscribers’ demographic
characteristics, their incomes, the prices of the services and the availability and
price of other communication options.
As described in Box B.1, the demand for basic telephony and other party-to-
party services is influenced by the number of subscribers connected to the
network — that is, by the size of network and call externalities.
Most studies of telecommunications demand have concentrated on voice
telephony services. They are subdivided into studies of residential and business
demand for local, long-distance and international calls. Studies of the long-
distance markets are further divided into studies of short-, medium- and long-
haul demand.
Access and local calls
Local demand has two inter-related components — access (number of
subscriber connections) and local calls (number of call-minutes).
Local calls depend on having access, and access is of value only if using the
network has value. Whereas most economic goods are substitutes, access and
local calls are complements. That is, if the price of access increases, the demandINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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for access and local calls both decrease. If the price of local calls increases,
demand for local calls and the numbers demanding access decrease.2
Box B.3 The demand for capacity
Historically, demand for telecommunications capacity depended mainly on the demand
for voice telephony. Later this was augmented by increasing demand for telegraph,
facsimile and data services. More recently demand for capacity has grown dramatically,
stimulated by increasing computer processing speeds, use of the Internet and greater
availability of capacity intensive uses and content — for example, video-conferencing
and multi-media applications incorporating graphics, animation and video.
Growth has also been stimulated by rapidly falling costs of transmission. MacKie-Mason
and Varian (1996) estimate that since the late 1960s telecommunications line and router
costs have been falling at a compound rate of 30 per cent each year.
Some indication of the growth in demand for capacity is given by the growth in numbers
of users and traffic on the Internet. In Australia, in 1995, there were 1.2 million users of
the Internet. By mid-1997 this number had grown to 2.8 million (Appendix  C,
Table C.2). By the year 2000 this number is anticipated to more than double again.
Growth in Internet traffic volumes has been even more dramatic. For example, MacKie-
Mason and Varian (1996) estimate that traffic on the United States NSFNET (part of the
Internet backbone) has been growing at 6 per cent per month (more than doubling each
year) since 1991.
Rapid growth in demand has also led to congestion. MacKie-Mason and Varian observe:
The Internet has experienced severe congestion problems in 1987. Even now [1996]
congestion problems are relatively common in parts of the Internet... (p.  167)
A further indication of the potential increase in the demand for capacity that growth in
the use of multi-media may stimulate is that although, with current infrastructure, 1400
pages of text (a 20 volume encyclopedia) may be sent across the Internet in half a
minute, some upgrading would be required before high quality Internet video
transmissions become widely available in real time.
Source: Lucky (1989), MacKie-Mason and Varian (1996).
The estimation of telecommunications demand has been made more difficult
because of this factor and also due to the proliferation of different ‘call plans’
                                             
2  Estimates of cross price elasticities — the per cent change in the demand for access given
a per cent change in the price of usage (and vice versa) — have not generally been
estimated. However, Taylor (1994) provides a formula for inferring their value indirectly
from access and usage price elasticities and their revenue shares.B   TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
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that are provided to subscribers. More recently, with increasing competition and
the rapid development of new services, obtaining comprehensive price and
usage data has been difficult. Nevertheless, the results of different studies have
been broadly consistent.
The effects of the many demand factors are typically measured by elasticities,
for example by:
·  Income elasticities which measure the per cent by which the demand for a
telecommunication service increases in response to a one per cent increase
in income; and
·  Price elasticities which measure the per cent by which the demand for a
telecommunication service decreases in response to a one per cent increase
in price.
Surveys of local demand studies, reported in, for example, Taylor (1994),
Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics (BTCE 1994) and Albon,
Hardin and Dee (AHD 1997), indicate that the demand for access is relatively
unresponsive to price (it is very price inelastic). The elasticity estimates reported
range from 0.10 to 0.003 (see Table B.1).
Table B.1 Price elasticities of residential demand for access
Study Price elasticities
Perl 1984 (United States) around 0.04 at a penetration rate
a of 0.93
Taylor and Kridel 1990 (United States) around 0.04  at a penetration rate of 0.93
Cain and MacDonald 1991 (United States) varying from 0.05 to 0.10 at a penetration rate of 0.95
Bodnar, Dilworth and Iacono 1988 (Canada) about 0.01 at a penetration rate of 0.98
Madden, Bloch and Hensher 1993 (Australia) about 0.003 at a penetration rate of 0.99
a The penetration rate is the proportion of households initially connected.
Source: AHD (1997); BTCE (1994), Taylor (1994).
Two important influences on access elasticities have been noted (Perl 1984).
First, (holding other factors constant) access demand has become significantly
less responsive to price changes since the 1970s.3 This may be due, in part, to a
relative increase in the cost of other forms of communication. Second, demand
for access is found to be less price sensitive at higher rates of penetration
(per cent of residences having telephones). This may be linked to the increased
benefit to subscribers when penetration is high.
                                             
3  This study also found that the benefits from access, or subscribers’ willingness-to-pay for
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On the basis of their survey of previous studies, AHD (1997) concluded that
price elasticities of 0.04 and zero for residential and business access
respectively, are representative for Australia.
Table B.2 Price elasticities of demand for local telephone calls
Study Price elasticities
Park, Wetzel and Mitchell 1983
(United States)
about 0.09 for per call
about 0.11 for per call minute
Bidwell, Wang and Zona 1995
(United States)
about 0.04 for per call
Trotter 1996 (United Kingdom) about 0.04 for per call minute
New York Telephone Company 1976
cited in Taylor 1980 (United States)
about 0.10 for basic residential service
about 0.18 for basic business service
Waverman 1974 cited in Taylor 1980
(United States)
about 0.21 for basic residential and business service in
the short run
about 0.27 for basic residential and business service in
the long run
Davis, Caccappolo and Chaudry 1973
cited in Taylor 1980 (United States)
about 0.09 for per call
about 0.11 for per minute
Source: AHD (1997); BTCE (1994); Taylor (1994).
Various studies have also reported price elasticities for local calls which ranged
from 0.04 to 0.27 (see Table B.2). AHD (1997) concluded that a residential and
business price elasticity for local calls of 0.06 is representative for Australia.
Both, access and local call demand seem to be more responsive to income with
their income elasticities ranging from 0.07 to some estimates of long-run values
in excess of 1.5. Most estimates for both, though, are less than 0.5 (see
Taylor 1994).
Income also influences sensitivity to price. Those on lower incomes have higher
local call and access price elasticities. Again, differences appear to decrease as
penetration increases (Taylor 1994).
Network externalities
Estimates have also been made of network externalities — that is, the increase
in service value that existing subscribers receive when a new subscriber
connects. One reason for interest in these externalities is that they form an
important justification for mandating interconnection, since without this,
expectations about which network would become largest would drive the choice
of service provider (Katz and Shapiro 1985).B   TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
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The existence of the externalities has also been argued as justifying an access
subsidy for some subscribers. This is because others gain when an additional
subscriber connects so there may be a net benefit to all subscribers if some
subscribers, who wouldn’t otherwise connect, are charged a lower access
charge.
Using data on the United States, Perl (1984) found that, overall, the gains to all
subscribers from network size are quite significant (see Table B.3).4
Table B.3 The effect of local network size on the value, to an
average household, of telephone services
Local network size (subscribers)
a Phones per square mile Value
b of telephone service in 1983
(No.) (No.) (US$)
25 000 100 $56.02
50 000 200 $60.38
100 000 400 $61.55
500 000 2000 $68.40
a The number of subscribers sharing the local network.
b The estimated value, per year, is the average net benefit a subscriber gains from having a telephone and
being able to contact others in their local area.
Source: Perl (1984) (United States), Figure 16.
Perl also estimated the benefits of an optimal access subsidy scheme designed to
maximise subscribers net benefit. High penetration rates meant that access
elasticities were close to zero. Consequently, Perl found that, for the average
American household, the additional gains from an optimal subsidy were
negligible — benefits almost eliminated by the administrative costs involved.
Long-distance and international calls
The demand for long-distance and international calls is relatively price elastic
compared with local calls. Elasticities reported in the Taylor (1994), BTCE
(1994) and AHD (1997) surveys range from 0.21 to 1.55 and 0.07 to 1.54 for
long-distance and international calls, respectively (see Table B.4 and B.5).
The international price elasticities tend to be larger than the long-distance
elasticities. Based on their survey, AHD selected elasticities of 0.60 for long-
                                             
4  Although the average or total network externality was large, high penetration rates meant
that the additional externality created by an extra subscriber is low.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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distance calls and 1.20 for international calls as being representative for
Australia.
Table B.4 Price elasticities of demand for (domestic) long-distance
telephone calls
Study Price elasticities
Duncan and Perry 1994 (United States) about 0.38 for call minutes
Gatto, Langin-Hooper, Robinson and
Tyan 1988 (United States)
about 0.72 for call minutes
Madden, Bloch and Hensher 1993
(Australia)
varying from 0.53 to 1.01 for call minutes
 according to distance
Train 1993 (United States) about 0.42 for call minutes
BTCE 1991 (Australia) about 0.93 for number of calls
Martines-Filho and Mayo 1993 (United
States)
varying from 1.05 to 1.55 for number of calls
Appelbe, Snihur, Dineen, Farnes and
Giordano 1988 (Canada)
varying from 0.21 to 0.39 for short-haul call minutes
about 0.48 for long-haul call minutes
Source: AHD (1997); BTCE (1994); Taylor (1994).
Table B.5 Price elasticities of demand for international telephone
calls
Study Price elasticities
Hackl and Westlund 1996 (Sweden) varying from 0.07 to 1.38, according to distance, for
call minutes
Acton and Vogelsang 1992 (United
States)
about 0.36 for number of inbound calls
about 0.49 for number of outbound calls
Bewley and Fiebig 1988 (Australia) about 1.54 for minutes of use on long-haul calls
Appebe, Snihur, Dineen, Farnes and
Giordano 1988 (Canada)
varying from 0.43 to 0.53 for call minutes
BTCE 1991 (Australia) about 1.01 for number of calls
Source: AHD (1997); BTCE (1994); Taylor (1994).
B.3 Supply
The costs of supplying telecommunication services are highly dependent on
economies and diseconomies related to the:
·  nature of the technologies used;B   TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
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·  location and distribution of subscribers — which determines the
configuration of the network; and
·  numbers of companies that make up the network.
Technical economies and diseconomies
Telecommunication outputs are typically measured in terms of the:
·  network’s capacity to transmit information;
·  numbers of subscribers served; and
·  flow of services provided — for example, number of call minutes.
Using these measures, technical economies in telecommunications are generally
associated with capacity, the flow of services and the location and distribution
of subscribers (see Boxes B.4 and B.5).
Diseconomies are associated with numbers of subscribers — particularly, in
local call areas (see Box B.4). The reason for this is the technology used to
provide telecommunications services.
The typical telecommunications network comprises lines and switches. In the
generic network, there are lines from customer premises to a set of switches, and
then lines or other media to another set of switches, with lines to the called party
completing the circuit (see Chapter 2).
Lines supply the capacity of the network. Point-to-point telecommunication
lines (or other media, for example, microwaves) have significant economies of
scale relating to capacity. That is, per unit of capacity, a line with greater
capacity is cheaper to provide. These economies mean, as a rule, that the cost of
a service can be more heavily dependent on the volume of traffic point-to-point
than on the distance involved.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that many of the economies of scale related
to capacity can only be realised by decisions made before it is provided.5 As a
result, it is usual for telecommunications companies to install a much larger
capacity to save on the long-term costs of accommodating increases in demand.
                                             
5  However, doubling existing capacity by laying an identical line exhibits economies of
scale. There are economies because the cables can be layed in existing conduits and right-
of-ways. Also, increased capacity allows higher average occupancy of circuits with a lower
probability of lost calls (Saunder, Warford and Wellenius 1994). Also, separate lines can
improve the integrity of the network. With separate lines there need be no interruption of
service when a single line fails.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Box B.4 Empirical studies of economies in telecommunication
networks




c in telecommunications networks. The results of these
studies have been equivocal. Also, rapid technological change means that further caution
is required when interpreting these results as applying to the current and future cost
characteristics of the industry.
The earliest system-wide econometric studies of the telecommunications industry, using
highly aggregated input and output measures, revealed, in some cases substantial,
economies of scale and scope (see Sharkey 1982).
Reviewing these and later studies, Saunders, Warford and Wellenius (1994) state that a
1 per cent increase in inputs has been associated with a 1.05 to 1.15 per cent increase in
outputs. Other studies have re-examined some of the earlier data and used new data with
new methods and higher levels of disaggregation. The results in these studies have
varied considerably with different results having been obtained with the same data sets.
Evans and Heckman (1984), for example, concluded the US ‘Bell system’ does not have
natural monopoly characteristics. Shin and Ying (1992) came to similar conclusions.
However, others, with the same (or similar) data sets have reached different conclusions
(Charnes, Cooper and Sueyoshi 1988, and Roller 1990).
A problem with all the above studies has been the difficulty in unravelling underlying
costs structures in the presence of rapid technological change and given the poor quality
of data available (Gabel and Kennet 1994).
Reviewing some of this work, Saunders, Warford and Wellenius (1994) report that
studies of long-distance transmission show that a 1 per cent increase in scale is
associated with a 0.6 per cent reduction in average unit cost. They also report that there
can be large economies associated with switching and routing. For example, mutli-
plexing and other factors mean that as a network’s size increases, average circuit
occupation can be increased because more customers share the circuits.
a Economies of scale exist where output can be increased proportionately with a less than
proportionate increase in inputs.
b Economies of scope exist where costs can be reduced by producing a group of outputs together.
c The concept of sub-additivity is used to evaluate ‘size’ economies in multiproduct companies.
Sub-additivity exists where use of the best available production technology means that a single
multiproduct company is able to produce the same total outputs at a lower cost than any
combination of two or more companies (Sharkey 1982).
Source: Charnes, Cooper and Sueyoshi (1988); Evans and Heckman (1984, 1988); Sharkey (1982).B   TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
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Box B.5 Economies of scale, scope and density
The importance of economies of density is confirmed by Guldmann (1991). This study
examined density and economies of scale in local telephone networks. It found that once
a certain level of density and market size was achieved (about 50  000 telephone
stations), economies of scale had been exhausted. Guldmann inferred that, above this
level, markets could support more than one company competing side-by-side.
Gabel and Kennet (1994) used an engineering approach to examine economies and
diseconomies of scope and their relationship to density in the local areas. Economies of
scope exist where costs can be reduced by producing or providing two or more products
together. In this case, the economy of scope was measured by the per cent additional cost
if different services were provided separately on two or more networks rather than
providing all the services together on a single network.
The four services examined were exchange switched service, toll switched service, local
private line service and toll private line service.
Using an optimisation model they concluded economies of scope tend to decrease as the
density of numbers of subscriptions in a local area increases. Nevertheless, they found
that their results vary according to the detail of local topography and patterns of demand.
Their comparison of a single network providing all services with the services divided
amongst two or more networks is presented below. In two of the three most densely
populated markets they modelled, they found that there were some diseconomies of
scope if all services were provide on one network. In these cases, it was better to have a
separate private line network (providing local and toll private services) and a switched
network (providing exchange and toll switched services).
Estimated economies and diseconomies of scope in providing services in local areas
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Source: Gabel and Kennet (1994); Guldmann (1991); Sharkey (1982).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
230
Consequently, capacity is described as being ‘lumpy’ because of the large
increments installed, due to these economies.6 This lumpy nature of investment
means that there are short-run ‘economies of fill’ while capacity is underutilised
(Sharkey 1982).
Switches are required to route calls from one subscriber to another. The need for
switching capacity is dependent on the subscriber numbers, their location and
distribution, and the distance between parties completing a call.
Switching equipment also has economies of scale. Some economies (referred to
as economies of massed reserves) relate to the cost reductions and improved
quality of service as the number of switches increases. Because of the random
nature of telecommunication demand, as the base level of demand for switch
use increases, proportionately fewer switches are required to handle the
variations in demand. Other economies relate to some of the fixed costs
associated with switching facilities which do not vary with facility size
(Saunder, Warford and Wellenius 1994).
That said, the need for switching equipment capacity increases more than
proportionately with the number of subscribers, resulting in off-setting
diseconomies (Mueller 1997).7 This is because the system of switches needs to
be capable of connecting each new subscriber with all the existing subscribers.
The significance of these diseconomies has been largely eliminated by
technological developments. Nevertheless, the diseconomy may have influenced
the results of some econometric studies which have used historical data.
Although numbers of subscribers can produce a diseconomy, the diseconomy
can be misleading. It does not, for example, infer that two or more separate
networks are necessarily better than a larger network (see Box B.4).
A network is only of value if it connects a subscriber to a desired party. In
disjoint networks the value from being able to contact the widest number of
other parties (the network externality) is reduced, because subscribers are split
into separate groups. Consequently, the existence of network externalities
implies that assessment of any technical diseconomy related to the number of
                                             
6  However, on occasion, new technology has allowed the capacity of existing lines to be
increased forestalling a need for new lines.
7  Historically, the growth in the size of an exchange, always increased the average costs
associated with switching and maintenance, and these diseconomies were not offset by
other economies. During the 1930s, public utility textbooks typically contained explicit
discussion of this feature of telephone systems (Jones and Bigham 1931). Also, American
utility commissions usually granted rate increases as exchanges grew
(Mueller 1997, p. 15).B   TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
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subscribers needs to be balanced against the increased utility provided by an
integrated network.
Effects of demography
Demographic factors can impact on telecommunication costs. In particular,
countries which have their populations concentrated in small areas may have
cost advantages resulting from economies of density.8
In telecommunications, economies of density exist because a shorter average
length of line (per subscriber) is required in areas where subscribers are more
densely located. Also, as population density in an area increases main lines can
benefit from economies of scale and massed reserves from the higher average
traffic volume.
An indication of the magnitude of these economies of density is provided by the
relationship between subscriber line density and average line cost (see
Table B.6).  As  Table  B.6  indicates,  there  is  an  inverse  relationship  between
density and the average cost per line.
Average population densities (total population divided by land mass) vary
substantially between countries and this might suggest that costs vary in a
similar manner. However, this need not be the case. Although broad aggregates
would provide a guide to cost impacts if the population in each country was
uniformly distributed, they are misleading where a large proportion of a
population is urbanised or living in a relatively small part of a large country.9
Detailed information on the distribution of line densities within each country is
required to accurately assess the impact of variations in line density across
countries. This would allow the impact of density on average cost per line in a
country to be more accurately estimated. For example, the average cost per line
for a country could be estimated as a weighted sum of the costs per line for each
density category where the weights are the proportion of lines falling in the
different density categories in that country.
                                             
8  Economies of density exist where the per unit cost of providing a product (or range of
products) is reduced as the density of customers being served in an area increases. There
are also economies of fill and economies of traffic density. These are related to the lumpy
nature of investment, and economies of scale related to increased point-to-point traffic.
9 For example, despite Australia having an overall average line density of 3.3  lines per
square mile, Telstra provides 74 per cent of its lines in areas with an average line density
of 300 or more, and a further 16 per cent in provincial districts where the average line
density is over 20 per square mile (NECG  1999c).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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The Commission invited Telstra to provide disaggregated information on the
distribution of line densities in Australia and the other benchmarked countries
so that the actual impact could be assessed. Telstra commissioned NECG Ltd to
prepare a paper on the issue. Some information was provided on the distribution
of line densities in Australia, along with results from two cost models which
provided a cost–line density relationship (NECG 1999c). However, the lack of
similar information for other countries precluded an assessment.
Table B.6 Average line cost by line density
Line density Average line cost
a  
Hatfield Model Benchmark Cost Proxy Model
(lines per square mile) (US$ per month) (US$ per month)
0 to 5 131 162
5 to 10 41 63
100 to 200 22 39
200 to 650 17 33
650 to 850 14 32
850 to 2550 12 29
2250 to 5000 10 27
5000 to 10 000 9 24
Greater than 10 000 6 21
a These average line costs were provided by Telstra. The estimates are derived from two US models, the
Hatfield Model and the Benchmark Cost Proxy Model developed by Bell South, Indetec International,
Sprint and US West. The estimation was undertaken by Charles River Associates using standard model
inputs for the US states of Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Missouri and Montana. Although indicative of
the magnitudes of the economies of density in telecommunications, Telstra stated that these results are
not directly applicable to Australia.
Source: NECG (1999c).
Others have examined the impact of population density and its distribution on
cost in Australia. In its 1995 benchmarking study, the Bureau of Industry
Economics (BIE) stated that it was difficult to substantiate evidence that
comparisons were being significantly influenced by countrywide average
densities (BIE 1995).
Ergas, Ralph and Sivakumar (1990) also noted that the population density in the
inhabited parts of Australia (where there is at least one inhabitant per 8 sq km)
was not significantly lower than that in the inhabited parts of Canada and the
US, and that the distribution of subscriber loop lengths in the Australian
network is not very different to that in the US.B   TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
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Ovum (1998) concurred by suggesting that, although the distribution of line
densities may influence the relative prices of some countries to some degree, the
overall impact on Australian costs is not very large. Ovum supported the
conclusion by noting that in Australia, for example,  over  55  per cent  of  the
population lives in the 5 largest cities compared with 20 per cent for Sweden
and approximately 8 per cent for the US and the UK.
Organisational economies and diseconomies
Telecommunications companies may also experience organisational economies
and diseconomies related to their size that are typical of any business.
For example, there are economies because some management functions and
operations are not heavily dependent on size. Larger organisations can have
scale economies in marketing, advertising and billing. Relative numbers of
maintenance staff and inventories can be reduced. Finally, a larger organisation
has greater bargaining power and thus may have better and lower cost access to
finance and other resources (Saunder, Warford and Wellenius 1994).
However, as with any organisation, a telecommunications company may
become so large that diseconomies set in. As its size expands and the distance
between the top and bottom of its organisational hierarchy increases, the
company may become increasingly ineffective and unresponsive to the
particular needs and circumstances of their subscribers. For example, staff at
lower levels may have inadequate authority and incentives to efficiently respond
to local concerns (Saunder, Warford and Wellenius 1994).
The reduced flexibility engendered by a large organisation may cause further
diseconomies (Saunder, Warford and Wellenius 1994). Flexibility and
responsiveness may be reduced by a standardisation of the services provided, of
job classifications, work and pay conditions. A reduction in flexibility may also
result in dynamic inefficiencies. For example, organisational inertias, including
failure to delegate authority and requirements to consider organisation-wide
implications of decisions, may reduce the speed with which under-utilised
resources are shed or redeployed (Saunder, Warford and Wellenius 1994).
There may also be diseconomies of scope associated with the industry’s
multilayered structure (see Box B.2). That is, the different types of activities
undertaken in different layers may be better suited to different types of
organisation. For example, the bottom two layers of the industry involve the
provision of network infrastructure and other carriage services. The nature of
these services is radically different from the services provided by the top two
layers — value-adding services and the provision of content. Whereas theINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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former tend to be capital intensive and use specialised technical labour, the
latter services are more reliant on a sales and marketing orientation.
Effects of innovation on economies and diseconomies
A number of researchers suggest that technological innovation may be reducing
any existing economies of scale and scope in mature telecommunications
networks (for example, King and Maddock 1996).10 They note, for example,
that recent technological advances have dramatically lowered costs, reducing
the significance of these barriers to entry and allowing entrants to compete more
effectively with incumbents.
In addition, technological innovations mean that many countries now have
separate and competing mobile networks, as well as local networks for both
voice telephony and cable TV. Each of these networks can also be used for other
telecommunications services.
Effects of different economies on prices
Regardless of the extent to which there are economies in telecommunications,
these effects do not appear to be reflected, significantly, in price differences
between countries. Research has found only a weak effect on observed price
differences (OECD 1990).
For example, OECD (1990) using a cross-country sample examined whether
low aggregate line densities were correlated with higher prices. They found that
they were, but not significantly so — the R-squared between the two was
only 0.010. When an index of urbanisation was also included as an explanatory
variable, the overall R-squared increased to 0.238.
B.4 Market power and barriers to entry
From the time the telecommunication industry began, central policy concerns
have been the extent to which:
·  parts of the industry are a monopoly or have barriers to entry; and
·  there is scope for the exercise and abuse of market power.
For many years, the industry was commonly described as a natural monopoly
(Sharkey 1982). Although more recently this characterisation has been re-
assessed, concern about market power and barriers to entry persists.
                                             
10  That said, the effects of future technological advances are unknown.B   TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
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Sources of market power
The scope for market power, in most industries, relies on barriers to entry.
Potential entrants either are unable to enter the industry or face significant
disadvantages, when compared with incumbents, after they enter.
Factors that create barriers to entry include:11
·  Incumbent cost advantages — a single or small number of companies may
be able to satisfy demand at a lower cost than potential entrants;
·  Legislation — entry into the industry may be unlawful or the legislative
framework may permit the incumbent to engage in entry deterring
practices;
·  First mover advantage — the original entrant into a market may gain
advantages, at little or no cost, that are costly for ‘latecomers’ to overcome
to compete on an equal footing. These include: favourable location, brand
loyalty, control of standards, network externalities, one-to-one
connectivity and other ‘lock in’ effects (Arthur 1989); and
·  Irreversible investment — because a sunk (or irreversible) investment has
no alternative use, and the money on it has already been spent, the
expenditure need not be factored into the incumbent pricing decisions.
Entry may be deterred because this makes the threat of a price war more
credible.
All these barriers to entry may play a role in telecommunications carriage.
Consequently, many components of the network infrastructure are referred to as
‘bottleneck’ facilities. However, with changing technology the magnitude of
these barriers and their significance need to be reconsidered.
Historically, the barriers to entry most often emphasised were cost advantages
due to economies of scale or scope. A common belief was that multiple outputs
provided by carriers could only be produced, at least cost, by a single company.
In many countries, belief in the existence of cost advantages (as well as the
benefits from keeping a network unified) also provided support for the creation
of legislative barriers to entry. Moreover, a concern was that regulatory
protection was required because the industry might be an ‘unsustainable’
monopoly and inefficient entry (cream-skimming and by-pass) could occur.12
                                             
11 To some extent, barriers to entry categories overlap. Nevertheless, the categorisation is
useful because it provides different perspectives for examining the related impediments
and may suggest different policy prescriptions.
12 Cream-skimming occurs when an entrant chooses to service only the most lucrative parts
of a market the incumbent being left to provide a complete service. This may be inefficientINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
236
Nevertheless, the view that market power in telecommunications simply resided
in cost was never universal. Others argued that the most significant barriers to
entry can be sourced to the network externality (Kahn 1971, Mueller 1997). As
outlined earlier, this beneficial externality is maximised by any-to-any
connectivity — subscribers linked to a single integrated network.
Kahn (1971) noted that for local exchange network providers to compete head-
to-head, without interconnection, subscribers would have to be connected
directly to both companies. In this case, a duplicate local exchange network may
contribute nothing and a single network is cheaper than two (Sharkey 1982).13
Mueller (1997) argues that the significant efficiencies reside on the demand, not
the supply side. One network with complete coverage makes a
telecommunication service cheaper to consume by eliminating a need for
duplicate subscriptions (see Box B.6).
This barrier is enhanced because subscribers may not be easy to entice away
from an existing network unless a competing network:
·  offers the same or a better ‘universe’ of subscribers; and
·  more than covers the inconvenience of the change.
The above suggests that the network externality provides an incumbent carrier
with a significant first mover advantage where it is able to refuse to interconnect
an entrant with its existing subscriber base at ‘reasonable’ prices.
Even where there is interconnection at reasonable prices, the lumpy and
irreversible nature of investment can constitute another significant barrier to
entry (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). If an incumbent carrier has more capacity than
necessary to meet current demand it has strong incentives to engage in predatory
                                                                                                                                   
where there are externalities because the lucrative parts of a market may rely on the whole
market being serviced. And, if the revenue from more lucrative parts of the market is not
available to cover common costs, providing service to the rest of the market may become
uneconomic. An incumbent’s monopoly may also become ‘unsustainable’ due to social
policies. For example, problem can arise if entry is permitted if Universal Service
Obligations (USOs) require prices that are not differentiated by costs (that have to be
funded by cross-subsidies between geographical regions or customer types). Entrants will
cream-skim the parts of the market that bear the cost of the cross-subsidies seriously
eroding the incumbents revenue base.
13 An exception to this is where duplicate networks, serving some other purpose, already
exist — for example, to supply electricity or cable television (Vogelsang and
Mitchell 1997).B   TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
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Box B.6 Monopoly or simply market power?
A long standing yet largely unresolved issue in telecommunications has been whether
any components of the basic carrier infrastructure have significant monopoly
characteristics. Monopoly characteristics are of interest because they can provide a
company with substantial market power.
Debate amongst policy makers and researchers has centred mainly around whether
telecommunications is a natural monopoly. A natural monopoly occurs where a single
provider is able to produce the industry output at a lower cost than two or more
providers. In this case, from the viewpoint of productive efficiency, the socially optimal
market structure is a single provider. Consequently, economists also call this type of
monopoly a ‘normative’ monopoly.
However, even where there are the conditions for natural monopoly, monopoly need not
occur. First, a monopoly may be unsustainable. To cover its costs, a company may need
to charge above its ‘marginal costs’. (The marginal cost of an output is the additional
cost of providing the last unit of output.) Unsustainability may allow other companies to
enter and co-exist. Unsustainable natural monopoly is believed to be quite exceptional.
Nevertheless, the possibility has been used to provide a rationale for creating legislative
barriers to entry in monopoly markets (Vogelsang and Mitchell  1997). Second, a
potential monopoly business may find it profitable to co-exist with competitors. That is,
even where monopoly is sustainable, a potential monopolist may find its profits
maximised by prices high enough to allow some others to enter.
Whether there are significant cost advantages for a single carrier in any of the carriage
services markets is a hotly disputed issue. See, for example, Evans and Heckman (1984)
and Röller (1990). More importantly, there do not appear to be cost advantages for a
single provider in the value-adding and content services markets.
Nevertheless, for many carriage services an incumbent network has substantial market
power — sourced in the network externality, rather than cost advantage (Mueller 1997).
These advantages mean that, regardless of its cost characteristics, many components of a
network are ‘bottleneck’ or essential facilities. The facilities are essential because they
provide access to the subscriber base on which the network externality depends.
The bottleneck that carriers control (mainly in the local loop — the final connection
from an exchange to a subscriber) can give them the power to dominate otherwise
competitive markets that rely on carrier services. This is referred to as monopoly
leverage (Vogelsang and Mitchell 1997 p. 57).
Source: Knieps and Vogelsang (1982), Mueller (1997), Vogelsang and Mitchell (1997).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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pricing in any entered market.14 This suggests that entry is most attractive where
demand is unmet or markets are expanding. This has been the case historically.
Risks from market power and barriers to entry
The exercise of market power is an issue because it can result in inequitable and
inefficient outcomes. Market power can be inequitable because subscribers may
have to pay significantly higher prices than can be justified on the basis of cost.
Market power and barriers to entry can also create inefficiencies because they
can create situations where, at least in principle, resources could have been used
in a way that would have made everyone better off (see Box B.7).
Market power can create allocative, productive and dynamic inefficiency.
Allocative inefficiency results where some demands remain unsatisfied because
of high profit maximising prices even though the additional cost of supply is
less than customers would be willing to pay.
Productive inefficiency may exist where barriers prevent more efficient entrants
from taking business away from an incumbent. Productive efficiency may also
be due to X-inefficiency resulting from the absence of competition. That is,
without the threat of losing business to competitors, an incumbent is under less
pressure to minimise costs and achieve productive efficiency.
Barriers to entry also create dynamic inefficiencies, again by protecting an
incumbent from cost reducing competitive pressures, limiting the diffusion of
new ideas and technologies, and, sometimes, creating perverse incentives to
over- or under-invest.
Market power is a particularly important issue in telecommunications because,
as described in Section B.1, the industry comprises several interdependent
layers. The services provided by a carrier or carriage service operator form
essential inputs into the higher layers in the industry (value-adding and content
services).
The exercise of market power in vertical production relationships presents two
risks. First, market power at more than one layer involves a risk of ‘double
marginalisation’. This happens when two or more companies in a vertical
production chain each add a ‘margin’ reflected in the final price. The resulting
price can be higher than if the companies had merged and also exercised market
power as a single entity (King and Maddock 1996).
                                             
14 Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult for an outside observer to distinguish between
predatory pricing and the efficient response of an incumbent to an increase in competition.B   TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
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Box B.7 Efficiency
The term ‘economic efficiency’ (or efficiency) is often used with reference to a
benchmark of Pareto efficiency (or the allied concept of a potential Pareto
improvement).
A Pareto efficient outcome (or a Pareto optimum) is a situation in which it is not
possible to make someone better off without making at least one person worse off.
Making one or more better off, without any one losing, is referred to as a Pareto
improvement. If a change leads to circumstances where those gaining, could in principle,
compensate those who lose (with everyone made better off), the change is referred to as
a potential Pareto improvement.
Use of the criterion of efficiency — that is, whether an option is more efficient than
alternatives (and represents a potential Pareto improvement) — is important when
assessing the merits of policy options. Where an option is not efficient, it may be
possible to achieve the same policy objective with fewer resources.
The concept of economic efficiency has been subdivided into allocative efficiency,
productive efficiency and dynamic efficiency. These concepts are also based on the idea
of Pareto efficiency.
Allocative efficiency is achieved when the prices of products (goods and services) reflect
their relative scarcity. When prices are allocatively efficient, products tend to go to those
who value them most (as expressed by their willingness-to-pay for them).
Productive efficiency is achieved when goods are produced in a technically efficient way
— that is, in the way that minimises on inputs used (capital, labour and so on).
Productive efficiency also requires that the mix of inputs used is allocatively efficient.
That is, when the choice of inputs minimises cost, so that output is maximised per dollar
spent on inputs.
Dynamic efficiency is achieved when incentives exist for resources to move over time to
their highest value uses, in particular by encouraging efficient investment, research and
development, and the diffusion of new ideas and technologies.
Second, carriers could use market power to appropriate rents in ‘down stream’
markets. If value-adding and content services are unable to recoup adequate
returns from innovation, intellectual property and other sunk investments, future
investment could be stifled.
Evidence of the exercise of market power and the significance of barriers to
entry in telecommunications has been muddied by a long history of either
comprehensive regulation or government ownership in all developed countries.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Nevertheless, the US provides some evidence of unfettered market behaviour
from a period of relatively light regulation starting in 1894, when the last Bell
patent protecting the telephone expired, and ending in the mid-1920s, when a
final unification of telephone services had been achieved (Mueller 1997).
In 1894 the national network was relatively immature. The telephone was not a
dominant mode of communication. In total, the US had about 280  000
telephones, so penetration and coverage was low.
The main carrier was the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
(AT&T) which had owned the Bell patents. AT&T had a number of ‘franchises’
and a long-distance network which constituted the ‘Bell system’. Many markets
were untapped and demand was growing rapidly.
Competition was vigorous and so was AT&T’s response to it (see Table B.7).
Mueller (1997) states that AT&T embraced five tactics as a response to entry by
independents:
·  ‘fighting rates’ — temporarily lower prices to drive an independent out of
a market;
·  buying out the competitor;
·  improving and extending AT&T’s service;
·  interfering with (local governments) franchising of independents;
·  spreading unfavourable publicity about independents to deter subscribers
and financiers (Mueller 1997, p. 70).
In 1906, the independents began to combine, threatening to form a viable long-
distance rival to AT&T. AT&T met this challenge by acquiring independents
and otherwise improving the terms on which it would interconnect with
independents. The potential long-distance rival lost critical mass.
Despite these tactics, some competition occurred (see Table B.7). Where there
was overlap, subscribers were typically offered services on two or more separate
networks. This was referred to as dual service.
Dual service meant that, initially, the vast majority of large business had dual
subscriptions. (For example, by 1910, 75 to 100 per cent of banks, railroads,
hotels, and wholesale farm suppliers had dual subscriptions where two or more
services were available.) Dual service resulted in additional cost and
inconvenience. Many had to pay two subscriptions and consult two sets of
telephone directories before making calls.B   TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
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Over one thousand commercial independent telephone companies started operation —
often as the ‘first mover’ in their local area. Many failed — depending on community
size between 15 to 40 per cent.
Some independents attempted to compete head-to-head with the Bell system in large
cities. Mueller  (1997) reports initial efforts almost always failed for three reasons.
Political manoeuvring was complicated and expensive. The heavy capital equipment
investment required to match Bell. And, the Bell service was reasonably good —
complaints only about its high price and Bell undermined entrants with rate
concessions.
Both the independent exchanges established in 1894 in cities with populations greater
than 50 000 failed within five years.
Phase 2:
1898 to 1907
A period of system overlap (dual service). In 1897, the Bell system (Bell and
independents connected to Bell) comprised 415 000 telephones and independents (not
connected to the Bell system) a further 100 000. By 1907, the Bell system comprised
almost 4 million telephones and unconnected independents a further 2.3 million.
Helped by growing dissatisfaction with Bell’s prices, independents succeeded in a new
wave of competition for the cities by concentrating on city peripheries.
Between 1897 and 1904, the proportion of communities with populations greater than
5000 served by competing exchanges increased from 23 to 60 per cent. ‘Dual service’
competition quickly yielded price and service improvements that often doubled
numbers of subscribers in affected cities within a year.
However, dual service produced problems. And, at that time telephone companies were
not required to physically interconnect with rivals. Moreover, AT&T made it a policy
not to interconnect where it or one of its franchises had a presence.
Phase 3:
1908 to 1914
This was the ‘shake-out’ period for competing ‘dual service’. After 1906, independents
began to develop competitive long-distance lines. Large independent regional operating
companies were formed through mergers and the independents started to threaten the
Bell system’s long-distance market. Mueller  states this threat gave AT&T a clearly
defined goal as ‘the elimination of dual service and the creation of a nationally
interconnected monopoly administered by Bell but supervised by regulators (p.107)’.
From the beginning of 1907, the number of independent telephones interconnected to
Bell rose, in two years, from less than 300 000 to 1.2 million. By 1913, the per cent of
cities with population over 5000 with dual service fell from 59 per cent to 37 per cent.
During the period, AT&T also acquired a number of competitors. The rapidity of the
acquisitions fuelled an already high level of anti-monopoly sentiment. In 1913, to
forestall litigation and potential antitrust action or government acquisition AT&T made
the ‘Kingsbury Commitment’ to the US Department of Justice (to cease acquiring and
to interconnect).
The combined effects of these factors meant that by 1914 two thirds of all independent
telephones were connected to the Bell system — although, more than 1800 cities still
had unconnected, competing exchanges. However, by the mid-1920s the remnants of
dual service had been eliminated through further interconnection and consolidation.
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However, dual service did not endure. Mueller (1997) reports that as the
duplication continued, eventually, one carrier or the other tended to dominate a
local area:
Once rapid growth in the overall number of subscribers stopped, large disparities
tended to reinforce themselves over time. More and more subscribers gravitated to the
dominant system ... (p. 86)
Toward the later phase of this competitive era, AT&T’s tactics had caused
wide-spread concern. In 1913, to forestall litigation and potential antitrust action
or government acquisition, AT&T entered into the ‘Kingsbury Commitment’
with US Department of Justice, agreeing to:
·  divest its controlling interest in Western Union Telegraph;
·  cease acquiring competing independents; and
·  open up its long-distance lines to independent exchanges under certain
conditions.
Over a period of thirty years, AT&T’s tactics had proved successful. By the
mid-1920s, the remaining independents no longer posed a credible threat to
AT&T’s domination.
Limiting market power
The market power of carriers, and its consequences, have been addressed by
most governments. Many approaches have been proposed and used. The
rationales underlying these approaches are considered in the remaining sections
of the appendix.
The approach taken depends on the policy objectives each government chooses
to pursue. Their evaluation of likely outcomes is also a determinant. For
example, the use of price regulations and mandated access regimes, in contrast
to the use of general competition policy, is often predicated on an assessment of
the relative costs of market failures in telecommunications compared with the
direct and indirect costs of regulation.
B.5 Regulating incumbent carriers
Incumbent carriers are regulated primarily to limit abuse of market power.
However, the industry has also been regulated, historically, to prevent possible
inefficiency from entrants cream-skimming (choosing to service only the most
lucrative markets thereby threatening the viability of the incumbent) orB   TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
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undertaking inefficient by-pass. Governments also regulate access (this is
discussed in Section B.7)
Regulatory approaches used include the following:
·  general trade practices regulation and competition policy; and
·  industry specific regulation:
cost-based regulation (primarily rate of return regulation);
price-based regulation (for example, price caps); and
incentive-based regulation.
General trade practices regulation and competition policy
One approach to the regulation of telecommunications carriage is to remove all
industry-specific regulations and rely exclusively on general trade practices
legislation and competition law.15
This is the path that was essentially followed in New Zealand.16
New Zealand originally had a protected government-owned monopoly carrier
(Telecom New Zealand Ltd. — TCNZ).17 With removal of restrictions on entry
in 1988, New Zealand adopted a regime:
·  generic to all industries that had previously been monopolies; and
·  relying on relatively ‘light-handed’ regulatory restraints on a monopolist
enforced by private legal actions together with actions undertaken by a
generic competition law enforcement body (MoC 1995).
In addition, the New Zealand Government explicitly left open the possibility of
more extensive, industry-specific, regulation should the need arise (MoC 1995).
The rationale for the regime was provided in a December 1991 policy statement:
The [New Zealand] Government sees competition as the best regulator of
telecommunications markets. Accordingly, there will continue to be no statutory or
                                             
15 Most countries, although not relying on general trade practices regulation and competition
policy exclusively, have used it as part of their telecommunications regulatory regime.
16  Nevertheless, New Zealand continues to have some telecommunications-specific
regulation — the Telecommunications Act (NZ) 1987, the Telecommunications
(Disclosure) Regulations (NZ) 1990 and the Telecommunications (International Services)
Regulations (NZ) 1994.
17 This situation was initially changed by the Telecommunications Amendment Act (NZ) 1988
which provided for the removal of restrictions on the supply of telecommunications
services by 1  April 1989. The New Zealand Government then sold TCNZ in
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regulatory barriers to competitive entry into the telecommunications market in New
Zealand. (MoC 1997, p. 8)
Under the New Zealand regime, interconnection agreements are secured by
private negotiations — mainly between the incumbent carrier (TCNZ) and
entrants (for example, Clear). The course of negotiations is influenced by:
·  overarching competition policy laws, intended to prevent anti-competitive
behaviour (in particular, s.36 of the Commerce Act (NZ) 1986 prohibiting
businesses in a dominant position from using dominance to restrict entry
or deter competition);
·  information disclosure regulations (to make the performance of businesses
with market power transparent and to facilitate negotiations and recourse
to the Commerce Act (NZ) 1986); and
·  threat of further regulation if market dominance is abused (for example,
price control which may be introduced under part IV of the Commerce
Act (NZ)1986).
Nevertheless, negotiations with the incumbent have been long and protracted.
Moreover, after enactment of the regime there were many complaints about the
TCNZ’s practices and substantial litigation. In June 1992, the New Zealand
Commerce Commission (NZCC) commented that:
... [TCNZ] has become the de facto industry regulator; it owns or controls most of the
critical inputs, it competes with all the firms to which it supplies those inputs, and, by
and large, it makes the rules under which competition is permitted to take place (p. 7).
... The number of substantive complaints about the telecommunication industry has
exceeded the number in any other industry. ... Several major court cases, both of private
action and Commission action, have arisen out of the telecommunication industry. In
no other instance has entry into an industry produced such a need for litigation
(NZCC 1992, p. 8).
Rate-of-return regulation
Rate-of-return regulation is a traditionally used form of cost-based regulation.
Under the approach, the regulated company’s schedule of prices need to be
approved by the regulator. To be approved, the company must be able to justify
its prices, overall, on the basis of cost.
Cost, in particular, includes provision for a market rate-of-return on the capital
employed (an appropriate weighted average cost-of-capital). The idea is to
prevent the company from earning excess profits. Nevertheless, just as
important is ensuring that an adequate level of profit can be achieved becauseB   TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
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without an adequate rate-of-return the company will not continue to attract
funds required for investment.
There are four steps in the regulatory process. They involve the regulator
establishing:
·  the allowable asset base;
·  a system for calculating allowable costs;
·  the rate-of-return to be allowed on the asset base (determining an
appropriate weighted average cost-of-capital); and
·  a set of prices that permits the rate-of-return to be achieved (Taylor and
Weisman 1996).
Rate-of-return regulation has been subject to a number of criticisms. The main
criticism is that because it is centred around justifying rather than reducing
costs, incentives are created to ‘cost-pad’ and, in particular, use more capital
than is efficiently required (referred to as ‘gold plating’).
This incentive toward over-investment is sometimes referred to as the Aversch-
Johnson effect (Aversch and Johnson 1962). If the rate-of return allowed
exceeds the appropriate risk adjusted market rate-of-return, and the regulator is
unable to detect unnecessary capital expenditure (and hence adjust the allowable
asset base), the company has a strong incentive to use more capital than is
optimal. Conversely, if the allowed rate-of-return is consistently below the
market cost of capital, there is a strong incentive to cease investing and let assets
run down.
Another criticism of rate-of-return is its high regulatory burden. It is expensive
to administer, imposes significant costs on the company and is extremely time
consuming (although, these are failings shared with many forms of regulation).
The basis of the regulation is cost. Consequently, the regulator and company
must be able to identify and allocate costs. This may require companies to adopt
complex and expensive accounting and recording systems simply for the benefit
of the regulatory process. In telecommunications, assessing costs on a service-
by-service basis is difficult because there are several services all using common
facilities. Regulators also incur significant expense in scrutinising and
evaluating these records, and in conducting their own cost studies.
The regulatory process may also encourage resource wastage through ‘gaming’.
That is, a company may engage in costly strategic behaviour, not because it is
good business, but in anticipation of a more advantageous regulatory outcome.
Problems also arise, because in telecommunications there are many common
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groups of subscribers. As a result, there is considerable argument about how
these costs ought to be allocated. The potential for dispute over the allocation of
common costs encourages additional ‘gaming’. It can also lead to misallocation,
because where the cost allowable is inflated, the company has an incentive to
expand these services while cutting back on others.
The emphasis on costs and profits, rather than prices gives rise to other
problems. The company obtains no reward from pricing more efficiently
because prices are approved primarily on the basis of whether the overall
revenue generated will allow the agreed rate-of-return to be achieved.
Nevertheless, rate-of-return regulation has been used to limit the exercise of
market power in many industries including telecommunications. The success of
rate-of-return regulation, in practice, may rely on the sophistication with which
regulatory discretion is exercised as well as the skill with which regulators are
able to address the above risks.
Price caps
Price caps are a more recently adopted approach to regulating incumbent
carriers. Pioneered in the UK in the early 1980s, they have since been used a
number of countries (King and Maddock 1996).
The two main advantages claimed for price capping are the promotion of :
·  allocative efficiency by providing the incumbent with greater flexibility in
pricing; and
·  dynamic efficiency because the incumbent retains all the gains from
unanticipated improvements in productivity.18
Essentially price capping involves:
·  establishing the telecommunication prices that will be subject to the cap;
·  developing a telecommunication price index to aggregate these prices into
a single number;19
·  establishing a general reference index against which performance is
judged — for example, the consumer price index (CPI) as is used in
Australia, or a retail price index (RPI) as used in the United Kingdom; and
                                             
18 That is, the productivity gains where the incumbent does better than the regulator
anticipated.
19 In some cases, Australia for example, sub-caps are also used. Sub-caps are price-caps
which apply to a more limited basket of products than the overall price-cap.B   TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
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·  establishing a reasonable rate (X) at which the relative telecommunication
prices should fall through productivity improvements, and a time period
over which this rate will take effect.
Price caps require the regulated basket of telecommunications products (the
index) to change in price, on an annual basis, by no more than the rate of change
of the representative index less some per cent (X). That is, prices should change
by no more than RPI-X or CPI-X per year. Consequently price caps are also
referred to as RPI-X regulation or CPI-X regulation, depending on the reference
index used.
Before a price cap can be implemented effectively, a number of technical issues
need to be solved.20 Chief amongst these is the determination of X (the relative
rate of price reductions) and the period over which an X should apply.
As King and Maddock (1996) note, reviewing the value of X can lead to a
blurring of the distinction between rate of return regulation and price capping.
This is because the X that is set depends on the regulator’s perception of the
scope for performance improvement and this, inevitably, is influenced by how
well the incumbent has done in the recent past as indicated by its rate of profit.
Another problem with price capping may arise from the pricing flexibility that it
is partly designed to promote. Price flexibility has advantages because it may
allow the incumbent to recover its cost in an efficient manner (see Box B.8).
However, the scope that a multi-product incumbent has to change price and
service levels over a range of products in a number of markets also provides it
with scope to use its market power against an entrant.
In the UK, British Telecom (the incumbent), operating under a price cap,
aggressively countered entry into its long-distance market by lowering its prices
while raising prices in its uncontested markets (King and Maddock 1996,
Vickers and Yarrow 1988, and Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers 1994).
One approach that has been taken to overcome this problem is the use of sub-
caps — that is, additional price caps covering subsets of telecommunication
products. Sub-caps have also been used to pursue other objectives — for
example, universal service obligations.
                                             
20 For example, details related to baskets of products, the measurement of quality and the
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Box B.8 Efficient pricing and pricing rules
Prices have an important economic role. In production, they can contribute to efficiency
by directing resources to highest value uses. In consumption, they contribute to
allocative efficiency by rationing goods and services to those who value them most.
The ‘first best’ rule for efficient pricing is that prices should equal marginal short-run
costs (that is, the additional short-run cost of producing an additional unit of output).
This rule promotes efficiency because extra output is sold where its value to the buyer is
greater than the additional cost in resources. However, simply ensuring that prices equal
short-run costs is not always practicable. For example, it may require considerable
regulatory oversight and in declining cost industries would result in a revenue short fall.
Also, in exceptional cases it could lead to inefficiency (see Coase 1946). For these
reasons, other rules, ensuring recovery of total costs, have been developed.
Two-part tariffs involve all customers paying a fixed sum and a per unit charge. The
revenue raised through the fixed sum covers fixed costs. This allows per unit charges to
be set equal to marginal cost. However, where individual valuations differ, a fixed
charge may be too high for some and potential customers may be inefficiently excluded.
Ramsey prices involve charging premiums above marginal costs to recover fixed or joint
costs. The pricing rule is designed to recover costs in a manner that minimises
inefficiency by least distorting the ‘first-best’ pattern of demand. A higher premium is
charged where demand is relatively unresponsive to price with the lowest premium
charged where demand is most responsive.
Non-linear pricing involves offering each customer a schedule of prices which varies for
different quantities of the product. Unfortunately, to implement non-linear pricing
effectively, considerable information about customers’ demands is required.
Subsidy-free pricing involves ensuring prices do not exceed stand alone costs (and are no
less than incremental costs) for individual or combinations of products. The rationale is
to avoid inefficient entry. An advantage of the rule is that no information on the pattern
of demand is required.
Pricing flexibility (subject to an effective price cap) provides companies with an
opportunity to recover revenue efficiently. The profit motive provides the incentive.
Consequently, telecommunications companies can be expected to use one or more of the
above pricing approaches, or their variants, as specific conditions make them
appropriate.
Source: BTCE (1995); Faulhaber (1975); Phlips (1983); Sharkey (1982).B   TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
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Incentive regulation
As King and Maddock (1996) note, both rate-of-return regulation and price
capping (as they are normally applied) may provide an incumbent carrier with
opportunities for ‘gaming’. Under both regimes, the incumbent may have
incentives to engage in various inefficient activities (cost padding, construction
of unneeded capacity, lobbying and so on) with the intention of favourably
influencing the regulator’s decisions.
Incentive regulation is intended to counter this unproductive activity by creating
an environment in which an incumbent’s profits are more directly linked to
efficient performance. One example of incentive regulation is yardstick
competition applied in the context of price capping. Using yardstick
competition, X — the relative rate at which the basket of telecommunication
services should fall — may be set in a transparent manner based on the
performance of other telecommunications companies (usually in other
countries). This enhances the incentive an incumbent has to reduce costs
because they gain all the benefits of the cost reduction without the risk that a
regulator will appropriate the gains in the future by unilateral adjustment of the
X rate.
B.6 Scope for competition
Historically, telecommunications networks have been treated as monopolies in
many countries. Currently, the industry is being opened to competition in most
countries (see Chapter 4).
Rationales for introducing competition
Many researchers suggest that, because telecommunications carriers have
market power, competition may be less than fully effective (see Section B.4).
However, direct regulation of market power also has problems. Therefore, more
recently, the promotion of effective competition has been part of the
telecommunications policy framework of most countries for the following
reasons (Director 1996):
·  monopoly characteristics need not justify limits on competition;
·  monopoly advantages are being eroded by technological change and other
factors;
·  legislators and regulators suffer from a number of limitations — for
example, uncertainty about the technological evolution of the industry,INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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poor information about those they regulate, as well as, inflexibilities
inherent in available regulatory instruments;
·  dynamic efficiency may be enhanced under competition; and
·  entrenched and powerful interests can be created by anti-competitive
legislation and regulation, and may be difficult to control.
Monopoly characteristics need not justify limits on competition
Any monopoly characteristics of the industry need to be evaluated, and any
advantages a single provider would have, need to be weighed against the
potential advantages of competitive alternatives.
In general, there can be arguments for protecting a monopoly from competition,
where competition would increase the costs of production. This is the
unsustainable monopoly argument (see Box B.6). These arguments depend on
the existence of economies of scale and scope.21
However, many monopoly advantages in telecommunications are based on
‘bottlenecks’, not on cost advantages.22 These barriers to entry may be reduced
or eliminated through appropriate interconnection policies.
The dynamic benefits of fostering competition also have to be considered. In
addition to the limits competition places on the exercise of market power, there
are benefits through more rapid innovation and the provision of a wider range of
choice.
Monopoly advantages may be disappearing
A number of researchers suggest that technological innovation may be reducing
any existing economies of scale and scope in the telecommunications network.
For example, King and Maddock note that:
Telstra’s local call network, particularly in the central business districts of
Australia’s major cities, is unlikely to involve natural monopoly technology. Call
volumes suggest that a number of local telephone companies, each with their
own cables, could operate as efficiently as one company. ... The growth of other
wire-based services and the use of mobile phones also suggests that competition
is both feasible and desirable in local telephone services (King and Maddock
1996, p. 32).
                                             
21 More exactly they depend on the existence of cost sub-additivity (see Section B.3). That is
whether a single provider can provide the overall services cheaper than any combination of
two or more providers. However, although cost sub-additivity is necessary for there to be
an unsustainable monopoly, it is not sufficient.
22  The existence of significant cost advantages, for a single network provider, is less clear.B   TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
251
Similarly, Rosston and Teece note that:
There are a variety of technological advances that have lowered local exchange
costs, changed the nature of local exchange costs to threaten the natural
monopoly, and reduced the difference between long-distance and local telephone
calls (Rosston and Teece 1995, p. 792).
Also, as indicated in Section B.3, economies of scale may already have
disappeared in some high density areas (Guldmann 1991).23
Legislators and regulators suffer from many limitations
Legislators and regulators have to make decisions in the face of uncertainty and,
are further disadvantaged because they do not have all the information at the
disposal of a regulated party.24
Accordingly, they are not well placed to make the decisions that comprehensive
regulatory oversight requires. For example, legislators and regulators are less
able than market participants to accurately predict market demand and
technological developments. They don’t have access to the best available
information and even if they did, rapid technological change often precludes
development of a comprehensive regulatory framework.
Dynamic efficiency may be enhanced under competition
Decentralisation and pressure on performance from other competitors in an
essentially unregulated market may be a more effective way of achieving
dynamic efficiency. It may provide strong incentives for companies to quickly
find and take advantage of new value-adding opportunities.
In such an environment, technological change may drastically reduce the costs,
or change the nature of bottleneck services. This may make relatively efficient
bypass and duplication possible. For example, the increased use and utility of
radio frequency services has altered the economics of competition in smaller
and less populous markets. If there are legislative or regulatory limits on entry,
potential competitors have no incentive to find ways of by-passing the
bottlenecks.
Also, network expansion might happen more rapidly under competition. An
incumbent monopolist, particularly if wholly or partly owned by government,
may be unwilling or unable to finance network expansion and development.
                                             
23 Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, the effects of future technological advances are
unknown.
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Permitting multiple entry is likely to increase the incentives in the industry to
rapidly access and deploy new capital.
Entrenched and powerful interests can be created by protection
Legal and regulatory protection of an incumbent network can create significant
property rights which an incumbent will defend vigorously. This is true even if
the incumbent is government owned, when the governments use ownership of
monopolies as a means of raising revenue. A program of deregulation may be
the most effective process for achieving better regulatory outcomes, because
companies in an unregulated market may be easier targets for legal and
regulatory action (Director 1996).
Choosing an objective for competition
Competition is a loosely defined concept and there are many types and degrees
of competition. Consequently, policy makers must address what they want
competition to achieve.
For example, the goal of competition could include creating a situation to ensure
that:
·  each company’s market power is sufficiently reduced; or
·  there are minimal barriers to entry into and exit from the
telecommunications markets.
Alternatively, the goal of competition might be focused on promoting choice or
retaining a company’s flexibility to price. For example, the plan might be to:
·  stimulate the development of at least one alternative to the incumbent
carrier;25 or
·  avoid promoting any particular market structure (Director 1996).
The goals chosen, and the tools used to achieve them, appear to have differed
between countries (see Chapter 4).
                                             
25 This would increase choice, place some limit on market power and prices while still
preserving operators ability to recover common and joint costs in a reasonably efficient
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B.7 Interconnecting others
In most cases, the opportunity for entrants to interconnect with an incumbent
network, under reasonable terms and conditions, is essential to ensure effective
competition in mature telecommunications markets.
Retaining the advantages of any-to-any connectivity means that to provide a
competing and equal service with an entrenched network, it is necessary for an
entrant to either:
·  interconnect with the existing network; or
·  bypass some, or many, elements of the network and interconnect with
others; or
·  duplicate the network in its entirety without interconnection.
For a number of services where an incumbent already has a mature network
with high penetration, the last choice may not be viable. Not only would an
entrant have to bear the costs of duplication, but, at least initially, it may find it
necessary to subsidise access, to obtain a critical mass of subscribers. These
subsidies may be required to attract sufficient subscribers away from an
incumbent.
Even if some duplication is intended, as in mobile services, interconnection may
still be necessary if only for the sake of providing an initial critical mass of other
parties for the entrants subscribers’ to call.
The importance of interconnection and the essential elements of a successful
access regime are noted by Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a):
... Open network architecture requirements, motivated by the existence of network
externalities, imply that networks are and will remain interconnected. Interconnection
however, requires cooperation among competitors, who must agree on its mode and
especially on its price (p. 2).
Access regimes
Most countries have some legislative requirement on carriers to allow entrants
to interconnect (see Chapter 4). The only country studied that does not currently
mandate such a requirement is New Zealand (see Section B.5).26
Regulatory arrangements buttressing the negotiation of access terms and
conditions vary from dispute resolution and the approval of tariffs to mandating
                                             
26  However, in New Zealand a refusal to interconnect is likely to be regarded as a violation of
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that operators with significant market power publish standard interconnection
offers.
The scope of access rights also vary. For example, some countries do not
mandate number portability and do not provide for resale of retail services at
wholesale rates. Unbundling requirements also differ.27 For example, the most
extensive unbundling requirements are in the US where local exchanges are
required to unbundle the local loop.
Access — non-price issues
The ways in which an entrant may interconnect with an incumbent network has
an important bearing on the success of any access regime because poor quality
interconnection could limit an entrant’s ability to compete.
As noted above, interconnection requires a high degree of co-ordination and co-
operation. It also involves risk.
The policy challenge is to obtain neutral competition, between incumbent and
entrants, without loss of efficiency. This may be difficult to achieve. On the one
hand, delays in the granting of access, overly restrictive technical requirements
and limits on the points of interconnection may increase the costs of an entrant.
On the other hand, an incumbent may bear significant costs if it is required to
interconnect at any of a number of points or to install new equipment to meet
the requirements of the entrant.
There may also be risks to both parties (and users) if either installs equipment
that compromises the quality or safety of the network (OECD  1995). In a
dynamic industry, consideration also needs to be given to the long-term interests
of users, the need to allow for the possibility of later entry and the potential for
technical standards to change or be upgraded.
To ensure promotion of static and dynamic productive efficiency, access
regimes usually provide for, as a minimum, consideration of the following:
·  user safety;
·  carrier safety;
·  network protection;
                                             
27 Unbundling refers to a requirement for a carrier to offer services or network elements
separately at reasonable prices. Unbundling allows an entrant to purchase only those
services or elements it requires — thus avoiding any need for the entrant to be ‘tied-in’ to
services or elements it may be better able to provide itself.B   TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
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·  inter-operability;28 and
·  quality of service (OECD 1995).
Bearing these considerations in mind, the more important non-price issues
subject to regulation or negotiation include issues related to:
·  equal access for pre-selection (eliminating any need to dial extra numbers
if the subscriber chooses the entrant as their main carrier);
·  number portability (ensuring that the same number may be used when a
subscriber changes carriers);
·  unbundling of the local loop;
·  unbundling of services — for example, whether local calls resale will be
provided for; and
·  disclosure of interconnection agreements.
Of these, the most important issues relate to unbundling.
The importance of unbundling is that it can allow a competitor to pick and
choose the elements or services they require. The competitor has the choice of
by-passing each and every network element or service of the incumbent. This
promotes transparency, competition and efficient pricing because when selling
elements and services to a competitor, the incumbent is faced with a credible
threat of by-pass. Nevertheless, although by-pass is likely to occur where a
competitor is more efficient than the incumbent, inefficient by-pass may occur
where opportunities exist for cream-skimming or the market is distorted by
regulation.
Access pricing rules
The achievement of efficient outcomes depends on the price of access.
If charges are too high, efficient entry may be discouraged and inefficient
duplication or by-pass may occur. If charges are too low, the incumbent may not
be able to fully recover costs and this may curtail further investment. Low
charges may also encourage inefficient entry or forestall efficient by-pass
because the incentives for entrants to establish their own infrastructure is
reduced even where it would be efficient for them to do so.
Access pricing rules may also create a conflict between the objectives of
achieving short-run and long-run allocative efficiency. For example, in the
                                             
28 This involves ensuring that the components of the two networks (software and hardware)
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short-run, allocative efficiency often involves ensuring that existing facilities are
used to the fullest. In the long-run, allocative efficiency also involves ensuring
adequate investment. However, access prices that promote full use of facilities
in the short-run may result in revenue short falls over the long-run — adversely
affecting long-run patterns of investment.
Another factor that has further complicated access pricing is the existence of
Universal Service Obligations (USOs) and cross-subsidies in
telecommunications (see Box B.9). The USOs and cross-subsidies arise because
incumbents, in many countries, have typically had to raise revenue to provide
low rates for local calls or minimum services in uncommercial areas. Where an
incumbent bears these costs, and access pricing does not make provision for
raising this revenue, incentives may be created for entrants to inefficiently
cream-skim an incumbent’s business.
Because of their crucial importance, a substantial part of negotiation and
regulation (where it exists) is devoted to determining appropriate
interconnection or access prices.
To facilitate negotiation and to guide courts and regulators, a number of pricing
rules have been proposed. They include:
·  demand based rules — for example, the Ramsey pricing rule (see
Box B.8);
·  an efficient entry rule — the efficient components pricing rule (ECPR)
proposed by Willig and promoted by Baumol (see Baumol, Ordover and
Willig 1997); and
·  cost based rules — for example, total service long-run incremental cost
(TSLRIC) and total element long-run incremental cost (TELRIC);
Ramsey pricing
Ramsey pricing is designed to recover full costs while minimising the efficiency
loses from setting prices above short-run marginal costs. In the simplest case,
where all products are sold to the final consumer, the rule involves setting the
mark-up of the price charged for each product above its marginal cost in an
inverse proportion to that products elasticity of demand. In the case of access
pricing, the rule is more complicated because access is not a final product (see
Tirole and Laffont 1994).
The rule is difficult to apply because it requires estimation of a full set of price
and cross-price elasticities for the products involved. In telecommunications,
innovation is rapidly changing patterns of demand so estimation of these
elasticities is made even more difficult.B   TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
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Furthermore, Ramsey pricing could lead to high margins on some products
resulting in cross-subsidisation in a multi-product industry (see Box B.9).
Cross-subsidisation of products occurs where the price of a product or group of
products is greater than those based on stand-alone costs.29 With a cross-subsidy
in place, an entrant could have an incentive to by-pass the incumbent in
providing the product (or group of products) regardless of whether the by-pass
is efficient.
Efficient components pricing rule
The efficient components pricing rule (ECPR) was proposed in the context of
determining the price that a regulated monopoly should be allowed to charge a
competitor for an essential input (Baumol, Ordover and Willig 1997).
The first step in implementing the rule is to establish the price the incumbent
currently charges for the complete product in the final market. The second step
is to establish the cost that the incumbent avoids by selling the incomplete
product (the incumbent’s incremental cost of producing the final product
component). The final step is to subtract this avoided cost from final price to
arrive at the ECPR access price.
Baumol and Sidak (1995) argue that the attractive feature of the rule is that
entry (and consequent by-pass of the component the incumbent no longer
supplies) would only occur where the entrant is a more efficient provider of the
final component. That this necessarily follows, in the context of a regulated
telecommunication carrier, has been disputed (see, for example, Laffont, Rey
and Tirole 1998). Baumol and Sidak (1995) also note, the rule does not promote
any dissipation of an incumbent’s monopoly rents. That is, under the rule the
incumbent still retains its full profit on any units it formerly sold in the final
market (that are now sold by the entrant).
TSLRIC and TELRIC
Total service long-run incremental cost (TSLRIC) and total element long-run
incremental cost (TELRIC) are two cost-based approaches that have been
proposed to overcome the informational requirements of demand-based
approaches and to avoid the possibility of product cross-subsidisation.
                                             
29 Stand-alone costs are the costs of producing a product or groups of products without
producing any other products. If there is sub-additivity, stand-alone costs may be higher
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Box B.10 Cross-subsidisation in telecommunications
Cross-subsidisation is thought to be possible in telecommunications because there are
typically economies of scale and scope. There is some dispute over the extent of these
economies. However for the purpose of this discussion, they are assumed to exist. The
types of cross-subsidisation often referred to are long-distance to local calls, low usage
to high usage, urban to rural and business to residence.
Reference to cross-subsidisation occurs in two broad contexts — between products
(commodities and services) and between consumers. Subsidisation of products has
consequences for competition and access prices that promote efficiency through
competition. Consumer subsidies determine, more directly, whether market outcomes are
efficient and equitable.
Cross-subsidies between products are defined to be absent when prices do not yield
revenues greater than the stand-alone cost of any quantity or subset of products. A cross-
subsidy means some consumers are paying a higher price than necessary. It also means
that entrants could provide the subsidised products at a lower cost. This test assumes
zero economic profit, and cost minimising production techniques and use of inputs.
Cross-subsidies between consumers are absent if the prices faced by consumers cover
incremental costs for each of the products. This does not preclude including a margin to
fully recover common and joint costs.
a
Demand patterns across products critically affect the relationship between product and
consumer subsidy-free prices. However, individual consumer demands are essentially
unobservable. Consequently, the concept of anonymous equity is used. Prices are defined
to be anonymously equitable if they are consumer subsidy free for any set of demands.
Further, anonymous equity implies that prices are no lower than short-run marginal
costs. Prices that are subsidy free for a particular set of demands are not necessarily
anonymously equitable, that is, not subsidy free for all possible sets of demands.
There are practical difficulties to determining the existence of cross-subsidies. In both
the stand alone and anonymous equity test the stand alone and the short-run marginal
cost must be determined. In the case of the stand alone test, there is also the practical
issue of testing all quantity and product combinations.
a Some regard that an absence of cross-subsidies implies that all consumers meet their incremental
cost plus a ‘fair’ allocation of common and joint cost.
Source: Faulhaber (1975).
TSLRIC involves estimating the incumbent’s total long-run additional per unit
cost of providing a particular service. In principle, this is done by establishing
what the efficient cost should be to provide all the incumbent’s services andB   TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS
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then subtracting from this the efficient cost of providing all services except the
service of interest.
TELRIC involves a similar approach, except with TELRIC it is the incremental
cost of the provision of elements of the infrastructure, rather than services, that
is evaluated.
TSLRIC (and TELRIC) have adopted a forward-looking approach to the
estimation of costs. A forward-looking approach involves estimating costs on
the basis of the best in-use technology currently available (not on the current
costs of the incumbent).
Forward looking costs provide for an expectation of cost recovery where an
incumbent has made efficient decisions in the past because part of the cost
allowed include an economic rate of depreciation. An economic rate of
depreciation is usually faster than the physical rate of depreciation because it
incorporates an allowance for the likelihood of technological obsolescence.
This forward looking aspect of TSLRIC increases the information requirements
of the approach. And the results of an over- or under-generous assessment of
costs are the same as those already detailed — inefficient entry or by-pass being
encouraged or excluded.
As the Industry Commission (1997c) noted, evaluating the merits of the
approach involves:
... efficiency trade-offs — in this case between static and dynamic efficiency. The issue
is whether building technological obsolescence into the access price for the sake of
dynamic efficiency may adversely impact on making best use of existing assets. It also
raises issues of risk bearing and incentives to invest appropriately in the first instance.
These issues are difficult to resolve because of uncertainty, lags associated with
employing the latest available capital equipment and practical considerations such as
ensuring additional investment is technologically compatible with other capital
equipment and operating protocols (p. 2).261
C THE VALUE-ADDED SERVICES INDUSTRY
Value-added services (VASs) accounted for $5.1 billion (23 per cent) of
telecommunications services revenue in 1998 and have been widely identified
as the telecommunications services segment that offers the greatest potential for
growth (see Table C.1).
Recent studies characterise the Australian VAS industry as diverse with strong
competition in many segments. However, it is also regarded as immature by
world standards with some segments exhibiting lower growth and profitability
than would have been expected given developments in overseas markets (see
Box C.1).
C.1 Industry overview
The highly dynamic and evolutionary nature of their services makes it difficult
to define the industry.  Three main segments are widely recognised:
·  Voice-based VASs:  Principally  delivered  over  the  PSTN,  voice-based
VASs include premium rate services, enhanced call services, interactive
voice response services, call centres and computer integrated telephony;
·  Video-based VASs:  Although  the  dominant  service  at  present  is  video
conferencing, video-based VASs also include video entertainment services
such as video-on-demand; and
·  Data-based VASs:  Data network services are the most significant Data-
based VAS.  Other Data-based VASs include data transaction services
(EFT/EFTPOS), electronic data interchange (EDI), enhanced facsimile
services, on-line information services, internet access provision, electronic
messaging, facilities management and outsourcing (telemetry and alarm)
and electronic bureau services.
Data network services — which are a major focus of the price comparisons
presented in this report — are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.  The remainder
of the VAS industry is examined in more detail in this appendix.
C.2 Voice-based services
Voice-based VASs are principally delivered via the PSTN.  Telstra Multimedia
and Optus (post-1995) are the major providers.  Their services, include:INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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·  premium rate services;
·  enhanced call services;
·  interactive voice response services; and
·  call centres and computer integrated telephony.
Premium rate services
Also referred to as premium call services or audio text services, premium rate
services are telephony-based information and entertainment services accessed
using particular number prefixes.  Examples include telephone competitions,
‘psychic services’ (tarot cards and horoscopes), freecall 1800 numbers and
credit card services.
In 1995–96, there were between 40 and 50 PRS providers (Austel 1996b, p. 17).
The top 10–15 PRS providers account for about 70 per cent of the market
revenue which was about $80 million in 1996 (Budde 1998n, p. 4).
Table C.1 Telecommunications value-added services revenue, 1992
to 1998
Category 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
($m) ($m) ($m) ($m) ($m) ($m) ($m)
Voice-based
IVR (incl. audiotex)  30  50  65  74  120  120  125
Centrex  / VPN  30  120  290  325  350  400  460
Data-based
EFT/EFTPOS  25  42  50  60  65  75  120
Electronic Data Interchange
(EDI)
 14  18  23  30  36  30  28
Enhanced Fax services  17  50  60  75  100  115  120
Facilities mngmnt/outsourcing  77  140  185  240  290  350  420
Online services (incl. Internet)  140  190  195  205  265  360  700
Computer Reservation Systems  40  60  80  90  100  110  140
Processing bureau services  90  100  110  115  115  110  110
Data network services revenue 1 140 1 180 1 250 1 300 1 550 1 895 2 500
Video-based
Video/broadcasting
a  175  210  230  250  275  300  310
Total revenue 1 778 2 160 2 574 2 764 3 266 3 970 5 060
a Video and broadcasting includes the revenue of Optus’s satellite services, terrestrial broadcast
transmission and tele-conferencing services revenues (no pay TV).
Source: Budde (1999f, p. 2).C   THE VALUE-ADDED SERVICES INDUSTRY
263
Box C.1: Characteristics of the VAS industry, 1996
In December 1996, Austel (now the ACA) released its final report on the Value Added
Services (VAS) industry in Australia.  This report examined the current state of the
industry and factors that may restrict its further development.  Austel noted that:
·  the VAS industry is diverse and dynamic, but also of a highly transitional and
volatile nature;
·  in general, VAS revenues were expanding more rapidly than those for basic
carriage services (however, there was some variation between segments);
·  overall, industry profits were reportedly low;
·  successful applications or services were fewer than those involved in the industry
had expected, given levels of innovation and development achieved in some
overseas VAS segments;
·  growth in some segments were slower than anticipated;
·  with the exception of a small number of segments, the overall level of competition
in the industry was strong and vigorous; and
·  the benefits of competition were being passed on to consumers in terms of falling
prices and increasing range and availability of services.
The study also identified a number of specific factors which were ‘... actual or likely
impediments to vigorous and sustained VAS industry growth and competition and the
levels of innovation in the industry.’  These factors included:
·  natural barriers to entry into the VAS segments of the industry arising out of rapid
technological developments which result in high risk and volatility;
·  barriers to entry and impediments to competition arising out of certain presently
unregulated carrier vertical integration activities; and
·  limited support available to VAS providers under the proposed (now current)
regulatory regime.
Austel recommended a number of ‘pro-competitive’ measures to overcome impediments
relating to unregulated carrier vertical integration activities.
Source:  Austel (1996a pp. 22–23, 1996c pp. 6–7).
Enhanced call services
Enhanced call services are exchange-based calling facilities available to
customers through tone signalling, * keys and # keys and times loop break.
Services include call waiting, call diversion, third party inquiry and conference,
call control, abbreviated dialling, delayed hotline and multiple number.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Call waiting and call forwarding are free services.  Other services cost between
40 cents and $4 a month.  Telstra’s Easycall® is the most prominent of these
services and had 2.5 million customers, using a total of 5.5 million services by
1998 (Budde 1998n, p. 6).
Interactive voice response services
Interactive voice response (IVR) services include automatic call distribution,
voice response services and call answering (also referred to as voicemail
services).  There were an estimated 400  000 public voice mail boxes in
Australia of which Telstra operates half, Optus and Vodafone operated 40 000
each and the remaining 120 000 were operated by independent operators.
The IVR market was estimated to be about $125 million in 1998 and has
dominated by Telstra which had a 70 per cent market share (Budde 1998n, p. 6).
Independent operators in the market included Connect International Australia,
Voice Information Processing Services, Voice Mail Australia, Voice Mail
Communications, Voice Messaging Australia and Voice-Tel.
Austel found evidence that the major carriers were cross-subsidising IVR
services.  For example, a voice mail box from Telstra retails at $6.90 per month
compared with $30 per month for similar products from independent providers
(Budde 1998n, p. 7).  Participants to the Austel study argued that the actions of
the major carriers in this respect stifled industry returns and resulted in lower
investment.  Austel argued that:
... while competition between carriers appears to be strong in call answering
services only, conditions at present do not indicate that the segment overall is
performing in a way which is likely to foster new entrants and the development
of innovative services or sustained healthy competition. Additionally, there is a
number of significant concerns held by non carrier associated voicemail service
providers which require further investigation (Austel 1996b, p. 22).
Call Centres and Computer Integrated Telephony
An evolution of the telemarketing industry, call centers make use of new value-
added services and technologies for integrating data processing and
telecommunications to use in marketing, customer service and help desk
activities.  Austel defined Telemarketing activities as:
... all activities which relate directly or indirectly to the marketing of goods or
services, product or consumer surveying, market research, fundraising or polling
and which involve the use of a telephone, facsimile machine or any other
relevant customer equipment connected to a telecommunications network and
used to contact an individual (Austel 1996b, p. 22).C   THE VALUE-ADDED SERVICES INDUSTRY
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Research by Optus suggests that in 1997, 79 per cent of call centres used ‘1800’
numbers, 58 per cent used ‘13’ numbers and 47 per cent local calls.  Revenue to
the carriers for toll-free numbers was about $6.5 million (Budde 1998n, p. 9).
C.3 Video-based services
Video-based services in Australia have traditionally been related to the area of
video conferencing and business TV services (Austel 1996c).  Video-based
services are also making some inroads into tele-education and tele-medicine.  In
the future, the convergence of voice, data and video services in the delivery of
communications, information and entertainment is likely to result in an
increasing range of applications.
Revenue from video-based services accounted for $310 million in 1998 (see
Table   C.1).1  Revenue growth has been modest, around 10 per cent a year since
1992, and is not likely to increase significantly until current bandwidth
constraints are overcome.
Carrier video-based network services for video-conferencing consist of:
·  private line services;
·  circuit switched data services;
·  specialised carrier video conferencing services; and
·  emerging data network services such as ATM.
In addition, Telstra and Optus offer public video conferencing centre access for
companies without inhouse facilities.
C.4 Data-based services
The data-based VASs are the most dynamic and competitive of the VAS
industries.  The main services are:
·  data network services;
·  data transaction services (EFT/EFTPOS);
·  electronic data interchange (EDI);
·  enhanced facsimile;
·  internet and online services; and
                                             
1 Note that video and broadcasting includes the revenue of Optus’s satellite services,
terrestrial broadcast transmission and tele-conferencing services revenues (no pay TV).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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·  computer reservation systems.
Data network services are a major focus of the performance comparisons
presented in this report and are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
Data transaction services (EFT/EFTPOS)
By 1997, there were about 150  000 EFTPOS (Electronic Funds Transfer at
Point of Sale) terminals in Australia — covering around 40 per cent of all retail
outlets. These services processed an estimated 440 million transactions a year
(Budde 1998d, p. 2).
The current EFTPOS network represents the interconnection of several separate
‘rival’ networks under bilateral agreements.  A further development that is
likely to influence future developments in EFT/EFTPOS is ‘e-cash’ for Internet
transactions.
Electronic Data Interchange
Based around formally structured electronic documents, EDI was originally
intended to promote the concept of the ‘paperless office’ and provide fast and
improved transactions between manufacturers, suppliers and retail outlets.2
However, most EDI systems are proprietary and mostly incompatible.
Therefore, the systems are mainly used where suppliers and customers adopt the
same system.3  It has been estimated that less than 1 per cent of all businesses
(about 6000) use some form of EDI and that only about 20 per cent of the
transactions of these firms are processed using EDI (Budde 1998c, p. 2).
The major EDI providers in Australia in 1995 were Telstra Enhanced Services
(40 per cent), GEIS (35 per cent) and AT&T Easylink–Tradegate (20 per cent).
The EDI market is declining as proprietary EDI is overtaken by the e-commerce
sites on the Internet (see Table B.1).
Investment in proprietary EDI is estimated to have peaked at around $80 million
in 1995.  EDI over the Internet is expected to cut EDI network costs by a factor
of up to 100.  By late 1997, more than 10 000 e-commerce Internet sites had
been established generating an estimated $25 billion in revenue (Budde 1998e,
p. 3).
                                             
2  The estimated 6000 organisations using EDI in Australia did so via value-added networks
(VANs). Typical VAN charges were 20 to 30 cents per 1000 characters, in addition to
substantial monthly mailbox charges. For a supplier to a major retailer, the savings could
amount to thousands of dollars a year (Budde 1998d, p. 2).
3  For example, after investing in EDI, the Victorian Public Transport Corporation (PTC)
could persuade only 30 of its 12 000 trading partners to follow suit.C   THE VALUE-ADDED SERVICES INDUSTRY
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Enhanced Facsimile
Enhanced fax services revenue was worth about $120 million in 1998 (see
Table C.1).  These services include fax broadcasting, store and forward services,
fax mail boxes for travellers and fax information services.
Telstra (FaxStream) has about an 80 per cent share of the enhanced fax services
market.  The other leading service providers are AAPT (MediaNet and the local
services of NewsNet), Fax International (formerly SingCom) and Xpedite (Vitel
and the Fax 2000 formerly operated by Pacific Star).  Other service providers in
this sector include Optus (Faxline 0019), AT&T Easylink, Tracom and about
150 resellers.
There were more than 1 million fax machines operating in 1996 and
approximately another 1 million personal computers with modem/fax capability.
Although it is not possible to differentiate fax traffic from normal calls, Budde
has estimated that between 20 and 30 per cent of telephone calls are fax calls
(Budde 1998i, p. 2).4 It is expected that enhanced fax services will decline
towards the end of this decade as e-mail and e-commerce related technologies
gain prominence.
Internet and online services
The Internet and online services market generated $700 million in revenue in
1998, an increase of about 100 per cent over the previous year (see Table C.1).
In 1997, there were an estimated 2.8 million Internet users in Australia (see
Table C.2).
Falling prices (and subsequent increased penetration) of personal computers and
the move away from proprietary interfaces have made a range of major online
services available at a fraction of their previous cost.  However, it is widely
argued that the Internet represents a fundamental development in
communications that will reach much wider than e-mail and online information
services:
The Internet has a potential to evolve into a multi-service network capable of
delivery of all media forms involving text, data, voice (audio) and still or moving
pictures (video), to meet a variety of differing customer needs.  Many of the
information types delivered will require substantially increased bandwidth to
continue to be made available and advanced network stations such as Frame
Relay (for data, essentially) and Asynchronous Transfer Mode (for multi-media)
(Austel 1996c, p. 25).
                                             
4  This includes local, long-distance and international calls.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Growth in Internet usage is often associated with the number of personal
computers equipped with a modem connection (the principle form of Internet
access).  It is estimated that there were 6.9 million personal computers and 1.2
million modems in Australia in 1997.  About 40 per cent of the personal
computers and 50 per cent of the modems were installed in private households.
By 2000, the installed base of personal computers is expected to increase to 9.7
million (with about 50 per cent in households) and from 1997 onwards, the
majority of home personal computers will include a modem.
Table C.2 Internet demographics, 1995 and 1997
Data 1995 1997 (mid)
Users in Australia 1.2 million 2.8 million











a Proportion of age groups that uses the Internet.
Source: Paul Budde (1998e, p. 2).
Computer Reservation Systems
American Airlines launched the first proprietary CRS (Computer Reservation
Systems) in 1976.5  By the late 1980s, 95 per cent of US travel agents used a
proprietary CRS with two major systems — Sabre (American Airlines) and
Apollo (United Airlines) — accounting for 80 per cent of the market (Budde
1998h, p. 1).
Europe responded to developments in the US by establishing two reservation
consortia:
·  Amadeus:  Launched in 1987, Amadeus is the world’s largest travel
distribution system and is jointly owned by Lufthansa, Air France, Iberia
and Continental Airlines.
·  Galileo:  Launched in 1993 by the merger of UK-based Galileo company
and the Apollo CRS, Galileo International is jointly owned by British
Airways and United Airlines.
Abacus is an Asian based CRS consortia, whose owners include many of the
major Asian airlines.
                                             
5 The genesis of CRS came out of work by American Airlines which found that travel agents
tended to sell flights that where on the top of the list on their screens and showed a
preference for reservation systems with which they were familiar (Budde 1998m).C   THE VALUE-ADDED SERVICES INDUSTRY
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Galileo and Sabre account for 90 per cent of the $100 million CRS market in
Australia (see Table C.1).6  Amadeus and Abacus each controled about 5 per
cent of the Australian market.
Growth in the proprietary CRS market has slowed since the early 1990s (see
Table C.1).  Future developments are expected to be linked to open (non-
proprietary) CRSs, driven mainly by the Internet:
The open systems trend is fuelled by the Internet. New electronic services in
general will cut out a large part of the ‘middleman’ market. Customers will
directly tap into travel services and look at their travel destinations on their PC or
TV set.  When secure electronic transactions will be in place there is very little to
stop airlines and other travel organisations to do direct business with their
customers (Budde 1998h, p. 4).
                                             
6  In Australia, Galileo and Sabre are represented by Southern Cross Distribution Systems
Pty Ltd and Fantasia Information Network Pty Ltd, respectively. Southern Cross and
Fantasia are owned by TIAS (Travel Industries Automated Systems Pty Ltd) which is
jointly owned by Qantas, Ansett and Air New Zealand.271
D AUSTRALIAN REGULATORY AND
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Australia’s regulatory and institutional arrangements are described in this
appendix. The arrangements in the overseas countries studied are described in
Appendix E.
The focus is on the arrangements in place in February 1998, the point in time at
which the benchmarking applies. However, the evolution of the arrangements is
also described briefly because of its influence on the market environment at any
point in time.
D.1 Evolution
Until 1975, Australia’s domestic telecommunications services were provided by
a statutory monopoly — the Australian Post Office (APO), within the
Commonwealth Government’s Post-Master General’s Department. International
telecommunications services were provided by another statutory monopoly, the
Overseas Telecommunications Commission (OTC).
The APO was required to fulfil certain universal and community service
obligations. The Commonwealth Government required the APO to provide a
standard of basic telephony services throughout Australia and provide local call
services at a regulated uniform rate nationally (universal service obligation
(USO)). The Government also required the APO to provide community service
obligations (CSO) including the provision of basic telephony services at
subsidised rates to disadvantaged groups in the community.
In the markets to which USOs and CSOs applied, the APO incurred losses.
These losses were met through pricing long-distance services well above costs.
Australian Telecommunications Commission
In 1975, the provision of domestic telecommunications services was moved out
of the Post-Master General’s Department and given to the newly-created
Australian Telecommunications Commission (Telecom). OTC remained the
sole provider of international telecommunications services.
The creation of Telecom had little impact on the structure of the industry.
Telecom retained domestic telecommunications services as a statutoryINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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monopoly and was required to continue the provision of the USOs and CSOs
previously provided by the APO.
Long-distance revenues continued to cover the costs of providing USOs and
CSOs. Telecom was given exemption from the Trade Practices Act 1974 to
allow it to continue this practice.
Telecom was subject to price regulations and other constraints on its operations.
Telecom itself acted as the industry’s technical regulator.
Telecommunications Act, 1989
The  Telecommunications Act 1989 marked the liberalisation of the
telecommunications industry. Initially, competition was restricted to the
provision of value-added services, private networks, customer equipment and
cable installation.
Telecom was corporatised but retained its monopoly on the installation,
maintenance and operation of the telecommunications network and the supply
of basic telecommunications services within Australia. Telecom’s monopoly on
basic telephony services was retained to protect the provision of a universal
service (Evans 1988, para. 3.24–3.42). OTC and AUSSAT1 also retained their
respective monopolies.
The Act restructured institutional arrangements governing the regulation of the
industry through the creation of the Australian Telecommunications Authority
(AUSTEL). AUSTEL assumed responsibility for the economic and technical
regulation of the industry and introduced new CPI-X price cap regulation.
AUSTEL’s other functions included the protection of carrier rights, the
protection of competitors from unfair practices, consumer protection and the
promotion of carrier efficiency.
Telecommunications Act 1991
The Telecommunications Act 1991 introduced major changes to the structure of
the telecommunications industry. The Act established a general carrier duopoly
and a three mobile carrier market. Restrictions on the number of operators were
to end on 30 June 1997 after the second general carrier had been given a period
of time to establish itself in the market place.
                                             
1  AUSSAT Pty Ltd was launched in 1985 to provide a national satellite telecommunications
system. However, AUSSAT could not supply public switched telephone services within
Australia, except on behalf of Telecom or OTC.D   AUSTRALIAN REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
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The general carrier duopoly comprised Telstra (created from a merger of
Telecom and OTC) and Optus Communications. Optus entered the market
through the purchase of AUSSAT, to which a full carrier licence was attached.
The licence guaranteed Optus regulated access to Telstra’s local network for the
reticulation of its calls and permitted Optus to establish a second mobile
telecommunications network.
Optus and Telstra could not initially agree on access terms and conditions. This
led to AUSTEL regulating the price of access on the basis of directly
attributable incremental cost.
The access price regulation was to cease after the existing carrier (Telstra) was
no longer in a position of dominance in a particular market. Once the position of
dominance was lost, interconnect charges would be determined by commercial
negotiation, although still having regard to policy objectives which recognised
the preferential interconnect rights of carriers.
Telstra retained responsibility for the provision of USOs and CSOs, but the
funding arrangements for these obligations changed. Telstra and Optus were
required to contribute to the funding of USOs and CSOs in proportion to their
share of timed traffic. However, Telstra’s dominance in the market meant that it
remained the major contributor.
The third mobile telecommunications licence was issued to Vodafone to
establish a digital mobile service. Telstra and Optus both offered digital and
analogue services, although Optus purchased its analogue capacity from Telstra.
Licences were also issued for the provision of value-added services and the
resale of basic carriage services purchased from Telstra.
AUSTEL’s functions and powers were expanded to ‘promote fair and efficient
market conduct’ in the industry. AUSTEL was given the power to arbitrate in
access disputes and, to assist in this capacity, developed a chart of accounts and
cost allocation manual to be used by carriers.
AUSTEL was also given consumer protection functions, including setting and
monitoring carrier service quality indicators, monitoring and reporting on price
controls, and enforcing licence conditions on carriers which included specific
consumer safeguards and those relating to the USOs.
Current legislation
In 1997, the legal framework for the telecommunications industry was redefined
with the enactment of two new pieces of legislation. These were the
Telecommunications Act 1997 and the Trade Practices Amendment
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The primary objective of the Telecommunications Act 1997 is:
To provide a regulatory framework that promotes the long-term interests of end-
users of carriage services or of services provided by means of carriage services
and the efficiency and international competitiveness of the Australian
telecommunications industry (Telecommunications Act 1997, section 3(a)).
This objective was to be achieved in a manner that promotes the greatest
practicable use of industry self-regulation without imposing undue financial and
administrative burdens on participants in the industry (Telecommunications Act
1997, section 4).
The revisions to the Act:
·  provided for unrestricted issue of carrier licences;
·  distinguished between carriers and service providers and assignation of
their different obligations;
·  redefined universal service obligations and the funding mechanisms;
·  preserved the right for Australian consumers to untimed local calls; and
·  established mechanisms for the determination of technical regulation.
 The  Trade Practices Amendment (Telecommunications) Act 1997 inserted two
new Parts into the Trade Practices Act 1974 establishing a telecommunications-
specific anti-competitive conduct regulatory framework (Part XIB) and an
access regime (Part XIC).
D.2 Regulatory arrangements
  The main areas of regulation examined in this study are:
·  the provision of USOs and CSOs;
·  retail price controls;
·  anti-competitive conduct; and
·  access terms and conditions.
  Regulations also define the roles and powers of institutions, and govern the
allocation of the spectrum.
Universal service obligations
  Part 7 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 broadened the concept of USO and
laid the basis for future extensions. Telstra remains the USO provider, but the
legislation allows flexibility to choose alternative arrangements. ContributionsD   AUSTRALIAN REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
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by other carriers are now in proportion to their shares of ‘eligible revenue’,
rather than timed traffic.
Principles underlying the USO
  Principles, set out in Part 7 of the Telecommunications Act 1997, include that
the USO should be fulfilled as efficiently and economically as practicable and
that the costs and funding of the USO should be arrived at by transparent
processes.
  The Minister is responsible for selecting universal service providers. They may
be selected by tender — or by any method the Minister determines — to cover
specific regions or elements of the service. Providers must draft universal
service plans for the Minister’s approval. These are subject to public
consultation and must be included in a register kept by the Australian
Communications Authority (ACA).
Current scope
 Under  the  Telecommunications Act 1997, the USO requires that:
·  standard telephone services;
·  payphones; and
·  prescribed carriage services, as specified in regulations,
  are reasonably accessible to all people in Australia on an equitable basis
wherever they reside or carry on business (s.149).
 The  standard telephone service is defined as a carriage service for the purpose
of voice telephony.  It must pass the test of any-to-any-connectivity. Disabled
persons unable to use voice telephony are to be given an equivalent form of
communication corresponding to the USO, but satisfying the requirements of
the Disability Discrimination Act 1992.
  The location of payphones — which the universal service provider is obliged to
supply, install and maintain — is prescribed in regulations.
  The obligation may be upgraded over time, mainly through re-specification of
the standard telephone service, but can occur in a number of ways.
  The obligation to supply ‘prescribed carriage services’ is intended to enable the
extension to services outside the standard telephone service (Department of
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Costing and funding
  The legislation permits alternative methods for calculating the cost of the
universal service:
·  the result of a method of selecting a provider approved by the Minister (for
example, by tender);
·  as agreed between carriers; or
·  determination by the ACA.
  ACA determinations must be on the basis of avoidable cost less foregone
revenue for designated ‘net cost areas’. The Minister can formulate cost
principles to prevent cost-padding or cross-subsidisation of the incumbent’s
loss-making services.
  In practice, Optus and Vodaphone reimburse Telstra, which remains the
universal provider.
Other aspects of the standard telephone service
  The standard telephone service has a number of other attributes. They are
covered by a variety of legislative provisions — such as license conditions —
not necessarily specific to the USO. They are:
·  access to untimed local calls;
·  the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman scheme;
·  free emergency call services;
·  pre-selection of the customer’s preferred carriage service provider;
·  calling line identification;
·  standard terms and conditions of supply; and
·  operator services, directory assistance and itemised billing.
Untimed local calls
  Under the 1991 legislation, all providers of the standard telephone service were
required to give their residential customers the option of untimed local voice
calls within local zones. The legislative right to untimed local calls now applies
to:
·  businesses with respect to voice applications;
·  residential customers for voice, data, facsimile and Internet applications.
  The local zones are as at 1 July 1991. The obligation applies to all carriage
service providers, with the exception of mobile or satellite-provided services,
unless covered by the USO.D   AUSTRALIAN REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
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Emergency call services
  Emergency call services are regulated by the ACA, which has the power to
oblige any carrier to participate.
Itemised billing
  All suppliers of the standard telephone service, including mobile and satellite-
delivered services, must offer itemised billing for calls other than untimed local
calls. If requested they must offer it for untimed local calls.
Retail price controls
  Retail price controls exist in the form of price caps on certain
telecommunications services. Telstra has been subject to price capping
arrangements since 1989. On 1 January 1996, new price cap arrangements were
introduced and applied to Telstra’s tariffs.
  The price cap was set at CPI–7.5 per cent and applies to Telstra’s charges for a
revenue weighted basket of main services. This basket includes:
·  connections;
·  line rentals;
·  local, trunk (including both STD and calls to mobile phones) and
international calls;
·  cellular mobile telephone services; and
·  leased lines.
  Individual price caps were set at CPI–1 per cent on Telstra’s individual stand-
alone charges for the following residential services:
·  connection;
·  line rentals; and
·  trunk (including both STD and calls to mobile phones) and international
calls.
  There is also a requirement on all operators that local calls be charged on an
untimed basis. There is a direct price control of 25 cents on local calls from
fixed phones and 40 cents on local calls from payphones. The pricing of
untimed local calls is revised annually.
  There are also provisions in the Telecommunications Act 1997 for the regulation
of universal service charges. These provisions, together with the Telstra price
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can be controlled. The Minister is able to make a declaration that a specified
universal service charge be subject to a price control arrangement. This
declaration sets out:
·  price-cap arrangements and other price control arrangements that are to
apply in relation to the charge; and/or
·  principles or rules in accordance with which the universal service provider
may impose or alter the charge.
  The telecommunications industry is subject to the general price monitoring
provisions contained in the Prices Surveillance Act 1983, however, as of
January 1999, these provisions had not been invoked
Anti-competitive conduct
  Part XIB of the Trade Practices Act 1997 provides safeguards against anti-
competitive conduct and is designed to complement the access regime set out in
Part XIC and supplement Part IV of the Act.
  Part XIB sets out two circumstances in which a carrier or carriage service
provider engages in anti-competitive conduct (see Figure  D.1). The first is
where a carrier or carriage service provider with a substantial degree of market
power uses that power with the effect of substantially lessening competition in
the market (s.151AJ(2)). Second, a carrier or carriage service provider engages
in anti-competitive conduct if that conduct contravenes sections 45, 45B, 46, 47
or 48 under Part IV of the TPA and the conduct relates to a telecommunications
market (s.151AJ(3)).2
  When a carrier or carriage service provider contravenes either s.151AJ(2) or
s151AJ(3), then that party has breached the Competition Rule — that carriers or
carriage service providers must not engage in anti-competitive conduct.
  When a party breaches the Competition Rule, the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (ACCC) may issue that party with a Competition
Notice. A Competition Notice sets out the particulars of how the Competition
Rule is deemed to have been breached. Its effect is to give the offending party a
‘grace’ period to cease the conduct before the ACCC or other injured parties
may seek injunctions or penalties through the Federal Court.
 
                                             
  2  A carrier or carriage service provider does not contravene sections 45, 45B, 46, 47 or
48 if the party concerned has been granted an authorisation or notification (s.151AJ(7)) or
the conduct occurred before 1 July 1997 (s.151AJ(8)).D   AUSTRALIAN REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
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Figure D.1 Operation of Part XIB — Anti competitive conduct
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Enforcement in Federal Court
Under Part XIB injured parties cannot instigate proceedings for damages until 
a competition notice has been issued. Therefore, in the event where the 
ACCC does not act, third parties may apply for damages under Part IV.
Source: Trade Practices Act 1974
 
Access arrangements
  Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 sets out a telecommunications access
regime (see Figure D.2). The access regime establishes processes for parties to
have carriage services ‘declared’ to establish access rights to
telecommunications services. It defines the obligations that access providers
must meet when supplying a declared service.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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  Certain carriage services were deemed declared by the ACCC under transitional
arrangements when the legislation was introduced on 1 July 1997. Deemed
services included:
·  domestic PSTN (fixed wire) originating and terminating access;
·  domestic GSM (digital mobile) originating and terminating access;
·  domestic AMPS (analogue mobile) originating and terminating access;
·  transmission;
·  digital data access service;
·  conditional local loop service;
·  AMPS to GSM diversion service; and
·  broadcasting access service.
  The transitional arrangements preserved existing access rights for carriers and
extended those rights to service providers (Trade Practices Amendment
(Telecommunications) Bill Second Reading Speech 5 December 1996). The
deeming of certain services on 1 July 1997 provided for the continuation of the
pre-existing arrangements.
  Alterations to the list of declared services may be made following the
recommendation of the Telecommunications Access Forum (TAF). The ACCC
must approve such a recommendation if the ACCC is satisfied that the TAF has
given reasonable opportunity for interested parties to comment on the
recommendation.
  It was the Commonwealth Government’s intention that TAF processes would be
the primary means of declaring additional carriage services:
  It is a clear policy intention that, as much as possible, both the determination of
access rights and terms and conditions of access be the result of commercial
processes and industry self-regulation. ... The government expects the industry as
a whole to work constructively to develop industry-driven solutions to access
issues which reflect the legitimate interests of those seeking access and those
under access obligations and which operate in the long-term interests of end
users of telecommunications services (Trade Practices Amendment
(Telecommunications) Bill Second Reading Speech 5 December 1996).
  An alternative route for having a carriage service declared is through the ACCC.
The ACCC may declare a carriage service on its own initiative or if requested to
do so by another party if it considers such a declaration would promote the long-
term interests of end-users. The ACCC is required to hold a public inquiry and
report its findings within 180 days following declaration.
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Figure D.2 Operation of Part XIC — Access
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  In determining whether a declaration will promote the long-term interests of
end-users, the ACCC must have regard to the extent to which declaration would
achieve the following (and only these) objectives:
·  promoting competition in markets for listed services;
·  achieving any-to-any connectivity in relation to carriage services that
involve communication between end-users; and
·  encouraging the economically efficient use of, and economic efficient
investment in, the infrastructure.
Declarations apply to all carriers and carriage service providers who supply the
declared service at the time of declaration. There is no provision under the
Trade Practices Act 1974 to appeal ACCC decisions on declaration.3
Access terms and conditions
  Under Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act 1997, declaring a carriage service
means that an access provider becomes subject to standard access obligations.
These require an access provider to:
·  supply a declared service to the access seeker; and
·  take all reasonable steps to ensure that the technical and operational
quality of the declared service being supplied is equivalent to what the
access provider provides to itself; and
·  take all reasonable steps to ensure that the access seeker receives a level of
fault detection, handling and rectification that the access provider provides
to itself.
  Standard access obligations do not apply where they would have the effect of
preventing an existing user, including the access provider, from obtaining a
sufficient amount of the service.
  In supplying a declared service, the access provider must allow access seekers to
interconnect their networks with the network of the access provider so as to be
supplied with the declared service. The point of interconnection is at those
points nominated by the access provider.
                                             
3  All decisions of the ACCC may be appealed under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial
Review) Act 1977 or Section 163A of the Trade Practices Act 1974 on the basis that the
ACCC either did not have jurisdiction or did not proceed in terms of the required statutory
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  The access provider must supply access seekers, if requested to do so, with
billing information in connection with matters associated with the supply of a
declared service. This billing information is defined in regulations.
  Access providers may obtain exceptions from standard access obligations where
it believes the access seeker would fail to comply with the terms and conditions
of access or fail to protect the integrity of the network or the safety of
individuals working on the network.
  Access providers may also obtain class or individual exemptions from standard
access obligations where the ACCC believes this will promote the long-term
interests of end-users. If the ACCC believes that its determination will have a
material effect on a party’s interests then, before making its final determination,
the ACCC must publish a draft for public comment and consider any
submissions forwarded to it.
  Carriers and carriage service providers must comply with standard access
obligations on terms and conditions agreed to between the access provider and
access seeker. Where parties fail to reach agreement, they may apply the terms
and conditions specified in an approved access undertaking or, if there is no
such undertaking, seek arbitration by the ACCC.
  An access undertaking specifies the terms and conditions under which a
particular carrier or carriage service provider undertakes to comply with the
standard access obligations in relation to a particular declared service.
  Access undertakings must be approved by the ACCC. The ACCC may accept an
undertaking provided it has published the undertaking for public comment and
considered any submissions received. Further, the ACCC must be satisfied that
the undertaking is consistent with the standard access obligations and the terms
and conditions proposed are reasonable. The undertaking must also be
consistent with any Ministerial pricing determinations.
  If an undertaking adopts the terms and conditions set out in an approved TAF
telecommunications access code, then the ACCC must accept that undertaking.
The access code sets out the model terms and conditions relating to compliance
with the standard access obligations. Compliance with this Code is voluntary
and is intended to provide guidance to access providers in the development of
access undertakings and to access seekers in assessing the terms of an
undertaking or proposed agreement.
Number portability and carrier preselection
Under Australia’s Numbering Plan, all carriers and carriage service providers,
unless exempted, must provide full number portability (including local calls) byINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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1 January 2000. The terms and conditions for providing number portability must
be negotiated, although the ACCC may arbitrate in a dispute.
The ACA determines pre-selection requirements, having regard to benefits,
costs and technical feasibility. The ACA has mandated that preselection be
available for a range of services, namely national long-distance, international
direct-dial services, operator assistance, and international ringback calls.
Allocation of spectrum
The allocation of spectrum by issuing spectrum licences is provided for by the
Radiocommunications Act 1992 and are carried out by the ACA.
Spectrum licences are a tradeable, technology neutral (that is, they are not
bound to any specific technology) spectrum access right for a fixed non-
renewable term (15 years in this case). Spectrum licences are flexible and can be
used to provide virtually any type of service.
The ACA allocates spectrum licences by an electronic auction system. To
support the spectrum licensing of these bands, the ACA has prepared a draft
marketing plan and auction rules. The draft marketing plan sets out the
procedures to be followed in issuing spectrum licences and also covers matters
such as timing, the area and bandwidth of lots and spectrum licence conditions.
D.3 Institutional arrangements
A new institutional framework was established to administer the legislative
arrangements under the Telecommunications Act 1997.
The Telecommunications Access Forum (TAF) was created as an industry self-
regulatory body. Membership of TAF is open to all carriers and carriage service
providers. The TAF was made responsible for recommending which services
should be declared, developing a draft access code and revising that code when
necessary.
The ACCC was made responsible for oversight of the TAF. The ACCC was
given the authority to approve or override the TAF where parties are not given
opportunity to comment on TAF proposals.
The ACCC also assumed control of competitive regulation of the industry from
AUSTEL. The 1997 reforms repealed the industry’s exemption from the TPA
and established industry-specific regimes, embodied in the TPA, governing
access and anti-competitive behaviour in the industry.D   AUSTRALIAN REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
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The Australian Communications Industry Forum (ACIF), another self-
regulatory body, was given responsibility for the development of consumer
codes. Membership was made open to all participants in the industry.
The ACA was formed by a merger of AUSTEL and the Spectrum Management
Agency. The ACA regulates consumer and technical issues under the 1997 Act
and radiocommunications issues under the Radiocommunications Act 1992. It
has responsibility for approving codes developed by the ACIF. In doing so, it
must be satisfied that ACIF represents all sections of the industry and has
consulted with all interested parties.
The ACA retained responsibility for the monitoring of the effectiveness of codes
and standards. This included the allocation of licences, preparation of spectrum
plans, marketing of spectrum and management of interference. It was also given
responsibility for standards-setting, compliance testing, labelling and issuing of
licences to industry bodies such as the ACIF.
The ACA was given the power to direct carriers or carriage service providers in
regard to matters relating to its powers and functions. However, a requirement
was placed on it to perform its functions consistent with government policy or at
the direction of the Minister.
The Telecommunications Industry Ombudsmen (TIO) was established in 1993.
Suppliers of the standard telephone service, mobile services and the Internet are
required to become members of the scheme and to comply with determinations
of the TIO.287
f7
E INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AND
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The regulatory and institutional arrangements of the European Commission and
benchmarked overseas countries are described in this appendix. This is a
companion to Appendix D which describes the Australian arrangements.
The focus is on the arrangements in place at February 1998, the point in time at
which the benchmarking applies. However, the evolution of the arrangements is
also described briefly because of its influence on the market environment at any
point in time.
E.1 Canada
Prior to 1979, telecommunications services were provided by CNCP
Telecommunications, Telecom Canada members (a consortium of federally
regulated telecommunications carriers dominated by Bell Canada), Teleglobe
Canada and Telesat Canada.
CNCP Telecommunications held a monopoly in the domestic telegraph market
while Telecom Canada members held a monopoly on the long-distance voice
market. Basic local telephone services were provided regionally across Canada
on a monopoly basis by either Telecom Canada members or other
telecommunications carriers. Data communications were provided nationally by
two carrier systems, CNCP Telecommunications and Telecom Canada
members.
Telesat Canada, incorporated in 1969, provided Canadian domestic satellite
telecommunications services on a monopoly basis. Teleglobe Canada was
established in 1974 as a federal corporation and was the monopoly supplier of
Canadian overseas telecommunications.
Regulation
The first changes in the regulation of Canada’s telecommunications industry
occurred in 1979. In this year, the Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) allowed CNCP Telecommunications
to interconnect its network with Bell Canada’s. This allowed CNCP to compete
in the provision of certain interconnected private line voice services andINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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interconnected data services in Bell Canada’s markets. This decision was later
extended in 1981 to B.C. Tel’s markets, another Telecom Canada member.
In 1982, the CRTC set out the terms and conditions governing the attachment of
subscriber-provided terminal equipment to the networks of all federally
regulated telecommunications carriers. In 1984, the CRTC set out the terms and
conditions for interconnection by cellular mobile radio systems with federally
regulated telephone companies. This followed a decision by the Department of
Communications to establish two cellular radio systems in each of the major
Canadian markets.
In 1986, the CRTC allowed Telesat Canada to offer interconnected private line
services like those permitted in 1979. In 1987, the resale and sharing of private
line services of the federally regulated companies was permitted.
In 1992, the CRTC set out the terms and conditions for competition in the
provision of public long-distance voice services. This allowed Unitel
Communications Inc. (previously CNCP) and other facilities-based service
providers to compete in some markets of the federally regulated Telecom
Canada (later known as Stentor Resource Centre Inc.) member telephone
companies.
In 1994, the CRTC established a new regulatory framework for the federally
regulated Stentor-member companies, that is traditional earnings regulation
(rate base/rate-of-return regulation) would be replaced with price cap regulation,
effective 1 January 1998. Toward that end, the CRTC established a transitional
period during which it would move toward the implementation of price cap
regulation for these companies’ Utility Segments.
In 1997, the CRTC set out the terms and conditions of local competition in the
markets of some of the Stentor-member companies and established the
parameters of the price cap regime. Also in that year, the CRTC decided not to
exercise its power to regulate the toll and toll free services provided by Stentor-
member companies, Quebec Telephone, Telebec Itee and Sogetel Inc. and the
inter-exchange private lines services provided by Stentor-member companies. In
1998, the CRTC opened the local pay telephone market to competition.
The implementation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services covering
basic telecommunications negotiated under the World Trade Organisation
(WTO/GATS) took effect 1 January 1998. Under the WTO/GATS, Canada
made a commitment to end Telesat Canada’s Fixed Satellite Services monopoly,
effective 1 March 2000.
Consistent with this newly competitive environment, the federal government
announced that it will end, on 1 October 1998, the monopoly of TeleglobeE   INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
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Canada over the provision of facilities-based overseas telecommunications
services. The CRTC has a proceeding underway to determine the regulatory
regime that should apply to the provision of international telecommunications
services, when Teleglobe’s monopoly terminates.
Institutional arrangements
Prior to 1994, telecommunications was regulated by either the CRTC, or a
provincial government public utility or a municipal board.
Prior to 1987, CRTC had jurisdiction over the federally regulated
telecommunications carriers in Canada which were B.C. Tel, Bell Canada,
NorthwesTel Inc., Terra Nova Telecommunications Inc., CNCP
Telecommunications and Telesat Canada. In 1987, Teleglobe Canada, a former
crown corporation, was privatised and became subject to CRTC’s jurisdiction.
In 1989, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that inter-provincial
undertakings were subject to the CRTC’s jurisdiction. Thus, the privately
owned, provincially regulated telephone companies (NBTel, MT&T, Island Tel
and NewTel) now were regulated by the CRTC.
Alberta Government Telephones Commission, Manitoba Telephone System
(known today as MTS Communications Inc.) and Sask Tel, as provincial crown
agents, were immune from federal regulation by the CRTC. However, in 1990,
the Alberta Government Telephones Commission was privatised and telephone
operations were transferred to AGT Limited (known today as TELUS
Communications Inc.) and came within the CRTC’s jurisdiction.
In 1994, as a result of the Supreme Court of Canada decision, the remaining
telephone companies (49 at that time) that provided services regionally across
Canada on a monopoly basis, referred to as independent telephone companies,
came under the CRTC’s jurisdiction. With the exception of SaskTel, a Province
of Saskatchewan crown agent, all telephone companies are currently under the
CRTC’s jurisdiction.
Revision of regulatory framework
In 1992, the CRTC announced that it would undertake a general review of
telecommunications regulation. In 1993, the Canadian Parliament passed the
Telecommunications Act 1993 which repealed the telecommunications-related
provisions of the Railway Act.
The Telecommunications Act 1993 provides the CRTC with the power to:
·  approve the rates to be charged by a Canadian carrier for a
telecommunications service;INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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·  ensure that the rates charged are just and reasonable and that the carriers
do not unjustly discriminate or give an undue or unreasonable preference
toward any person;
·  to approve the working agreements between a Canadian carrier and
another telecommunications common carrier;
·  forbear, in whole or in part, from regulating classes of services; and
·  to order a Canadian carrier to connect any of the carrier’s
telecommunications facilities to any other telecommunications facilities.
  In 1998, the Telecommunications Act 1993 was amended to ensure that its
telecommunications policy objectives were consistent with Canada’s
commitments under WTO/GATS. The amendments, among other things,
provide the CRTC with the statutory authority to require all members of any
class of service providers to obtain a licence to provide international
telecommunications services and to impose terms and conditions in such
licences.
  In 1994, having completed a general review of telecommunications regulation,
the CRTC issued a Decision detailing a new regulatory framework. For certain
of the Stentor-member telephone companies, the CRTC:
·  required that the rate bases be split into Competitive and Utility Segments,
effective 1 January 1995;
·  determined that traditional earnings regulation would be replaced with
price cap regulation, effective 1 January 1998;
·  established a transitional period during which it would move towards the
implementation of price cap regulation for the Utility Segment; and
·  determined that restrictions on entry into the local market should be
removed.
In 1997, the Commission set the parameters of a four year price cap plan and the
terms for local competition.
  Universal accessibility of service in a local market
  Continued universal accessibility is achieved through public policy limits on
residential service rates to the extent that, in higher cost areas, these are held
below cost. This public policy approach is facilitated by price cap limits on
increases in basic local residential rates (applied to incumbents only), provision
of a portable ‘contribution’ subsidy available to all local service providers that
provide residential services and the continued application of the telephone
companies’ obligation with respect to the provision of service where effectiveE   INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
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facilities-based competition is absent. The CRTC will also continue to monitor
the quality of service provided by incumbents.
  The portable ‘contribution’ subsidy is based on the contribution mechanism
established at the beginning of long-distance competition as a way of
maintaining affordable local rates which had traditionally been subsidised by
long-distance toll revenues. A contribution rate was established for each
incumbent telephone company territory as an explicit charge levied on all long-
distance toll traffic carried on the networks of all toll providers.
  At least for the price cap period, toll contribution remains as the only explicit
source of subsidy for basic residential local services. The contribution rates of
the telephone companies subject to price cap regulation are frozen at the going
rates for the price cap period. Freezing contributions rates aimed to maintain a
subsidy that allows residential rates to remain affordable while not hindering the
development of effective local competition.
  In general terms, the contribution requirement is calculated as the difference
between costs and revenues for all residential services in an incumbent’s
market, whether provided by the incumbent or by competitors. This amount,
divided by total long-distance market minutes (telephone company and alternate
providers of long-distance), yields the average per-minute contribution rate.
  The funds are distributed to all local carriers based on subsidy requirements per
residential Network Access Services or equivalent by rate band. On an interim
basis, the incumbent local exchange carriers are acting as central fund
administrators.
  Currently, the CRTC has a proceeding underway to consider the issues
associated with service to high cost serving areas, including whether changes
are required to current obligations.
  Retail price controls during price cap regulation
  In the 1994 Decision detailing a new regulatory framework, the CRTC aimed to
bring the residential services rates for some of the Stentor-member telephone
companies more closely in line with costs during the transitional period prior to
price regulation. Local telephone rates were increased by $Can2 in 1996 and in
1997, with a final round of rate rebalancing increasing rates in 1998 up to
$Can3.20 on average depending on the company.
  For the transitional period 1995 to 1997 leading to price cap regulation which
began on 1 January 1998, the CRTC implemented a split rate base regime.
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required to split their rate bases into ‘competitive’ and ‘Utility’ Segments. This
required the telephone companies to separate the revenues, expenses and
investments associated with competitive services (long-distance, network and
terminal) from the revenues, expenses and investments associated with the
utility services (local and access). During the transitional period, the Utility
Segment was regulated on the traditional rate base/rate-of-return basis.
  Price caps only apply to BCTEL, Bell Canada, The Island Telephone Company
Limited, Maritime Tel & Tel, MTS Communications Inc., The New Brunswick
Telephone Company Limited, NewTel Communications Inc. and TELUS
Communications Inc.
  The features of the price cap plan are as follows:
·  Certain Utility Segment services are grouped into a single basket.
·  The single basket is capped by the Price Cap Index (PCI). The PCI
includes the Gross Domestic Product Price Index (GDP PI) as the inflation
measure, a productivity offset (X factor) of 4.5 percent and limited
exogenous factors arising from events which are beyond the telephone
companies’ control.
·  The single basket of capped services is divided into three sub-baskets
subject to additional pricing constraints:
  Basic residential local services:  The weighted-average annual rate
increase will not exceed the level of inflation (GDP PI) during the
price cap period. In addition, no rate element in this sub-basket will
increase by more than 10 per cent in any year. The exception to this
is primary exchange services within bands for which local loops are
considered nonessential.
  Single and multi-line local business services:  These are not subject
to an overall sub-basket pricing constraint. However, a 10 per cent
constraint in any year was applied to individual rate elements for
single-line business services, other than the rates for primary
exchange service within the bands for which local loops are
considered nonessential.
  Other services:  The remaining Utility Segment services, which do
not qualify as services excluded from price caps nor included in the
other subbaskets. Prices will be constrained by the level of inflation
(GDP PI).
·  Contribution charges and the rates for emergency services, message relay
services and several other services will be frozen for the price cap period.E   INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
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·  Services that were priced to maximise contribution prior to the
implementation of price caps, such as optional local services, and those
services under which a cap on prices would be redundant, such as Special
Facilities Tariffs and competitor services required by local and toll
competitors are not included with capped services.
·  Streamlined regulatory process. Revenue requirement and annual
contributor proceedings are eliminated and no longer a requirement to file
capital plan submissions, depreciation studies or financial forecasts.
·  A four year price cap plan, with no earnings sharing overlay, to be
reviewed prior to the end of 2001 to ascertain that the parameters have
been set correctly.
  Access Arrangements
  In 1997, the CRTC established a framework, to begin in 1998, for the entry by
new local exchange carriers in the territories of some of the incumbent local
telephone companies. Incumbent telephone companies are required to provide:
·  for the unbundling of ‘essential facilities’ and co-location on the same
terms as are used by the incumbent telephone companies themselves;
·  access to their local networks at prices consistent with established access
pricing rules; and
·  for the resale of local residential services (not necessarily at wholesale
rates).
  The framework also:
·  indicated the CRTC’s intention to implement a number portability scheme;
·  provided for equitable access to toll contribution as a subsidy for basic
residential local services in high cost areas;
·  created the Canadian Interconnection Steering Committee to deal with
technical implementation issues;
·  required competitors to meet certain public interest requirements; and
·  allowed for competition and convergence between the telecommunications
and broadcasting industries.
  Essential Facilities and Mandatory Unbundling
  The CRTC determined that mandatory unbundling would be required where a
facility was ‘essential’. The CRTC determined that, for a particular facility to be
essential, it must be monopoly controlled, a competitor requires it as an input to
provide services and a competitor cannot technically or economically duplicateINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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it. Unbundling requirements were only to apply to the incumbent telephone
companies as the CRTC was satisfied that the new competitors’ local exchange
service facilities would rarely meet the test of essential facilities.
  Facilities classified by the CRTC as being essential are central office codes
(NXXs), subscriber listings and local loops in small urban and rural areas. Local
loops in other areas did not meet the criteria for essential facilities as there was
some competitive supply. However, the CRTC believed that this supply was
limited and therefore required that these local loops be unbundled and priced
based on the rating principles for essential facilities for a period of five years
from the date of the Decision (1 January 1998).
  Resale of local retail services
  Although entrants are permitted to resell the local retail services of the
incumbents, incumbents are not required to provide these services at wholesale
rates. The CRTC considered that ultimately facilities-based competition would
be more effective.
  Competitive safeguards
  The CRTC has introduced some industry competitive safeguards. The
telecommunications industry is to some extent subject to general competition
law as administered by the Competition Bureau of Industry Canada.
  The CRTC prohibits exclusivity arrangements between newly entered local
exchange carriers and inter-exchange service providers as it considered such
arrangements reduce consumer choice. New competitive local exchange carriers
must provide equal access to all inter-exchange service providers at terms and
conditions that are equivalent to the terms and conditions contained in the
incumbents’ tariffs.
  The CRTC requires competitive local exchange carriers to file proposed tariffs
for inter-exchange carrier equal access, and to justify any departure from the
terms and conditions contained in incumbents’ tariffs. The equal access
requirement applies equally to wireless services providers supplying public
switched voice services.
E.2 European Commission
  The European Commission derives its power to regulate telecommunications
from competition and harmonisation provisions in the Treaty of Rome, which
established the European Economic Union (formerly the EuropeanE   INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
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Community). The objective of these provisions in the Treaty is to ensure free
trade and open competition within the Common Market.
  The European Commission has used the following Articles in the treaty to
achieve progressive liberalisation of telecommunications:
·  Article 85 permits the Commission to prohibit and declare illegal all anti-
competitive behaviour between businesses within the European Union;
·  Article 86 prohibits abuse of dominant position by a dominant company in
a market that affects trade between member states;
·  Article 90 permits the Commission to issue directives to member states;
and
·  Article 100a permits the Council of Ministers and the European
Parliament, on the recommendation of the Commission, to enact
legislation which member states must in turn incorporate into their own
laws (Lewin and Kee 1997).
  In 1987, the Commission issued a Green Paper on the development of a
common market for telecommunications services and equipment. This proposed
the introduction of a more competitive environment within European
telecommunications combined with a greater degree of harmonisation.
  In 1990, the Commission adopted the principles of Open Network Provision.
These principles were objectivity and transparency in setting criteria for access
conditions and price setting, and non-discrimination. The intention was to
achieve harmonisation of network interfaces, usage conditions and tariff
principles within the European Community as part of the process of achieving
economic integration.
  The Commission usually seeks to prevent anti-competitive agreements and the
abuse of market power through legal action on a case-by-case basis. However,
in 1992, it published general guidelines for telecommunications which stated
that it will actively apply the competition rules to:
·  interconnection agreements;
·  conditions of access for competing infrastructure and service providers;
·  schemes for funding the universal service;
·  access to rights of way;
·  cross-ownership of networks and joint provision of networks and services;
and
·  the emergence of global and regional partnerships and alliances.
  In May 1995, members were required to liberalise the mobile market by
abolishing any ‘special and exclusive’ rights enjoyed by providers.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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  Licensing conditions for telecommunications operators had to be liberalised and
made consistent across the European Union by April 1997. Only technical
limitations on new licences, such as restrictions on the availability of suitable
radio frequencies or telephone numbers (on a temporary basis) are now
permitted within the European Union.
  On 1 January 1998, all telecommunications services and infrastructure were
required to be liberalised, although extensions of time were granted to countries
with smaller or less developed networks. Within the framework established by
the European Commission, each country must enact its own legislation, but the
details vary from country to country. Waverman and Sirel (1997) discuss
national responses to the Commission’s requirements, which depend on the
progress already made with liberalisation of the telecommunications market,
and on local attitudes to such issues as privatisation.
  Although there is no requirement for privatisation, when organisations
providing telecommunications services continue in public ownership, regulation
must be conducted by an independent national regulatory authority. By
European Law, these must be independent (EC 1996).
  The stated objectives of the European Commission’s policy on
telecommunications are to ensure economic efficiency and a guaranteed
universal service (EC 1998, p. 57). The most important elements in the new
regulatory system are the arrangements for interconnection and  universal
service.
Universal service obligations
  The new arrangements for funding and the methodology for costing the
universal service obligation within the European Union are intended to be
competitively neutral. In the absence of compensation, the universal service
obligation may impose an unfair burden on the incumbent. On the other hand, a
requirement that new entrants contribute heavily to reimbursing the incumbent
may have an anti-competitive effect and may deter entry.
  The universal service is defined by the European Commission as access for all
users, at an affordable price, to the public fixed telephone network at a fixed
location for voice, fax and data transmission, and to a basic range of facilities
such as itemised billing and tone dialling. Each country may designate the
providers of its universal service.
  The providers may be compensated through a cost sharing arrangement or
through a national fund. If a fund is established, only the providers of public
communications networks can be required to contribute. ‘Access deficit’E   INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
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schemes — schemes to compensate incumbents for customer access prices that
(allegedly) do not cover costs — must be phased out by 1 January 2000.
  The cost of the universal service obligation must be estimated transparently, and
must only cover the cost of voice telephony services and the public telephone
network. In other words, the contribution required from new entrants must be
limited. Member states have the option of determining that the cost is minimal,
making compensation of providers unnecessary. To date, the majority have not
instituted cost sharing arrangements
  Tariff rebalancing, to ensure that charges for calls and customer access reflect
costs, is required by the Commission. Countries which had not already
implemented this by 1 January 1998, were required to submit a timetable on
their progress. However, because rebalancing may entail increases in customer
access charges there is a contradiction between this and the affordability criteria
of the universal service. Countries are therefore permitted to proceed at a pace
consistent with the maintenance of affordability in the local call market.
  The European Commission expects that, in the long run, downward pressure on
charges exerted by competition will guarantee affordability. It also believes that
affordability is not just a matter of prices, but concerns the ability to match
desired usage and expenditure patterns. Therefore household ‘penetration rates’
are treated as a useful indicator of affordability. Targeted subsidies — for
example, reduced charges for low usage households — are prefered to
uniformly low tariffs.
  National regulatory authorities for the telecommunications sector are required to
monitor and report to the Commission on service quality.
Interconnection
  The objectives of the European Commission’s policy with respect to
interconnection are to ensure any-to-any communication and to guarantee the
rights of market participants to obtain interconnection with the networks of
others when this is ‘reasonably justified’. A longer-term objective is to achieve
harmonisation of access conditions across Europe.
  Interconnection to public switched telecommunications networks must be
granted on non-discriminatory and transparent terms based on objective criteria.
New entrants have interconnection rights for call termination within the existing
public telecommunications network. The terms of interconnection must be
negotiated but are subject to the European competition laws. Agreements must
be publicly available. Cheap and timely arbitration must be provided.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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  More stringent rules for interconnection apply where the network operator has
significant market power. Significant market power is defined as more than 25
per cent market share but this definition may be modified by national regulatory
agencies.
  Operators with significant market power must provide interconnection on a non-
discriminatory basis. To prevent delay, they were required to publish standard
interconnection terms and conditions, called reference offers, by 1 January
1998. Interconnection charges in reference offers must be cost-based and
supported by transparent cost-accounting systems. Accounting separation of
interconnection must prevent cross-subsidisation of interconnection from other
activities.
  If access seekers wish to interconnect at network points other than those
specified in the reference offers, access providers with significant market power
must not refuse to negotiate, unless the request is unreasonable.
  The European Commission recommends the adoption of long-run incremental
cost principles for interconnection prices but recognises that this will take time
to achieve.
  These interconnection arrangements are supported by regulations pertaining to
telephone number portability and pre-selection of carriers:
·  all carriers with significant market power must offer call-by-call carrier
pre-selection; and
·  by 1 January 2000, all fixed local access providers with significant market
power must offer carrier pre-selection and number portability.
  By 1 January 1999, a European Telephony Numbering Space (ETNS) is to be
established on a trial basis.
  To ensure that competition is equitable, new entrants are prohibited from cross-
subsidising their telephony services from unrelated parts of their business and
are required to practice accounting separation to demonstrate that cross-
subsidisation is not occurring.
E.3 Finland
  Private ownership has always been a notable feature of the Finnish
telecommunications system. In the 1930s, there were over 800 private telephone
companies providing local telephone services. By 1996, these had been reduced
by merger to 46 companies operating as the Finnet Group.E   INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
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  The publicly owned Posts and Telecommunications (P&T), later named
Telecom Finland Ltd and now Sonera, provided long-distance services and built
lines in sparsely populated areas. P&T also acted as the industry regulator until
the Telecommunications Act 1987 shifted this responsibility to the Ministry of
Transport and Communications.
  Between 1987 and 1997, amendments to the Telecommunications Act 1987
progressively opened local, long-distance and mobile markets to competition.
Until 1994, the telecommunications industry comprised a duopoly, with P&T
providing long distance and international services and the Finnet Group
providing local calls. In 1994, the local, long-distance and international markets
were opened to competition and Telecom Finland was formed as a separate
company from the postal section of P&T.
  In 1996, further amendments abolished licensing for service providers and
established their right to be connected to the networks of other companies. Price
regulation of retail services was abolished but retained for interconnection
charges. However, these were to be established in the first instance through
negotiation. Number portability was also introduced.
  Telecommunications is currently regulated under the Telecommunications
Markets Act 1997. The new Act was introduced to bring regulation of the
telecommunications industry in line with the Directives of the European
Commission.
Access arrangements
  Generally, requirements in regard to providing access only apply to operators of
fixed networks as the mobile sector is considered sufficiently competitive not to
require special arrangements.
  Section 10 of the Telecommunications Market Act 1997 requires fixed network
carriers to allow interconnection with their networks. Operators with significant
market power must accept all reasonable interconnection requests unless
otherwise provided for by regulations. Interconnection must be effected at the
point indicated by the telecommunications operators requesting interconnection
unless otherwise provided for by the Minister.
  The fees for using another operator’s network must be determined through
negotiation. Such fees must be non-discriminatory and reasonable with regard to
the costs incurred through the provision of a service.
  Operators with significant market power must publish standard reference offers
which specify the technical conditions and tariffs applicable for interconnectionINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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(MTCF 1997). Offers must be approved by the regulator against cost-based
pricing principles. The technical and financial conditions offered to competitors
must be the same as what the operator provides itself. Operators must not refuse
any requests to negotiate where certain interconnection conditions are not
covered by the offer. Standard offers do not preclude negotiated agreement so
long as they are objectively justified and transparent.
  Interconnection contracts must be submitted to the Ministry and made available
to the public with the exception of sections handling the business strategy of the
parties.
Number portability and carrier selection
  Number portability has been required in Finland since 1996.
 Every  long-distance carrier has a Carrier Identification Code, enabling customers
to choose their preferred carrier for both long-distance and international calls. A
customer failing to use a code is charged a price determined in accordance with
the network selected at random.
Accounting separation
  Operators with significant market power must also use cost-accounting systems
that show the main categories into which costs are divided as well as the rules
used for the allocations. The two primary cost categories are direct costs and
common costs.
  Cost-accounting descriptions must be submitted to the Ministry.
E.4 France
  Until the late 1990s, France Telecom had a monopoly on telecommunications
services and was completely state-owned. Waverman and Sirel report:
  In the late 1980s, France Telecom was among the best operators in Europe in
terms of digital conversion of the network, quality of service and minimal
waiting list (Waverman and Sirel 1997, p. 121).
  However, they also report that France Telecom’s customer access charges were
among the lowest in Europe while their call charges were among the highest.
  In late 1995, the French Government issued a public consultation document.
This set out proposed changes to the French regulatory framework necessary to
ensure compliance with the directives of the European Commission forE   INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
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liberalising the sector on 1 January 1998. The document set out three objectives,
namely to:
·  to guarantee a high-quality communications service for all at an affordable
price;
·  to provide consumers with a choice of supplier, while guaranteeing easy
access to telecommunications services through interconnection between
public networks; and
·  to create an environment which fosters competition.
  These principles were incorporated into the Telecommunications Act 1996. The
main objective of this legislation was to liberalise the telecommunications
market prior to 1 January 1998, in conformity with the directives of the
European Commission. The main effects of the French legislation were the
abolition of licensing for network operators — except on technical grounds or
on the grounds of national security — the establishment of an interconnection
regime, and the establishment of a new telecommunications regulatory
authority, the Autorite de Regulation des Telecommunications (ART).
  ART acts as a technical regulator to the industry, but is also charged with
implementation of economic regulation. It has responsibility for:
·  arbitrating disputes relating to interconnection and infrastructure sharing;
·  approving interconnection reference offers by public network operators
with significant market power;
·  the efficient allocation of radio frequencies and telephone numbers;
·  processing licences for existing public network operators, service
providers and new entrants (the Minister grants the licences);
·  proposing the contributions to fund universal service obligations;
·  advising on universal service tariffs, and tariffs by monopoly suppliers;
and
·  regulating competition in consultation with the competition authority.
  There is a general competition authority, Conseil de la Concurrence, with which
ART confers on matters relating to telecommunications. The Public Service
Commission for Posts and Telecommunications provides policy advice to the
Minister, including licence conditions and competition matters. ART
participates in drafting legislation and regulations and in international
negotiations pertaining to telecommunications.
  In consultation with the competition authority, ART publishes a list of operators
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be those with more than 25 per cent of a particular market, but the authority
must also take into account:
·  turnover relative to the size of the market;
·  control of access to end-users;
·  access to financial resources; and
·  experience in providing products and services in the market.
  A party to commercial negotiations over access may call upon the authority to
arbitrate the terms and conditions of access. ART also arbitrates disputes about
access to the cable TV network.
Licensing
  Consistent with the directives of the European Commission, licences to operate
public telecommunications networks or provide public telecommunications
services within France may be refused on technical grounds only. A restriction
of 20 per cent foreign ownership applies.
  Operators with annual turnovers exceeding a threshold (specified by the
Ministers for Telecommunications and the Economy) or enjoying a monopoly
or dominant position (as assessed by ART) must separate the accounts for
authorised activities or for activities in which they dominate or have a
monopoly. The intention is to prevent telecommunications operators from
competing unfairly through cross-subsidisation from other activities.
Universal Service Obligation
  Under the 1996 legislation, the uniform service means the provision of a quality
telephone service at an affordable price. France Telecom, as the universal
service provider, is obliged to provide:
·  an information service and directory;
·  public payphones;
·  free emergency calls (compulsory for all public providers);
·  services adapted for low income and disabled users; and
·  continued access to limited service for heavily indebted users.
  The French Government has expressed the desire to widen the scope of the
universal service by including access to the Internet within schools, but is
constrained by the definition adopted in the relevant directive of the European
Commission.E   INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
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  The Public Service Commission for Posts and Communications is responsible
for specifying a tariff which is affordable and uniform across all geographic
locations.
  Two components of the cost of the universal service are funded through
contributions raised from carriers requesting interconnection in proportion to
their traffic volumes. These components are the cost of a uniform tariff across
all geographic areas — that is, the cost of servicing non-profitable areas — and
the cost of non-profitable subscribers in profitable areas. However, to encourage
competition in the mobile sector, mobile service providers will be exempt from
the portion of the charge relating to non-profitable subscribers. By 1 January
2000, each provider will be required to provide at least one service in every
remote area.
  The cost of the other components of the service — special tariffs for the
disadvantaged, public payphones and the directory and information service —
are met through a fund, to which all operators subscribe in proportion to their
shares of traffic volume.
Retail price regulation
 The  Telecommunications Act 1996 required a gradual re-balancing of the tariff
structure. Full rebalancing is required by 31 December 2000. In 1996-97,
France Telecom announced an increase of almost 50 per cent in mainline phone
rental rates, with corresponding decreases in call rates in both the long-distance
and international markets (Waverman and Sirel 1997).
Interconnection
  Interconnection is mandated for operators with fixed networks only, as the
mobile sector is believed to be sufficiently competitive.
  All operators must provide for interconnection. Operators with significant
market power must accept all reasonable requests for interconnection. The
technical quality of the interconnection services offered, the degree of
unbundling and the quality of the information provided to external access
seekers must be equivalent to that provided to access providers’ own
departments, subsidiaries and partners.
  Interconnection terms must be agreed through negotiation. Operators with
significant market power must publish standard reference offers which specify
the technical conditions and tariffs applicable for interconnection. Offers must
be approved by the regulator against cost-based pricing principles. The technicalINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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and financial conditions offered to competitors must be the same as what the
operator provides itself. Operators must not refuse any requests to negotiate
where certain interconnection conditions are not covered by the offer. Standard
offers do not preclude negotiated agreement so long as they are objectively
justified and transparent.
  Interconnection contracts must be forwarded to the regulator. The regulator may
make agreements public without prejudice to commercially confidential
information.
  The regulatory authority may arbitrate interconnection disputes. After having
heard the parties, the authority may make a determination within a period
specified by State Council. It must give reasons for its decision and — subject to
certain requirements for confidentiality — must publish its decisions. Its
determinations are subject to appeal or judicial review within one month of the
decision. However, unless there are exceptional circumstances, notification of
an appeal will not delay the putting into effect of the regulator’s determination.
Numbering system and carrier pre-selection
  Carrier pre-selection is being introduced. At present, the system of long-distance
carrier pre-selection is based on digit codes. Callers wishing to use a carrier
other than France Telecom must replace 0, the first digit of the French telephone
numbering system, with a digit applying to the preferred carrier.
  ART is required to establish a national numbering system and subscribers
changing their suppliers will be able to retain their numbers. It is intended to
have complete number portability — even for subscribers changing their
location — by 1 January 2001.
Anti-competitive conduct
  The regulator and the competition authority must confer on abuses of a
dominant position or on any anti-competitive practice by network operators or
service providers. Behaviour constituting a criminal offence must be referred to
the public prosecutor.
  The regulator can itself impose penalties — fines or licence suspensions — for
breaches of telecommunications regulations. These decisions are subject to
appeal to the State Council. The imposition of penalties is suspended pending
the hearing of appeals.E   INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
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E.5 Japan
  The Japanese telecommunications system was first liberalised in 1985. The
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) was established as both
regulator and policy maker. The telecommunications market was separated into a
national component (local and long-distance) and an international component.
  Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT) and Kokusai Densin Denwa
Co (KDD), the incumbents in the national and international markets, respectively,
were each exposed to competition in their own markets. New entrants were
permitted to operate in either market, but the incumbents — NTT and KDD —
were not permitted to compete with each other. New entrants were classified as
Type 1 carriers (owning their own facilities) or Type 2 carriers (renting network
facilities from Type 1 carriers). Legislation preventing ‘excess’ investment in any
market deterred facilities-based competition by Type 1 carriers.
  NTT, previously Government-owned and operated, was partially privatised.
Interconnection was not mandated. Interconnection terms and conditions were
negotiated between the parties, and agreements, if reached, were required to be
authorised by the MPT. When negotiations failed, the MPT arbitrated. Before
approving agreements, the MPT scrutinised NTT’s costs.
  In the opinion of Japan’s Telecommunications Council, this system did not
function effectively. NTT continued to enjoy a monopoly in the local call market,
accounting for approximately 99 per cent of inter-prefectural calls in 1996.
  Both the subscriber’s connection charges and the cost of local calls increased
between 1985 and 1996. For example, calls from public telephones increased
three-fold. Although the cost of calls declined in the cellular, long-distance, and
international call markets, it remained higher than in the US, UK, Germany or
France. The range of services offered was lower than in the US and NTT attracted
criticism for its customer relations policies. It was also criticised for bundling local
and long-distance calls together, thus thwarting competition.
  NTT’s superior bargaining position enabled it to prolong negotiations and to
charge access fees above those charged internally and above international
standards. NTT’s accounting system made it difficult to assess the reasonableness
of NTT’s charges.
  Despite its monopoly status, most of NTT’s local call services areas reported a loss
in 1995. According to the Telecommunications Council, this poor financial
performance was due to poor operating efficiency on the part of NTT. NTT’s
incentive to improve its efficiency was adversely affected by a virtual lack of
competition in the local call market.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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  However, according to Lewin and Kee (1997), price regulation was an important
factor in NTT’s poor financial results. Under Japan’s universal service obligation,
all increases in NTT’s and KDD’s customer charges required approval by the Diet,
which required lower charges in less populated areas. According to Lewin and Kee
(1997), constraints on local call and customer access charges resulted in cross-
subsidisation by NTT’s long-distance services. In recent years cost recovery from
local services has increased. Nevertheless, Lewin and Kee (1997) regards
continued cross-subsidisation of the universal service as ‘unsustainable’, because
increased competition will erode NTT’s long-distance call revenue.
  In January 1996, the Japanese Government announced reforms to the regulatory
regime for telecommunications. These reforms focused on restructuring NTT and
specifying new interconnection requirements.
Restructuring NTT
  The Japanese Government announced its intention to restructure NTT into a
long-distance carrier and two companies supplying local call services in the East
and West sections of NTT’s current sphere of operations. It is unclear whether the
restructure has occurred.
  NTT is to be completely privatised, and will be allowed to compete in all areas of
communications — including mobile, international and local phone services.
Discontinuation of the current system for authorising long-distance rates will be
considered. Consideration will also be given to changing the current system for
authorising mobile and international call service charges to a system of prior
notification.
  The two regional companies are to be prevented from competing in the long-
distance or international segments of the market within their own areas. They will,
however, be permitted to compete with each other in all market segments outside
their own regions. It is anticipated that they will also face competition from the
‘long distance’ NTT and from other companies, including KDD, which will also
be permitted to compete in the local and long-distance markets.
  As the two regional companies are considered to have monopoly power, the
current system of authorising rates will continue for the time being. However, legal
restrictions on ‘excess’ facilities investment have been removed.
Universal Service Obligations
  The USO requires uniform and regulated charges for local calls and customer
access. In high-cost areas, these charges are cross-subsidised by customer accessE   INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
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charges in more populated, and therefore less costly, areas and by long-distance
charges.
  Funding of the universal service will be reviewed in two years. In the meantime,
designated carriers must not seek contributions from other service providers, but
must attempt to recoup the cost through efficiency improvements.
Access arrangements
  Access arrangements group operators into Type I carriers, Type II carriers and
designated carriers. Type I carriers own their own network facilities while Type
II carriers do not. Designated carriers are a special class of Type I carriers who
control over 50 per cent of subscriber lines. NTT is the only designated carrier.
Access requirement applying to Type I carriers
  Type I carriers are obliged to provide for interconnection with other carriers
unless there is an appropriate reason for not doing so. Authorised interconnect
agreements must be made available for public perusal and arbitration is available
in the event of interconnection disputes.
  Type I carriers are obliged to provide access on wholesale rates.
  The current competition law permits Ministerial intervention if a Type 1 carrier
unreasonably discriminates against an access seeker. Consideration is being given
to facilitating Ministerial intervention when interconnection is unreasonably
delayed.
Access requirement applying to designated carriers
  Designated carriers (NTT) must provide for interconnection at any technically
feasible point. The Ministry of Posts and Communications specified seven
minimum points of interconnection — local loop; local switching equipment;
tandem switching equipment; local transmission facilities; interoffice transmission
facilities; and signalling network — and, subject to technical feasibility, required
designated carriers to unbundle other facilities on request.
  Tariffs for interconnection with essential facilities must be cost-based and
submitted to the Minister for authorisation. The Minister reviews these tariffs
annually and carriers must seek authorisation for any proposed amendments.
Essential facilities must be provided to other carriers on conditions equal to those
that designated carriers provide to themselves.
  The Ministry proposed the establishment of guidelines for calculating
interconnection charges which designated carriers must follow. This proposalINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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indicated the use of long-run incremental cost. It is unclear whether these
guidelines have been developed.
  When carriers apply for a point of interconnection not covered by the approved
tariff schedule, interconnection must be based on individual agreement.
Number portability
  The Ministry aims to have number portability operating by 2000 once it has
completed a study on implementation and costing.
  The Ministry proposes that designated carriers provide number portability for
subscriber telephone numbers, ISDN numbers and freephone service numbers.
Number portability for subscriber telephone numbers and ISDN numbers will
only be guaranteed when switching between carriers at the same location.
Accounting separation
  Designated carriers must separate their accounts according to accounting standards
defined by the Government. These standards require accounts be separated into
two parts — the management and operation of essential facilities and the use of
essential facilities.
  Carriers are obliged to submit a report on their interconnection accounting to the
Minister and disclose it. A certification of calculation results authorised by a
certified public accountant must be attached.
Anti-competitive conduct
  Article 36 of the Telecommunications Business Law provides for the Minister to
issue an order to improve business activities.
  However, this framework is being reviewed as the Ministry believes Article 36
does not provide for a proper response to acts (such as deliberately delaying
interconnection) that hinder smooth interconnection (MPT 1997).
E.6 New Zealand
  Prior to 1987, telecommunications services in New Zealand were provided by
the New Zealand Post Office. The Post Office was a government department
which, among other things, was responsible for the provision of all
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  In 1986, the New Zealand Government announced plans to corporatise the Post
Office. The Post Office was split into three state-owned enterprises, one of
which was Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd (TCNZ). TCNZ was
required to operate on a fully commercial basis, capable of earning profits and
of paying dividends and tax to the government.
  Policy and regulatory functions, previously handled by the Post Office, were
transferred to the Department of Trade and Industry (now the Ministry of
Commerce).
  Restrictions on the provision of telecommunications goods and services were
abolished with the passage of the Telecommunications Act 1987 and the
Telecommunications Amendment Act 1988. The former removed restrictions on
the supply of customer premises equipment. The later removed restrictions on
the supply of telecommunications services of all kinds.
  Section 2A of the Telecommunications Act 1987 provides for designation of
telecommunications suppliers as ‘network operators’. Designation as a network
operator provides suppliers with special rights of access to land and, in
particular, the road reserve, to lay or construct lines where required to carry on a
telecommunications business.
 The  Radiocommunications Act 1989 introduced fundamental reforms to the
management of the radio spectrum in order to facilitate competitive entry in
telecommunications and broadcasting, as well as to promote efficiency in
spectrum management.
 The  Telecommunications Amendment Act 1990 placed information disclosure
requirements on TCNZ with the purpose of facilitating effective competition.
TCNZ must publish the prices, terms and conditions for the supply of certain
prescribed telecommunications goods and services including:
·  access to the public switched network;
·  interconnection to a network owned and operated by Telecom for the
purposes of operating any other network, whether or not owned or
operated by Telecom;
·  leased circuits; and
·  local, national and international calls.
 The  Telecommunications (International Services) Regulations 1994 allows
registered providers to operate public switched telecommunications services, or
leased circuits, between New Zealand and any overseas operator in a territory
outside New Zealand. It also allows registered operators to negotiate freely with
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  The Ministry of Commerce has the power to require the registered operator to
pay the same rates of settlements, in accordance with the same accounting
method, that an overseas operator charges other registered operators.
Universal service obligations and retail price controls
  Universal service obligations are implicitly included in the Kiwi Share
Obligation (KSO) built into TCNZ’s charter. The KSO requires TCNZ:
·  to provide a local free calling option for residential customers;
·  to ensure residential customer access charges rise no faster than
movements in the CPI unless the profits of TCNZ Regional Operating
Companies are unreasonably impaired;
·  to ensure ordinary residential telephone services remain as widely
available as at 11 September 1990; and
·  to ensure customer access charges for residential customers in rural areas
are no higher than those in the cities.
Access arrangements
  Access or interconnection to either fixed or mobile networks is not mandated
under legislation. Service providers and carriers are required to negotiate access
to networks. There is no formal means of arbitration.
  Where negotiations fail, negotiating parties may seek redress through the Courts
under the Commerce Act 1986. In the early 1990s, Clear Communications
brought action against TCNZ under Section 36 of this Act (dealing with misuse
of market power) when negotiations over the terms and conditions of access to
the network failed.
  The protracted nature of these legal proceedings precipitated the Ministry of
Commerce and the Treasury to jointly issue a discussion paper setting out
options for enforcing the regulatory environment, including arbitration and
introducing a statutory regulatory agency. The paper included options for broad
legislative principles, access pricing and universal service obligations.1
  In 1993, amendments to the Telecommunications (Disclosure) Regulations
1990 required TCNZ to publish in full its interconnection agreements with other
parties.
                                             
1  Debate on the discussion paper lead to maintenance of the status quo. However, further
regulation was proposed if telecommunications carriers did not negotiate in good faith.E   INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
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  Following the election of the Coalition Government in 1996, a discussion paper
on Commerce Act penalties and remedies was issued. No decisions have yet
been made.
Allocation of spectrum
 The  Radiocommunications Act 1989 provides for the allocation of spectrum
through tendering processes. Rights to cellular telephone frequencies were first
tendered in 1990. The successful bidders were required to obtain Commerce
Commission clearance before uplifting the rights. TCNZ had incumbency rights
to one of the bands while three further bands were offered for tender. BellSouth
New Zealand Ltd successfully secured the rights to one band while TCNZ
acquired the rights to another. The third right was retendered in 1993 and
secured by Telstra (New Zealand) Limited. In 1997, Telstra subsequently sold
its right to BellSouth.
  TCNZ operates an analogue AMPS cellular service and has introduced a digital
AMPS cellular service, while BellSouth is offering a digital GSM service.
 The  Radiocommunications Act 1989 is currently under review.
Number portability
  In 1993, the Telecommunications Numbering Advisory Group (TNAG) was
established to facilitate the resolution of numbering issues.
  In 1997, TNAG reached agreement on the technical means of providing initial
telephone and mobile number portability between service providers. Telephone
number portability based on call forwarding has been introduced. Mobile
number portability is under negotiation. Portability has yet to be introduced for
0800 numbers.
  In 1998, the New Zealand Government issued an ultimatum to the industry to
agree on satisfactory voluntary arrangements to resolve number administration
and number portability issues or face regulation.
Anti-competitive behaviour
  Competitive conduct is regulated under the Commerce Act 1986. The legislation
is designed to prevent anti-competitive behaviour and unlawful use of a
dominant market position in industries generally. Proof of anti-competitive
conduct requires proof of ‘dominance’ and proof of ‘purpose’.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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E.7 Sweden
  Competition in Swedish telecommunications commenced in 1992, when the
incumbent, Telia, negotiated Sweden’s first interconnect agreement with Tele2.
In 1993, the Swedish Government enacted the Telecommunications Act 1993. It
also entered into a three year agreement with Telia. Telia, which is wholly
government-owned, was corporatised at that time.
  The 1993 legislation established an independent regulator for
telecommunications, National Post and Telecom Agency (PTS). PTS was given
responsibility for the licensing system, and for mediating access disputes, if
requested by one of the parties. It had no power to arbitrate, but could issue
statements about the reasonableness of Telia’s proposed interconnection
charges. It could also prohibit pricing proposals which were not, in its opinion,
cost-based. PTS has the power to collect data on which to base such
assessments. PTS succeeded in achieving reductions in Telia’s interconnect
charges for fixed telephony between 1993 and 1997 (Lewin and Kee 1997).
  Sweden also enacted the Competition Act 1993. This prohibits agreements
detrimental to competition or abuses of a dominant position. It is administered
by the Swedish Competition Authority. Since 1993, the Competition Authority
dealt with a large number of complaints against Telia, many of which alleged
unreasonable delays over negotiating access agreements. In 1996, it used its
powers to break a deadlock in access negotiations between Telia and Tele2.
  AB Stelacon (1997) reports that, despite the fall in interconnection charges, by
1996, competition in Swedish telecommunications was virtually limited to
international and long-distance calls. Telia had 94 per cent of the fixed phone
market, with 13 companies sharing the remainder. Wider margins in the
international market allowed more scope for competition than in local and long-
distance. By 1996, Telia’s share of the international market had fallen to
between 70 and 75 per cent with its nearest rival, Tele2, claiming 22 per cent.
  Telia continues to dominate the mobile market, but its market share had fallen to
71 per cent by the end of 1996, as compared with 84 per cent at the beginning of
the year (Stelacon 1997). Competition has taken the form of subsidised phones
rather than reduced call charges, which remain higher than local call charges.
Telia is the only operator with an analogue network.
  Stelacon attributes the failure of Telia’s competitors to make inroads into the
fixed telephony market to the level of customer access charges imposed by Telia
for access to the local loop. Customer access charges are combined with
reasonably low local call charges which generally do not cover local
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  Another factor limiting competition is that customers using operators other than
the incumbent must use a prefix for all calls. Users tend to omit this. Tele2 has a
relative advantage over other entrants, since its prefix is 007 — more likely to
remembered and used by customers than alternative prefixes.
  Stelacon reported that alternatives to the use of the local loop, such as radio-
based telephony and cable TV, with which Telia’s competitors are
experimenting, may lead to enhanced competition. Tele2, Telia’s strongest
competitor, is engaged in renting and buying its own network infrastructure. In
Stelacon’s view, this strategy may in the long-run offer lower costs than relying
on access. In 1996, however, Telia’s interconnection charges, although high
enough to discourage competition in the retail market, were sufficiently low to
deter the construction of alternative infrastructure.
  Between 1994 and 1996, Telia’s local charges increased by 45 per cent, while
long-distance call charges fell by 40 per cent. However, to some extent this
reflects a ‘re-balancing’ of prices to bring them more in line with costs. In 1997,
Telia announced that ‘rebalancing’ had been completed.
  In 1997, Sweden enacted amendments to the Telecommunications Act 1993.
This was partly a response to a number of reports indicating that the regulatory
framework had room for improvement, but was also prompted by the need to
conform to the directives of the European Commission. A preliminary
assessment by the European Commission (1997a) was that the Swedish
legislation appeared to be in broad conformity with the Commission’s
framework for liberalisation by 1 January 1998.
  The main features of the 1997 legislation are:
·  the adoption of the provision of telephone services at an affordable price
as the main objective of Government policy;2
·  the attainment of the Government’s objectives through legislation rather
than through State ownership of — and formal agreement with — Telia;
and
·  the imposition of special obligations regarding interconnection on
operators with significant market power — in practice, on Telia.
  The incumbent, Telia, remains in government hands, but Lewin and Kee (1997)
reports that consideration is to be given to the question of its future ownership.
                                             
2  The phrase affordable price is the most significant addition to the 1993 legislation’s
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  The 1997 legislation attempted to clarify the respective roles of the PTS and the
Competition Authority by giving PTS greater powers with respect to
interconnection disputes.
  Under the 1997 legislation, PTS’s main responsibilities are:
·  the supervision of compliance with the telecommunications legislation and
regulations, including the notification (registration) and licensing systems;
·  determinations of interconnection prices;
·  assessment of significant market power and notifications of undertakings
with significant market power to the European Commission;3 and
·  monitoring the industry.
  Decisions by PTS are subject to appeal in the Courts. Unless the decision
involves the revocation of a licence or imposition of a charge, its decisions will
normally stand until the appeal has been heard.
Registration and Licensing
  The object of the Swedish system of registration and licensing is to facilitate
entry (PTS 1997). Operators wishing to provide fixed and mobile
telecommunications services or network capacity or to access the numbering
system must register with the PTS. Although there are no pre-requisites for
registration — only the provision of basic information — registration entails
rights and obligations, particularly with regard to interconnection.
  Operators are also required to hold licences if their activities are deemed by PTS
to be significant with respect to factors such as the size of their area of
operations or the number of users. The exceptions to this are where the operator
provides premium rate services or have only registered in order to access the
numbering system.
  More extensive obligations are attached to licences depending on whether or not
the licencee is considered to have significant market power. Currently only
Telia has significant market power since it has greater than 25 per cent of
market share.
  For fixed network services, licence applicants must be capable of reaching
‘adequate’ capacity and quality. Mobile operators seeking access to the
                                             
3  Under European law, the benchmark for significant market power in telecommunications
is a 25 per cent market share, but significant market power can also be determined by
national regulatory authorities by reference to numbers of customers, area covered or other
circumstances.E   INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
315
frequency spectrum must be granted access through a selection process utilising
objective criteria.
  Both licence holders and those registered with PTS have reciprocal rights to
interconnection on commercial terms. They must:
·  comply with requests for interconnection, subject to network capacity;
·  have regard to the requirements of the disabled;
·  adhere to international agreements;
·  contribute to public emergency services;
·  provide subscribers’ details for directory service; and
·  provide information as required by the authorities, including separate
accounts for telecommunications activities.
  In addition, licence holders must:
·  comply with universal service obligations (only Telia);
·  maintain a required standard of capacity and quality;
·  provide information about their owners;
·  publish their own telephone directories; and
·  without compensation, provide a public telephone network to required
specifications.
Universal Service Obligation
  The Swedish Universal Service is now defined as access to telephony services
between fixed points to all regardless of where they live at an affordable price.
The reference to affordable price was added in the 1997 legislation. However,
the definition of telephony service between fixed points does not include
services suitable for people with disabilities, because this would contravene the
legislation of the European Commission. Instead, PTS arranges for the provision
of these services and receives Government funding for this purpose. This is
consistent with the European Commission’s view that services to the disabled
should be a social, rather than an industry, obligation.
  Telia is currently responsible for the Universal Service Obligation and receives
no compensation for this or for the provision of public telephones.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Retail price regulation
  Until 1997, PTS administered a price cap on baskets of Telia’s retail charges.
Within this price cap, considerable re-alignment of charges took place. Local
call charges increased, while long-distance and international call charges fell.
  The 1997 legislation applies to all licence holders for fixed telephony and leased
lines and stipulates that their retail tariffs must be cost-based. Notwithstanding
this, the Government has the power to determine them. However, call price
regulation has been discontinued in Sweden, and replaced by monitoring of
‘affordability’ by PTS, particularly in market segments not exposed to
competition. Price capping of customer access fees for both business and
household subscribers continues.
  The grounds for discontinuing the call price cap were mainly that it was
originally intended to protect consumers from rapid increases in prices while
‘re-balancing’ occurred. As ‘re-balancing’ is considered to have been
completed, price-capping is considered unnecessary. Furthermore, it is believed
that restraints on interconnection charges should benefit consumers by
encouraging greater competition at the retail level. There is some concern that
price capping may concentrate entry into the higher call price segments of the
market.
  Prior to 1997, Telia’s licence conditions required it to charge uniform prices to
end-users no matter what their geographical location. However, geographical
variations are now permitted on the grounds that uniformity may inhibit product
development and price falls in response to increases in competition, to the
detriment of consumers.
Interconnection
  All operators of public network services are required to provide for competitors
to interconnect with their network. In the case of those considered to have
significant market power, the party requesting interconnection may request the
point of interconnection and the access provider must not refuse any reasonable
requests.
  The terms and conditions of interconnection must be determined through
commercial negotiation. The PTS is empowered to mediate or arbitrate if
requested by one of the parties and may set a time limit for negotiations. Lewin
and Kee (1997) stated that arbitration becomes available six months after
negotiations commence. The PTS retains the right to alter interconnection
charges if these are not fair and reasonable.E   INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
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  Operators with significant market power must publish standard reference offers
which specify the technical conditions and tariffs applicable for interconnection.
Offers are reviewed by the regulator against cost-based pricing principles. The
technical and financial conditions offered to competitors must be the same as
what the operator provides itself. Operators must not refuse any requests to
negotiate where certain interconnection conditions are not covered by the offer.
Standard offers do not preclude negotiated agreement so long as they are
objectively justified and transparent.
  In assessing interconnection terms, the PTS had previously used fully allocated
cost principles. However, the PTS believed this was unsatisfactory as it involved
an arbitrary allocation of fixed costs. The burden of proof that interconnection
charges are cost-based lies with Telia (MTCS 1997).
  The Swedish 1997 legislation originally only required that interconnection
charges be cost-based with respect to fixed telephony providers with significant
market power and not to mobile operators. To conform to the directives of the
European Commission, during 1997 this requirement was extended to mobile
operators with significant market power in the national market for
interconnection.
Number portability and carrier pre-selection
  PTS is responsible for the numbering system. The European Commission has
directed that number portability should be available by 1 January 2003 at the
latest and Sweden intends to introduce it as soon as possible (Swedish Ministry
of Transport and Communications 1996).
  A decision to implement equal access with pre-selection by September 1999 has
been taken. Equal access pre-selection means that the subscriber is required to
use an equal number of digits in the prefix to the number called, regardless of
the carrier. This would give other providers parity with Telia. Under the current
system, Tele2 has already built up a subscriber base with its 007 prefix.
E.8 United Kingdom
  Competition was first introduced into the telecommunications sector in 1984.
Prior to this, all telecommunications services were provided by British Telecom
(BT) which was a government-owned monopoly.
  In 1984, BT was privatised and a duopoly policy initiated, regulated by the
newly-formed OFTEL, which limited entry into the sector until 1991. Mercury
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operator. The duopoly policy aimed to provide Mercury with a degree of
protection against future competition to allow Mercury time to install and
consolidate its national network.
  BT’s retail prices were controlled by a price cap covering quarterly rentals and
connection charges and national and local call charges. The price cap limited
price rises to: RPI-3 per cent from 1984 to 1989; RPI-4.5 per cent from 1989 to
1991; RPI-6.25 per cent from 1991 to 1993; RPI-7.5 per cent from 1993 to
1997. Until 1996, BT also undertook to limit quarterly rental increases to RPI+2
per cent and wholesale customer access charges to RPI+5 per cent.
  Licence conditions required BT to interconnect with Mercury. It was intended
that BT and Mercury negotiate interconnection arrangements. However, when
the parties failed to reach agreement, OFTEL determined the arrangements.
  In the mobile services market, two network operators — Cellnet and Vodafone
— were licenced. Network operators were not permitted to sell directly to
customers. Mobile services had to be marketed through service providers.
Cellnet and Vodafone were allowed to own or control service providers,
however, there were conditions in their licences which prevented them from
favouring their tied service provider.
  In 1991, entry into the telecommunications market was liberalised for domestic
traffic. In particular, cable companies were able to enter the telephony market,
although BT and Mercury were prevented from entering the cable business. This
aimed to provide cable companies with an opportunity to construct their
networks before having to face competition from BT (Cave and Williamson
1996, p. 103).
  BT’s prices remained under price caps except that the controls were extended to
international calls. BT was able to offer quantity discounts subject to restrictions
relating to the availability of such packages, a floor on prices and limitations on
the speed at which prices could be reduced.
  An access deficit contribution scheme was introduced to compensate BT for the
losses it claimed it was making because of the price cap on customer access
charge increases. Operators interconnecting with BT were to make a
contribution to BT access deficit proportional to profitability of the service
which the entrant was providing.
  OFTEL imposed accounting separation requirements on BT, requiring it to
account separately for its retail and network businesses and to charge its retail
affiliate transfer prices equal to those its levied on its competitors.
  Competitors were entitled to purchase network services at wholesale prices.
However, this advantage was only extended to facilities-based entrants asE   INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
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OFTEL sought to maximise network competition. Service providers had to
purchase network services at retail prices.
  OFTEL assumed control of the telephone numbering system and required BT to
make technical arrangements for the introduction of number portability.
  The same year, the mobile duopoly ended and two further operators — Mercury
One-to-One and Orange — were licensed. No further GSM licences are to be
issued until at least 2005, though licensing of third-generation mobile
(“UMTS”) is expected in summer 1999. All four GSM operators are now
permitted to retail directly to the public.
  In 1997, OFTEL initiated a third wave of deregulation. Firstly, this completely
liberalised the international facilities market, allowing all appropriate applicants
to receive International Facilities Licences. This was followed by action in the
domestic field aimed to minimise the level of regulation in the industry by
removing regulatory controls from what it considered to be competitively
provided services.
Universal service obligations
  OFTEL established the level of universal telecommunications service for the
four year period from 30 September 1997 to 29 September 20014 as consisting
of the following services:
·  a connection to the fixed network able to support voice telephony and low
speed data and fax transmission;
·  the option of a more restricted service package at low cost; and
·  reasonable geographic access to public call boxes across the UK at
affordable prices.
  All consumers should be able to access emergency phone services free, receive
itemised bills, be able to choose selective call barring, and have access to
operator assistance and directory information. Consumers should also be given
the option of an outgoing calls barred service, together with a repayment plan,
as an alternative to disconnection for non-payment.
  The provision of universal services should be at geographically averaged prices.
  In its calculations, OFTEL did not find that BT faced an undue burden as a
result of its obligations as the universal service provider. Therefore, OFTEL did
not propose to establish a universal service funding mechanism.
                                             
4  Subject to a review in 1999 which will take into account the views of the Secretary of
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  However, OFTEL recognised that the decision not to adopt a funding
mechanism immediately did not remove the need to consider how such a fund
might work in the future. OFTEL has consulted on the various ways of
organising such a funding mechanism and the basis for making payments.
Although, no clear consensus on the way forward emerged from the
consultation, OFTEL will continue to work on the practicalities of a funding
mechanism with the assistance of a Working Group and will undertake a review
of the situation in the summer of 1999.
Retail price controls
  New retail price controls came into effect in 1997. The residential price cap was
refocussed to reflect the pattern of usage of the first 80 per cent by spending of
residential customers. OFTEL estimated that the last 20 per cent were the
highest users of residential services and had access to volume discounts
unavailable to the rest of BT’s customers. By excluding the highest volume
users, the new price cap gives less weight to international and national calls than
would otherwise have been the case.
  The new residential price cap was set at RPI-4.5 per cent and is intended to end
in July 2001. At this stage, OFTEL would like not to have to renew the price
cap after its expiry as it hopes competition will be providing adequate protection
for consumers.
  The arrangements also include a degree of protection for the top 20 per cent of
users. The residential price cap acts as a ceiling for the prices they pay.
  The price cap extends to residential services only and therefore specific
protection has been provided for small business. BT is required to offer a
package which has call charges at least as low as those required to meet the
price cap for the residential market and annual retail increases are limited to
RPI.
Access arrangements and pricing
  The provision of access remains a condition of BT’s licence. However,
interconnection or network charges, as OFTEL terms them, are now subject to a
price-cap regime. The network charge controls apply to the charges BT makes to
other operators when they use BT’s network. BT is free to determine its network
charges itself as long as those charges remain within the price cap and above the
Long-Run Incremental Cost (LRIC) floor. However, BT is also subject to an
overarching revenue cap. (Access charges of non-dominant operators areE   INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
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determined by commercial negotiation with recourse to OFTEL if agreement
cannot be reached.)
  OFTEL developed three different network baskets, each of which is subject to
its own price cap. The first basket comprised those services which were not
competitive and were unlikely to become so during the charge control period.
OFTEL defined these services to include call origination, local-tandem
conveyance and single transit. This basket is indexed at RPI-8 per cent.
  The second basket related to services that were expected to become competitive
during the charge control period. These services included inter-tandem
conveyance, inter-tandem transit, international direct dial conveyance, value-
added elements of access to Directory Enquiries services and are indexed at
RPI.
  The third basket included only call termination where OFTEL believed BT’s
market power would remain for the duration of the charge control period. The
charge cap for call termination is RPI-8 per cent. OFTEL also required that the
actual charges for call termination be reciprocal and required the industry to
develop suitable implementation procedures.
  In addition to the price caps, BT is subject to a revenue cap. BT must ensure that
the charges it sets for interconnection services in any basket, multiplied by the
prior financial year volumes of those services, is less than or equal to the
allowable revenue for that basket as set by OFTEL. Allowable revenue is
calculated using an incremental cost model.
  OFTEL also requires the:
·  publication of separate, audited accounts for BT’s regulatory businesses
and disaggregated activities, including a detailed explanation of the
methodology used to attribute costs;
·  publication of BT’s interconnection agreements and of the amounts
attributed to Network Components and Parts, and charges for Standard
Services;
·  non-discrimination requirements to oblige BT Network to set transfer
charges to BT Retail Systems on the same basis as the interconnection
charges to other operators; and
·  a requirement upon BT not to discriminate between itself and other
operators in respect of the quality of service offered.
  Interconnection arrangements and charges in the mobile sector have never been
controlled, but the charges are currently the subject of an inquiry by theINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) following a referral from
OFTEL.
Anti-competitive conduct
  OFTEL inserted a Fair Trading Condition (FTC) into BT’s licence as the new
regulatory arrangements gave BT greater pricing freedom at the retail and
network level, and therefore greater scope for anti-competitive behaviour.
  The FTC prohibits abuses of a dominant position, anti-competitive agreements
and concerted practices between businesses. The FTC requires the Director-
General to have regard to the principles of European competition law and also
the decisions of the European Commission, the Director-General of Fair
Trading and the MMC in deciding whether any behaviour is caught by the
condition.
  OFTEL sought the introduction of a FTC as it considered the processes under
the Fair Trading Act or the Competition Act too slow:
  ... the competitor might be put out of business before the offending behaviour
could be stopped ... OFTEL needs to get away from detailed, specific conditions
and to have instead powers which are more broadly drawn and which allow it to
act quickly as soon as particular behaviour is recognised as anti-competitive.
(OFTEL 1996, para. 3.5-3.6)
  The FTC is enforced, as all licence conditions, by the Director-General of
Telecommunications (DGT) issuing Orders under procedures laid down in the
Telecommunications Act 1984. A Provisional Order (this lasts three months) can
be made with immediate effect, where it appears to the DGT that a breach is
occurring. To issue a Final Order, the DGT must be satisfied that there is, has
been or is likely to be again a licence breach. The DGT must give a minimum
period of 28 days notice and hear representations from the licencee before a
Final Order can come into effect. A Final Order is permanent until revoked and
permits third parties to seek damages from a licencee breaching the Order.
  The decisions made by the DGT may be challenged by judicial review. Under
the Telecommunications Act 1984, there is no other mechanism for appeal.
However, OFTEL argued that:
  The onus is on OFTEL to show that a particular action has had, or is likely to
have, an appreciable effect on competition in a market (OFTEL 1996, 3.28).
  In addition, the operator is only liable to penalties if the operator persists in anti-
competitive behaviour after an Order (Provisional or Final) is made.
  OFTEL indicated that Article 85 (prohibiting anti-competitive agreements) and
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Commission Treaty would override the FTC. The United Kingdom Government
has proposed the introduction of the European Commission Articles in a new
competition act with stringent enforcement measures of fines imposed by the
competition authorities and the right of third parties to seek damages through
the courts. An appeals mechanism will also be introduced.
E.9 United States
  National regulation of the United States telecommunications industry was first
implemented with the Communications Act 1934. Until this time, the industry
comprised an unregulated interstate monopoly (American Bell, later AT&T) and
monopolies in each local area were subject to State-based regulation. AT&T
owned the local operators in the major cities while independent companies
served the small towns and rural areas.
  The 1934 Act established the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and
gave it broad discretionary authority to regulate the telecommunications
industry:
  The Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations,
and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this Act, as may be necessary in the
execution of its functions (United States Code quoted in Brock 1994, p. 50).
  In particular, the Act allowed the FCC to:
·  suspend new tariffs for up to five months to determine lawfulness;
·  prescribe tariffs after an appropriate hearing;
·  investigate complaints against carriers and award damages;
·  require extensions to facilities;
·  prescribe accounting systems and depreciation charges for carriers; and
·  compel information from the carriers.
  The FCC’s authority over these matters only extended to interstate and
international telecommunication services. The 1934 Act reserved the regulation
of intrastate services to the State Commissions. The division of powers
frequently resulted in conflict between Federal and State regulatory authorities
over policy issues, as each believed it had the right to act independently of the
other (Brock 1994, p. 56). The division of Federal and State jurisdictional
responsibilities affected the operation of AT&T which acted across those
political jurisdictions. AT&T encountered different levels of restraint on its
prices.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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  The 1934 Act also provided stronger regulatory authority to compel
interconnection and to suspend tariffs. The Act specified:
·  common carrier obligations to serve all who request service;
·  the right of the FCC to require interconnection with other carriers;
·  that rates of interconnection be just and reasonable;
·  that unreasonable discrimination was prohibited; and
·  tariffs for all communications charges be filed, publicly available and
followed in a non-discriminatory manner.
  Regulation at the State level aimed to ensure universal service. To this end,
State regulators argued that long-distance services should subsidise the cost of
local services:
  The State regulators had an incentive to argue that the long-distance service is
only possible because of the local connections and that part of the long-
distance toll revenue should be used to cover the cost of local service ... (Brock
1994, p. 66).
  The desire to use long-distance revenues to subsidise local services culminated
in the ‘separations and settlements’ policy. Separations referred to a cost
allocation process that divided the costs of commonly-used plant into State and
interstate jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction then set its own policies for the
recovery of these costs. State regulators sort to keep local rates as low as
possible by increasing the costs allocated to the interstate jurisdiction.
  Settlements allowed for local exchange companies to recover a portion of their
costs allocated to the interstate jurisdiction from interstate toll revenues. In
effect, the separations and settlements policy transferred revenue from long-
distance services to local-call services. It also resulted in interstate PSTN long-
distance prices being far above the cost of the services (Brock 1994, p. 70).
  Between 1959 and 1979, competition was gradually introduced into the long-
distance network and the provision of telecommunications equipment through
the interaction of FCC decisions and Federal Appeals Court decisions.
  The trend toward competition culminated in the Modified Final Judgement
(MFJ) of 1982. The MFJ restructured the telecommunications industry,
separating the industry’s competitive services from its natural monopoly
services. The MFJ resulted in:
·  AT&T divesting its local operating companies. The local operating
companies were re-organised into seven regional holding companies,
known as regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs) or “Baby Bells”;E   INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
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·  Each RBOC provided telephony services within a designated local access
transport area (LATA). LATAs were constructed so that few LATAs
crossed state boundaries (that is, each state consisted of one or more
LATAs). In more profitable high-density areas, LATAs were small
geographically so that a high proportion of originating traffic was carried
by the inter-LATA operators. In low-density areas, the LATAs were large
so that a high proportion of originating traffic was carried by the RBOC
(Lewin and Kee 1997);
·  AT&T restricting its operations to the long-distance market. It also retained
control of its equipment manufacturer Western Electric and the Bell
Laboratories;
·  All licensing and supply agreements between Western Electric and the
RBOCs were cancelled and the RBOCs were not to show preference for
Western Electric equipment;
·  AT&T was prohibited from purchasing stock in the RBOCs;
·  RBOCs were required to provide interconnection to any long-distance
provider; and
·  RBOCs were prohibited from producing customer premises and other
telecommunications equipment. Neither could they offer inter-exchange
long-distance and information services.
  The effect of the MFJ was to open all areas of the telecommunications industry
competition, with the exception of intra-LATA services. Regulatory control of
the RBOCs remained with the respective State Commission while inter-LATA
and international services were regulated by the FCC.
Universal service obligations
  Each telecommunications carrier that provides interstate or intrastate
telecommunications services must contribute, on an equitable and non-
discriminatory basis, to the provision of the universal service.
  Universal service obligations require local exchange carriers to give consumers
in remote areas access to telecommunications services that are ‘reasonably’
comparable to services provided in urban areas at charges which are also
‘reasonably’ comparable (Harris and Kraft 1997, p. 109). Local exchange
carriers must average call rates across their entire service areas for calls of a
given distance, independent of any cost differences that may exist.
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·  eligible primary and secondary schools, libraries, and rural and non-profit
hospitals at preferential rates; and
·  the provision of telecommunications equipment and services to individuals
with disabilities to the extent readily achievable.
  Eligible schools and libraries will also receive full support for Internet access.
  The FCC has a general universal service responsibility to ensure
telecommunications are available to all people of the United States ‘without
discrimination on the basis of race, colour, religion, national origin or sex’.
Retail price controls
  Retail price controls on inter-LATA services are applied only where the FCC
determines a carrier is dominant. Currently, there are no retail price controls, the
last being abandoned in 1995 when the FCC declared AT&T was no longer
dominant in inter-LATA services. All inter-LATA carriers, whether dominant
or not, are required to file their tariffs with the FCC.
Access arrangements
 The  Telecommunications Act 1996 introduced new regulatory and institutional
arrangements for the telecommunications industry in the United States. The Act
primarily aimed to introduce competition into those areas of the industry still
characterised by monopoly, that is, the local telephone exchange services.
  Section 251 of the Act requires all carriers to provide for interconnection and to
abide by any interconnection standards set by national bodies. However,
because local exchange carriers remained within the jurisdiction of the State
Commissions, the FCC had no direct authority to enforce Section 251 at the
local level. Consequently, the FCC could not compel the local exchanges to
open their markets to competition.
  The FCC structured the implementation of the 1996 Act in such a way as to
provide the local exchange carriers with an incentive to liberalise their markets.
The FCC would not authorise the entry of incumbent local exchange carriers
into the long-distance market within its own region unless the incumbent carrier
had opened its own market for intra-LATA services to competition. However,
they were permitted to provide long-distance services outside their local service
areas.
  To determine whether a local exchange carrier had opened its market to
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needed to satisfy to obtain FCC authorisation. This checklist requires the
incumbent to interconnect new entrants at any technically feasible point on
reasonable and non-discriminatory rates, terms and conditions.
  The FCC has prescribed certain minimum points of interconnection necessary to
permit competing carriers to choose the most efficient points at which to
interconnect with the local network. The FCC also developed a list of
unbundled network elements that the local exchange carrier must make
available to new entrants upon request.
  Incumbent local exchange carriers must also resell local call services to
competing carriers at wholesale rates. The FCC requires that wholesale rates are
based on avoided costs.
  Compliance with the competitive checklist must be certified by the relevant
State Commission. The FCC must then consult with the Justice Department
regarding the likely competitive implication. Based on this input and its own
evaluation, the FCC determines whether entry of the local exchange carrier in
the long-distance market is in the public interest.
  Where competitors show little interest in entering a local market, the FCC
provides a so-called ‘track B’ method of entry into the long-distance market for
incumbent local exchange carriers. Track B requires local exchange carriers to
have proposed wholesale tariff schedules approved by the relevant State
Commission. Where this approval is received, local exchange carriers are
permitted entry into the long-distance market.
Access terms and conditions
  Section 252 of the 1996 Act requires commercial negotiation of the terms and
conditions of interconnection, although final agreements must be approved by
the relevant State Commission. In the event that a State Commission fails to
ratify an agreement within the deadlines specified in the 1996 Act, the
negotiating parties may seek approval from the FCC. State or local governments
cannot prevent carriers from interconnecting with the local network.
Interconnection agreements must be published.
  Where negotiations fail, the interconnecting party may file for arbitration by the
State Commission according to the broad guidelines laid out by the FCC. Where
the FCC is required to arbitrate, the FCC has indicated its intention to use ‘final
offer’ arbitration. Under this approach, each party proposes its best and final
offer and the FCC chooses between them on an issue-by-issue basis.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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  In arbitrating disputes, FCC guidelines require the State Commissions to use
forward-looking Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost (TELRIC) plus
some mark-up for joint and common costs. Where States were unable to
conduct the appropriate cost studies and apply TELRIC, the FCC established
default ceilings and ranges for the States to apply on an interim basis — 0.2-0.4
cents per minute plus access charges for local switching and 0.15 cents per
minute for tandem switching.
Co-location, number portability and dialling parity
  Other provisions under the 1996 Act require local exchange carriers —
incumbents and entrants — to provide:
·  Either physical or virtual co-location of equipment required for
interconnection including access to the local exchange carrier’s offices on
reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions. Rural local exchange
carriers and local exchange carriers with fewer than two per cent of the
nation’s subscriber lines are exempted.
·  Number portability to the extent technically feasible.
·  Dialling parity which allows a rival’s customers to dial the same number
of digits as its own customers to reach other parties.
·  Reasonable access to rights-of-way, poles and conduits.
Implementation
The implementation of the 1996 Act remains ‘gridlocked’ in the Courts as local
exchange carriers and State Commissions test the validity of the FCC’s
requirements.
In July 1997, the Eighth Circuit Court found that the FCC did not have the
authority to interpret the pricing provisions of Section 252 of the Act (Brock
and Katz 1997). This implies that the FCC cannot require the State
Commissions to apply its pricing rules in arbitration.
In December 1997, Judge Kendall of the United States District Court struck
down several key provisions of the 1996 Act as unconstitutional, noting that
they restrict the rights of local exchange carriers to compete in long-distance by
unfairly delaying their entry. Kendall, however, preserved all provisions of the
Act requiring that local exchange carriers continue to open their local markets to
competitors (Pointcast Network, 8 January 1998).
Commentators claim that the confused jurisdictional situation evolved from the
way the 1996 Act was established. The 1996 Act was structured as anE   INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
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amendment to the 1934 Act rather than a complete replacement for it. It
established federal control over the development of local exchange competition,
however, it did not repeal provisions from the 1934 Act reserving oversight of
intrastate communications to the States.
Mobile communications and the allocation of spectrum
Cellular mobile communications were introduced on a regional basis. Licences
were issued to provide services within given metropolitan areas. In each of these
areas, two operators were licenced — the local exchange carrier took one
licence and an independent company the other.
Operating outside its licenced area required the mobile operator to enter into
roaming agreements with other carriers. Consequently, cellular mobile services
remain mainly a local rather than national service.
With the 1996 Act, mobile operators have been consolidating their networks to
create larger contiguous areas.
The FCC, which manages spectrum, designates particular parts of the spectrum
for particular uses. It then assigns licences to individual applicants for the
designated uses.
The FCC initially used administrative hearings to assign licences. However,
hearings resulted in lengthy delays in the introduction of new technologies such
as cellular telephones (Scharwtz 1997, p. 223).
In 1981, lotteries replaced administrative hearings. Lotteries reduced delays but
also created windfall gains to those who resold their licences through secondary
markets.
In 1993, Congress gave the FCC the authority to auction spectrum licences. The
FCC uses electronic simultaneous multiple-round auctions. A simultaneous
multiple-round auction is similar to a traditional auction, except that, rather than
selling licences one at a time, a large set of related licences are auctioned
simultaneously and bidders can bid on any licence offered. The auction closes
when all bidding activity has stopped on all licences.
The principal advantage of a multiple round auction for assigning spectrum is the
information that it provides bidders about the value other bidders place on
licences. This information increases the likelihood that licences will be assigned
to the bidders that value them the most and will generally yield more revenue
than auctions where there is much uncertainty about common factors that affect
the value of a licence to all (FCC 1998, p. 2).331
F PRICE BASKET ASSUMPTIONS USED FOR
PRICE COMPARISONS
Comparisons of Australian telecommunications prices with those of eight other
OECD  countries  are  presented  in  Chapters 5  and  6.  These  comparisons  are
derived by costing a number of defined baskets of telecommunications services
in each country. The price baskets were developed by Eurodata Foundation in
consultation with the Productivity Commission.
The baskets represent the usage patterns of different residential and business
users. The assumptions underlying these baskets are described in broad terms in
Chapters 5 and 6 and are presented in more detail in this Appendix.
F.1 Coverage
Prices are compared for the services and countries listed in Table F.1, which
also indicates the availability of price information for the various services.
Table F.1 Services and carriers covered in this study





Australia Telstra ÆÆ ÆÆÆÆÆ
Canada BC Tel/
Stentor
 ÆÆ Æ Æ
Finland Tele  Æ  Æ  ÆÆÆ
HTC  ÆÆ Æ
France FT  Æ  Æ  ÆÆÆ
Japan NTT/KD
D






Sweden Telia ÆÆ ÆÆÆÆ
Tele2 Æ




Source: Eurodata (1998).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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There are a number of gaps in the coverage because only some carriers provide
the full range of telecommunications services. For example, Canada and the US
were excluded from the ISDN comparisons where services are available only for
small areas of these countries.
Frame Relay and ATM tariffs were also not available for some countries. Tariff
information was considered to be commercially sensitive or only available on a
customer-by-customer basis.
Table F.2 Telecommunications price baskets’ characteristics
Basket Characteristics
Residential One line, very little (1 per cent) international traffic, some traffic to
Internet and mobile phones, no fax calls.
Small business (S1) One line, one user, some international traffic, some traffic to mobile
phones, no fax and Internet calls.
Small business (S2) Three users with individual lines, a fax line and a modem line.
Some international traffic (3 per cent), fax and Internet traffic and
calls to mobile phones.
Medium-sized business
(M1)




A company with 100 users. Some international traffic (2 per cent),
but with an emphasis on local traffic.
Medium-sized business
(M3)
A company with 30 users, with 7 per cent of the traffic is




A company with 100 users, high (10 per cent) international traffic
and an emphasis on regional and long-distance traffic.
Large business (L1) A large, national company with 30 sites and ten users per site. Low
(2 per cent) international traffic and an emphasis on local calls.
Large business (L2) A large, national company with five sites and 60 users per site.
Medium (5 per cent) international traffic and an emphasis on local
calls.
Large business (L3) A large, international company with 8 per cent international traffic,
and ten sites with 60 users per site on a national basis.
Large business (L4) A large, multinational company with high (15 per cent)
international traffic and five sites with 200 users per site nationally.
Source: Eurodata (1998).
F.2 Baskets used in this study
The baskets used in this study are based on OECD telecommunications price
baskets. The OECD baskets are structured to reflect the cost of typical
telecommunications consumption within member countries.F   PRICE BASKET ASSUMPTIONS
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The OECD produces a series of baskets for different services and residential and
business user groups. Currently they are defined for PSTN services, national
leased lines, X25 and mobile services.
The baskets were originally developed in the late 1980s. The Commission
modified the OECD baskets to include calls to mobile phones and Internet
service providers. Additional baskets including multiple telecommunications
lines were developed to represent larger business users. Baskets for ISDN
services, Frame Relay and ATM services were also developed.
The baskets are based on users with the characteristics outlined in Table F.2.
Baskets were constructed for a range of users for PSTN, ISDN, mobile, leased
line and data services. The basket sizing parameters vary with the size of
business. However, these baskets are kept as consistent as possible, to allow for
direct comparability.
Large business baskets were not developed for all substitute services. For
example, large businesses were assumed to use ISDN services, but not PSTN
services, and ATM or Frame Relay services, but not X25 services.
See Table F.3 for the different service types specified for the large business
baskets.
Table F.3 Large business baskets
Services L1 L2 L3 L4
ISDN basic rate for voice, fax, Internet Æ
ISDN primary rate for voice, fax ÆÆÆ
Mobile ÆÆÆÆ
Leased lines for Internet ÆÆÆ
Leased lines for other data ÆÆÆÆ




PSTN baskets were constructed for residential, small and medium-sized
business users. The assumptions used to construct the PSTN baskets are
presented  in  Table F.4.  Large  business  users  were  assumed  to  use  ISDN
services, so no large business PSTN basket was constructed.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Table F.4 Underlying assumptions, PSTN baskets
Charge Assumption
Installation charges Basket includes installation charges depreciated over five years.
Rental Rental per year.
Recurring option charges Option charges per year.
Call setup Multiplied with total number of calls for each calling zone. Call
setup charge may vary with calling zone.
Minimum charge per call Compared with actual call charge, and applied if call charge is less
than the minimum.
Duration  charge Used with call duration for each call. If fixed charge units are
used, only full units are calculated.
Volume  discount Total usage charges of the basket are compared with discount
thresholds (where applicable), and discounts are applied.
Call  charge  discounts Where a specific discount has been applied to specific call
charges, this discount is included in input data.
Selective discounts  ‘Friends and Family’ type discount packages have not normally
been taken into account in this study.
Internet All calls to Internet service providers are local calls.
Fax Fax is only included in the business baskets. As specific
information is unavailable on fax usage patterns, an even
distribution over national distance is assumed.
Source: Eurodata (1998.).
Residential PSTN baskets
The residential PSTN basket reflects a residential user with a single telephone
line. The fixed costs of the line and connection are included. The majority of
calls are local calls, with some long-distance and international calls. The
discount package that is widely available and which minimises the cost to the
customer is used.
The residential user was assumed to make a total of 1200 calls per year. The
assumed distributions of calls are given in Tables F.5, F.6 and F.7. The number
of calls to Internet service providers was assumed to be about one call every
other day, that is, 150 calls per year.
The number of international calls has been set at 1 per cent of the total number
of calls, or 12 calls per year. International calls were weighted using an average
of the international traffic statistics reported by the ITU between 1990 and 1995.F   PRICE BASKET ASSUMPTIONS
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Table F.5 Call distance distributions, residential PSTN basket
Distance Proportion of calls Distance) Proportion of calls
(km) (%) (km) (%)
3 56.4 110 1.4
7 13.2 135 1.2
12 4.7 175 0.9
17 2.8 250 0.9
22 1.4 350 0.7
27 2.4 490 3.3
40 2.4 Mobile 5.0
75 2.4 International 1.0
Source: Eurodata (1998).
Table F.6 Time of day and day of week call distribution, residential
PSTN basket
Proportion of calls
Day: time National voice calls International calls Internet calls
(%) (%) (%)
Weekdays: 1100 26.3 12.5 5.0
Weekdays: 1500 22.1 12.5 5.0
Weekdays: 2000 26.6 18.9 40.0
Weekdays 0300 3.0 18.9 10.0
Saturdays: 1100 10.0 18.9 20.0
Saturdays: 1500 13.0 18.9 20.0
Source: Eurodata (1998).
Small business PSTN baskets
Two small business PSTN baskets were constructed:
S1 A small business with one telephone line.
S2 A small business with three telephone lines, one fax line, one modem line
for Internet, and three users.
See Tables F.8, F.9, F.10 and F.11 for the assumed distribution of calls for the
small business PSTN baskets.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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3 – 12 2.5 3.5
17 – 40 3.5 6.0




Table F.8 Distribution of call types, small business PSTN baskets
Number of calls (per annum)
Call type S1 basket S2 basket
(No.) (No.)
National voice 2899 3480
International voice 33 120
To mobiles 326 400
National fax – 460
International fax – 115
Internet – 230
Source: Eurodata (1998).F   PRICE BASKET ASSUMPTIONS
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Table F.9 National voice and fax call distance distributions,
small business PSTN baskets
S1 basket S2 basket






(km) (%) (%) (%)
3 53.0 53.0 7.1
7 11.0 11.0 7.1
12 7.0 7.0 7.1
17 4.0 4.0 7.1
22 2.5 2.5 7.1
27 3.0 3.0 7.1
40 3.5 3.5 7.1
75 3.5 3.5 7.1
110 2.5 2.5 7.1
135 2.0 2.0 7.1
175 1.5 1.5 7.1
250 1.5 1.5 7.1
350 1.0 1.0 7.1
490 4.0 4.0 7.1
Source: Eurodata (1998).
Table F.10 Time of day and day of week call distributions, small
business PSTN baskets
Proportion of calls








(%) (%) (%) (%)
Weekdays: 1100 45.4 40.0 12.5 40.0
Weekdays: 1500 40.6 40.0 12.5 40.0
Weekdays: 2000 7.0 5.0 18.9 5.0
Weekdays: 0300 0.8 0.0 18.9 0.0
Saturdays: 1100 5.7 10.0 18.9 10.0
Saturdays: 1500 0.5 5.0 18.9 5.0
Source: Eurodata (1998).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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3 – 12 2.5 2.5
17 – 40 3.5 3.5





Medium-sized business PSTN baskets
The medium-sized business PSTN baskets reflect users of four different sizes of
business. See Tables F.12, F.13 and F.14 for the assumptions underlying the
four medium-sized business PSTN baskets. The distribution of fax call
destinations was assumed to be the same as that for the small business baskets
— a uniform distribution over all call distances.
The assumed time of day and day of week distribution of calls and the call
durations for the medium-sized business baskets are the same as those assumed
for the small business baskets (see Tables F.10 and F.11).
Table F.12 Medium-sized business PSTN baskets
Medium-sized business basket
Assumption      M1          M2         M3         M4
National calling profile Local      Local National National
International calling profile None Minimal      Light    Heavy
Number of sites        1              1             1             1
Number of telephone lines per site     10           30           10           30
Number of users per site     30         100           30          100
Number of fax lines per site      2            4             2              4
Number of Internet lines per site      3            9             3              9
Source: Eurodata (1998).F   PRICE BASKET ASSUMPTIONS
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Table F.13 Distribution of call types, medium-sized business PSTN
baskets
Number of calls (per user per annum)
Calls M1 M2 M3 M4
(No.) (No.) (No.) (No.)
National voice 3600 3520 3320 3200
International voice – 80 280 400
To mobiles 400 400 400 400
National fax 460 460 460 460
International fax – 60 115 230
Internet 230 230 230 230
Source: Eurodata (1998).
Table F.14 National voice and fax call distance distributions,
medium-sized business PSTN baskets
Proportion of calls



















Source: Eurodata (1998).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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ISDN baskets
ISDN baskets were constructed for residential, small, medium-sized and large
business users.
Residential ISDN basket
The residential ISDN basket applies to a residential user with a basic access
connection.1  The type, number and distribution of calls, and call durations
assumed for the residential ISDN basket are the same as those assumed for the
residential PSTN basket (see Tables F.5, F.6 and F.7).
Small business ISDN baskets
Two small business ISDN baskets were constructed:
S1 A small business with one basic access connection.
S2 A small business with three users, and three basic access connections,
where one channel is designated to fax, and another to Internet.
The number and distribution of calls, and call durations assumed for the small
business ISDN baskets are the same as those assumed for the small business
PSTN baskets (see Tables F.8, F.9, F.10 and F.11).
Medium-sized business ISDN baskets
Medium-sized businesses were assumed to be using primary rate ISDN with
fully utilised systems in multiples of 30 channels. The reduction in fax and
Internet channels, compared with PSTN, reflects the increased capacity per
channel. The medium-sized business ISDN baskets are more fully defined in
Table F.15.
The number, distribution and duration of calls assumed for the medium-sized
business ISDN baskets are the same as those assumed for the medium-sized
business PSTN baskets.
Large business ISDN baskets
The large business ISDN baskets were constructed so that they could be
combined across services to obtain a total large business telecommunications
expenditure figure for each benchmarked country.
For ISDN services, it was assumed that all companies except L1 use primary
                                             
1 A basic access ISDN connection is defined as two 64 kbps channels.F   PRICE BASKET ASSUMPTIONS
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Table F.15 Medium-sized business ISDN baskets
Medium-sized business basket
Assumption M1 M2 M3 M4
National calling profile Local Local National National
International calling profile None Minimal Light Heavy
Number of sites 1 1 1 1
Number of users per site 30 100 30 100
Number of channels per site 26 55 26 55
Number of fax channels per site 2 3 2 3
Number of Internet channels per site 2 2 2 2
Source: Eurodata (1998).
rate services, with fully utilised systems. All non-voice calls in the ISDN
baskets were charged as data calls. The assumptions for the ISDN baskets for
large businesses are described in Table F.16.
The call distance and time of day and day of week profiles for the large business
baskets are based on the call profiles defined for the medium-sized business
PSTN baskets. The distributions of different call types for the large business
baskets are given in Table F.17.
Table F.16 Large business ISDN baskets
Large business basket
Assumption L1 L2 L3 L4
National calling profile Local Local Local Local
International calling profile Little Some Medium Heavy
Number of sites 30 5 10 5
Number of users per site 10 60 60 200
Number of voice channels per site 6 20 20 60
Number of fax/Internet channels per site 1 5 5 10






Source: Eurodata (1998).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
342
Table F.17 Distribution of ISDN call types, large business baskets
Number of calls (per user per annum)
Calls L1 L2 L3 L4
(No.) (No.) (No.) (No.)
National voice 3920 3800 3680 3400
To mobiles 400 400 400 400
National fax 437 414 391 345
International voice 80 200 320 600
International fax 23 46 69 115
Internet 230 0 0 0
Source: Eurodata (1998).
Mobile baskets
Mobile baskets were constructed for residential, small and medium-sized and
large business users.
Residential mobile basket
The residential mobile basket represents a residential user’s consumption of
digital cellular mobile (GSM) services. The structure of the mobile basket was
based on the PSTN basket and adjusted to reflect the impact of mobile tariff
structures. The basket includes only national calls.
The residential mobile user is assumed to make 365 calls per annum (one per
day) with the distance distributions shown in Table F.18. The time of day and
day of the week distributions and call durations for the residential mobile basket
are the same as those assumed for the residential PSTN basket (see Tables F.6
and F.7).
Small business mobile basket
The small business mobile basket represents the use of digital cellular mobile
(GSM) services by a user from a small business. As with the residential mobile
basket, the basket structure was based on the small businesses PSTN baskets,
and adjusted to reflect the impact of mobile tariff structures.
The small business mobile user is assumed to make 920 calls per annum, that is
four calls per working day. The assumed distribution of calls over distance is
given in Table F.19. The distribution of calls over time and call durations are
the same as those assumed for national voice calls in the small business PSTN
baskets (see Tables F.10 and F.11).F   PRICE BASKET ASSUMPTIONS
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Table F.18 Call distance distributions, residential mobile basket








Calls to mobiles 10.0
Source: Eurodata (1998).
Table F.19 Call distance distributions, small business mobile basket








Calls to mobiles 18.0
Source: Eurodata (1998).
Medium-sized and large business mobile basket
The medium-sized and large business mobile basket reflects the use of digital
cellular mobile (GSM) services by a user from a medium-sized or a large
business. Although this basket was intended to include international calls, it was
not possible to price international calls for all countries in the study.
Consequently international calls were not taken into account in the
benchmarking study.
The medium-sized and large business mobile user is assumed to make 1840
calls per annum, that is eight calls per working day. The assumed distribution ofINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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Table F.20 Call distance distributions, medium-sized and large
business mobile basket








Calls to mobiles 17.0
International calls 5.0
Source: Eurodata (1998).
Table F.21 Medium-sized business leased line baskets
Medium-sized business basket
Assumption LL1 LL2
Number of circuits 10 30
(Per cent)
2 km circuit, 64k 50 30
50 km circuit, 64k 30 18
200 km circuit, 64k 20 12
2 km circuit, 2M –1 0
50 km circuit, 2M – 6
200 km circuit, 2M – 4
International: 64k, neighbouring country
a –1 0
International: 64k, distant country
b –6
International: 64k, overseas country
c –4
a A neighbouring country is the closest (cheapest) country, not including border zone tariffs.
b A distant country is a country on the same continent, with the highest circuit charge.
c The overseas country is the US for all countries except the US, and the UK for the US.
Source: Eurodata (1998).F   PRICE BASKET ASSUMPTIONS
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calls over distance is given in Table F.20. The distribution of calls over time and
the distribution of call duration are the same as those assumed for national voice
calls in the small business PSTN baskets (see Tables F.10 and F.11).
Leased line baskets
The leased line baskets reflect the use of leased line services by each business
type. The leased line circuits assumptions for two types of medium businesses
are presented in Table  F.21. The assumptions for the four large businesses are
given in Table F.22.
Table F.22 Large business leased line baskets
Large business basket
Assumption L1 L2 L3 L4
Number of circuits 29 25 120 35
(Per cent)
2 km circuit, 64k 40 40 45 –
50 km circuit, 64k 24 10 10 10
200 km circuit, 64k 16 10 5 10
2 km circuit, 2M 10 5 10 30
50 km circuit, 2M 6 15 10 15
200 km circuit, 2M 4 15 10 15
International: 64k, neighbouring country
a –5 5 5
International: 64k, distant country
b –– 5 5
International: 64k, overseas country
c –– – 1 0
a A neighbouring country is the closest (cheapest) country, not including border zone tariffs.
b A distant country is a country on the same continent, with the highest circuit charge.
c The overseas country is the US for all countries except the US, and the UK for the US.
Source: Eurodata (1998).
The prices for each leased line basket are calculated by first determining the
price for each circuit type, then applying the percentage weights to those prices
for each company type and multiplying by the number of circuits used by the
company. Connection charges are excluded in the leased line baskets.
X25 baskets
The X25 baskets describe the usage of packet switched services for each
business type under the following assumptions:INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
346
·  The data traffic is defined by data volume, based on a standard transaction.
·  A new call is made for each transaction.
·  The definition of a transaction, 512 kilobytes per transaction, is taken from
the OECD Packet Switched basket.
·  Each company has only one interface.
·  Connection charges are not included.
·  Calls are assumed to be distributed over time.
The assumed X25 service usage for medium-sized businesses are described in
Chapter 6. Large business was assumed to use ATM or Frame Relay services,
rather than X25 services.
Frame Relay baskets
The Frame Relay baskets were structured to best suite available services and
their tariff structures and were based on the following assumptions:
·  The CIR speed is half that of the port speed.
·  No overflow is included.
·  The cost of connecting to the Frame Relay network is not included in the
basket.
·  Traffic (CIR) rates are priced over a 200 kilometre distance, where
applicable.
The assumptions for medium-sized and large businesses are presented in
Tables F.23 and F.24 respectively.





Usage profile National International
Number of ports 2 4
Port speed (kbps) 64 128
CIR per port (kbps) 32 64
a Describes the company’s telecommunications activities, within the medium-sized business range.
Source: Eurodata (1998).F   PRICE BASKET ASSUMPTIONS
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Table F.24 Large business Frame Relay baskets
Large business basket
Assumptions L1 L2 L3 L4
Number of ports 0 20 0 20
Port speed – 128 kbps – 128 kbps
CIR per port – 64 kbps – 64 kbps
Source: Eurodata (1998).
ATM baskets
ATM services provide high speed and high capacity data transmission. Prices
were obtained for only 3 countries. ATM was not included in the large business
baskets because of the lack of price information.
The assumptions used for two representative businesses used in the study are
presented in Table F.25.
Table F.25 Medium-sized business ATM baskets
Medium-sized business basket
Assumptions ATM1 ATM2
Number of ports 2 15
Port speed (Mbps) 34 34
Bandwidth per virtual circuit (Mbps) 10 10
2km virtual circuit 2 5
50km virtual circuit 1 3
200 virtual circuit 1 3
Source: Eurodata (1998).349
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